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In this paper we investigate the dynamics of a duopoly game with ambiguity aversion regarding uncertainty in demand and constant expectations concerning competitor production. The focus is on an asymmetric Cournot game where players engage in robust optimization and have different beliefs about the possible realizations of the random parameters of the price function. The players' ambiguity aversion introduces multiple equilibria and instability that otherwise would not be present. The investigation of the global dynamics of the game reveals the emergence, through border-collision bifurcations, of periodic and chaotic dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a behavioral stock market model in which a market maker adjusts stock prices with respect to the orders of chartists, fundamentalists and sentiment traders. We analytically prove that the mere presence of sentiment traders, i.e. traders who optimistically buy stocks in rising markets and pessimistically sell stocks in falling markets, compromises the stability of stock markets. In particular, this means that instead of converging towards their fundamental value, stock prices either display endogenous oscillatory dynamics or converge towards nonfundamental fixed points – observations that challenge standard stability claims offered in the pertinent literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes an evolutionary version of a Schelling-type dynamic system to model the patterns of residential segregation when two groups of people are involved. The payoff functions of agents are the individual preferences for integration which are empirically grounded. Differently from Schelling's model, where the limited levels of tolerance are the driving force of segregation, in the current setup agents benefit from integration. Despite the differences, the evolutionary model shows a dynamics of segregation that is qualitatively similar to the one of the classical Schelling's model: segregation is always a stable equilibrium, while equilibria of integration exist only for peculiar configurations of the payoff functions and their asymptotic stability is highly sensitive to parameter variations. Moreover, a rich variety of integrated dynamic behaviors can be observed. In particular, the dynamics of the evolutionary game is regulated by a one-dimensional piecewise smooth map with two kink points that is rigorously analyzed using techniques recently developed for piecewise smooth dynamical systems. The investigation reveals that when a stable internal equilibrium exists, the bimodal shape of the map leads to several different kinds of bifurcations, smooth, and border collision, in a complicated interplay. Our global analysis can give intuitions to be used by a social planner to maximize integration through social policies that manipulate people's preferences for integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we propose an evolutionary oligopoly game of technology adoption in a market with isoelastic demand and two possible (linear) production technologies. While one technology is characterized by lower marginal costs, the magnitude of fixed costs entails that a technology does not necessarily dominate the other. Firms are forward-looking as they assess the profitability of employing either technology according to the corresponding expected profits. The dynamics of the system is studied through a piecewise-smooth map, for which we present a local stability analysis of equilibria and show the occurrence of smooth and border collision bifurcations. Global analysis of the model is also presented to show the coexistence of attractors and its economic significance. This investigation reveals that firms can fail to learn to adopt the more efficient technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study was to investigate how Trichinella spiralis infection can be affected by contraceptive pills in vivo. Methods included six groups of female Wistar rats; healthy, Trichinella infected, receiving combined contraceptive pills (COCPs), receiving progestin only pills (POPs), infected receiving COCPs and infected receiving POPs. Parasite burden was measured; adult worm counts, gravidity, larvae and reproductive capacity index). Histopathological examination, immunohistochemical detection of C-kit+ mast cells and Foxp3+ T-reg. cells in intestinal sections, eosinophils muscle infiltration and CPK level were performed. Rats infected and receiving COCPs showed a significant increase in parasitic burden, and infected receiving POPs showed a significant reduction compared to infected only, with a significant increase in nongravid females (Mean total worms=964.40±55.9, 742±52.63, 686±31.68, larvae/g=5030±198.75, 2490±143.18 and 4126±152,91, respectively). Intestinal sections from infected receiving COCPs showed intact mucosa (though the high inflammatory cells infiltrate), and significant increase in C-kit+ mast cells number and intensity (30.20±4.15 and 60.40±8.29), and Foxp3+ T-reg. cells (10±1.58). Infected receiving POPs showed a significantly less CPK (5886±574.40) and eosinophilic muscle infiltration (58±13.51). Oestrogen-containing pills established a favourable intestinal environment for Trichinella by enhancing Foxp+T-reg. cells and stabilizing C-kit+mast cells, while POPs gave a potential protection with less gravidity, larval burden and eosinophilic infiltrate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: An important contribution in sociophysics is the Galam’s model of rumors spreading. This model provides an explanation of rumors spreading in a population and explains some interesting social phenomena such as the diffusion of hoaxes. In this paper the model has been reformulated as a Markov process highlighting the stochastic nature of the phenomena. This formalization allows us to derive conditions for consensus to be reached and for the existence of some interesting phenomena such as the emergence of impasses. The proposed formulation allows a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of the diffusion of rumors. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]