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2. The use of Husserl's phenomenology in nursing research: A discussion paper.
- Author
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Al‐Sheikh Hassan, Mohammed
- Subjects
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ONLINE information services , *CINAHL database , *PSYCHOLOGY information storage & retrieval systems , *RESEARCH methodology , *SYSTEMATIC reviews , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *QUALITATIVE research , *NURSING research , *MEDLINE - Abstract
Aims: To discuss how Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as a philosophy and approach, has been used and reported in researching the experiences of others, using the topic of foreign‐trained nurses. Design: Discussion paper. Data sources A systematic search of MEDLINE (PubMed), CINAHL, SCOPUS, British Nursing Database and PsycInfo was carried out in December 2021. The inclusion criteria were peer‐reviewed phenomenological research articles, grounded by Husserl's philosophy, conducted among foreign‐trained nurses and published in English from 2000 to 2021. Findings Two main themes were the outcome of critically reviewing relevant selected literature, 'referring to the original philosophy is not enough' and 'phenomenological findings need to be phenomenological'. These findings confirm some arguments about nurse researchers' discrepant use of phenomenology in their studies, including the proper application of phenomenological notions on the ground. Implication for Nursing: Nurse researchers need to clearly distinguish between phenomenology and other qualitative research approaches and consider the uniqueness of philosophical underpinnings that are essential in Husserl's phenomenology, which also need to be clearly applied and reflected in their studies. Conclusion: There are continually existing discrepancies and variations in using phenomenology by nurse researchers. These variations were uniquely evident when nurse researchers could not provide enough philosophical grounds and assumptions to their studies and underestimated the need to keep up with the various applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions, including the proper practice of phenomenological attitude. Therefore, it is recommended that nurse researchers should opt for different, less complex qualitative approaches if they do not adequately prepare and understand what constitutes phenomenology and the particulars of Husserl's philosophy. Impact What problem did the study address? Phenomenology remains popular in nursing. However, it can confuse nurse researchers and may result in an improper understanding of its core concepts. The use of phenomenology in nursing has been criticized over the years with nurse researchers being accused of conducting phenomenological research inconsistent with the original philosophy. What were the main findings? Using phenomenology by nurse researchers is various and includes some discrepancies. This variation is caused by not complying with essential philosophical grounds and underestimating proper applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions. Where and on whom will the research have impact? Outcomes of this paper illustrate examples of proper and improper uses of Husserl's phenomenology in nursing research, including critical considerations, which can guide nurse researchers aiming to conduct descriptive phenomenological research. Additionally, nurse lecturers can utilize this paper to show and emphasize the importance of philosophical grounds in phenomenology. No Patient or Public Contribution: Due to the nature of this discussion paper addressing philosophical and methodological aspects using examples from the literature, no direct patient or public contribution was required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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3. Il valore dell'intertestualità per il progresso della psicoanalisi. Replica ai commenti di F.M. Ferro & G. Riefolo e di M. Fornaro al saggio "Sul concetto di intersoggettività in psicoanalisi"*.
- Author
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Civitarese, Giuseppe
- Subjects
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PSYCHOANALYSIS , *SELF-disclosure , *INTERSUBJECTIVITY , *INTERTEXTUALITY , *DEFINITIONS - Abstract
The author responds to the critical remarks in the comments by Ferro & Riefolo (2023) and by Fornaro (2023). The main points are, in the first comment, the status of reality in psychoanalysis, enactment, the various conceptions of the unconscious, self-disclosure, and the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. As for the second comment, on the other hand, the issues addressed concern the interpretation of Husserl's contribution to a better definition of the concept of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis and methodological aspects related to the use of notions derived from speculative thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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4. Corporeity and the Eurocentric Community: Recasting Husserl's Crisis in Merleau-Ponty's Ontology of the Flesh.
- Author
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Delestrade, Andréa
- Subjects
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EUROCENTRISM , *ONTOLOGY , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *PHILOSOPHERS , *CRISES - Abstract
This paper attempts to develop a phenomenological account of community which would not be pervaded by Eurocentric assumptions. Such Eurocentrism is what Husserl's phenomenological framework has been accused of. I first reconstruct Husserl's phenomenology of community in his late transcendental phenomenology by examining the Vienna Lecture. I show that Husserl's Eurocentrism is encapsulated in his account of corporeity, which simultaneously recognizes the importance of corporeity and its necessary overcoming in theoria , which originates in the European philosopher. I then argue that Merleau-Ponty, through his rigorously embodied phenomenology, can offer a non-Eurocentric phenomenology of community. Elaborating on the Husserlian insight of corporeity, notably the perceptual experience and the écart at stake in the encounter with other bodies, allows Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh to recast community from and with the body as an open, situated, and non-archeo-teleological structure, allowing phenomenology to reimagine inter-cultural encounters away from tropes of European exemplarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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5. Reframing Anorexia Nervosa: A Phenomenological Exploration of the Self-Other Relationship with Husserl's Intersubjective Theory.
- Author
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Zhang, Junguo
- Subjects
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ANOREXIA nervosa , *BODY image disturbance - Abstract
This paper explores the overlooked contributions of Husserl's Phenomenology of intersubjectivity in understanding anorexia nervosa. It highlights the intricate relationship between the self and others, emphasizing their mutual constitution while acknowledging inherent differences. The distorted body image approach often overlooks this perspective, leading to psychopathological issues in individuals with anorexia nervosa. By integrating subjective experience and external observation, a more balanced and equal intersubjective relationship can be established. Utilizing this philosophical framework allows for a deeper understanding of the disorder's dynamics and sheds new light on the subjective experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa in relation to others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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6. Experience, Subjectivity, Selfhood: Beyond a Meadian Sociology of the Self.
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Zahavi, Dan and Zelinsky, Dominik
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SELF , *SOCIOLOGY , *SUBJECTIVITY , *SOCIAL interaction , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *SOCIOLOGISTS - Abstract
Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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7. From Tendencies and Drives to Affectivity and Ethics: Husserl and Scheler on the Mother–Child Relationship.
- Author
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Serban, Claudia
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MATERNAL love , *ETHICS , *INTERSUBJECTIVITY , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *AFFECT (Psychology) - Abstract
The reassessment of intentionality as "tendency" or "drive," already important when the intentionality at stake designates the directedness of lived experiences toward a particular object, might be even more crucial when the orientation toward others is concerned. How do drives and affects intermingle within our intersubjective life and fashion our relations to others? The present paper will address this question by focusing on a particular or even primary kind of intersubjectivity: the mother–child relationship, that received a particular, yet still insufficiently noticed attention in early phenomenology. Scheler and Husserl both analyse this relationship, indeed, in terms that imply drive intentionality as well as affective intentionality (that is, for what concerns the mother, maternal instinct and maternal love). In their view, this relation also has a crucial ethical significance, and may even be taken to be paradigmatic for ethical relationships as such. Accordingly, drive intentionality is understood as an instinctive orientation toward others, that love takes up and develops, thus providing an affective and even instinctive ground for ethical behaviour. All this imples the depart from an ethics grounded on the primacy and sufficiency of reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2024
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8. The Eidetics of the Unimaginable. What a Phenomenologist can Learn from Ethnomethodology.
- Author
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Ferencz-Flatz, Christian
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL sociology , *IMAGINATION , *ETHNOMETHODOLOGY , *PHENOMENOLOGY - Abstract
This paper discusses the phenomenological method's reliance on imaginative procedures in view of ethnomethodological research. While ethnomethodology has often been seen in continuity with Alfred Schütz' phenomenological sociology, it mainly parts ways with phenomenology by stressing that the decisive details structuring mutual understanding (gestures, bodily expressions, or the myriad trifles that regulate casual conversation) are „not imaginable, but can only be found out". This paper reflects from a phenomenological perspective on what such a claim entails by first delineating this line of criticism from other objections raised against the use of imaginative procedures in phenomenology and by showing how this line of questioning departs from the core philosophical debates concerning imaginabilitiy and unimaginability in the Kantian tradition. Further on, the paper offers an in-depth interpretation of the aforementioned ethnomethodological claim in order not only to outline its methodological implications for phenomenology, but also to show that it involves possible key insights for understanding interaction, which phenomenology needs to take into account despite its eidetic scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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9. The Phenomenological and the Symbolical in Richir's "Quasi-Theology".
- Author
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Ekweariri, Dominic Nnaemeka
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PHENOMENOLOGY , *TRANSCENDENCE (Philosophy) , *PRICES , *ATHEISM , *THEOLOGY , *FATHERS - Abstract
If a new generation of phenomenologists (Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-François Courtine) in France sought to overcome the "methodic atheism" imposed on the phenomenological method by the fathers of phenomenology, it was at the price of going beyond experience immanent to existence which targeted the invisible, and therefore of lacking a discourse on the critical restriction of the phenomenological method and on the points of contact between phenomenology and theology. The task of this paper is to show how this lack is overcome by Marc Richir's "quasi theology" viewed from his articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological and the symbolical. This paper argues that whereas for the new French phenomenologists it is usually a question of a subreptitious crossing from one discipline to another, in Richir, what we have is an enigmatic relationship of the overlap between phenomenology and the symbolical. While Richir was only interested in the articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological, the symbolical and the absolute transcendence, his thoughts motivate us to explore, following Emmanuel Falque's approach, the reciprocal transformation between phenomenology and theology. The paper concludes, on the one hand, that experience remains the immanent ground for phenomenology and theological science and, on the other, that Richir's approach could be understood as a "metaphysical phenomenology". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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10. Approval, reflective emotions, and virtue: sentimentalist elements in Husserl’s philosophy.
- Author
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Carta, Emanuela
- Abstract
In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl’s analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury’s theory of affections in his lecture course
Einleitung in die Ethik . The sections of this course devoted to Shaftesbury are the only place in Husserl’s later philosophical production where he addresses the need to clarify the nature of approval from a phenomenological point of view and provides precise indications about the role that such emotions play in our life. I thereby examine Husserl’s criticisms of Shaftesbury’s account of reflective emotions, and I compare these criticisms with Husserl’s account of approval in the texts from theKonvolut über Billigung collected in theStudien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins . I argue that, according to Husserl, approval is an essential but not sufficient component in the pursuit of virtue. The upshot is that crucial parts of Husserl’s ethics come from a radical and original reworking of central notions of the early modern sentimentalist tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2023
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11. Deeper into Brentano's mind: response to critics.
- Author
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Textor, Mark
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CRITICS , *CRITICISM , *METAPHYSICS , *SOUL - Abstract
Laura Gow, Uriah Kriegel, Hamid Taieb, and David Woodruff Smith raised help – and insightful points of criticism about my book Brentano's Mind. In this paper, I will defend and expand on the main claims of the book. My responses are organized around four topics: Psychology without a Soul, Plural Intentionality (and Conceptual Parts), Intentionality and Intentionality Primitivism, Mark of Mental. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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12. Destiny, Love and Rational Faith in Husserl's Post World War I Ethics.
- Author
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Geniusas, Saulius
- Subjects
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WORLD War I , *FATE & fatalism , *ETHICS , *RESEARCH ethics , *WAR - Abstract
The fundamental goal of this paper is to clarify the importance of Husserl's reflections on destiny (Schicksal) in the context of his post-WWI ethics. In the first section, I sketch Husserl's reflections on war in his private correspondence. In the second section, I show that, in his post-WWI research manuscripts on ethics, Husserl conceptualized various forms of meaningless suffering under the heading of destiny. One of the main questions of Husserl's post-WWI ethics can be formulated as follows: in the dark horizon of senselessness, how is an ethical life possible? In the remaining sections, I show that Husserl's reflections on this question led him to deformalize his earlier ethics and motivated him to ground his ethics of reason in an ethics of love. In the third and fourth sections, I sketch Husserl's two fundamental answers to this question, the first of which concerns his phenomenology of love, while the second one – his phenomenological metaphysics in general, and his phenomenological teleology, in particular. While for Husserl, these answers are complementary, after clarifying Husserl's view on the conflicts of values, I conclude with some reflections on the importance of not overlooking that these answers are analytically distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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13. The End of Time and the Possibility of World: Between Divinity and Nature.
- Author
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Murchadha, Felix Ó
- Subjects
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PHILOSOPHICAL theology , *THEOLOGY , *CHRISTIAN eschatology , *PHILOSOPHY of religion , *THEOLOGIANS , *KINGDOM of God , *RESURRECTION , *FATE & fatalism , *PROMISES - Abstract
Eschatology is central to Christian theology: the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ is the promise of the "kingdom of God". This paper takes up this idea in discussion with contemporary Christian theologians and discusses it phenomenologically by recourse to Husserl's account of "horizon". The horizon is both finite and infinite: always limited in its actualization but with an infinity of potential actualizations. This is explored with respect to time and its relation to the eternal, as well as the dispositions of hope and fear with respect to the eschaton. The final section draws these insights together in a discussion of the eschaton to understand the eschatological destiny of nature in a "new heaven and a new earth" (Revelations, 21: 1) and conceiving of eschatological justice as a harmony of horizonal perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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14. Provincializing Nature: A Phenomenological Account of Descola’s Relative Universalism.
- Author
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Barroso, Gabriel
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ETHNOLOGY , *COLLECTIVE behavior , *ANTHROPOLOGISTS , *NATURALISM , *NATURALISTS , *ANTHROPOLOGY - Abstract
Anthropologists have recently argued that the divide between nature and culture is not a universal framework suitable for understanding collective behavior but rather a local variation among various ways of composing the experience of the world. Notably, in the case of Philippe Descola’s anthropology, this critique led to a radical reconceptualization of social sciences and the humanities in terms of ontological regimes, which draws upon key aspects of the phenomenological tradition. In this paper, I develop a phenomenological perspective on Descola’s anthropology to clarify whether and how we can assess our engagement with the world beyond the divide between nature and culture. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, I present the main claims of Descola’s position, which he calls “relative universalism,” and introduce two critiques of this project: the potential conflation between his ontological framework and aspects of modern naturalism and the risk of reifying cultural determinations as ontological properties. In the second section, I address the first critique by showing how the universalist claim of Descola’s anthropology, according to which collective experience is organized by the duality of planes of physicality and interiority, can be elucidated through Husserl’s account of the embodied experience to avoid a conflation with the naturalist framework. Finally, I contend that anthropology’s idea of a diversity of ontological regimes can be made coherent by analyzing the two layers of the world constitution: the primordial experience of the lived body and the intersubjective process of communalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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15. Husserlian Phenomenology of Limit-Problems: a “‘Geometry’ of Lived Experience”?
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Hadji-Pulja, Vera
- Abstract
The proper way in which limit-problems [
Grenzprobleme ]—birth, death, dreamless sleep, the “prior to birth” [das vor der Geburt ], the “after death” [das nach dem Tod ], etc.—can be accessed according to Husserl is by means of so-called “construction” [Konstruktion ] or “reconstruction” [Rekonstruktion ]. Contrary to what is usually claimed with respect to this method, and therefore the acts it is composed of, this paper will attempt to prove that they do not consist in non-intuitive acts, but rather in intuitive, but non-sensible acts. In other words, the aforementioned acts of construction consist in categorial acts. More specifically, they represent acts akin to the ones involved in the constitution of exact material essences of a qualitative (the “pure” red, the “pure” blue …) or of a geometrical kind (a triangle, a chiliagon …): both the acts involved in the constitution of elementary exact essences, or acts of idealization, and the acts involved in the constitution of derived exact essences, or acts of deriving. However, the acceptance of such acts of construction suggests a serious reconsideration of some of the basic tenets of Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, it challenges the idea that phenomenology is an eidetic science of inexact—morphological, descriptive …—material essences, namely the essence of a subjective sphere (the essence of consciousness, the essence of ego …); in fact, it turns phenomenology, at least partially, into something Husserl explicitly repudiates on multiple occasions: a “geometry” of lived experience. It is thus important to determine whether these acts of construction should be integrated into Husserlian phenomenology, and, if yes, how they should be integrated into it. Providing an indication of this will be the ultimate goal of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2024
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16. Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Sedimentations.
- Author
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Geniusas, Saulius
- Subjects
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SEDIMENTATION & deposition , *SEDIMENTATION analysis , *PHENOMENOLOGY - Abstract
The paper explores the meaning of the phenomenological concept of sedimentation in the framework of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. The analysis I offer suggests that Merleau-Ponty initiates a transition from the constitutional problematic of sedimentations that we come across in Husserl's phenomenology to the analysis of existential sedimentations. Merleau-Ponty accomplishes this transformation by binding the Husserlian conception of sedimentations with the Heideggerian conception of facticity. The distinction Merleau-Ponty draws between originary sedimentations and secondary sedimentations is especially important, for it allows one to claim that Merleau-Ponty recognizes all experiences as sedimented. Against the background of this realization, I offer a reevaluation of Merleau-Ponty's cryptic remarks in the Phenomenology of Perception regarding the "original past," also described as "a past that has never been a present." I argue that these are metaphors for originary sedimentations. In place of a conclusion, I suggest that especially when the concept of sedimentation is universalized, we come to recognize its inherently paradoxical nature. In the final analysis, besides being a genetic concept, sedimentation is also a limit problem and a limit phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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17. Husserl on Kant and the critical view of logic.
- Author
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Hartimo, Mirja
- Subjects
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SYLLOGISM , *JUDGMENT (Logic) , *IDEALISM , *LOGIC , *CRITICAL thinking - Abstract
This paper seeks to clarify Husserl's critical remarks about Kant's view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929, §100) Husserl criticizes Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logic, but rather ascribing an 'extraordinary apriority' to it. He thinks the reason for Kant's uncritical attitude to logic lies in Kant's view of logic as directed toward the subjective, instead of being concerned with a '"world" of ideal Objects'. Whereas for Kant, general logic is about laws of reasoning. Husserl thinks that formal logic should describe formal structures. Husserl claims that if Kant had had a more comprehensive concept of logic, he would have thought of raising critical questions about how logic is possible. This kind of criticism cannot itself use forms of judgments or syllogisms of logic, nor even the 'inferential' [schliessende] method more generally, but should be descriptive in nature. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the method for such criticism. The paper argues that this results in reflection, and possibly revision, of the logical principles with respect to the normative goals governing the investigation in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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18. Génesis y evolución del concepto de "fantasía" en la fenomenología de Husserl.
- Author
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Tamina Katz, Azul
- Subjects
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FANTASY (Psychology) , *INTUITION , *CONSCIOUSNESS , *IMAGINATION , *CONTEMPLATION , *MEMORY , *EMPATHY - Abstract
This paper seeks to restore the questions that led Husserl to capture the morphological essence of phantasy and its modalities and to fix each of its essential features. Despite the early stabilization of the definition of phantasy as a type of intuitive, simple and non-positional presentification, the literature on the subject is still opaque regarding the way in which this type of experience is constituted in internal consciousness and in relation to the criteria that allow to distinguish it from other more or less close phenomena, such as perception, memory, image-consciousness or imagination, among others. Establishing the genesis and evolution of this concept will enable not only to clarify these opacities, but also to shed light on those other spheres of experience in which phantasy plays a substantial role, such as the intuition of essences, empathy, or aesthetic contemplation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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19. Silence, Attention, Body.
- Author
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Rosales, Diego I.
- Subjects
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GESTURE , *CONSCIOUSNESS , *SELF , *AWARENESS - Abstract
This paper argues that the gesture of being silent —or "subjective silence"— can be described as a specific modulation of attention, in which consciousness gains awareness of a specific realm of experience where the body appears as a transcendental dimension of the self. Taking Dauenhauer's typology as a point of departure, I will describe what I understand with the expressions "subjective silence" –and "the gesture of being silent"– and try to show its specific relation to "attention," according to Husserl's description of it. Second, that the noematic field of this "subjective silence" is the realm of the pre-predicative, since it allows consciousness to maintain a certain intentional tension that does not focus on any categorial object. Finally, I will try to show that in this realm of the pre-predicative, the body appears as an immanent dimension of consciousness and, therefore, not as a mere object but as a transcendental instance of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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20. Can the "real world" please stand up? The struggle for normality as a claim to reality.
- Author
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Wehrle, Maren
- Subjects
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FEMINISM , *FEMINIST theory , *STRUGGLE - Abstract
In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one's longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or objective? And to what extent is the sense for "what (really) is" related to our beliefs of what should be? To investigate this, I combine a phenomenological approach to lived normality with a genealogical account of represented normality that sheds light on the social and historical contingency of definitions of normality and their intertwinement with structures of power. It is my contention that such an approach to normality is well-suited to investigate how is and ought are interrelated within subjective experience and practice. This might in turn help overcoming one-sided debates on post-truth, which rely on the strict opposition of objectivity versus subjectivity, universal truth versus subjective experience, facticity versus meaning, or reason versus stupidity. It also sheds light on the ambivalent or contested status of experience within debates of post-truth and feminist theory. I will conclude that post-truth is related to what Hannah Arendt has termed the lack of a common world (i.e., normality), arguing that a plurality of experiences is needed to let the "real world" stand its ground again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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21. Problem „świata fenomenologicznego” w filozofii Husserla.
- Author
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Rolewski, Jarosław
- Subjects
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PHENOMENOLOGY , *PARADIGM (Theory of knowledge) , *INTERSUBJECTIVITY , *CLOSURE (Psychology) , *PRIVACY - Abstract
This paper discusses the notion of the ‘phenomenological world’ and the problems it generates in the ‘hard’ paradigm of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the lack of universality and intersubjectivity of this world, its closure and privacy, and its being only the personal world of a subject. Also, an attempt was made to show some of the sources of this problematic situation and the impossibility of solving it in a fundamentalist paradigm. It is only in the last period of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology (the so-called period of the Crisis) that these problems find their satisfactory solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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22. The Limits of Abstraction: Towards a Phenomenologically Reformed Understanding of Science.
- Author
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Berghofer, Philipp
- Subjects
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NEED (Psychology) , *PARADOX , *REFORMS - Abstract
Husserl argued that psychology needs to establish an abstraction that is opposite to the abstraction successfully established in the natural sciences. While the natural sciences abstract away the psychological or subjective, psychology must abstract away the physical or worldly. However, Husserl and other phenomenologists such as Iso Kern have argued that there is a crucial systematic disanalogy between both abstractions. While the abstraction of the natural sciences can be performed completely, the abstraction of psychology cannot. In this context, Husserl argues that the psychological reduction leads to paradoxes. In this paper, I critically discuss whether it is true that the natural sciences can successfully abstract away the subjective. Or more precisely, I raise the question of whether they should. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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23. The Limits of Imagination in Husserl.
- Author
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Sam, Seyran
- Abstract
This paper attempts to examine imagination with respect to its two poles and argues that in the phenomenological framework the locus of imagination is one between perception and ideation. Where imagination approaches perception we encounter the terminus a quo of imagination and therefore its lower limit and where it approximates ideation, we encounter its terminus ad quem and therefore its upper limit. In the former case we find the first form of imagination, which is the least articulated sense of imagination: image-consciousness. In the latter case we find the last form of imagination, which is the most articulated sense of imagination: free phantasy. On the one hand, then, image-consciousness is delineated from perception, and accordingly it is delineated from something that is determined. On the other hand, free phantasy is delineated from ideation, and as such it is delineated from something that is determining it. Situated between something that is determined and something that is determining it, the different forms of imagination can be said to have acquired different levels of freedom; imagination becomes freer the more it departs from perception and the more it approximates ideation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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24. DAÑO, MIEDO, TRAICIÓN: ASPECTOS DE LA GÉNESIS CORPORAL Y SIGNIFICACIÓN MORAL DEL SENTIDO DE VULNERABILIDAD.
- Author
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Quepons, Ignacio
- Subjects
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VALUES (Ethics) , *TRUST , *AFFECT (Psychology) , *EMOTIONS , *SENSES - Abstract
The paper outlines a phenomenological description of the meaning and moral significance of vulnerability. Such a description begins with a negative characterization in accordance with the contributions to the phenomenology of the body found in the works of Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Landgrebe, to advance at a later stage to the phenomenological characterization of the notion of the individuation of harm in relation to what Heidegger calls "the harmful" in his description of the affective disposition of fear. The exposure to harm that reveals the anticipatory understanding of fear in relation to the harmful, not explicitly thematized by Heidegger, is what we refer to here, in a broad sense as vulnerability. In the second moment I will present a positive characterization of vulnerability in relation to two levels of the formation of axiological meaningfulness. As we shall see, vulnerability, including bodily vulnerability, points to an understanding of exposure to being wounded as a guideline to follow in the reconstruction of axiological meaning revealed through affective life, in accordance with Husserl's programmatic indications. In this sense, it is necessary to refer more specifically to the place of trust, and its essential relationship with vulnerability, in the formation of the meaning of values, in particular, of moral value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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25. The affective allure – a phenomenological dialogue with David Miall's studies of foregrounding and feeling.
- Author
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Sopcak, Paul and Kuiken, Don
- Subjects
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AFFECT (Psychology) , *FOREGROUNDING , *EMOTIONS , *AUTHORSHIP - Abstract
This paper attempts to rescue the notion of foregrounding from the prevailing focus on defamiliarization. It does so by engaging in a phenomenological dialogue with David Miall's account of foregrounding and feeling and Viktor Shklovsky's discussion of literary device and aesthetic function. In particular, it contextualizes Miall's proposal of the response to foregrounding as a feeling-guided process involving boundary crossings, a defamiliarization-refamiliarization cycle, and self-transformative feelings within Husserl's philosophical analysis of sense constitution. Miall's feeling explorations and explications find their counterpart in Husserl's active egoic turning toward the affective allure and enticement of affective resonances. Using Miall's work as a touchstone, some frequently overlooked aspects of Shklovsky's conception of ostranenie are clarified by drawing on Husserl's notions of the natural attitude, active and passive synthesis, affective allure, expressive explication, and awakenings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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26. On Making Phenomenologies of Technology More Phenomenological.
- Author
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Scharff, Robert C.
- Abstract
Phenomenologists usually insist that their approach involves going “back” to and “starting” with technoscientific experience—that is, returning to the actual existing or living through of technoscientific life—after centuries of privileging the analysis of how things are “objectively” known and denigrating accounts of how they are “subjectively” lived with. But then who says this and how is this understood? “Who” is really a phenomenologist, when so many diverse thinkers claim the title? This paper considers some of the reasons why this is such a difficult question and argues that it is wrong to look for The Answer to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
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27. Is Violence a Limit Phenomenon? A Critical Approach from the Perspective of Transcendental Phenomenology and Public Health Studies.
- Author
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Pérez-Gatica, Sergio
- Subjects
- *
INTERPERSONAL relations , *ECOLOGICAL models , *CONSCIOUSNESS , *VIOLENCE , *INTERDISCIPLINARY research , *PHENOMENOLOGY - Abstract
This paper examines the idea, prevalent in post-Husserlian scholarship, that violence is a ‘limit problem’ of phenomenology. It offers a critical approach to this idea and proposes an alternative way of understanding the phenomenology of violence. The study comprises four analytical moments. First, I show the implications and shortcomings of interpreting violence as a ‘limit phenomenon’. Second, I address the issue of aggression as a mode of interaction between agents who can take on the role of perpetrators, victims, or witnesses. Here the intentionality of aggression as a phenomenon of the will in interpersonal relations will be addressed. It will be concretely shown to what extent intentional analysis, the kind of analysis prescribed by the ‘general scheme’ of transcendental phenomenology, is indispensable for fleshing out the experiential nature of aggression as interaction between agents who can either exert, suffer, or witness violence. Third, I turn to Husserl’s brief account of violence (
Gewalt ) inZur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität and, expanding upon it, propose a definition that aims to express the most fundamental structure of violence as a phenomenon of consciousness. Next, this phenomenologically grounded definition will be shown to be consistent with the sociological and intentional approach adopted by the World Health Organization in itsWorld Report on Violence and Health . This will lead to the realization that the transcendental approach to violence can both contribute to the philosophical grounding of thisReport and benefit from its multidisciplinary perspective—in particular its ecological model for analyzing the experiential horizons constitutive of the individual-environment relationship. Finally, it will become clear that violence harbors no more mysteries than any other form of intersubjective encounter and that transcendental phenomenology provides indispensable tools for conceptual clarification in interdisciplinary violence research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. The phenomenal contribution of attention.
- Author
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Mitchell, Jonathan
- Abstract
Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper attempts to get clearer on the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention. In doing so it considers and sets aside two prominent impure intentionalist accounts, namely the Phenomenal Structure view of Sebastien Watzl, and the Demonstrative Awareness view of Wayne Wu. As an alternative I outline a Modification view, which draws on ideas in Husserlian phenomenology. On this view, we should think of the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention in terms of attentive modifications of what I call a ‘pre-attentive phenomenal field’. I develop this view and highlight its benefits over alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
29. Religious Experience in the First-Person Perspective: The Lived Body and Perception of Reality.
- Author
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Louchakova-Schwartz, Olga
- Subjects
- *
RELIGIOUS experience , *BODY image , *GENEROSITY , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *TELEOLOGY , *CONCRETE analysis , *EMOTIONS - Abstract
The first-person perspective, developed by Husserl for the scientific study of consciousness, consists of formal categories which can be used both for the analyses of consciousness as such and its concrete forms. Evidence (Evidenz), the central category in this approach, characterizes consciousness as knowledge. This paper presents the phenomenology of changes in perception and embodiment which lead to evidence for religious/spiritual experience (RE). Such change develops over time via contemplative practice, but also can be a part of spontaneous RE. Because of the presence of evidence, RE containing the change of perception are presentational (as distinct from appresentative). This temporally extended evidence concerns reality's giving of itself, granted that the main distinction between religious and non-religious experience is in the kind of reality to which they refer: physical in the case of non-religious, and 'ultimate' in the case of religious experience. Involving flesh and the reversibility of the body, the change in such complex RE also entails the transmutation of emotion from negative to positive. I compare these findings with Husserl's analysis of religious experience in HUA XVII, and argue that grounding religious experience in the preconceived idea of God, as Husserl does, limits RE to regressive forms which do not constitute knowledge. Such experiences remain teleologically directed at the world-horizon. By contrast, REs grounded in change of perception have a different teleology and do constitute knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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30. Fiat cura, et pereat mundus: la fenomenología del cuidado y del compromiso en Husserl.
- Author
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de Warren, Nicolas
- Subjects
- *
VOCATION , *ANGLES , *MANUSCRIPTS - Abstract
"Fiat cura, et pereat mundus. Husserl's Phenomenology of Care and Commitment". The present paper explores "the importance of what we care about" from a phenomenological angle in the spirit of Frankfurt's seminal essay. I shall reflect upon a few of its central concepts and issues within a Husserlian frame of analysis. My overarching claim is that Frankfurt's threefold distinction - knowing, ethical conduct, caring - is equally central to Husserl's phenomenology of reason and, more directly, underlies Husserl's phenomenological ethics of values and vocation in his Freiburg manuscripts of the 1920s and 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
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31. THINGS, GOODS, AND VALUES: THE OPERATIVE FUNCTION OF HUSSERL'S UNITARY FOUNDATION IN SCHELER'S AXIOLOGY.
- Author
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CAMINADA, EMANUELE
- Subjects
- *
PHENOMENOLOGY , *EMOTIONS , *COGNITION , *METAETHICS - Abstract
In this paper, I contend that the core intuition that resides at the basis of Scheler's metaethics is expressed through the formal axiological distinction between things, goods, and values. I pursue a twofold aim: 1) to show that Scheler implicitly operates within Husserl's concept of 'unitary foundation' when describing how values inhere within goods; 2) to compare Scheler's metaethical argument concerning the independence of a world of goods with Hare's 'indiscernibility argument'. Scheler's reversal of Hare's argument confronts us with the formal-ontological difference between the analytic account of supervenience and the phenomenological account of unitary foundation. My argument is based on the formalization of the second type of unitary foundation that Husserl outlines in his Third Logical Investigation. The second type of unitary foundation is usually conflated with the first type of unitary foundation, as a result of the gross mistakes found in Findlay's English translation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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32. ARE EMOTIONS VALUECEPTIONS OR RESPONSES TO VALUES? HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF AFFECTIVITY RECONSIDERED.
- Author
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DELAMARE, ALEXIS
- Subjects
- *
EMOTIONS , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *COGNITION , *INTENTIONALITY (Philosophy) - Abstract
How are we able to experience values? Two sides are competing in contemporary literature: 'Meinongians' (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claim that axiological properties are apprehended in emotions, while 'Hildebrandians' (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) assert that such experiences of value (or valueceptions) are accomplished in special 'value feelings', and that emotions are only responses to these felt values. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this issue. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars have assumed so far, Husserl's position is not reducible to Meinong's and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks. It indeed recognizes (with Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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33. Affect Disorders: An Husserlian Interpretation of Alexytimia, BPD and Narcissistic Traits.
- Author
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Ferrarello, Susi
- Abstract
Affects and all its variants (affection, allure, affective force, etc.) represent our via
regia to be alive and connected with our life-world. It is not the ego that constitutes the world we live in but the affections that allow us to become respectively objects of our life and subjects of our own choices. Affects are in fact main triggers of lower and higher feelings through which we become subjects and experience empathy with other people, intersubjectively connecting with them and making ethical choices that are hopefully considerate of ourselves and our community. Yet it might happen that our feelings are not capable of truly feeling what we are affected by. When this happens, what affects us remains with us but cannot be felt and accordingly processed. In this paper, I will first work on the term affect and its variants. I will then describe how this connects with feelings. To finally analyze what happens when we are not capable of feeling our affects as in the case of alexithymia; or when we feel our affects too much as in the case of BPD; or when we do not want to feel certain affects as in the case of NPD. The main conceptual reference of this analysis will be Husserl and his static and genetic phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2024
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34. Derrida, la Fenomenología husserliana, y el paso de la estructura a la génesis.
- Author
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Dionísio, Jefferson
- Subjects
- *
PHENOMENOLOGY , *DECONSTRUCTION , *ARGUMENT , *STRUCTURALISM , *ACHIEVEMENT , *INTERPRETATION (Philosophy) , *CONSTRUCTION (Philosophy) - Abstract
The aim of this article is to present Derrida's reading of Husserl's phenomenology in his text Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology. Its structural stages, its due themes and conclusions will be presented. The aim of this paper is to understand the problem that Derrida points out in the passage from structure to genesis in the Husserlian phenomenological method, and to observe the arguments that conclude the bad achievement of the phenomenological method. The aim is to detail this interpretation by basing it on Husserl's texts and Derrida's considerations on them. In the same way, this work is intended to serve as a basis for introductory studies to phenomenology and deconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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35. La actitud personalista: Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler y Edith Stein.
- Author
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Moran, Dermot
- Subjects
- *
ABSOLUTE value , *AFFECT (Psychology) , *ETHICS , *INTELLECT , *HEART , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *FREE will & determinism - Abstract
This paper discusses the close similarities between Husserl's, Scheler's and Stein's concept of the person as an absolute value that exercises itself in position-takings. Ethics, for the classical phenomenologists, Husserl, Scheler, and Stein, concerns the whole person, including the affective and rational dimensions, intellect and the heart, as well as volition. Persons are distinctive for their free agency, capacity to recognize norms, and ability to interact responsibly with other personal agents in the context of the communal and historical life-world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
36. Self-Consciousness without an "I": A Critique of Zahavi's Account of the Minimal Self.
- Author
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Alweiss, Lilian
- Subjects
- *
SELF , *CONSCIOUSNESS , *SELF-consciousness (Awareness) - Abstract
This paper takes Zahavi's view to task that every conscious experience involves a "minimal sense of self." Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls "for-meness" or "mineness." Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi's account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be committed to the view that we necessarily have a sense of ownership. However, Husserl only claims that I am self-conscious but not that I am a self that owns its consciousness. Zahavi thus misses the novelty of Husserl's position, namely that I do not need to have a sense of abiding ownership, to have experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
37. L’autrui dans la sphère la plus originaire : Merleau‑Ponty et la théorie husserlienne de l’instinct.
- Author
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Eun‑Hye Choo
- Subjects
- *
SUBJECTIVITY , *EXPLANATION , *EMPATHY - Abstract
This paper examines the influence that Husserl’s drive/instinct theory has on Merleau‑Ponty’s late philosophy. Husserl’s interest in the passive realm of life develops into a study of a more profound level which even precedes the emergence of subjectivity. We analyze how it leads Merleau‑Ponty, in his philos‑ ophy of flesh, to furnish an ontological explanation regarding the problem of the relationship with others. In this regard, we investigate firstly Husserl’s theory of originary affection and its limits, before scrutinizing the notion of empathy; thereby we show how Merleau‑Ponty develops the Husserlian inten‑ tional relation into a carnal relation based on the idea that others and I belong to the same world. This will reveal that the relationship with the others always lies in the most profound level of our experience, because we share the onto‑ logical affinity, namely, the flesh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. How Do Social Structures Become Taken for Granted? Social Reproduction in Calm and Crisis.
- Author
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Gunderson, Ryan
- Subjects
- *
SOCIAL structure , *SOCIAL reproduction , *SOCIAL order , *SOCIAL marginality , *SOCIAL change - Abstract
This paper identifies experiential processes through which social structures become taken for granted, termed processes of "structure marginalization". Passive processes of structure marginalization relegate social structures to the margin of experience without the use of higher-order cognitive acts such as evaluation and reflection. Examples include adapting to social structures via routine and habitual practices (material reification), a lack of conscious awareness of the complexity, historical formation, and other details of social structures (ignorance), and rendering social structures irrelevant when they are unreflectively judged to be of no value for achieving ends (nullification). Active processes of structure marginalization reflectively and discursively relegate social structures to marginal consciousness. Examples include the use of naturalistic and necessitarian explanations for the social order that implicitly justify it as inalterable or "just the way things are" (discursive reification), normative justifications for the status quo (legitimation), and conscious awareness of one's powerlessness to control social-structural conditions (helplessness). Active processes of structure marginalization originate in passive processes. The goal of the typology is to explain, at the level of experience, why social structures typically remain unproblematic and unnoticed in everyday life, even during periods of social crisis and change or when existing structures produce harmful effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. The Givenness of Other People: On Singularity and Empathy in Husserl.
- Author
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Rosen, Matt
- Subjects
- *
EMPATHY , *HOSPITALITY , *SPHERES , *CENTRALITY , *ATTENTION - Abstract
Other people figure in our experience of the world; they strike us as unique and genuinely other. This paper explores whether a Husserlian account of empathy as the way in which we constitute an intersubjective world can account for the uniqueness and otherness of other people in our experience. I contend that it can't. I begin by explicating Husserl's theory of empathy, paying particular attention to the reduction to a purely egoic sphere and the steps that ostensibly permit a subject to re-inhabit a world of others from out of this sphere. In querying Husserl's theory, I consider a series of problems, raised by Zhida Luo, concerning the apparent centrality of bodily similarity in empathy. I sketch Luo's solution, which involves a shift to tactile similarity. While it makes for a better theory of empathy, this solution isn't sufficient to make room for the givenness of another person not originally predicated on similarity. To clarify what's at issue here, I turn to the Husserlian pictures of empathy presented by Heinz Kohut and Edith Stein. I conclude with a remark about what might be required, given the inability of Husserlian empathy to make room for the experience of others as singular and other, for a picture of our phenomenal life to have a shape that accounts for the coexistence of empathy to others who are like oneself and hospitality to others as genuine others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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