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This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor might step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. In a series of experiments, we study whether people invoke the replacement excuse, that is, the argument "if I don't do it, someone else will," to justify narrowly self-interested actions. Our data are consistent with the possibility that the existence of a clear social norm of moral conduct can limit the impact of the availability of the replacement excuse on behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the game-theoretical literature on forming international environmental agreements (IEAs) countries use to be self-interested materialists and stable coalitions are small. This paper analyzes IEA games with identical countries that exhibit Kantian moral behavior. Kantians are concerned with doing the right thing which means that they take those actions and only those actions that they advocate all others take as well. Countries may behave morally with respect to both emissions (reduction) and membership in an IEA. If countries are emissions Kantians or membership Kantians the equilibrium of the IEA games is socially optimal. To model more realistic Kantian behavior, we define an emissions [membership] moralist as a country whose welfare is a weighted average of the welfare of an emissions [membership] Kantian and a materialist. The game with emissions moralists produces stable coalitions not larger than those in the standard game with materialists. The game with membership moralists yields stable coalitions that are increasing in the membership morality. The aggregate emissions decline if the degree of morality of either type of moralists increases. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium of an IEA game with moderate moralists with respect to both emissions and membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concern for a positive self-image is a central assumption in a large class of signaling models. In this paper, we exogenously vary the impact of self-image concerns by manipulating self-directed attention and study the impact on moral behavior. The choice context in the experiment is whether subjects inflict a painful electric shock on another subject to receive a monetary reward. In the main treatment, subjects see their own face on the decision screen in a real-time video feed. In three control conditions, subjects see either no video at all or a neutral video, or they see themselves in a mirror. We find that increasing self-awareness significantly reduces the fraction of subjects inflicting pain. The finding emphasizes the importance of self-image concerns for moral decision making with implications for theory as well as practical applications to promote socially desirable outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the analysis of a number of religious texts, this paper explores the possible natural origin of the moral dimension in human behavior, positing a common root of precepts for social life. This common root succeeds in preserving a harmonious communication between God, nature, human beings and community in auditory civilizations, prior to any written record. The prospect of finding this physical foundation to the moral dimension is enticing, because it opens the possibility of interpreting the organic and psychic qualities of human actions, and their consequences, by using the same natural laws that govern the existing world. This leads researchers to conjecture about the relational importance that any natural alteration would have into the dysfunction of the psychic-moral sphere, and to speculate on the transcendence of the scars left on our current mentality by the accelerated technological development that we have undergone in the last few centuries. Finally, the paper includes some counterbalancing reflections based on the same naturalist approach, which suggest a more nuanced and hopeful relativism to look at the present and the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper analyzes households'' perceptions of recycling activities in a municipality in northern Sweden, Piteå. The purpose of the paper is to analyze whether moral motives matter for the assessment of households'' waste sorting costs. Data were gathered using a mail-out survey to 850 randomly chosen individuals in the municipality of Piteå, Sweden. We employ an economic model of moral motivation and econometric techniques. The main result that follows from the analysis is that the results support the notion that moral motives significantly lower the costs associated with household recycling efforts. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Despite decades of interest in moral character, comparatively little is known about moral behavior in everyday life. This paper reports a novel method for assessing everyday moral behaviors using the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)—a digital audio-recorder that intermittently samples snippets of ambient sounds from people’s environments—and examines the stability of these moral behaviors. In three samples (combined N = 186), participants wore an EAR over one or two weekends. Audio files were coded for everyday moral behaviors (e.g., showing sympathy, gratitude) and morally-neutral comparison language behaviors (e.g., use of prepositions, articles). Results indicate that stable individual differences in moral behavior can be systematically observed in daily life, and that their stability is comparable to the stability of neutral language behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many conservatives, including some conservative scholars, blame the ideas and influence of John Dewey for what has frequently been called a crisis of character, a catastrophic decline in moral behavior in the schools and society of North America. Dewey’s critics claim that he is responsible for the undermining of the kinds of instruction that could lead to the development of character and the strengthening of the will, and that his educational philosophy and example exert a ubiquitous and disastrous influence on students’ conceptions of moral behavior. This article sets forth the views of some of these critics and juxtaposes them with what Dewey actually believed and wrote regarding character education. The juxtaposition demonstrates that Dewey neither called for nor exemplified the kinds of character-eroding pedagogy his critics accuse him of championing; in addition, this paper highlights the ways in which Dewey argued consistently and convincingly that the pedagogical approaches advocated by his critics are the real culprits in the decline of character and moral education. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: Moral behavior and concern for others are sometimes argued to set humans apart from other species. However, there is some evidence that humans are not the only animal species to possess these characteristics. Work from behavioral biology and neuroscience has indicated that some of these traits are present in other species, including other primates. Studying these behaviors in other species can inform us about the evolutionary trajectory of morality, helping us to understand how the behaviors evolved and which environmental characteristics were critical for their emergence. A brief historical look indicates that, while this evolutionary approach to human behavior is not always well received, this line of inquiry is not new. For instance Adam Smith, better known for his economics than his natural history, was clearly sympathetic with the view that moral behaviors are present in species other than humans. This paper focuses on how individuals respond to inequity, which is related to moral behavior. Recent evidence shows that non-human primates distinguish between inequitable and equitable outcomes. However, this is primarily in situations in which inequity hurts the self (e.g. disadvantageous inequity) rather than another (e.g. advantageous inequity). Studying such responses can help us understand the evolutionary basis of moral behavior, which increases our understanding of how our own morality emerged. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

When a New York City man risked his own life to save a stranger on the subway tracks, the New York Times interpreted his behavior not in terms of virtue but as a product of certain ‘hard-wiring’ he happened to possess. In denying virtue, the Times followed a school of thought that is pervasive in social science (referred to in this paper as the ‘individualists’) who, for example, explain charitable donations by pointing out tax deductions, explain volunteer work by revealing the opportunities contained therein to meet other singles, and so on. Actually, the assumptions and arguments which ground this widespread ‘denial of virtue’ are both empirically and normatively flawed, and the theory itself is belied by data about people doing good for moral reasons. Evidence drawn from personal introspection, from empirical studies of human behavior, from analysis of voting as a civil act, from interpreting peoples’ reaction to Alzheimer’s disease, from critical inspection of the logic of ‘individualist’ social explanations, and from a normative criticism of the products of the ‘individualist’ approach all support a rejection of the ‘individualist’ approach. The deniers of virtue should heed the evidence and pay mind to the amoralizing consequences of their erroneous theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key source of support for the view that challenging people's beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]