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Considerable attention has been given recently to the perplexing problem of the relationship between attitudes and behavior (Ehrlich, 1969; Deutscher, 1969; Warner and DeFleur, 1969; Ajzen et al., 1970; Lastrucci, 1970; Tarter, 1970). Methodological issues have been debated, the lack of congruence between attitudes and behavior has been examined, and a variety of solutions have been offered. We are told, for example, that the continuing poor correlation between measured attitudes and overt behavior requires us to search for the intervening variable or variables which apparently obtain (Ehrlich, 1969); or to employ the "direct observation" of the phenomenon under investigation rather than try to extrapolate from paper-and-pencil tests to behavior (Deutscher, 1969); or to develop theories that, in turn, enable us to find indicators that are more valid than the paper-and-pencil type (Lastrueci, 1970); or to simply admit that attitudes as "presently conceptualized play no real role in behavior" (Tarter, 1970). A number of important aspects of attitude research, however, have been obscured or omitted in these discussions. For the surprising aspect of the situation is not, as has often been implied, the lack of congruence between attitudes and behavior, but the persistent use of research designs that are inappropriate for the complexity of the subject under investigation. Further, it is surprising that researchers have failed to draw out other important implications of their research. That is, the fact that an attitude does not lead directly to a behavior does not justify the assertion that attitudes play no role in behavior, or that attitude research lacks significant implications for social life. The basis for this latter statement will be shown below in a discussion of the values of attitude research. It may be that inadequate research designs, valued for their simplicity rather than their appropriateness, are a manifestation of the "publish or perish" syndrome. In any ease, this paper attempts to outline the problems and the values of attitude research, and to demonstrate thereby that such research is of great significance for the understanding of social phenomena. If that significance seems minimized by those studies that have found poor correlation between attitudes and behavior, the fault lies both in the failure to create research designs that reflect the complexity of the problem and in the tendency to exalt the importance of the proximate causes of overt behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the name suggests, social-psychology is a bastard field. It consists of such a variety of peoples doing so many different things in different ways, that it defies definition—at least for me. In spite of the neat delineations which are made in textbooks and the scholarly historical treatments which appear in encyclopediae and symposia, I find it difficult to grasp a concept of "social-psychology" which is anything more than the operational definition: "Social psychology is what people who call themselves social-psychologists, do." That is not much help, but it is all we have got. I mention my own confusion in this matter, not with the aim of confusing others, but by way of explanation: some of the issues I will touch upon in this paper may infringe upon what readers consider to be other areas of sociology. I regret such territorial invasions. But in my own quest for understanding why people act as they do, I have increasingly found that the traditional "fields" in the discipline and the traditional courses in the catalogue do not provide appropriate categories with which I can explain to colleagues and students what it is I am discovering. Having said all of this, let us get down to business. It is a decade since Dennis Wrong published the paper in which he challenged "The oversocialized conception of man in modern society" (1961). Reacting to a determinism which pervaded the social sciences and which seemed to be seeping into popular currency, Wrong asked if man were in fact as constrained by a monolithic culture as we social scientists would have it. A few years later Harold Garfinkel referred more bluntly to the models of men constructed by the various social sciences: he called them "judgmental dopes." The cultural dope and the psychological dope are, respectively, the man in the sociologist's society and the man in the psychologist's society (1967:67-68). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an invitation to sociologists to take seriously the topic of fashion. Only a handful of scholars, such as Simmel (1904), Sapir (1931), and the Langs (1961), have given more than casual concern to the topic. Their individual analyses of it, while illuminating in several respects, have been limited in scope, and within the chosen limits very sketchy. The treatment of the topic by sociologists in general, such as we find it in textbooks and in occasional pieces of scholarly writing, is even more lacking in substance. The major deficiencies in the conventional sociological treatment are easily noted—a failure to observe and appreciate the wide range of operation of fashion; a false assumption that fashion has only trivial or peripheral significance; a mistaken idea that fashion falls in the area of the abnormal and irrational and thus is out of the mainstream of human group life; and, finally, a misunderstanding of the nature of fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its first systematic treatment by Max Weber in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in the early twenties, the concept of charisma has been of only limited use to the social sciences. This is so because of fundamental disagreement concerning its meaning and application. In response to this, the present paper offers (1) a brief examination of Weber's contribution, (2) a critical analysis of this position based in part on the recent literature, and (3) a final formulation of the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades limited research attention has been given to those smallest population centers, beyond the individual farmstead, commonly referred to as hamlets. Alluding to this fact, the following statement made in 1943 by the geographer, Glenn T. Trewartha, is still indicative of the situation: "… one of the most numerous and widespread settlement types in the United States, the unincorporated hamlet, does not deserve the near oblivion that has been accorded it by geographers and other workers in the social sciences." The lack of research interest may be attributed partially to the dimunition of the farm population and rural institutions and the increasing significance of industrialization and urban development. Because of these and other changes, students of society may share the opinion that hamlets are rapidly disappearing and consequently not worthy of study. Various studies, however, are not in agreement concerning whether or not hamlets have increased or decreased in size and numbers. According to Fuguitt, the contradictory findings stem from the fact that previous researchers have not made "a clear distinction between (1) changes in population size categories over time, and (2) changes in individual places over time." In a study based on Census data, Fuguitt examined Wisconsin's incorporated small towns for the period 1880-1960. He simultaneously analyzed the two analytical components indicated above through the use of the Markov model. His general conclusion was: "While fewer small towns are being 'born' these days, they aren't 'dying,' but are growing up to be big towns, in some cases." Although it is possible, as Fuguitt also suggests, that small unincorporated places are declining in size and number, there is little reported data to suggest they are rapidly diminishing as a rural collectivity or settlement center in contemporary society. In general, the purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to our descriptive knowledge of hamlets. Initially, an effort is made to determine the main activity pursued by the principal family supporters within or near the hamlet area. Secondly, based on the major activity pursued by each resident family's primary income recipient, a statistically derived typology of hamlets is described. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper reference will be made consistently to constructive typology. In order to avoid confusion—to use McKinney's words— "the term 'constructed' type is used here in preference to the designations 'ideal' and 'pure' types. The terms ideal and pure have been misinterpreted so frequently that it seems advisable to follow Howard Becker's usage and refer to these types as 'constructed types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]