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Canada has just enacted legislation to give the broadcast regulator, the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), authority to regulate online streaming platforms, both domestic and international. This legislation, known as Bill C-11 as it passed through an extensive parliamentary review process, was highly controversial. The bill empowers the CRTC to review and possibly amend the definition of “Canadian content.” It will also require that streaming services contribute financially to the production of Canadian content and will impose “discoverability” requirements on digital streaming platforms (like YouTube, Spotify, Netflix and others) to ensure that Canadian content is promoted. The CRTC will have broad leeway to issue and enforce regulations to achieve these ends. The U.S. high-tech and streaming industry does not like this legislation and has used various tactics to oppose it. Among these are arguments that C-11 violates commitments that Canada made to the United States in the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), the replacement for NAFTA, and that implementation of C-11 will result in U.S. trade retaliation. This paper analyzes the arguments to this effect put forth by the U.S. tech industry’s trade association, the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), and refutes them, particularly the argument that Canada will need to invoke CUSMA Article 32.6 (the cultural exception clause) to justify its actions. At the same time, the paper cautions that the CRTC needs to be careful with respect to imposing a requirement on foreign streamers to contribute to Canadian production if at the same time it denies them the ability to acquire and exploit the production they have helped finance when no such limitation is imposed on equivalent Canadian streaming services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses “Regulatory Alignment for Multi-Modal Infrastructure Corridors” in the context of the Canadian Northern Corridor Concept (CNC). In particular, the paper reviews whether there are any existing models “for regulatory oversight and approval for multi-modal corridors and the subsequent placement of infrastructure within” that might be appropriate in developing the CNC. The paper concludes that existing models do not include certain of the elements of the CNC Concept as it has evolved to date, nor could any of the models be applied within the framework of Canada’s jurisdictional realities that would govern the CNC. The paper identifies several questions that need to be addressed in order to advance the CNC Concept to a more fully-formed proposal, which would form the basis for further examination of the need for regulatory oversight and approval and the form that such oversight and approval might take. The paper also suggests a forum that might oversee this further work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore how the power wielded by regional incumbents has impacted subnational innovation agendas. Our findings suggest that the design of mission-oriented innovation policies should be more attentive to regional innovation policies and their relationship to how innovation may serve to bolster incumbents and not undermine them. We use a case-study of innovation in fossil fuels. Recently, innovation policy literature has explored innovation policy and global climate as a major topic. On the one hand, carbon lock-in has been used to explain why there has been such difficulty in reducing carbon emissions, in many cases, despite an increasing emphasis of mission-innovation policies. On the other hand, mission-innovation policies are believed to be a key to the development of disruptive innovations that could break this carbon intensive path dependency. Although the two literatures explore the same problem, there could be more integration. While carbon lock-in is being considered in the mission-innovation literature, it nevertheless has been largely overlooked at the mission-setting stage. On the other hand, the lock-in literature has tended to overlook the findings of mission-oriented innovation literature in offering solutions, which suggests that there is a more productive role for mission-oriented innovations in breaking free of previous constraints to serve in the low-carbon energy transition. To make our case, we argue it is important to distinguish among the various impacts disruptive innovations have on the market shares of incumbents'. We propose the following three schema: new market, market rewarding and market destroying. By variegating the potential impact of innovations, we suggest that mission-oriented innovation polices may be designed to only support certain types of innovations that do not directly undermine the market share of incumbents. Using a detailed case study of the Province of Alberta, Canada, we then explore the role of the province's mission-oriented policy in the development of technology to produce the Canadian oil sands. The case study illustrates how incumbents influenced the establishment and direction of the mission's goal. Shifts in incumbency opposition toward the province's mission-oriented innovation policy coincided with the changing impact of the innovation from being market destroying to market rewarding. We suggest that future research should be more attentive to the role of incumbents in influencing mission-oriented innovation policy and the importance of their influence at the mission-setting stage. Furthermore, we suggest that to meet the grand challenge of addressing climate change through mission-oriented innovation policies, these policies must be designed to break free of these institutional constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the transition from the "era of the health accords" (from 2000 to 2017) to the new regime of individual bilateral agreements between Ottawa and each of the provinces and territories, allocating federal health transfers and setting agreed-upon health-reform priorities in each jurisdiction. The paper argues that the health accords of 2000, 2003 and 2004 were essentially unsuccessful for a number of reasons. First, they tended to raise expectations among the public, health system actors and health policy experts about the ability to transform health care in Canada in a relatively short period of time. This was, in part, a result of the accords' very broad and general commitments to change, but also their lack of recognition of the barriers to change that exist within the system. Second, and related to the first, attention was paid mostly to the amount of the transfer from the federal government to the provinces and territories, rather than to how those dollars were to be spent. At best, governments bought only a modest amount of change in the system, despite the billions of dollars of new investment. Unlike other industrialized federations, Canada appears to be the only one that relies on an ongoing, highly politicized process of intergovernmental diplomacy to negotiate the fiscal relationship in health care. This, combined with a somewhat amorphous and changeable understanding of the federal government's overall role in health care, complicates the process of reform and heightens the political stakes around the negotiations. The new model of bilateral agreements negotiated under an umbrella statement of common principles around health-reform priorities may yet prove to be an improvement in both process and outcomes. Bilateralism can serve to de-escalate the political stakes inherent in the federal-provincial diplomacy around Canada's most popular social program, by moving away from the "grand bargains" that characterized the accords. In short, there will be less opportunity for the kind of political rhetoric that unduly raises expectations of rapid change. More importantly, the bilateral agreements, although far from perfect, may actually better serve to focus attention on the specific health-service organization and delivery issues the provinces and territories intend to improve, restructure or expand. Under very broad principles such as "improving access to mental health and community care," the bilateral agreements articulate some very clear plans about specific approaches, programs and policies on which the transfers will be spent. This should provide a much greater opportunity for the Canadian public to hold governments to account for progress in those areas, something the accords never really managed to do. Going forward, there is still room for improvement. Some provincial plans are decidedly vague, and governments should be urged to be more specific in their commitments and intentions. Common indicators continue to be difficult to develop, although big strides have been made in recent decades. Governments would be well advised to talk seriously and openly about the challenges and barriers to change that exist within the system and, in doing so, marshal public support to dismantle them. And the federal government itself needs to actively engage in assisting jurisdictions in learning from and adapting the successful reforms and initiatives of other jurisdictions. This could be an act of true system stewardship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada is well known as an export-based economy, particularly with respect to its agricultural and agri-food industries. Since the signing of the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA) in 1989, the federal government has negotiated trade agreements with more than 40 international partners, providing Canadian firms with access to a multitude of foreign markets while also giving consumers at home a greater set of choices in the market for a great number of goods and services. Progress on more liberalized internal trade within the federation has not, however, kept pace with accomplishments on the international trade front. Despite the implementation of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) in 1995 and the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) in 2017 (along with several smaller but significant interprovincial agreements), a number of significant barriers remain to internal trade in goods and services in Canada. The focus of this paper is upon barriers that prevent the movement of goods and services among provinces, referred to as interprovincial trade barriers. There are a number of different types of these barriers; one such type is tariffs (which function similar to a sales tax) upon goods and services themselves. While tariffs are a major topic of study in international trade, they do not form a focus of this paper, which will instead focus on non-tariff barriers or NTBs. One such category of barriers to internal trade includes natural barriers such as lakes, rivers, mountain ranges and the simple distance between potential trading partners. A second type is called prohibitive barriers, which make illegal the movement of certain types of goods or services among provinces; perhaps the most wellknown of these pertains to the prohibition of the movement of alcohol or tobacco between provinces. Technical and regulatory/administrative barriers also exist, and pertain to provincial differences in requirements within specific sectors, licensing requirements, etc. The Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) has noted that differences in trucking regulations as well as inconsistent regulation of provincially and federally inspected meat-processing facilities are of particular concern in the agricultural and agri-food industries (CFA 2021). These barriers are costly to the Canadian economy, limiting its growth, output, efficiency and productivity. Estimates by Alvarez et al. (2019) suggest that Canadian GDP would increase by between one and four per cent if trade in goods alone were completely liberalized. This is approximately $92 billion per year, an amount that, if realized, could lead to significant job creation, increased streams of taxation revenue for government, enhanced economic growth and improved productivity. Economists have long cited the efficient and welfare-maximizing outcomes associated with unfettered markets, and removal of interprovincial trade barriers would provide significant gains for the Canadian economy. Several important drivers have led to the current situation where barriers to interprovincial trade constrict the freer flow of goods and services in Canada. One of them is federalism itself, where the duty of provincial governments is to act in the best interest of constituents, even if it means overall gains to Canada as a whole are not being realized. Related to this is a second driver, which is the balancing act that courts must strike in Canada when interpreting both federal and provincial legislation in areas where both levels of government can be argued to have jurisdiction. A third driver is the potential for stakeholders to act to prevent liberalization of trade if it is in their best interest to do so. Regulators and gatekeepers, industry associations and even governments can have vested financial or personal interest in the status quo, and be hesitant to change it even if they recognize that change would have the potential to provide greater economic benefits to others. A final driver that has led to the current system is the sheer amount of time, effort and expertise that would be required to update the current system. There are at least three plausible options for reducing interprovincial barriers to trade in Canada. The first would be to encourage courts to interpret relevant legislation in a way that would aid the freer flow of products and services internally. For example, section 121 of the Constitution Act seems to clearly require the free movement of goods among provinces, but the Supreme Court of Canada has, out of respect for provinces' rights, deferred to the notion of federalism and consistently interpreted legislation in a way that permits provinces to put limits on trade. Should the Court interpret 121 in a more constructionist way, interprovincial trade would increase. A second option is for provinces to independently negotiate more open markets in Canada. The New West Partnership Trade Agreement (NWPTA) among the four Western provinces has been successful, as have other regional agreements, at opening markets and generating economic benefits. A third option is to use the CFTA's mechanisms and resources at the federal and provincial levels to remove barriers on an industry-by-industry basis. Given the sheer number of firms and industries, it is more cumbersome to negotiate large-scale, national or multi-provincial agreements than smaller scale, industry-specific ones. There are costs and benefits associated with each of these options. Requiring courts to revise how they interpret law is beyond the power of the federal and provincial governments. Striking new trade partnerships is a time-consuming process, with no assurance of success. Negotiating improvements in specific subsectors and industries is achievable, but provides only incremental gains. From a benefits perspective, there is much to be gained: the estimated economic benefits from the freer flow of goods and services are considerable, although it is likely that those with a vested interest will see some of their current benefits transferred to others as a result of removing trade barriers. Overall, it seems obvious that previous work to liberalize trade has been fruitful, and a combination of the options proposed is likely to be worth the effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Infrastructure corridors are among the most complicated transactions in Canada. Establishing a pre-determined corridor and completing linear infrastructure projects within it requires transactions related to property rights, infrastructure planning, design, construction, financing, operation and maintenance, securing public support or social licence, and because of the long overdue recognition of Indigenous rights and title, informed support from affected Indigenous communities. This paper uses a comparative systems analysis to identify specific transaction costs in four areas -- historic, infrastructure development process, fiscal and economic systems. We argue these transaction costs can be significantly reduced by systematically implementing Indigenous fiscal, infrastructure and lands jurisdictions because this will permanently ensure that Indigenous communities and people are able to receive similar fiscal and economic benefits generated from infrastructure corridor projects as those enjoyed by other Canadians and other governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is centred on the use of legislation as a tool of public action in health policy. We suggest that, as with the Canada Health Act (CHA) of 1984, this option should be considered to direct future reform efforts and pursue our collective aims of health and wellness. The CHA is the legislative expression of the federal government's exercise of its spending power, serving to consolidate key national agreements governing the circumstances under which the federal government contributes to the costs of medically necessary health services delivered by the provinces and territories. Two features of the CHA merit highlighting. The first is that its core provisions -- in particular, the five criteria often referred to as Canada's "national standards" for health care -- were not new or original to the CHA. The CHA was nonetheless an important step in the development of Canada's health system because it enshrined together, in one statute, longstanding commitments. A second feature of the CHA worth highlighting is that it does not stand alone. The CHA is one of 13 statutes across the country, including one in each province and territory, that serve together to establish the basic legal infrastructure of Canada's health insurance system. The CHA's powers to make regulations and issue policy interpretation letters offer important potential to achieve needed health system reforms without needing to "open" the act. Even where these powers are unrestricted by an express requirement for consultation with the provinces and territories, however, this would undoubtedly be required, given the fundamentally consensual nature of the CHA. Finally, the federal government's legislative options are not limited to the CHA. Jurisdiction over health and health care in Canada is shared between the federal and provincial and territorial governments. The various federal powers with health aspects allocated by the Constitution Act, 1867 are significant, including the residual "federal health power" to make laws "for the peace, order and good government of Canada" It therefore makes good sense to consider federal policy objectives in the health domain with regard for the full spectrum of federal legislative competence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health workers are the foundation of health systems. The alignment of health workforce structures and processes to achieve the quadruple aim outcomes is central to any learning health system. This requires robust data and evidence. A key problem is that Canada lags behind comparable OECD countries in terms of health workforce data and digital analytics. As a result, health workforce planning and decision-making tend to be ad hoc, sporadic and siloed by profession or jurisdiction, generating significant costs, inefficiencies and risks for all involved. 2 Health workers in Canada account for more than 10 per cent of all employed Canadians and over two-thirds of all health-care spending, which amounted to $175 billion in 2019, or nearly eight per cent of Canada's total GDP. 3 Recognizing these facts and supporting strategic health workforce planning, policy and management ought to be key priorities for federal and provincial/ territorial governments and other health-care organizations. Across all the different stakeholders that make up the complex, adaptive health workforce system in Canada, we lack a centralized and co-ordinated data, analytics and strategic planning infrastructure, a neglect that has been readily acknowledged for over a decade. COVID-19 has exposed the significant gaps in our knowledge about the health workforce, causing critical risks for planners to manage during a health crisis. The time is ripe for the federal government to take on a co-ordinating leadership role to enhance the data infrastructure that provinces, territories, regions and training programs need to better plan for and support the health workforce. Efforts should centre on three key elements that will improve data infrastructure, bolster knowledge creation and inform decision-making activities: • A minimum data standard and enhanced health workforce data collection across all stakeholders; • More timely, accessible, interactive and fit-for-purpose decision-support tools; • Capacity building in health workforce data analytics, digital tool design, policy analysis and management science. This vision requires an enhanced federal government role to contribute resources to co-ordinate the collection of accurate, standardized and more complete data to support analysis across occupations, sectors and jurisdictions, with links to relevant patient information, health-care usage and outcome data, for more strategic fit-forpurpose planning at all levels. This paper presents a vision for enhanced federal support of data-driven and evidence-informed health workforce planning, policy and management. First, two data infrastructure and capacity-building recommendations include: 1. The federal government should create an initiative dedicated to enhancing standardized health workforce data, purpose-built for strategic planning and associated decision-making tools for targeted planning, through a specially earmarked contribution agreement with the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI). 2. In addition to the need to build better data, digital tools and decision-support infrastructure, there is a parallel need to build the human resources capacity for health workforce analytics. Through a special Canadian Institutes of Health Research-administered fund, this could include a strategic training investment in health workforce research and a complementary signature initiative to fund integrated research projects that cut across the existing scientific institutes. Building on these two necessary but insufficient building blocks, a co-ordinating national health workforce organization could include one of the following three options: 1. The federal government could create a dedicated agency with a mandate to enhance existing data infrastructure and decision-support tools for strategic planning, policy and management across Canada. 2. Through a contribution agreement, the federal government could support the creation of an arm's-length, not-for-profit organization -- a partnership for health workforce -- as a steward of a renewed strategy and to provide health labour market information, training and management of human resources in the health sector, including support for recruitment and retention. 3. The federal government could support the creation of a robust, transparent and accessible secretariat for a council on health workforce to improve data and decision-making infrastructures, and to bolster knowledge creation through dedicated funding to inform policy and decision-making and collaborate on topics of mutual interest across stakeholders. In addition to building a more robust health system for Canada's post-pandemic recovery, these actions would align with the World Health Organization's Global Strategy on Human Resources for Health (2016) which encourages all countries to have institutional mechanisms in place by 2030 to effectively steer and co-ordinate an intersectoral health workforce agenda and established mechanisms for health workforce data sharing through national health workforce accounts. Because of the importance of the health workforce to Canada's economy and pandemic recovery, building the necessary infrastructure requires a sizable and sustained investment over the course of at least 10 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2018, the federal government coordinated point-in-time counts in 61 Canadian communities. These counts, all conducted over the course of a few nights during the months of March and April, revealed that 25,216 people were experiencing homelessness. Of those, 20,803 slept in emergency shelters while 4,481 slept on the streets, in cars, or in some other unsuitable place. Reviewing the data for 49 of those 61 communities, this paper examines the impact of community-level conditions on the prevalence of homelessness. The structural determinants of both sheltered and unsheltered homelessness are examined. The analysis shows that more expensive low-quality rental units have a strong positive relationship with the numbers of people staying in homeless shelters. A higher percentage of people in a community living in poverty is also related to increased numbers of people having to make use of homeless shelters. Increases in social assistance income, which undoubtedly improved the well-being of recipients, had no significant relationship with the number of people experiencing homelessness. This latter result is consistent with individuals and families with low income having a small income elasticity of housing demand. For these individuals and families, marginal additions to income are first used to relieve constraints on their budgets for food, utilities, and other necessities rather than being used to finance improvements in housing conditions. The fraction of the population that self-identifies as Indigenous is positively related to both sheltered and unsheltered homelessness, a result consistent with claims of discrimination in housing markets. Finally, a milder climate is associated with higher numbers of people experiencing unsheltered homelessness. These results suggest the most effective policy response to addressing homelessness is to lower the cost of shelter, an outcome best achieved by increasing the supply of shelter that can be afforded by individuals and families with limited income. To this end, public policies directed toward reducing the cost of construction, policies that include reviewing density restrictions and land-use regulations and offering tax incentives, can be effective. Preventing the disappearance of single-room occupancy hotels, boarding houses, trailer parks and other forms of housing affordable to people with limited income are other policy responses likely to be associated with decreases in homelessness. Increasing the stock of government-owned housing is another policy option, one best suited for providing housing for people whose homelessness is caused or exacerbated by disability, mental illness, substance abuse or other health issues requiring other support services. Marginal increases in income support, while important for increasing the well-being of individuals and families with limited income, are unlikely to be associated with decreases in homelessness unless they are sufficiently large to significantly reduce rates of poverty in the community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]