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It is proposed a fine-tuning of the definition of intersubjectivity as inferable by Giuseppe Civitarese (2023a) – especially with regard to the expression “with-being” which is included therein – in order to overcome certain ambiguities within a constructive perspective, also paying particular attention to compatibility with Bion’s notion of group (and therefore of “field”). It is urged also to stick to the most consolidated interpretations of the philosophers mentioned, if their ideas are used in non-philosophical disciplines; in this way it is further attested to Husserl’s unlikely compatibility with psychoanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aims: To discuss how Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as a philosophy and approach, has been used and reported in researching the experiences of others, using the topic of foreign‐trained nurses. Design: Discussion paper. Data sources A systematic search of MEDLINE (PubMed), CINAHL, SCOPUS, British Nursing Database and PsycInfo was carried out in December 2021. The inclusion criteria were peer‐reviewed phenomenological research articles, grounded by Husserl's philosophy, conducted among foreign‐trained nurses and published in English from 2000 to 2021. Findings Two main themes were the outcome of critically reviewing relevant selected literature, 'referring to the original philosophy is not enough' and 'phenomenological findings need to be phenomenological'. These findings confirm some arguments about nurse researchers' discrepant use of phenomenology in their studies, including the proper application of phenomenological notions on the ground. Implication for Nursing: Nurse researchers need to clearly distinguish between phenomenology and other qualitative research approaches and consider the uniqueness of philosophical underpinnings that are essential in Husserl's phenomenology, which also need to be clearly applied and reflected in their studies. Conclusion: There are continually existing discrepancies and variations in using phenomenology by nurse researchers. These variations were uniquely evident when nurse researchers could not provide enough philosophical grounds and assumptions to their studies and underestimated the need to keep up with the various applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions, including the proper practice of phenomenological attitude. Therefore, it is recommended that nurse researchers should opt for different, less complex qualitative approaches if they do not adequately prepare and understand what constitutes phenomenology and the particulars of Husserl's philosophy. Impact What problem did the study address? Phenomenology remains popular in nursing. However, it can confuse nurse researchers and may result in an improper understanding of its core concepts. The use of phenomenology in nursing has been criticized over the years with nurse researchers being accused of conducting phenomenological research inconsistent with the original philosophy. What were the main findings? Using phenomenology by nurse researchers is various and includes some discrepancies. This variation is caused by not complying with essential philosophical grounds and underestimating proper applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions. Where and on whom will the research have impact? Outcomes of this paper illustrate examples of proper and improper uses of Husserl's phenomenology in nursing research, including critical considerations, which can guide nurse researchers aiming to conduct descriptive phenomenological research. Additionally, nurse lecturers can utilize this paper to show and emphasize the importance of philosophical grounds in phenomenology. No Patient or Public Contribution: Due to the nature of this discussion paper addressing philosophical and methodological aspects using examples from the literature, no direct patient or public contribution was required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author responds to the critical remarks in the comments by Ferro & Riefolo (2023) and by Fornaro (2023). The main points are, in the first comment, the status of reality in psychoanalysis, enactment, the various conceptions of the unconscious, self-disclosure, and the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. As for the second comment, on the other hand, the issues addressed concern the interpretation of Husserl's contribution to a better definition of the concept of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis and methodological aspects related to the use of notions derived from speculative thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to develop a phenomenological account of community which would not be pervaded by Eurocentric assumptions. Such Eurocentrism is what Husserl's phenomenological framework has been accused of. I first reconstruct Husserl's phenomenology of community in his late transcendental phenomenology by examining the Vienna Lecture. I show that Husserl's Eurocentrism is encapsulated in his account of corporeity, which simultaneously recognizes the importance of corporeity and its necessary overcoming in theoria , which originates in the European philosopher. I then argue that Merleau-Ponty, through his rigorously embodied phenomenology, can offer a non-Eurocentric phenomenology of community. Elaborating on the Husserlian insight of corporeity, notably the perceptual experience and the écart at stake in the encounter with other bodies, allows Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh to recast community from and with the body as an open, situated, and non-archeo-teleological structure, allowing phenomenology to reimagine inter-cultural encounters away from tropes of European exemplarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the overlooked contributions of Husserl's Phenomenology of intersubjectivity in understanding anorexia nervosa. It highlights the intricate relationship between the self and others, emphasizing their mutual constitution while acknowledging inherent differences. The distorted body image approach often overlooks this perspective, leading to psychopathological issues in individuals with anorexia nervosa. By integrating subjective experience and external observation, a more balanced and equal intersubjective relationship can be established. Utilizing this philosophical framework allows for a deeper understanding of the disorder's dynamics and sheds new light on the subjective experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa in relation to others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reassessment of intentionality as "tendency" or "drive," already important when the intentionality at stake designates the directedness of lived experiences toward a particular object, might be even more crucial when the orientation toward others is concerned. How do drives and affects intermingle within our intersubjective life and fashion our relations to others? The present paper will address this question by focusing on a particular or even primary kind of intersubjectivity: the mother–child relationship, that received a particular, yet still insufficiently noticed attention in early phenomenology. Scheler and Husserl both analyse this relationship, indeed, in terms that imply drive intentionality as well as affective intentionality (that is, for what concerns the mother, maternal instinct and maternal love). In their view, this relation also has a crucial ethical significance, and may even be taken to be paradigmatic for ethical relationships as such. Accordingly, drive intentionality is understood as an instinctive orientation toward others, that love takes up and develops, thus providing an affective and even instinctive ground for ethical behaviour. All this imples the depart from an ethics grounded on the primacy and sufficiency of reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the phenomenological method's reliance on imaginative procedures in view of ethnomethodological research. While ethnomethodology has often been seen in continuity with Alfred Schütz' phenomenological sociology, it mainly parts ways with phenomenology by stressing that the decisive details structuring mutual understanding (gestures, bodily expressions, or the myriad trifles that regulate casual conversation) are „not imaginable, but can only be found out". This paper reflects from a phenomenological perspective on what such a claim entails by first delineating this line of criticism from other objections raised against the use of imaginative procedures in phenomenology and by showing how this line of questioning departs from the core philosophical debates concerning imaginabilitiy and unimaginability in the Kantian tradition. Further on, the paper offers an in-depth interpretation of the aforementioned ethnomethodological claim in order not only to outline its methodological implications for phenomenology, but also to show that it involves possible key insights for understanding interaction, which phenomenology needs to take into account despite its eidetic scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If a new generation of phenomenologists (Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-François Courtine) in France sought to overcome the "methodic atheism" imposed on the phenomenological method by the fathers of phenomenology, it was at the price of going beyond experience immanent to existence which targeted the invisible, and therefore of lacking a discourse on the critical restriction of the phenomenological method and on the points of contact between phenomenology and theology. The task of this paper is to show how this lack is overcome by Marc Richir's "quasi theology" viewed from his articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological and the symbolical. This paper argues that whereas for the new French phenomenologists it is usually a question of a subreptitious crossing from one discipline to another, in Richir, what we have is an enigmatic relationship of the overlap between phenomenology and the symbolical. While Richir was only interested in the articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological, the symbolical and the absolute transcendence, his thoughts motivate us to explore, following Emmanuel Falque's approach, the reciprocal transformation between phenomenology and theology. The paper concludes, on the one hand, that experience remains the immanent ground for phenomenology and theological science and, on the other, that Richir's approach could be understood as a "metaphysical phenomenology". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl’s analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury’s theory of affections in his lecture course Einleitung in die Ethik. The sections of this course devoted to Shaftesbury are the only place in Husserl’s later philosophical production where he addresses the need to clarify the nature of approval from a phenomenological point of view and provides precise indications about the role that such emotions play in our life. I thereby examine Husserl’s criticisms of Shaftesbury’s account of reflective emotions, and I compare these criticisms with Husserl’s account of approval in the texts from the Konvolut über Billigung collected in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I argue that, according to Husserl, approval is an essential but not sufficient component in the pursuit of virtue. The upshot is that crucial parts of Husserl’s ethics come from a radical and original reworking of central notions of the early modern sentimentalist tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laura Gow, Uriah Kriegel, Hamid Taieb, and David Woodruff Smith raised help – and insightful points of criticism about my book Brentano's Mind. In this paper, I will defend and expand on the main claims of the book. My responses are organized around four topics: Psychology without a Soul, Plural Intentionality (and Conceptual Parts), Intentionality and Intentionality Primitivism, Mark of Mental. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fundamental goal of this paper is to clarify the importance of Husserl's reflections on destiny (Schicksal) in the context of his post-WWI ethics. In the first section, I sketch Husserl's reflections on war in his private correspondence. In the second section, I show that, in his post-WWI research manuscripts on ethics, Husserl conceptualized various forms of meaningless suffering under the heading of destiny. One of the main questions of Husserl's post-WWI ethics can be formulated as follows: in the dark horizon of senselessness, how is an ethical life possible? In the remaining sections, I show that Husserl's reflections on this question led him to deformalize his earlier ethics and motivated him to ground his ethics of reason in an ethics of love. In the third and fourth sections, I sketch Husserl's two fundamental answers to this question, the first of which concerns his phenomenology of love, while the second one – his phenomenological metaphysics in general, and his phenomenological teleology, in particular. While for Husserl, these answers are complementary, after clarifying Husserl's view on the conflicts of values, I conclude with some reflections on the importance of not overlooking that these answers are analytically distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eschatology is central to Christian theology: the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ is the promise of the "kingdom of God". This paper takes up this idea in discussion with contemporary Christian theologians and discusses it phenomenologically by recourse to Husserl's account of "horizon". The horizon is both finite and infinite: always limited in its actualization but with an infinity of potential actualizations. This is explored with respect to time and its relation to the eternal, as well as the dispositions of hope and fear with respect to the eschaton. The final section draws these insights together in a discussion of the eschaton to understand the eschatological destiny of nature in a "new heaven and a new earth" (Revelations, 21: 1) and conceiving of eschatological justice as a harmony of horizonal perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthropologists have recently argued that the divide between nature and culture is not a universal framework suitable for understanding collective behavior but rather a local variation among various ways of composing the experience of the world. Notably, in the case of Philippe Descola’s anthropology, this critique led to a radical reconceptualization of social sciences and the humanities in terms of ontological regimes, which draws upon key aspects of the phenomenological tradition. In this paper, I develop a phenomenological perspective on Descola’s anthropology to clarify whether and how we can assess our engagement with the world beyond the divide between nature and culture. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, I present the main claims of Descola’s position, which he calls “relative universalism,” and introduce two critiques of this project: the potential conflation between his ontological framework and aspects of modern naturalism and the risk of reifying cultural determinations as ontological properties. In the second section, I address the first critique by showing how the universalist claim of Descola’s anthropology, according to which collective experience is organized by the duality of planes of physicality and interiority, can be elucidated through Husserl’s account of the embodied experience to avoid a conflation with the naturalist framework. Finally, I contend that anthropology’s idea of a diversity of ontological regimes can be made coherent by analyzing the two layers of the world constitution: the primordial experience of the lived body and the intersubjective process of communalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proper way in which limit-problems [Grenzprobleme]—birth, death, dreamless sleep, the “prior to birth” [das vor der Geburt], the “after death” [das nach dem Tod], etc.—can be accessed according to Husserl is by means of so-called “construction” [Konstruktion] or “reconstruction” [Rekonstruktion]. Contrary to what is usually claimed with respect to this method, and therefore the acts it is composed of, this paper will attempt to prove that they do not consist in non-intuitive acts, but rather in intuitive, but non-sensible acts. In other words, the aforementioned acts of construction consist in categorial acts. More specifically, they represent acts akin to the ones involved in the constitution of exact material essences of a qualitative (the “pure” red, the “pure” blue …) or of a geometrical kind (a triangle, a chiliagon …): both the acts involved in the constitution of elementary exact essences, or acts of idealization, and the acts involved in the constitution of derived exact essences, or acts of deriving. However, the acceptance of such acts of construction suggests a serious reconsideration of some of the basic tenets of Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, it challenges the idea that phenomenology is an eidetic science of inexact—morphological, descriptive …—material essences, namely the essence of a subjective sphere (the essence of consciousness, the essence of ego …); in fact, it turns phenomenology, at least partially, into something Husserl explicitly repudiates on multiple occasions: a “geometry” of lived experience. It is thus important to determine whether these acts of construction should be integrated into Husserlian phenomenology, and, if yes, how they should be integrated into it. Providing an indication of this will be the ultimate goal of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the meaning of the phenomenological concept of sedimentation in the framework of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. The analysis I offer suggests that Merleau-Ponty initiates a transition from the constitutional problematic of sedimentations that we come across in Husserl's phenomenology to the analysis of existential sedimentations. Merleau-Ponty accomplishes this transformation by binding the Husserlian conception of sedimentations with the Heideggerian conception of facticity. The distinction Merleau-Ponty draws between originary sedimentations and secondary sedimentations is especially important, for it allows one to claim that Merleau-Ponty recognizes all experiences as sedimented. Against the background of this realization, I offer a reevaluation of Merleau-Ponty's cryptic remarks in the Phenomenology of Perception regarding the "original past," also described as "a past that has never been a present." I argue that these are metaphors for originary sedimentations. In place of a conclusion, I suggest that especially when the concept of sedimentation is universalized, we come to recognize its inherently paradoxical nature. In the final analysis, besides being a genetic concept, sedimentation is also a limit problem and a limit phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to clarify Husserl's critical remarks about Kant's view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929, §100) Husserl criticizes Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logic, but rather ascribing an 'extraordinary apriority' to it. He thinks the reason for Kant's uncritical attitude to logic lies in Kant's view of logic as directed toward the subjective, instead of being concerned with a '"world" of ideal Objects'. Whereas for Kant, general logic is about laws of reasoning. Husserl thinks that formal logic should describe formal structures. Husserl claims that if Kant had had a more comprehensive concept of logic, he would have thought of raising critical questions about how logic is possible. This kind of criticism cannot itself use forms of judgments or syllogisms of logic, nor even the 'inferential' [schliessende] method more generally, but should be descriptive in nature. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the method for such criticism. The paper argues that this results in reflection, and possibly revision, of the logical principles with respect to the normative goals governing the investigation in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to restore the questions that led Husserl to capture the morphological essence of phantasy and its modalities and to fix each of its essential features. Despite the early stabilization of the definition of phantasy as a type of intuitive, simple and non-positional presentification, the literature on the subject is still opaque regarding the way in which this type of experience is constituted in internal consciousness and in relation to the criteria that allow to distinguish it from other more or less close phenomena, such as perception, memory, image-consciousness or imagination, among others. Establishing the genesis and evolution of this concept will enable not only to clarify these opacities, but also to shed light on those other spheres of experience in which phantasy plays a substantial role, such as the intuition of essences, empathy, or aesthetic contemplation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the gesture of being silent —or "subjective silence"— can be described as a specific modulation of attention, in which consciousness gains awareness of a specific realm of experience where the body appears as a transcendental dimension of the self. Taking Dauenhauer's typology as a point of departure, I will describe what I understand with the expressions "subjective silence" –and "the gesture of being silent"– and try to show its specific relation to "attention," according to Husserl's description of it. Second, that the noematic field of this "subjective silence" is the realm of the pre-predicative, since it allows consciousness to maintain a certain intentional tension that does not focus on any categorial object. Finally, I will try to show that in this realm of the pre-predicative, the body appears as an immanent dimension of consciousness and, therefore, not as a mere object but as a transcendental instance of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one's longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or objective? And to what extent is the sense for "what (really) is" related to our beliefs of what should be? To investigate this, I combine a phenomenological approach to lived normality with a genealogical account of represented normality that sheds light on the social and historical contingency of definitions of normality and their intertwinement with structures of power. It is my contention that such an approach to normality is well-suited to investigate how is and ought are interrelated within subjective experience and practice. This might in turn help overcoming one-sided debates on post-truth, which rely on the strict opposition of objectivity versus subjectivity, universal truth versus subjective experience, facticity versus meaning, or reason versus stupidity. It also sheds light on the ambivalent or contested status of experience within debates of post-truth and feminist theory. I will conclude that post-truth is related to what Hannah Arendt has termed the lack of a common world (i.e., normality), arguing that a plurality of experiences is needed to let the "real world" stand its ground again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the notion of the ‘phenomenological world’ and the problems it generates in the ‘hard’ paradigm of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the lack of universality and intersubjectivity of this world, its closure and privacy, and its being only the personal world of a subject. Also, an attempt was made to show some of the sources of this problematic situation and the impossibility of solving it in a fundamentalist paradigm. It is only in the last period of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology (the so-called period of the Crisis) that these problems find their satisfactory solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl argued that psychology needs to establish an abstraction that is opposite to the abstraction successfully established in the natural sciences. While the natural sciences abstract away the psychological or subjective, psychology must abstract away the physical or worldly. However, Husserl and other phenomenologists such as Iso Kern have argued that there is a crucial systematic disanalogy between both abstractions. While the abstraction of the natural sciences can be performed completely, the abstraction of psychology cannot. In this context, Husserl argues that the psychological reduction leads to paradoxes. In this paper, I critically discuss whether it is true that the natural sciences can successfully abstract away the subjective. Or more precisely, I raise the question of whether they should. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to examine imagination with respect to its two poles and argues that in the phenomenological framework the locus of imagination is one between perception and ideation. Where imagination approaches perception we encounter the terminus a quo of imagination and therefore its lower limit and where it approximates ideation, we encounter its terminus ad quem and therefore its upper limit. In the former case we find the first form of imagination, which is the least articulated sense of imagination: image-consciousness. In the latter case we find the last form of imagination, which is the most articulated sense of imagination: free phantasy. On the one hand, then, image-consciousness is delineated from perception, and accordingly it is delineated from something that is determined. On the other hand, free phantasy is delineated from ideation, and as such it is delineated from something that is determining it. Situated between something that is determined and something that is determining it, the different forms of imagination can be said to have acquired different levels of freedom; imagination becomes freer the more it departs from perception and the more it approximates ideation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper outlines a phenomenological description of the meaning and moral significance of vulnerability. Such a description begins with a negative characterization in accordance with the contributions to the phenomenology of the body found in the works of Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Landgrebe, to advance at a later stage to the phenomenological characterization of the notion of the individuation of harm in relation to what Heidegger calls "the harmful" in his description of the affective disposition of fear. The exposure to harm that reveals the anticipatory understanding of fear in relation to the harmful, not explicitly thematized by Heidegger, is what we refer to here, in a broad sense as vulnerability. In the second moment I will present a positive characterization of vulnerability in relation to two levels of the formation of axiological meaningfulness. As we shall see, vulnerability, including bodily vulnerability, points to an understanding of exposure to being wounded as a guideline to follow in the reconstruction of axiological meaning revealed through affective life, in accordance with Husserl's programmatic indications. In this sense, it is necessary to refer more specifically to the place of trust, and its essential relationship with vulnerability, in the formation of the meaning of values, in particular, of moral value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to rescue the notion of foregrounding from the prevailing focus on defamiliarization. It does so by engaging in a phenomenological dialogue with David Miall's account of foregrounding and feeling and Viktor Shklovsky's discussion of literary device and aesthetic function. In particular, it contextualizes Miall's proposal of the response to foregrounding as a feeling-guided process involving boundary crossings, a defamiliarization-refamiliarization cycle, and self-transformative feelings within Husserl's philosophical analysis of sense constitution. Miall's feeling explorations and explications find their counterpart in Husserl's active egoic turning toward the affective allure and enticement of affective resonances. Using Miall's work as a touchstone, some frequently overlooked aspects of Shklovsky's conception of ostranenie are clarified by drawing on Husserl's notions of the natural attitude, active and passive synthesis, affective allure, expressive explication, and awakenings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenologists usually insist that their approach involves going “back” to and “starting” with technoscientific experience—that is, returning to the actual existing or living through of technoscientific life—after centuries of privileging the analysis of how things are “objectively” known and denigrating accounts of how they are “subjectively” lived with. But then who says this and how is this understood? “Who” is really a phenomenologist, when so many diverse thinkers claim the title? This paper considers some of the reasons why this is such a difficult question and argues that it is wrong to look for The Answer to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the idea, prevalent in post-Husserlian scholarship, that violence is a ‘limit problem’ of phenomenology. It offers a critical approach to this idea and proposes an alternative way of understanding the phenomenology of violence. The study comprises four analytical moments. First, I show the implications and shortcomings of interpreting violence as a ‘limit phenomenon’. Second, I address the issue of aggression as a mode of interaction between agents who can take on the role of perpetrators, victims, or witnesses. Here the intentionality of aggression as a phenomenon of the will in interpersonal relations will be addressed. It will be concretely shown to what extent intentional analysis, the kind of analysis prescribed by the ‘general scheme’ of transcendental phenomenology, is indispensable for fleshing out the experiential nature of aggression as interaction between agents who can either exert, suffer, or witness violence. Third, I turn to Husserl’s brief account of violence (Gewalt) in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität and, expanding upon it, propose a definition that aims to express the most fundamental structure of violence as a phenomenon of consciousness. Next, this phenomenologically grounded definition will be shown to be consistent with the sociological and intentional approach adopted by the World Health Organization in its World Report on Violence and Health. This will lead to the realization that the transcendental approach to violence can both contribute to the philosophical grounding of this Report and benefit from its multidisciplinary perspective—in particular its ecological model for analyzing the experiential horizons constitutive of the individual-environment relationship. Finally, it will become clear that violence harbors no more mysteries than any other form of intersubjective encounter and that transcendental phenomenology provides indispensable tools for conceptual clarification in interdisciplinary violence research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper attempts to get clearer on the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention. In doing so it considers and sets aside two prominent impure intentionalist accounts, namely the Phenomenal Structure view of Sebastien Watzl, and the Demonstrative Awareness view of Wayne Wu. As an alternative I outline a Modification view, which draws on ideas in Husserlian phenomenology. On this view, we should think of the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention in terms of attentive modifications of what I call a ‘pre-attentive phenomenal field’. I develop this view and highlight its benefits over alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first-person perspective, developed by Husserl for the scientific study of consciousness, consists of formal categories which can be used both for the analyses of consciousness as such and its concrete forms. Evidence (Evidenz), the central category in this approach, characterizes consciousness as knowledge. This paper presents the phenomenology of changes in perception and embodiment which lead to evidence for religious/spiritual experience (RE). Such change develops over time via contemplative practice, but also can be a part of spontaneous RE. Because of the presence of evidence, RE containing the change of perception are presentational (as distinct from appresentative). This temporally extended evidence concerns reality's giving of itself, granted that the main distinction between religious and non-religious experience is in the kind of reality to which they refer: physical in the case of non-religious, and 'ultimate' in the case of religious experience. Involving flesh and the reversibility of the body, the change in such complex RE also entails the transmutation of emotion from negative to positive. I compare these findings with Husserl's analysis of religious experience in HUA XVII, and argue that grounding religious experience in the preconceived idea of God, as Husserl does, limits RE to regressive forms which do not constitute knowledge. Such experiences remain teleologically directed at the world-horizon. By contrast, REs grounded in change of perception have a different teleology and do constitute knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Fiat cura, et pereat mundus. Husserl's Phenomenology of Care and Commitment". The present paper explores "the importance of what we care about" from a phenomenological angle in the spirit of Frankfurt's seminal essay. I shall reflect upon a few of its central concepts and issues within a Husserlian frame of analysis. My overarching claim is that Frankfurt's threefold distinction - knowing, ethical conduct, caring - is equally central to Husserl's phenomenology of reason and, more directly, underlies Husserl's phenomenological ethics of values and vocation in his Freiburg manuscripts of the 1920s and 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I contend that the core intuition that resides at the basis of Scheler's metaethics is expressed through the formal axiological distinction between things, goods, and values. I pursue a twofold aim: 1) to show that Scheler implicitly operates within Husserl's concept of 'unitary foundation' when describing how values inhere within goods; 2) to compare Scheler's metaethical argument concerning the independence of a world of goods with Hare's 'indiscernibility argument'. Scheler's reversal of Hare's argument confronts us with the formal-ontological difference between the analytic account of supervenience and the phenomenological account of unitary foundation. My argument is based on the formalization of the second type of unitary foundation that Husserl outlines in his Third Logical Investigation. The second type of unitary foundation is usually conflated with the first type of unitary foundation, as a result of the gross mistakes found in Findlay's English translation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are we able to experience values? Two sides are competing in contemporary literature: 'Meinongians' (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claim that axiological properties are apprehended in emotions, while 'Hildebrandians' (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) assert that such experiences of value (or valueceptions) are accomplished in special 'value feelings', and that emotions are only responses to these felt values. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this issue. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars have assumed so far, Husserl's position is not reducible to Meinong's and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks. It indeed recognizes (with Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The peculiar legacy of Husserl's mereology, chiefly studied by analytic philosophers interested in ontology, has led to a partial understanding of the III. LU, which is too often reduced to a chapter of "formal ontology". Yet, the power of this Investigation goes far beyond: it enabled Husserl to deal, in the framework of a unified theory, with a vast range of particular problems. The paper focuses on one of these issues, namely abstraction, so as to expose how Husserl instrumentalizes his formal tools in order to tackle material issues. The existence of an up and down pattern is uncovered: Husserl first reinterprets the psychological problem of abstraction in ontological terms ("bottom-up"), before coming back to the original problem with new insights ("top-down"). The second, correlative aim of the paper is to emphasize the key role played by Friedrich Schumann, a forgotten yet crucial character for Husserl's conception of abstraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that Husserl offers an important, although almost completely neglected so far, contribution to the reductionist/antireductionist debate about testimony. Through a phenomenological analysis, Husserl shows that testimony works through the constitution of an intentional intersubjective bond between the speaker and the hearer. In this paper I focus on the Logical Investigations, a 1914 manuscript now published as text 2 in Husserliana 20.2, and a 1931 manuscript now published as Appendix 12 in Husserliana 15. I argue that, in those texts, Husserl highlights three essential phenomenological features of testimony: a) testimony is personal, meaning that it only takes place among persons, b) testimony is social, meaning that it requires the joint effort of multiple cognitive agents, c) testimony is community-building, meaning that it generates a long-lasting social bond among the parts involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the relation between the later Husserl and the later Heidegger regarding their criticisms of modern science and technology. It is suggested that the overlap between both accounts is more significant than is standardly acknowledged. The paper first explores Heidegger's ideas about the 'essences' of science and technology, how they allegedly determine the contemporary worldview, conceal our relation to being, and how Heidegger warrants his critical attitude toward this. It then discusses Husserl's philosophical–historical assessment of the 'idea' of modern science, which Husserl believed resulted in the decapitation of philosophical questioning. Although key differences in method, aims, and their proposed solution to the dominance of the technological-scientific worldview should not be overlooked, the paper suggests that core aspects of Heidegger's analyses can be traced back to Husserl. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affects and all its variants (affection, allure, affective force, etc.) represent our via regia to be alive and connected with our life-world. It is not the ego that constitutes the world we live in but the affections that allow us to become respectively objects of our life and subjects of our own choices. Affects are in fact main triggers of lower and higher feelings through which we become subjects and experience empathy with other people, intersubjectively connecting with them and making ethical choices that are hopefully considerate of ourselves and our community. Yet it might happen that our feelings are not capable of truly feeling what we are affected by. When this happens, what affects us remains with us but cannot be felt and accordingly processed. In this paper, I will first work on the term affect and its variants. I will then describe how this connects with feelings. To finally analyze what happens when we are not capable of feeling our affects as in the case of alexithymia; or when we feel our affects too much as in the case of BPD; or when we do not want to feel certain affects as in the case of NPD. The main conceptual reference of this analysis will be Husserl and his static and genetic phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to present Derrida's reading of Husserl's phenomenology in his text Genesis and Structure and Phenomenology. Its structural stages, its due themes and conclusions will be presented. The aim of this paper is to understand the problem that Derrida points out in the passage from structure to genesis in the Husserlian phenomenological method, and to observe the arguments that conclude the bad achievement of the phenomenological method. The aim is to detail this interpretation by basing it on Husserl's texts and Derrida's considerations on them. In the same way, this work is intended to serve as a basis for introductory studies to phenomenology and deconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the close similarities between Husserl's, Scheler's and Stein's concept of the person as an absolute value that exercises itself in position-takings. Ethics, for the classical phenomenologists, Husserl, Scheler, and Stein, concerns the whole person, including the affective and rational dimensions, intellect and the heart, as well as volition. Persons are distinctive for their free agency, capacity to recognize norms, and ability to interact responsibly with other personal agents in the context of the communal and historical life-world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes Zahavi's view to task that every conscious experience involves a "minimal sense of self." Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls "for-meness" or "mineness." Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi's account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be committed to the view that we necessarily have a sense of ownership. However, Husserl only claims that I am self-conscious but not that I am a self that owns its consciousness. Zahavi thus misses the novelty of Husserl's position, namely that I do not need to have a sense of abiding ownership, to have experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the influence that Husserl’s drive/instinct theory has on Merleau‑Ponty’s late philosophy. Husserl’s interest in the passive realm of life develops into a study of a more profound level which even precedes the emergence of subjectivity. We analyze how it leads Merleau‑Ponty, in his philos‑ ophy of flesh, to furnish an ontological explanation regarding the problem of the relationship with others. In this regard, we investigate firstly Husserl’s theory of originary affection and its limits, before scrutinizing the notion of empathy; thereby we show how Merleau‑Ponty develops the Husserlian inten‑ tional relation into a carnal relation based on the idea that others and I belong to the same world. This will reveal that the relationship with the others always lies in the most profound level of our experience, because we share the onto‑ logical affinity, namely, the flesh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies experiential processes through which social structures become taken for granted, termed processes of "structure marginalization". Passive processes of structure marginalization relegate social structures to the margin of experience without the use of higher-order cognitive acts such as evaluation and reflection. Examples include adapting to social structures via routine and habitual practices (material reification), a lack of conscious awareness of the complexity, historical formation, and other details of social structures (ignorance), and rendering social structures irrelevant when they are unreflectively judged to be of no value for achieving ends (nullification). Active processes of structure marginalization reflectively and discursively relegate social structures to marginal consciousness. Examples include the use of naturalistic and necessitarian explanations for the social order that implicitly justify it as inalterable or "just the way things are" (discursive reification), normative justifications for the status quo (legitimation), and conscious awareness of one's powerlessness to control social-structural conditions (helplessness). Active processes of structure marginalization originate in passive processes. The goal of the typology is to explain, at the level of experience, why social structures typically remain unproblematic and unnoticed in everyday life, even during periods of social crisis and change or when existing structures produce harmful effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Other people figure in our experience of the world; they strike us as unique and genuinely other. This paper explores whether a Husserlian account of empathy as the way in which we constitute an intersubjective world can account for the uniqueness and otherness of other people in our experience. I contend that it can't. I begin by explicating Husserl's theory of empathy, paying particular attention to the reduction to a purely egoic sphere and the steps that ostensibly permit a subject to re-inhabit a world of others from out of this sphere. In querying Husserl's theory, I consider a series of problems, raised by Zhida Luo, concerning the apparent centrality of bodily similarity in empathy. I sketch Luo's solution, which involves a shift to tactile similarity. While it makes for a better theory of empathy, this solution isn't sufficient to make room for the givenness of another person not originally predicated on similarity. To clarify what's at issue here, I turn to the Husserlian pictures of empathy presented by Heinz Kohut and Edith Stein. I conclude with a remark about what might be required, given the inability of Husserlian empathy to make room for the experience of others as singular and other, for a picture of our phenomenal life to have a shape that accounts for the coexistence of empathy to others who are like oneself and hospitality to others as genuine others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives an account of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language, beginning with the genetic and intuitive model of Edmund Husserl and the dialectical (diacritical) model of Ferdinand de Saussure. Throughout the text, the evolution and appropriation of these two approaches is described, in order to give some answers to the following problems concerning the philosophy of language: the ontological status of language, the structure that underlies the acts of signification, the unity of meaning (its essence) understood as coexistence--and not as a significant entity. Finally, the diacritical approach is discussed within the framework of a negative ontology, conceiving the meaning at the margins of the expression, as an indirect and sauvage meaning, that is, as an act of non-positional expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show that Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations should be regarded as one of the fundamental sources of structuralism. Husserl's version of structuralism is, however, quite original in many respects. Indeed, what Husserl advocates in his works can be defined, following and expanding a line of research inaugurated by scholars like Elmar Holenstein and Giovanni Piana (see Holenstein, E. 1975. Roman Jakobsons phänomenologischer Strukturalismus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. 1976. Linguistik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik: Plädoyers für eine strukturale Phänomenologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. In publication. Phenomenological Phenomenology of Language: Scattered Papers. Geneva: sdvig, Piana, G. 2013a. L'idea di uno strutturalismo fenomenologico. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 5-17. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismofenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html (accessed 20 February 2018), Piana, G. 2013b. Momento figurale e qualità ghestaltica. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 101-119. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-epsicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html accessed 20 February 2018), in terms of phenomenological structuralism or of structural phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that 'duality' accounts of time, as exemplified by Henri Bergson's, Edmund Husserl's, and John McTaggart's ideas, parallel the decomposition of temporal experience in depressive psychosis into objective and subjective dimensions of time. The paper also proposes to comprehend the full-fledged depressive temporal delusion, in which the subjective flow of time comes to a standstill, via the idea of a double orientation to reality characteristic of schizophrenic delusions. In the depressive temporal delusion a person claims that time is not moving while simultaneously her cognitive orientation in temporal surroundings remains largely unaffected, hence the double orientation. The juxtaposition of temporal experience in depression with the temporal disorientation in dementia enables us to situate the depressive delusion regarding the flow of time in the middle of a proposed scale of the disintegration of normal temporal experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl's reflections on art and aesthetics can be discussed in four parts. First, a comparison of the phenomenological and aesthetical attitudes focusing on existential disinterestness and the suspension of the external world is drawn. Second, there are Husserl's views on imageconsciousness which play a prominent role in understanding the work of art as a work of art, as well as its differences from other types of consciousness and its three-layer nature namely the physical substrate, the image-object, and the image subject. The third part concerns the division of art into the realistic, idealistic, and philosophical art. And the fourth part deals with the capabilities of Husserl's phenomenology to formulate a phenomenological theory of art. The concepts ‘artworld’ and ‘life-world’ as a framework or context play a crucial role in this regard. In this paper, it has been tried to point out some of these capabilities according to the basic elements of phenomenology such as opposition to reductionism, presuppositionless investigation, anti-psychologism and anti-naturalism, descriptive method and “going back to the things themselves”. Accordingly, the phenomenological aesthetics emphasizes more than anything the intentionality of aesthetic consciousness and the relationships between the subjects of the artworld, and seeks the foundation of art and the work of art in these intentionalities and relations. It can serve as a basis and framework for traditional aesthetical theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an interpretation of trust and betrayal within political communities from the perspective of Husserl’s concept of social communities. I situate the paper amidst Margaret Gilbert’s theory of political obligations, arguing that at least one outside conception of trust fills a gap left in her theory. More specifically, I argue for the supplementary fit that Karen Jones’s conception of trust understood as ‘basal security’ provides for Gilbert. From there, I tie this conception of trust and betrayal to Husserl’s notions of ‘original belief’ and socio-cultural crisis. There is thereby a phenomenological elucidation of features within the social world that allow such crises to occur in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to offer a basic analysis of the peculiar kind of intentionality involved in the experience of joy. First, I deal with the two meanings of joy. Secondly, I point out some questions related to the object of joy and with the rightness or legitimacy of this experience. Thirdly, I refer to the so-called "laws of joy." Lastly, I offer some thoughts on the relation between joy and alterity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to defend the unity of Husserl's philosophical work as a defense of a special "position" that belongs to the human being and which uniquely enables us to engage in science and other cultural activities. The argument proceeds in three stages: fi rst, it connects Husserl's earliest work, especially his opposition to the positivist Zeitgeist, with his late work; next, it critiques some of the most persistent prejudices in the interpretation of his philosophy; fi nally, from this newly reconstructed point of view, it describes basic concepts of the phenomenological method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how Sartre's early phenomenological works were influenced by Emmanuel Levinas's The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. Sartre embraced two key aspects of Levinas's interpretation of Husserl: 1) that phenomenology is an ontological philosophy whose foundation is the doctrine of intentionality; and, 2) that consciousness's being consists in intentionality, which entails that consciousness is non-substantial as well as pre-reflectively or non-thetically aware of itself. In addition to adopting these views, Sartre also became gripped by a methodological problem raised by Levinas. Namely, phenomenology reflects on consciousness, yet reflection modifies the consciousness it reflects on. I argue that Sartre responds to this problem by developing two of Levinas's ideas: that reflection is a motivated act and that reflection must adequately grasp consciousness's temporality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]