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It is well known that North Korea uses political propaganda to elicit popular support, and this article focuses on how primary and secondary schools play an essential role in conveying the regime's messages. The article asks how this process shapes North Koreans' perceptions towards citizenship and how their perceptions of 'democracy' differ from those in other parts of the world. School education, I argue, socialises North Koreans and shapes their everyday political attitudes and citizenship perceptions. This study examines 32 North Korean Socialist Moral textbooks and identifies four core regime messages embedded in these texts: Personality Cult education in relation to the Kims, promoting socialism, fostering nationalism, and cultivating communitarianism and collectivism. I propose that these regime messages positively and negatively affect perceptions of democratic citizenship. Messages that promote communitarianism can encourage North Koreans to engage in democratic politics, but messages about political leadership, nationalism, and collectivism can hamper North Koreans' understanding of democracy and their capacity to develop democratic norms. This study has implications for research into how North Korean defectors are integrated into democratic South Korea, suggesting that these defectors' longstanding exposure to authoritarian education in North Korea will necessarily influence how they conceive of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 2016 and 2019, South Korean conservatives organized a movement called the T'aegŭkki Rallies to oppose the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and to protest against President Moon Jae-in's administration. This movement is puzzling for its timing, demographic composition, and rhetorical choices. Through in-depth interviews with rally participants and non-participants, I illustrate that a collective identity, shaped by authoritarian socialization, strengthened with positive memories about an authoritarian past, combined to mobilize rally participants. Curiously, rally participants saw themselves as defenders of liberal democracy, protecting South Korea against progressive forces seeking to turn the country into a communist state. However, my interviews revealed that they were, in fact, trying to protect the authoritarian past. In this manner, South Korea's authoritarian legacy entrenches ideological polarization and hampers common understandings of democratic citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are authoritarian successor party (ASP) supporters more likely to protest? I propose that ASP supporters are less likely to protest in general. The post-democratization mobilization environment is shaped upon the pre-democratization mobilization basis. During the pre-democratization period, protest was organized around the democracy movement. Thus, protest tactics and networks were accumulated through it. As former authoritarian ruling party supporters, ASP supporters are less likely to have legacies of participating in the democracy movement, which prevents them from accessing the accumulated protest resources from the democracy movement. However, I argue that this negative association varies based on the ASP qualities and supporters' age. Supporters of ASPs that maintain strong pre-democratization legacies are more likely to participate in protests than supporters of ASPs that do not strongly highlight their authoritarian legacies. Also, when the ASPs' characteristics are considered, older ASP supporters are more likely to participate in protests than younger supporters. Using both single-level and multilevel statistical analyses, I examine four Asian countries with politically powerful ASPs and find evidence supporting my hypotheses. Lastly, I compare two South Korean mass movements, the Candlelight movement and the Taegeukgi rallies to unpack the relationships between ASP supporters, protest resources, and mobilization. This study reveals authoritarian legacies among post-democratization citizens through ASP supporters' protesting behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to their analytical framework, Slater and Wong revise the classic modernization theory, which maintains that economic development and subsequent structural changes lead to a stable democracy. Tackling these two classic questions, Dan Slater and Joseph Wong break with the longstanding assumption that democratization starts when an authoritarian regime is too weak to withstand internal and external pressures. Thus, I From development to democracy i redirects our attention to the role that dictators play in democratization processes. [Extracted from the article]

This letter presents a high-frequency boost converter using an accurate feedforward-path current sensor for the fast-load transient response. To operate with the switching frequency of up to 25 MHz, the proposed current sensor senses the inductor current with a fast-sensing response time of about 4.5 ns. It also provides more accurate sensing gain than previous current sensors. In addition, the adaptive on-time control method is used for the proposed converter to further enhance the transient responses. The converter has been fabricated using a 0.18-μm CMOS process with a total chip area of 1.3 × 1.12 mm. It achieves a fast-load transient of only 1 μs at a 400-mA load step, and peak efficiency of 91.5 and 88.2% at switching frequencies of 15 and 25 MHz, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Central Election Management Commission (CEMC) was rebranded by Park Chung Hee and keeps managing elections and the election landscape after democratization. South Korean elections are known as one of the most clean and fair elections.[1] If one emphasizes elections to gauge democracy, South Korea can be considered a well-performing democracy. When Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party, which actively mobilized voters, fell with rampant electoral fraud, Park successfully created a democracy symbol that disconnects ordinary citizens and politicians and "minimizes voter-politician interaction" (p. 32). [Extracted from the article]

What is field research? Is it just for qualitative scholars? Must it be done in a foreign country? How much time in the field is "enough"? A lack of disciplinary consensus on what constitutes "field research" or "fieldwork" has left graduate students in political science underinformed and thus underequipped to leverage site-intensive research to address issues of interest and urgency across the subfields. Uneven training in Ph.D. programs has also left early-career researchers underprepared for the logistics of fieldwork, from developing networks and effective sampling strategies to building respondents' trust, and related issues of funding, physical safety, mental health, research ethics, and crisis response. Based on the experience of five junior scholars, this paper offers answers to questions that graduate students puzzle over, often without the benefit of others' "lessons learned." This practical guide engages theory and praxis, in support of an epistemologically and methodologically pluralistic discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]