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In Taiwan, where relations with China define the major political cleavage, voters have distinct preferences on the issue of independence. Do Taiwanese favor a symbolic or pragmatic approach to the Taiwan independence issue? What are the factors that account for their political preferences? We identify two types of voters, symbolic and pragmatic, according to whether their preferences on independence are conditional or unconditional on China's potential counter actions. Specifically, symbolic voters have unconditional preferences on independence, while pragmatic voters are more agreeable to independence under more favorable conditions. Using multiple wave data from the Taiwan National Security Surveys (TNSS 2002–2022), we investigate the individual- and macro-level factors and find that gender, age, education level, ethnicity, partisan strength, and economic growth rate shape the types of voters in Taiwan. This paper contributes to the study of political attitudes in Taiwan, and have important implications on the regional stability in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party won the 2016 election in Taiwan, Beijing's Taiwan policies have witnessed some strategic and tactical adjustments. This article attempts to clarify the underlying changes and continuity in Beijing's Taiwan policy by addressing three vital questions. First, for Beijing, what is the prominent concern for its Taiwan policy making? Second, what is the top priority for its 'great rejuvenation' ambition? And third, what is Beijing's guideline for dealing with Taipei's reluctance to accept reunification? This paper argues that, firstly, how to prevent Taiwan's de facto independence from perpetuating has become the primary challenge for Beijing, given Taiwan's inclination to indefinitely maintain de facto independence. Second, Beijing still prioritizes the achievement of comprehensive modernization before the fulfillment of reunification within its overarching 'national rejuvenation' timetable. Third, discouraged by Taiwan's anti-China dynamics, Beijing has switched its guideline for promoting unification from 'placing hope on the Taiwanese' to 'placing more hope on the mainland itself'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History curriculum and textbooks, as a key mechanism of constructing collective memory, play a critical role in shaping national, social, and cultural imaginations of the young. This paper analyses history textbooks in Taiwan during the martial law period (1950-1987) to explore narratives about Taiwan and examines the ways in which those narratives as collective memory created particular images of Taiwan. The analysis indicates that history textbooks delineated two threads of narrative, one is a Sinicisation narrative, namely Chinese colonisation, and the other is Chinese restoration narrative. The Sinicisation narrative constructed particular collective memory about Taiwan being of Chinese descent and an inheritor of Chinese culture, lost and restored by China after World War II. In the narrative of restoration, Taiwan was imagined as reborn to be the model child of Chinese descent that was obligated to emancipate all Chinese compatriots from Communism and to ultimately realise the goal of Chinese reunification. These narratives served for emancipating Taiwan from Japanese colonisation and constructed particular collective memory that Sinicised Taiwan for Chinese restoration. The image of Taiwan as Chinese descent, identified with Chinese culture, has endured to the present and continue to shape imaginations and discourses about Taiwan in the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two Taiwan projects: the National Palace Museum (1965) in Taipei (NPM) and the NPM Southern Branch (NPMSB) in Chiayi (2003). The NPMSB targeted the liberalisation of the NPM from the stained political connotation of Chinese nationalism and constructs anew Taiwan's autonomous national identity. This paper argues that the construction of NPM/NPMSB in Taiwan is a cultural and colonial traumatism of national identity, and a struggle between official Chinese nationalism and rising prior Taiwanese subjectivity in a postcolonial context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to say a state is angry? To answer this question, this paper theorizes a diplomacy of anger. Specifically, the diplomacy of anger involves a vehement and overt state-level display of anger in response to a perceived violation. Although the diplomacy of anger threatens precipitous escalation in the face of further violations, it can be ameliorated by conciliatory gestures and will subside over time absent new provocations. What is more, the diplomacy of anger can also exercise a reciprocal influence on the emotional dispositions of those that practice it. The diplomacy of anger thereby contributes to constructing particular issues as sensitive and volatile, and thus outside the realm of standard bargaining interactions. To examine the analytical purchase of this approach vis-à-vis standard accounts of coercive diplomacy, this paper looks in-depth at the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper investigates the diverse approaches of EU members' integration with the EU through modelling, and assesses the applicability of each model to Taiwan-China relations. Building upon two variables: 'the association with national identity and reorientation or not', and 'being the leading or founding member or not' four EU members' integrative models stand out. The German model is proved to be the most integrationist, followed by the Finnish and the French models. The UK model appears to be the least committed. Due to sovereignty controversies, the visionary German and French models are not applicable to Taiwan-China integrations and the prospects are for the pragmatic Finnish model at best, and the UK model at worst. These modelling outcomes can then explain why the growing economic integration between the two sides has not produced spillover effects into the political arena. This paper therefore argues that it would be in China's interest to make Taiwan an equal leading player in Taiwan-China integrations, and to transform its 'one-China policy' from the current political and sovereignty contents to a cultural and value-laden concept. Among the theories being examined, (neo)realist-constructivism demonstrates more applicability than two mainstream integration theories - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]