This project employs tools of political psychology to take a new look at a traditional puzzle in International Relations. According to conventional wisdom, when faced with the prospect of a nuclear exchange, states with nuclear arsenals are particularly cautious of their behavior during times of crisis or conflict. This nuclear peace, as it has been termed, is founded in traditional theories of deterrence and mutually-assured destruction. The often-overlooked alternative to nuclear peace is limited war, in which parties to a conflict mutually recognize that the nuclear option is untenable, and are therefore more likely to enter into a conventional conflict. The critical difference between these models of conflict behavior is the assumption of rationality during escalation. That is, nuclear peace theory assumes that a conflict, once begun, is unpredictable and uncontrollable. Limited war theory, on the other hand, allows for rational, step-by-step escalation, during which adversaries may choose to halt the process before a nuclear exchange takes place. This leaves us with a puzzle: under what conditions will states engage in nuclear peace versus limited war? As the existence of nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea become more and more probable, this issue is deserving of increased attention. In this analysis of crisis decision-making, I employ two case studies. The 1955 Taiwan Straits crisis, involving China and the U.S., is an example of successful nuclear deterrence. Threats by the U.S., particularly statements to the American public by Kennedy and Dulles, convinced the Chinese government to cease shelling of Taiwan and led to almost immediate de-escalation of the conflict. The other case I look at is the 1999 crisis in Kargil, involving India and Pakistan. An early spring incursion across the Kashmiri Line of Control by Pakistani troops led to a three-month mini-war between India and Pakistan. After weeks of escalation, including mass mobilization of the Indian Navy and the deaths of numerous combatants from both parties, the crisis de-escalated in July and both states retreated to pre-conflict positions in Kashmir. What led to the success of nuclear deterrence in 1955 that was absent during the limited war of 1999? Alternatively, what allowed India and Pakistan to enter a conventional war in Kargil that China and the U.S. were unable to employ in Taiwan? I contend that a structural or systemic explanation of conflict behavior cannot explain the conditions under which states would choose a strategy of nuclear peace versus limited war. Instead, we must look to decision-making theories from political psychology. Specifically, I draw upon theories of political taboos, schema/heuristics, and priming. These tools, traditionally used to explain American political behavior, are particularly well-suited to explain how states make decisions prior to and during periods of conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]