Search

The adoption of the shared prosperity goal by the World Bank in 2013 and Sustainable Development Goal 10, on inequality, by the United Nations in 2015 should strengthen the focus of development interventions and cooperation on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. This paper contributes to the incipient literature on within-country allocations of development institutions and assesses the geographic targeting of World Bank projects to the bottom 40 percent. Bivariate correlations between the allocation of project funding approved over 2005–14 and the geographical distribution of the bottom 40 as measured by survey income or consumption data are complemented by regressions with population and other potential factors affecting the within-country allocations as controls. The correlation analysis shows that, of the 58 countries in the sample, 41 exhibit a positive correlation between the shares of the bottom 40 and World Bank funding, and, in almost half of these, the correlation is above 0.5. Slightly more than a quarter of the countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit a negative correlation. The regression analysis shows that, once one controls for population, the correlation between the bottom 40 and World Bank funding switches sign and becomes significant and negative on average. This is entirely driven by Sub-Saharan Africa and not observed in the other regions. Hence, the significant and positive correlation in the estimations without controlling for population suggests that World Bank project funding is concentrated in administrative areas in which more people live (including the bottom 40) rather than in poorer administrative areas. Furthermore, capital cities receive disproportionally high shares of World Bank funding on average. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are public officials more responsive to requests from affluent or poor constituents? A growing body of evidence suggests that lawmakers are more responsive to the rich when they craft policy. However, some scholars theorize that officials also exhibit a corresponding bias in favor of the poor when they handle casework, essentially giving policy to the rich and services to the poor. In this paper, we test this casework prediction using four experiments in which confederates sent simple requests to state or local officials. In each, our confederates’ reported social classes were randomly assigned and signaled with a brief introductory statement mentioning the sender’s occupation or economic situation. Across our samples, we find precisely-estimated null effects of social class biases: the officials we studied were equally likely to respond regardless of the constituent’s class. These findings raise doubts about whether casework is really a class-biased process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Incentive pricing programs have potential to promote economically efficient water use patterns and provide a revenue source to compensate for environmental damages. However, incentive pricing may impose disproportionate costs and aggravate poverty where high prices are levied for basic human needs. This paper presents an analysis of a two-tiered water pricing system that sets a low price for subsistence needs, while charging a price equal to marginal cost, including environmental cost, for discretionary uses. This pricing arrangement can promote efficient and sustainable water use patterns, goals set by the European Water Framework Directive, while meeting subsistence needs of poor households. Using data from the Rio Grande Basin of North America, a dynamic nonlinear program, maximizes the basin''s total net economic and environmental benefits subject to several hydrological and institutional constraints. Supply costs, environmental costs, and resource costs are integrated in a model of a river basin''s hydrology, economics, and institutions. Three programs are compared: (1) Law of the River, in which water allocations and prices are determined by rules governing water transfers; (2) marginal cost pricing, in which households pay the full marginal cost of supplying treated water; (3) two-tiered pricing, in which households'' subsistence water needs are priced cheaply, while discretionary uses are priced at efficient levels. Compared to the Law of the River and marginal cost pricing, two-tiered pricing performs well for efficiency and adequately for sustainability and equity. Findings provide a general framework for formulating water pricing programs that promote economically and environmentally efficient water use programs while also addressing other policy goals. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]