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In recent years, China has been under frequent attacks by nature. Due to high population, low economic development, wide climate range and vulnerable environment, China would adopt appropriate adaptive and reduction actions according to the basic situation of the country and under the framework of sustainable development. the PRC government released its first policy report on climate change in June 2007, China's National Plan for Climate Change. In 2008 and 2009, China followed up with the release of a white paper titled China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change, which points out that "as a responsible developing country, China is fully aware of the importance and urgency of addressing climate change and has adopted a series of policies and measures in this regard." This essay addresses China's policy responses towards climate change. This paper discusses China's policy response to climate change. The discussion begins with the influences of climate change on China's environment and then moves on to discuss China's concern, guiding principle, goal and policy action in reaction to the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the various impacts of contemporary globalization on national security, with special reference to the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China and its security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper adheres to a sectoral approach to the study of globalization-security interconnections and adopts a broadly based definition of security pertaining to the case study in question that encompasses economic, technological and defense security. The analysis of the subject matter is grounded in evidence collected in more than 140 interviews with chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data. On sectoral migration, the paper argues that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the development of the indigenous Chinese chip industry. It has been discovered that some Taiwanese non-state chip actors have violated government regulations in the process of spearheading the migration, and some have even forged business ties with their PRC counterparts associated with the PLA. As for the ensuing security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved, although long-term strategic repercussions are paramount. The depth and scope of the continuous sectoral migration in years to come will determine the level of economic security risks faced by the US and Taiwan. Long-term technological and defense security repercussions need to take into account two important elements at play: technological change in the sector (increasing commercial-to-military spin-on and dual-use nature of the chip technology), and the PRC dual-track (economic and defense) grand strategy behind its resolve to upgrade its indigenous chip capability. Four pertinent aspects are analyzed: (a) concerns over the PRC chip industrial base, its contribution to the PLA modernization and the ensuing shift in the balance of power in Beijing's favour; (b) technology-related misgivings over the trustworthy supplies of chips for the US and Taiwanese military end uses, as well as the shrinking "chip gap"; (c) fear of denial of chip supply due to foreign dependency; (d) dubious implementation of export control policies at the unilateral and the multilateral level that exacerbate some of the above security repercussions. The concluding section elucidates how the case study helps to show the impact of globalization on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. To sum up, the study offers a fresh look at the complex security repercussions of the globalization of a strategic industry that occurs in a politically sensitive region in world politics today. It not only helps us disentangle an important policy issue, but also advances our theoretical understanding of the globalization-security interconnections in international relations today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contends that one can apply a cultural lens to the study of Chinese security policy through examination of the perceptual effects of military doctrine. Through the development of two brief historical cases, this paper shows the importance of PLA doctrine in shaping the way China viewed its interaction with the United States in the past. The paper also lays out the relevance of this today by probing the way in which modern Chinese doctrine might shape perceptions. I argue that this (relatively narrow) approach to strategic culture has significant advantages in terms of objectivity and clarity of causal statements that can enhance the utility of the study of strategic culture to policymakers and scholars alike. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the complex learning process that occurred between 1979 and 1987, elites confronted anomalies in the long-term revolutionary development paradigm, which sought to establish a strong independent China by achieving three interrelated goals: security, prosperity, and self-reliance. Based on the perceived success of the SEZs and the nascent coastal development strategy, elites reached a consensus over replacing the long-term goal of self-reliance with a state-managed embrace of the international economy. The concept of self-reliance thus became obsolete as elites were no longer tethered to the Nativist beliefs of Mao Zedong and had incrementally learned of the limitations of import substitution. This paper hypothesizes that by 1987, Chinese elites agreed that China should join the rest of the East Asian economies in formally adopting outwardly oriented development regime, which regarded foreign capital, technology, and markets as tools to empower China. Elites thus initiated the GATT accession process, established the fifth special economic zone on Hainan, and announced the coastal development strategy. A new generation of technocratic elites would take over the country’s leadership to institute the new technocratic regime. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China has grown economically it has gained in world influence and military power as well. Some realist IR theorists believe that rising powers in general - and China in particular - pose serious dangers of conflict with the older great powers they seek to join or displace. Other scholars see China as acting cautiously and responsibly, like a status-quo-power. Neo-liberal theorists tend to believe that China can be integrated into a peaceful world system and constrained by a web of normative and legal obligations. Chinese leaders themselves speak of seeking a "harmonious world" and disclaim any intention to threaten anyone. What does the American public think about the rise of China as a world power? In this paper we use a variety of data collected by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and others to explore the nature and causes of Americans' views.It turns out that most Americans are well aware of the rise of China. Some are apprehensive about that rise, chiefly for national security (rather than economic) reasons, and many favor a degree of off-shore "balancing" of the sort that realists recommend. But few Americans want to actively work to limit the rise of China. Very few favor the use of troops to defend Taiwan. Very few favor a nuclear-armed Japan. Large majorities of Americans take stands more akin to those of neo-liberal than realist theorists, favoring cooperation and peaceful engagement with China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of the other great power - India, and how these two Asian great powers - India and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these two very different Asian giants with a complex relationship view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This paper examines how Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the rise of China and their assessment of the feasibility of Indo-Chinese partnership ("Chindia") or rivalry by employing a mixed-method research strategy, combining secondary literature research, elite interviewing, and direct observation conducted over the summer of 2008. It analyzes the Indo-Chinese relationship through three paradigms - geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes preliminary findings of a sectoral empirical case study that explores the impacts of contemporary globalization on national security. The case focuses on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry migration to China, as part of the continuous globalization of the chip sector, and the extent to which such a globalization process, under certain conditions, may pose security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper is composed of four sections. The introductory section explains why it matters to adopt a sectoral approach to the study of globalization's impacts on security and why it matters to focus on the chip industry in the proposed study. The section further defines key concepts of globalization and security as used in the paper, identifies inadequacies in the existing literature, and highlights the significance of the proposed research undertakings. The second section explains rationale behind the methodological choice for the study, and summarizes strategies used to ensure interview access, data representativeness and data reliability. Using evidence collected in more than 140 in-depth interviews with a wide range of chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data, the next two sections dissect the empirical data in two major areas: the sectoral migration and the security implications. On sectoral migration, it is argued that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the indigenous Chinese chip industry development. The ways in which non-state actors of Taiwanese firms and individuals have violated government regulations in order to migrate to China are also identified. As for the ensuing technological and defense security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved; long-term security challenges, however, may emerge taking into account two intervening factors. They involve the technological change in the sector concerning spin-on prevalence and dual-use nature of the chip technology, as well as the PRC grand strategy behind its resolve to establish a solid indigenous chip industry. These long-term security challenges are chiefly linked with three conduits of influence: the defense industrial base and the PLA modernization, technological security risks, and the dubious export control policy implementations. The concluding section argues how and why empirical findings presented in the previous sections deepen our understanding of globalization's impacts on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the strategic outlook of the world's largest yet understudied armed force ? China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). With its sheer size, rapidly increasing capabilities, and uncertain intentions, the PLA's assessment of the country's external security environment entails profound implications for international relations. China has the world's largest military (with a manpower of over 2.3 million), second highest defense spending ($90 billion in 2004, by Pentagon's estimates; or $25.6 billion, by China's Defense White Paper), and one of the fastest-growing economies serving as the resource base for double-digit increases in defense spending for each of the past 15 years and for rapidly expanding its military capabilities. Yet, studying China's strategic intentions faces methodological challenges. China's decision-making process is opaque; its top leadership is not accountable to the electorate. A peculiar "civilian control of the military" ensures that the military will protect the party's interests. Access is guarded. Top generals rarely give interviews and their public statements echo top party leaders' statements. Discussions with "think tanks" affiliated with PLA tend to be formalistic. Moreover, a "strategic culture" of realism and a "cult of defense" combine to give Chinese an edge in deception and asymmetry. For a question crucial to U.S. national security, these problems have confounded scholars and policy-makers.The PLA's stated raison d'être is to "safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and preventing Taiwan's formal independence for now (or, in the future, incorporating Taiwan through force) has provided the impetus for the modernization of this armed force. But will China's aspirations increase with growing capabilities? The "Taiwan issue" thus provides a good angle to understand and evaluate China's perception and assessment of its security environment in the first decade of the 21st century.This paper tackles four questions: (1) How to disentangle the PLA's worldviews from those of China's civilian party leaders? (2) Compared to civilian leaders, is the military more hardline on issues perceived to pertain to sovereignty and territorial integrity but also more cautious on the use of force? (3) Are there subtle differences within the PLA -- by services, cohorts, doctrines -- on key strategic issues? (4) How does China's military development coalesce with the current leadership's stated strategy of "peaceful rise"? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's grand strategy, reflected in recent years by its "New Security Concept", is becoming more dependent on governmental and sub-governmental institutional cooperation. The development of sub-governmental dialogues (Track II) on regional security issues in the Pacific Rim has accelerated since the 1990s and is now widely seen as an optimal method of promoting both discourse and confidence-building in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until the late 1970s China was relatively isolated and alienated from the international system. Since then the Chinese government has gradually opened the country to the rest of the world. In the last three decades China has become increasingly integrated into the international system along various dimensions, such as security, economy, and politics. I argue that this development has had a major impact on the domestic political and social order in China. It has created new actors, altered the balance of power among new and old actors, and modified the institutional context in which they operate. In this process, China's participation in the international system has indirectly shaped the patterns of Chinese politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States—a liberal democracy—responded to the communist regimes' transition to market economies but not necessarily democratic politics by separating trade from security policy: opening trade to reforming economies but maintaining military superiority over non-democratizing military powers. Congressional attempts to use trade sanctions against market opening economies accused of human rights violations or weapons proliferation failed, while heavy investment continued in developing weapons to deter such countries. In Congress, this "liberal-realist" foreign policy emerged by "ends-meet-the-center" voting, in which bipartisan centrists prevail over extremists of both parties, or by "ideological bipartisan" voting, in which lawmakers on the same ideological side of both parties coalesce. Such patterns persisted in spite of majority party changes, divided governments, or economic downturns. The requirements for such voting patterns: an exogenous agenda setter, issue compartmentalization, inter-party politics, and ideological overlap between the two parties, strongly suggest the existence of a bipartisan, centrist, and pro-business group of lawmakers who serve as the domestic anchors of U.S. trade and security policy. Empirical evidence corroborates this claim, implying that to further understand foreign policymaking, it is necessary to tailor the standard models of Congressional lawmaking, incorporate empirically established policy preferences, and to go beyond the unitary actor-single preference models. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today everyone knows that in the coming century India, like the Medici, has the intention and potential to enhance its wealth, prestige, and power.In this context, observers of world politics are wondering: How will India pursue those intentions? What will it do to realize its potential and assure its security? In the last year and half since the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal was announced, numerous experts have tried to induce answers to these questions from what is still a small universe of cases including India's attitude toward Iranian nuclear policy and energy (particularly pipeline) policy, toward US missile defense initiatives, toward the enlargement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, toward Chinese activity in South Asia (particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan and Nepal). But, above all, observers have focused on a proposed deal between the US and India on nuclear cooperation.The dimensions and general features of the arena in which India will act are clear. It is a triangular space with China, India, and the US at the corners. The view that a rising India will be the fulcrum of balance in Asia is now increasingly common. A 2004 editorial in the Chinese People's Daily is a good example. "Steadily warming India-US relations have resulted in widespread attention to the geopolitics of Asia. It is difficult to predict whether or not India will become a strategic ally of the US or of China, but the sudden attractiveness of India will sooner or later alter the regional balance of power between the three countries" (Joseph, 2004). The 2005 Indo-US deal was interpreted by many observers to be an obvious American effort to draw India onto the US bandwagon.In the real world, of course, actors are motivated and constrained by power, wealth, and prestige. Syncretic approaches such as the currently fashionable "analytic eclecticism" draw selectively on all three international relations traditions in rendering "explanatory sketches" of important international security questions such as the durability of US-South Korean alliance, the possible revisionist aspiration of a rising China, or whether it is international institutions rather than balance of power dynamics that are shaping strategy in South East Asia. Explaining the future direction of Indian strategy within the China-India-US triangle is as analytically demanding a problem as one is likely to find in contemporary international relations.The conclusion I draw from what follows is that India is very unlikely to balance or to get on the bandwagon. Equipoise is the policy dictated by India's geography, power capabilities, identity, and potential to be a robust actor in global and regional politics. Like the old and now discredited Indian grand strategy of nonalignment, equipoise shuns formal alliances. The term draws on the realist balance of power idiom to identify an alternative stance - neither balancing nor bandwagoning - that is in dynamic equilibrium. That equilibrium is struck between domestic and international dynamics; balancing contradictory domestic cultural and political forces (such as nationalism/cosmopolitanism, anti-Americanism/pro-Americanism, self-sufficiency/trade-optimism) and international appeals and threats (such as American democratic/technological/commercial affinity, American unilateral neo-Imperialism, Chinese commercial appeal, and Chinese threatening intrusion/pressure). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most analyses of the development in post-Cold War Chinese security policy presume or picture the Chinese security policy as reflecting a coherent security strategy being either revisionist or status quo oriented. In contrast, my departure point is that the development in the Chinese post-Cold War security policy shows both revisionist and status quo oriented characteristics, and that the development in the policy has a highly reactive character. I argue that it is possible to identify a pattern in what the Chinese post-Cold War security policy is reacting to, and how the policy develops as a reaction to these factors. Thus, my overall objective is to identify the most important factors that influence the development in post-Cold War Chinese security policy and in which way. For achieving this objective, I construct and apply a so-called contingent realist argument about the development in a rising power's security policy under unipolarity. In this paper, I present the theoretical argument and conduct a preliminary case study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995-96. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China continues its shift from being an energy exporter to one of the greatest importers in the world, Beijing's foreign policy is becoming increasingly sensitive not only to the international energy market, but also to the security of its energy trade routes. Since 2003, there has been increased talk within the Chinese government of a "Malacca Dilemma", the problem of potential trade bottlenecks in the South China Sea region which could conceivably be blocked, creating a potential political and economic crisis for China. This thinking has greatly affected China's diplomacy in Southeast Asia but also with other energy producing regions in the developing world. This paper will examine the geo-strategic question of the Malacca Dilemma and its effects on Chinese energy policy and its 'new diplomacy', including whether its policies will bring it into greater opposition with the West as it too seeks to secure energy sources from the Middle East and beyond. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]