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"Quangos" (quasi-autonomous, non-governmental organizations) are ubiquitous in British policymaking, often assailed as lacking a direct accountability to the electorate given their quasi-independent status. This paper argues that quangos provide an avenue for understanding the "personal vote" and political control of administrative policymaking in Britain. Quangos deal in policies that directly impact particularistic aspects of a member's constituency. Moreover, governments can expend political capital, gleaned through electoral support, to influence quangos when actions raise more universal policy issues. Statistical analysis of 246 British quangos observed from 2001-2005, suggests that increases in backbench salience (personal vote) and public satisfaction with government (government strength) increase the transparency by which quangos make decisions, thus decreasing their independence. Public satisfaction with the status quo of public service provision, by contrast, decreases transparency, increasing independence. These results suggest that far from being independent, quasigovernmental organizations are subject to political control through well-known channels. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]