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This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronēsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self‐controlled and akratic agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines a particular aspect of Paolo Mantegazza's (1831-1910) work: the establishment of the Museo Psicologico as part of his anthropological project. The study begins by examining the general characteristics of Mantegazza's anthropological viewpoint, justifying the inclusion of comparative psychology as a subfield of anthropological psychology, with a focus on the key principles that served as the theoretical foundation for the establishment of the Museum. Subsequently, the proposal for the foundation of the Museum will be analyzed, including a description of the theoretical and methodological principles underlying the selection and arrangement of the objects to be collected. Finally, the paper will describe the Museo Psicologico at the time of its inauguration, providing an overview of its organization in the following years and an attempt to uncover the reasons behind its abrupt dissolution after the death of its founder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the first half of Part 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza presents his directions for mitigating the passions through reason. He touts his account of the power of reason over the passions as ground-breaking and unique, while positioning himself squarely within the traditional debate of akrasia, or weakness of will. Spinoza claims he is the first to identify the affects through their characteristic effects, and demonstrate the way these effects can be countered by the mind's activity. It follows that Spinoza's claim for originality can be explained in (at least) two ways: first, passions themselves have been misunderstood, and second, previous philosophers have misunderstood the relationship between reason and the passions. In the first part of this paper, I place Spinoza's discussion of the passions and reason's power over them in a historical context. Next, I present Spinoza's definition of the affects, and his directions for 'destroying' the passions. In the third section I point to the differences between my interpretation and that of recent commentators. Finally, I discuss the way in which Spinoza's directions for mitigating the passions serve as the psychological basis for his moral theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the 'desire of company', we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyze the concept of passions in Kant, trying to answer the question: are passions good for society or are they the source of evil and irrationality? I begin by showing the danger of passions, if compared with affects. In the Anthropology, as well in the Religion, Kant claims that passions are the evil we should fight against. More than inclinations, or affects, the evil principle refers to passions. However, in the Ideia for an Universal history with a cosmopolitan aim, Kant admits that passions are good for society. They are not the cause of their irrationality, but the possibility of the development of the natural predispositions of human being. I claim that we have two distinct answers in Kant, and I try to understand this ambiguity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the anthropology, ethics, and politics of Helvetius, focusing on the theme of power and the passions that gravitate around it, and highlighting the transition from a position that could be broadly defined as "anarchic" (all powers are bad) to one that realistically takes power for granted as an insurmountable horizon (and which leads to the future-laden idea of a "democratic despotism"). By analyzing these themes, it questions the common interpretation of Helvetius's thought as a compact block ("Le système d'Helvétius"), emphasizing the way in which the theoretical reworkings presented in De l'homme must be understood in light of the internal tensions of De l'esprit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Descartes' theory of the passions has important connections to his view that nonhuman animals are automata. In this paper, I show how critics of animal automatism exploited these connections. I interpret a criticism of animal automatism developed by Gabriel Daniel (1649–1728). Daniel argues that animal automatism commits Descartes to an implausible account of the phenomenology of conflicts between passion and reason. If animal bodies act by mere automatic mechanism, then when a human being resists their animal impulses they should experience a conflict between the disposition of their body and their rational soul. However, our experience of conflicts between passion and reason instead suggests that these conflicts are internal to the soul. Daniel's objection to Cartesian animal automatism was later criticized by David Renaud Boullier (1699–1759), but Boullier himself raises an objection to Cartesian animal automatism that develops insights from Daniel. I argue that Boullier succeeds in raising a powerful objection to Cartesian animal automatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Descartes, the passion of generosity—defined as legitimate self-esteem— appears to be egocentric, the result of agents' contemplation of their nature. Yet Cartesian generosity is also intended to serve as the foundation for other-regarding passions, attitudes, and dispositions. This paper examines this tension as it is addressed in the writings of an early Cartesian feminist, Mary Astell. We uncover the social dimension of generosity in Descartes's Passions of the Soul and demonstrate how Astell extends the Cartesian concept in her Serious Proposal. We argue that while there is an internal relationship between Cartesian generosity and good will toward others, Astell's work recognizes that generosity can only be fully actualized under equitable social conditions. We thus provide a deeper analysis of the role that this master passion plays in Descartes's ethical thought as well as a greater appreciation of the impact of Cartesian ethics on early modern feminism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adam and Eve served their passion of gastrimargy and their ambition to become gods without the grace of God. The result was their exile from Paradise and death. The incarnation of Logos, His crucifixion, His death on the cross and His resurrection gave a second chance of man's salvation. Unfortunately, people do not put into practice this gift of their reconciliation to God. In this paper, we will compare the opinion of two important Church Fathers, Isidore of Pelusium and Theodore Stoudite. It is important to underline for what kind of passions these Church Fathers speak. Do they relate the passions only with monks or general with Christians? How can we get rid of a passion? Can their teaching be put into practice in nowadays? Which is the worst passion according to them? Are diseases and pandemic a punishment of God for our sins? Of course, we should explain that the passions in the life of a Christian can be proved deadly but they have no connection with the view that diseases are punishments from God for our passions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focused upon Descartes' writings and letters, this paper considers the exponentially-charged relationship between sadness, melancholy, doubt and philosophical inquiry. The first sections examine the relation between sadness in the Cartesian corpus and melancholy as a traditional pathological classification, with both set against a larger seventeenth century intellectual discourse. The letters exchanged between the Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and the Palatine and Descartes between 1643 and 1649, that is, just prior to the death of the philosopher in 1650, reveal the central paradigm of this particular relationship between sadness and melancholy. The call to use philosophy as a cure against sadness also enters consideration, with the theatrical, artificial nature of the philosophical cure presented as essential not only to Descartes' relation to sadness, but also to philosophical method in general. The moral aspect of the establishment of mental habits and their emendation by philosophy hence yields central insights into the larger Cartesian project, here viewed as essentially premised upon a medical vocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]