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Carbon trading mechanism is an effective means to control greenhouse gas emissions. This paper focuses on the low‐carbon economic operation of the integrated energy system under carbon trading mechanism in China. The integrated energy system includes the energy storage, ground source heat pump, and other equipment. The objective of this paper was to minimize the annual total cost of the system considering the carbon trading cost and study the operation modes under different carbon trading prices by commercial optimization software. The simulation results show the operation modes in summer are changed obviously with the increase of the carbon trading prices, while the operation modes in winter basically are not changed with the fluctuation of the carbon trading prices; under the carbon trading mechanism, the integrated energy system can not only reduce the carbon emissions, but also reduce the annual total cost through carbon trading, which shows its advantages and good development prospect. In addition, the setting of the carbon emission quota has a direct impact on the economy of the enterprises. Furthermore, the ground source heat pump and the electric refrigeration units can stabilize the fluctuation of the equipment output caused by the change of natural gas prices in this integrated energy system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emission trading scheme (ETS) is considered as a tool to reduce emissions at a low cost, which can effectively promote the carbon peak and carbon neutrality. As the main participants in the carbon emission trading (CET) market, the behavior and strategies for governments and different types of enterprises affect the final emission reduction performance. Taking the national carbon market as an example, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity to analyze the possible game situations in the development process of the CET market. The results show that with the development of the CET market, the governments and power generation enterprises will have different game results. In order to achieve the optimal stable equilibrium and maximize carbon emission reduction, governments should improve regulatory efficiency and formulate appropriate incentive strategies for excess emission reduction and punishment strategies for insufficient emission reduction. In addition, the initial willingness will not affect the final strategy choice of the three parties. Reasonable free carbon quota ratio, lower technology emission reduction cost and higher carbon price can stimulate the enthusiasm of governments and enterprises to reduce emissions. The above results provide a reference for coordinating the relationships between governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity in the construction of the CET market in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]