Search

In order to enhance effective cooperation, the Marrakesh Accords provide a compliance system for the international climate regime. An innovative part of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorized to impose punitive consequences on countries that fail to comply with their Kyoto obligations. Previous research has primarily focused on the ability of this compliance system to deter non-compliance. In contrast, this paper discusses whether the actual use of punitive consequences will induce a non-compliant country to return to compliance. To deter non-compliance punitive consequences must be relevant, potent, and credible. However, when punitive measures are actually imposed, deterrence has already failed. This needs to be considered when analyzing their ability to restore compliance. We argue that only if the imposition of punitive consequences is unanticipated, or their effects prove harsher than expected, will the non-complier be induced to return to compliance. Neither of these conditions can be expected to be fulfilled under the climate regime's compliance system. Thus, it will likely be the exception, rather than the rule that the use of punitive consequences will restore compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most scholars agree that NGOs make a difference in global environmental politics, there has been little systematic work that looks at the actual influence NGOs have on policy outcomes. This paper looks to shed some new light on the question of NGO effectiveness through an evaluation of the role played by NGOs in the climate negotiations. We begin with a brief sketch of different kinds of green NGOs, along with a review of the sorts of strategies and resources they employ. Next, we look to gauge the influence that NGOs have had on recent rounds of negotiations to do with compliance, flexibility mechanisms, and appropriate crediting rules for sinks. Our analysis is based on detailed interviews with members of some of the most prominent environmental NGOs involved in climate work. Finally, we suggest, based on our findings, some means by which NGOs may look to extend their influence in the development of the climate regime. Our analysis points to the crucial need for further "insider" capacity -- that is, NGOs are likely to have the most far-reaching influence on future climate negotiations if they foster ways to work closely and collaboratively with key negotiators and governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection without deterring participation. The problem of global warming provides an interesting case in the study of international environmental cooperation: it presents a clear case of cross-national externalities where incentives to defect are high; it raises fundamental questions about economic growth and development; and there have been varying degrees of scientific uncertainty throughout the climate change regime's development. This paper seeks to advance our understanding of the relationship between institutional design, compliance, and ratification in international environmental affairs. I argue that differences in enforcement mechanisms from one treaty to the next have an important impact on states' decision to ratify international environmental agreements. Treaties that do not carry binding commitments will attract a large membership base, and the extent of compliant behavior will bear little relation to the decision to ratify. Treaties that carry quantified, legally-binding, commitments are much more likely to be enforced, and therefore states will be 'selective' about ratifying them. I test these arguments using a newly-compiled dataset on carbon dioxide emissions and ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The results yield strong support for my arguments. Although it is not yet possible to examine statistically the impact of these treaties on the extent of compliant behavior, the findings have important implications for future studies on that question, and for future institutional design in the international climate change regime. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper portrays the normative structure of international climate change regime, consisting of 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997 Kyoto Protocol and other additional elements, the practices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Environmental Facility and procedures of these institutions.The first part of the paper explains the international legal foundations on which the climate change regime is built, including how rules with different normative qualities, i.e. hard and soft law rules, are used in this regime. This part gives an overview of the role of various participants in the climate change regime, including both governmental and non-governmental actors. Part two covers the substantive rules of the climate change regime, including the reporting, review and non-compliance mechanisms and institutions and procedures established by the regime to oversee implementation, enforcement and future development. Part three explains the increasing role of soft law in environmental regime and climate change regime and analyses the interaction between legally binding and enforceable rules and legally binding but unenforceable and legally non-binding. Part four reflects on the effects of the interplay between hard and soft law on the normative development of the climate change regime and assesses their relative advantages and disadvantages. The paper concludes that both hard and soft law have differential effects on both rule development and effective implementation of climate change rules depending on three factors: 'political saliency', 'the perceived state of scientific knowledge' and 'the bargaining power of the states' that favour either hard or respectively soft law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection without deterring participation. Indeed, relatively ‘soft’ international law often garners widespread participation, but it creates few concrete incentives for states to improve their behavior. ‘Harder’ legal commitments make shirking more difficult, but these institutional features are potentially problematic because they may deter from joining the very states whose behavior most needs improvement. I argue that a treaty's institutional design has important consequences for the prospects that states will commit to it. More specifically, because the potential (i.e., post-ratification) costs of soft international legal commitments are comparatively low, states should be relatively willing to ratify these agreements. On the other hand, because the potential costs of hard international legal commitments may be high, states should be less willing to commit to these agreements, and their ability subsequently to comply should have an important impact on the decision to ratify. I test these arguments using data on carbon dioxide emissions and ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The results largely yield support for my arguments. Although it is not yet possible to examine statistically the impact of these treaties on the extent of compliant behavior, the findings have important implications for future studies on this question. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]