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This paper examines the diplomatic engagement of the EU3 (Germany, France and the UK) with Iran, in the context of growing regional and international concerns about the Iranian uranium enrichment programme and Tehran's perceived regional hegemonic ambitions. Drawing on the academic literature on coercive diplomacy/strategic coercion, this paper examines EU3 negotiating strategy and that of Tehran, focusing on three key elements: demands, threats and time frame. The central argument is that the Iran case is a unique, if not anomalous example of coalitional coercive diplomacy, in which the states engaging in diplomatic negotiations lack either the military capabilities or political will to threaten coercion, and the states making threats are not engaged in diplomacy. Nonetheless, the Iran issue provides an interesting case-study which highlights the possibilities and limitations of coalitional coercive diplomacy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1997 New Labour government set about modernising British foreign policy by devising new ways of conceptualising, making and talking about Britain’s role in the world. First, in May 1997 Foreign Secretary Robin Cook famously announced that he wanted to give British foreign policy an ‘ethical dimension’. Second, in April 1999 the Prime Minister set out his ‘doctrine of the international community’ in which he spelt out the multifarious security challenges posed to individual nation states by global interdependence and the ‘circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts’. Finally, Chancellor Gordon Brown has returned time and again to the potential gains to be had from exploiting what he calls the ‘British genius’ on the world stage.New ways of representing foreign policy, together with a sophisticated communications strategy on the part of the government since 1997 demands new ways of researching British foreign policy. In this paper I consider two questions arising from this challenge: first of all, what can discourse analysis contribute to political research in general? Second, how can we design a workable research programme into New Labour’s European policy that has discourse analysis at its very centre? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many of the 3-4 million Zimbabweans living outside their country left during the last decade because contemporary economic & political crises. Yet there is litle analysis to date of diasporic contributions to political change & social reconstruction other than on remittances. Nevertheless, various civil society groups do exist in such disporas. Indeed, many such activists were very engaged back home; primary parts of the reason for their exits. This paper identifies Zimbabwean groups in the UK active in & about the intensifying crises back home: what mechanisms to encourage change there? What future in & around Zimbabwe for democratic, devlopmental governance? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen increasing attention, in the context of studies of hegemony, to the concept of global reach, closely related to the concept of power projection. The latter, that is, can be used as one measure of hegemony. The author is amidst a research project on the history of basing access, involving the compilation of data for the Mongol Empire, Genoa and Venice, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, the U.s and the USSR. The data are mostly in hand. In this paper, I will deal with the factors of, among others, the relative geographic comprehensiveness of basing access, factors of time and distance (how long did it take a Portuguese fleet to get from Lisbon to India?), and how much gets projected. In the current period, of course, the U.S. has an almost comprehensive global reach via satellites, tanker refueling, long range missiles, etc. I will be looking at how global reach has developed over several centuries. That will also help in contributing to the debate in the literature over whether Portugal or Spain (or both) was the real hegemon in the 16th century long cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two ways of looking at Sovereignty. Realists make sovereignty a near-synonym of statehood and the axiomatic basis of the theory of international anarchy. By contrast, constructivists tend to view sovereignty as a norm, a social construction. Krasner’s a modified Realism accepts the notion that sovereignty is a construction but denies it constraining power as a norm, functioning only as hypocrisy. Alexander Wendt accepts it as a weak norm internalized only to the second degree in some aspects and in other respects accepts with Realists that sovereignty is a definitional attribute of statehood. Some constructivists emphasize its normative role further while post-modern constructivists emphasize its ephemeral value in a system of arbitrary symbols. The authors argue that state behavior demonstrates that sovereignty is a norm of the international system but that states regularly seek to evade or test its constraints. The task is to build a framework that can specify: 1. What constitutes behavior that demonstrates recognition of sovereignty as a norm 2. Which states act within the constraints of the norm of sovereignty and which do not 3. When states act within the norm and when they do not. This paper distinguishes the material contours of sovereignty from its normative and socially constructed features to show how leading powers shape the normative features of Sovereignty to construct an international system. We will look at Britain following the Napoleonic Wars, the Great Powers at Versailles, The US and the Soviet Union after WWII as a basis to understand the problems confronting the institutionalization of US hegemony today. A self-help system is constrained only by the gradient of power relations among states. Normative restraint is a direct alternative to reliance on one’s own power and that the context for normative restraint is a form of social knowledge based on the expectation of reciprocal restraints on the part of other actors. Powerful actors in the international system have the least incentive to prefer normative restraints to self-reliance. Preponderant power gives little incentive to respect the sovereignty of smaller, weaker states absent a powerful countervailing coalition. Ikenberry shows that the organization of a system of mutual restraints falls to leading powers at the time of post-War settlements and that these orders are designed to maximize the long-term advantages of leading states (Ikenberry 2001). Ikenberry suggests that the norm of sovereignty became to postwar order under Westphalia, but this was a limited European system. Little and Buzan show however, that the sovereign state became the norm of the international system only following decolonization after the Second World War. Ikenberry’s methodology suggests that the norm of sovereignty and institutional binding are alternative forms of system and international order, whereas the chronology developed by Little and Buzan (2000) suggests that sovereignty becomes universal only with the emergence of embedded liberalism in the post WWII era. In the post cold war era a new challenge to the universality of the norm of sovereignty has emerged with the twin projects of humanitarian intervention and the deliberate pursuit of a ‘democratic peace’ contained in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the US. Is universal democracy displacing sovereignty as a universal norm? Great power disunity surrounding the Iraq war is seen as conflict over competing norms as the basis of the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how a hegemon can affect its environment through the foreign policies that it chooses to adopt. In this strategic setting, challengers will take into account likely responses before deciding on which strategy to adopt. Both historical and contemporary cases of hegemony will be examined (Britain in the 19th century, the US in the 20th and 21st centuries), in particular the domestic politics of both hegemons and challengers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The case of the UK private equity industry provides unique insights into how a financial actor can successfully negotiate the complex landscape of a hostile political arena and thwart a potential negative regulatory response. Using evidence from regulato ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether could write a history of British international thought. It begins by asking whether the idea of a history of British international thought is an intelligible one, and with the related question of whether there is a distinctively British tradition of thinking about international relations and if so how that tradition might be defined and explained. It examines debates over national traditions of political thought, the apparent anomaly of a national tradition of inter-national thought, and Churchill’s suggestion that there is a distinctive Anglo-American political tradition supporting a distinctive Anglo-American tradition in foreign affairs. It suggests that although limited themes or periodsâ€"such as Atlantic republicanism, Victorian international law, Edwardian liberalism, or a mid-twentieth century “English School”â€"might be suitable objects of historical inquiry, one must be skeptical of the idea of a national tradition extending from Bacon or Hobbes to Namier or Bull. In the course of this inquiry, the key terms in these debatesâ€"tradition, history, thought, and internationalâ€"are considered. The advantage of studying British international thought is to focus attention on neglected thinkers and themes, and on their context, but there may also be value in looking back at the international thought of a nation in (what might be) its moment of European or global dusk, which isâ€"as Hegel remarkedâ€"when the historian properly enters the scene. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Could a growing transatlantic rift between France, the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the use of military force outside Europe propel the political break-up of Canada? Scholars have posited a direct link between Canada’s binational (French and English) composition and its Atlanticist grand strategy. Two cultural hypotheses account for this link. First, Canada’s socio-demographic composition, mainly populated by immigrants from France and the United Kingdom during the 18th and 19th centuries, has fostered a sense of collective identity between Francophone and Anglophone Canadians and their respective countries of ethnic origin. Combined with its inevitable North American geographical location next to the United States, these socio-historical backgrounds help explain Canada’s attachment to a quadrilateral Atlanticism. Second, France’s strong influence over Québécois’ attitudes regarding the use of force, and a similar Anglo-American sway over English Canadians, further explain the prevalence of this Atlanticist grand strategy since the second half of the 20th century. The institutionalization of these relationships within NATO and the UN Security Council, moreover, have entrenched a multilateralist strategic culture in Canada, which sought, with the establishment of these international institutions, to reduce to a minimum the potential for division within Canada’s three “natural” allies. A significant transatlantic split could spark divisive debates between Canada’s two “founding nations,” and worst, lead to the political break-up of the country. National unity imperatives, in other words, motivated the Canadian federal government to adopt a moderate, consensus-seeking multilateral strategy.This paper empirically tests these two cultural hypotheses from a reverse angle. It examines whether the varying threat perceptions between France, the United States, and the United Kingdom surrounding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could generate a national unity crisis in Canada along ethno-cultural lines. Evidence reveals the existence of diverging strategic subcultures within Canada -- in Québec, Alberta, and to some extent in Atlantic Canada -- which could be politically mobilized to further advance separatists political movements, but have yet failed to do so, even in Québec. These regional divides within Canada nevertheless illustrate the potentially disruptive nature of the allegedly growing transatlantic gap between France and the United States’ regarding the use of force. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British government's administrative response to European Union (EU) policymaking has changed over time to account for the redefined institutional rules and new policy competences established through successive "episodic constitutional change" within the EU-a phenomenon Bulmer and Burch have suggested represents a Europeanization of Whitehall. One such constitutional change in the area of defence policy-the establishment of new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) institutional framework in Brussels following the Nice European Council in December 2000-created the initial institutional imperative within the machinery of British government to adjust established policymaking procedures and bureaucracies to the realities of the EU's new defence and security role. This paper seeks to trace these institutional adaptations in the British government's policymaking machinery and procedures occurring as a result of British participation in ESDP across the main Whitehall departments and ministries involved in the policy process. Its findings are primarily based on interviews conducted between November 2005 and March 2006 with current and former British government officials in the UK's Permanent Representation to the European Union (UKRep), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and No. 10 Downing Street. It concludes that a growing number of British officials have become closely involved in the formulation and implementation of British ESDP policy as these policy demands have grown with the recent proliferation of ESDP operations and institutional initiatives. Consequently, some ministries and departments with little or no previous EU experience such as the Ministry of Defence have begun to participate in the EU policy process. Furthermore, the ability of other Whitehall actors to influence the formulation and implementation of British ESDP policy has changed with the evolution of ESDP at the EU level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the impact of Europe on the internal cohesion of the major British political parties, through its capacity to affect their issue profiles. It recounts the irruption of the European issue onto the agenda of British politics at various times in the recent history of the country, noting how this is reflected in the manifesto statements of the major parties. More particularly, it focuses on the impact of Europe on the attitudinal cohesion of the parties, making use of cluster analysis of survey data of parliamentarians in order to show how the parties - and especially the Conservatives - seem to have absorbed this issue and thus staved off the threat of internal fragmentation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the life of the current parliament the British government will again have to adress the issue of a replace for the strategic nuclear deterrent. The debate todate has been limited both in its volume and scope - it has tended to follow the traditional lines of rights and wrongs of possessing such a capability. This paper seeks to place the debate within the wider transformation debate within defence and consuider the impact that party politics will have the decision. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations theorists posit the importance of "state identity," but lack consensus on what it is. The result is in an insufficient understanding of its sources and significance. Two views predominate. One sees identity as role, the other stresses cultural discourses. Levels of analysis also vary within these perspectives, with some studies concentrating on state interactions, others on the domestic realm. Based on these two dimensions of difference, we delineate four distinct manifestations of corporate identity. The evolution of British foreign relations illustrates the utility of disaggregating identity as a variable. Interactions across international, domestic, and transnational dimensions of collective identities lead us to differentiate between "state" and "imperial" identities. The 1950s, in particular, mark a critical transition from imperial to state identity in Britain, offering an opportunity to delineate more clearly the key features of identity as a variable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]