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This paper complicates the classic security dilemma by considering the notions of ontological security and relational deterrence. It studies how the ontological security dilemma has emerged between the US, China, and Taiwan from the relational perspective and how these spiral chains will further develop in the future. The paper incurs the literature on relational analysis to expound on how different ontological security concerns allude to relational deterrence between the three actors. Taiwan's separatism is more of a threat to China's relational self than to physical security because the separatist does not belong to any already agreed relationship. A geometric model and a few simulations yield three unconventional findings. 1) The less advantaged the US military is over China, the less likely armed unification will occur. 2) The US anti-Chinese tendency is irrelevant in determining the probability of armed unification. 3) What may escalate the spiral are China's anti-Taiwan independence and Taiwan's anti-unification. Case sensitivity indicates the ontological sensibilities of a security dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China-Taiwan Relations have become significantly less confrontational since 2008. One of the indicators demonstrating the improvement of their relations is the resumption of the contact between China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 2008 after 9 years of no formal interaction. The purpose of this paper is to explore China-Taiwan relations in the period from 1990 to 2008 by examining the interaction between the aforementioned two organizations which were founded in 1991. By analyzing the relevant official announcements and statements made by China and Taiwan in the period from 1990 to 2008, this paper finds that China became more hostile toward Taiwan and therefore its ARATS in turn was unwilling to negotiate with Taiwan's SEF when it perceived that the Taiwanese government was pushing for Taiwan's independence. By contrast, when it perceived that the Taiwanese government was more compromising on the issue of Taiwan's independence, it became relatively conciliatory and its ARATS in turn was more willing to interact with Taiwan's SEF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation. It argues that social construction of national reality originates from everyday life experience taken for granted during the process of socialization. Individuals make sense out of the external world. Experiences taken for granted become actor's stock of knowledge. A common scheme of knowledge shared by the community serves to differentiate in-group (nationals) and out-group (foreigners). Collective consciousness thus defines national identity and hence a nation. Unless people (both in-group and out-group) interact with and learn from each other, different stocks of knowledge taken for granted will create political tension. This theory will be applied to understand the tensions in Tibet and along the Taiwan Strait. The paper further argues that Taiwan can hardly separate from mainland China in the future, while strong Tibetan consciousness continues to defy against powerful Chineseness, resulting in endless upheavals in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world's most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the 'ethnicity' factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the 'ethnicity' may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the 'ethnic peace' thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute has caused tensions among China, Japan, and Taiwan for decades. Although the Taiwanese government keeps a low profile on the dispute, the issue has flared up online discussion among Taiwan's netizens. Many consider Taiwanese people more pro-Japan than other countries in East Asia, as elder generation living on the island shares nostalgia toward Japan, and as its younger generation charmed by Japanese manga and anime, let alone Taiwan being the top donor to Japan's 311 earthquake. In this vein, Taiwanese people should accommodate well with Japan. However, Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute may tell another story. The act of Japanese government to nationalize Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012 has provoked anger among its neighbor countries. Are Taiwanese people in favor of Japan's stance on Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute due to the attachment for Japan or the other way round? This paper applies text mining technique and sentiment analysis to the digital data of Taiwan's largest bulletin board system station-PTT-established by college students and extracts postings concerning Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute in the past 4 years (2009~2012). By this bottom-up approach, we aim to examine Taiwan's netizens' emotion toward the two hegemonies-i.e., Japan and China-and to see whether the strong attachment to Japan has any impact on netizens' opinions on the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The island of Taiwan has successfully managed 60 years of fast-paced economic growth. Taiwan is a demonstrably resilient player in the global economy, while also maintaining high levels of income equality. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding whether the factors that have enabled and sustained the Taiwanese development project thus far will be an adequate means of managing the contemporary challenges facing the island. Taiwan may be becoming increasingly vulnerable to global economic conditions, and the island's future seems also to be increasingly tied to developments in the Chinese mainland. This paper examines the prospects for a continuing Taiwanese growth paradigm from both a cultural and an economic perspective and finds reason for optimism. This optimism is contingent on the strength of international export markets and prudent management of cross-Strait relations with the Chinese mainland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how and why China has been perceived as an economic threat in Taiwan through an examination of Taipei's post-Cold War economic policy with respect to the mainland. While Taipei's restriction on trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait until mid-2008 was widely considered a failure by both opponents and supporters of closer cross-Strait economic ties, this analysis points to an overlooked function of Taiwan's economic policy that was not just about tackling the problems of the security externalities or promoting the island's economic development. What appeared to be an ineffective policy can be understood as a successful boundary-drawing practice that discursively constituted a vulnerable Taiwan under Chinese economic threat, hence conducive to the (re)production of Taiwanese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U. S. role in cross-strait relations before and after the political power transition in Taiwan during 2008. It explores the question of whether a new dynamic is shaping the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral relations with the significant relaxation of cross-strait relations, and how that affects Washington's ability to influence the direction of cross-strait relations in the future. More specifically the paper analyzes the role the United States played in shaping the new reality in the Taiwan Straits, and the evolving thinking on Taiwan in American strategic and political circles. It will also discuss how Washington has managed the cross-strait relations so far as well as how Beijing and Taipei have handled the American factor on some sensitive issues. Finally it will look at the potential benefits and limitations that the United States could contribute to achieving a higher level of reconciliation and integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]