Search

Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many individuals who have been through transition struggle to obtain the necessary medical and psychological support. This paper explores the importance of psychological support for post‐transition individuals. In my experience, there is a subgroup of patients who struggle to come to terms with life post‐transition, particularly the losses involved. They remain stuck in the mourning process. There is a loss of fantasies regarding an ideal transition, and the gap between the hoped‐for transition outcomes and the post‐transition reality can be painfully large. In addition, issues that the transition was meant to address remain in some form for some people, and they may also be haunted by misgivings about how the transition occurred. This paper employs a heavily anonymised composite case to illustrate and elaborate on how these issues emerged and were dealt with in the context of a psychotherapeutic process. Working through issues that led to transition and grievances about perceived and actual failures in care from the past allowed the patient to mourn the loss of her pre‐transition image. The patient was able to come to terms with the reality of her transfer from male to trans‐female and her body and life post‐transition and to shift from a preoccupation with the past to move on with her life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that correlative thinking, a fundamental aspect of Chinese thought often distinguished from rational thinking, is rooted in our situated bodily experiences, constituting a unique mode of sensemaking. It performs a comparative analysis between Zhuangzi's Fish Parable and Merleau‐Ponty's philosophy of embodied perception, focusing on the self‐attunement in our embodied experience and Dao, which remains invisible but gradually reveals its presence as the parable unfolds. The paper illuminates the embodied nature of correlative thinking by exposing the intricate interplay between the self and others, as well as the self and its lived environment. This analysis underscores the reciprocal relationship between Dao and correlative thinking: Dao acts as the origin of correlative thinking, while correlative thinking, in turn, unveils the presence of Dao. This analysis could enrich our understanding of the interplay between the self, others, and the world they inhabit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Complex dynamic systems offer a rich platform for understanding the individual or the person‐specific mechanisms. Yet, in learning analytics research and education at large, a complex dynamic system has rarely been framed, developed, or used to understand the individual student where the learning process takes place. Individual (or person‐specific) methods can accurately and precisely model the individual person, create person‐specific models, and devise unique parameters for each individual. Our study used the latest advances in complex systems dynamics to study the differences between group‐based and individual self‐regulated learning (SRL) dynamics. The findings show that SRL is a complex, dynamic system where different sub‐processes influence each other resulting in the emergence of non‐trivial patterns that vary across individuals and time scales, and as such far from the uniform picture commonly theorized. We found that the average SRL process does not reflect the individual SRL processes of different people. Therefore, interventions derived from the group‐based SRL insights are unlikely to be effective in personalization. We posit that, if personalized interventions are needed, modelling the person with person‐specific methods should be the guiding principle. Our study offered a reliable solution to model the person‐specific self‐regulation processes which can serve as a ground for understanding and improving individual learning and open the door for precision education. Practitioner notesWhat is already known about this topic Self‐regulation is a catalyst for effective learning and achievement.Our understanding of SRL personalization comes from insights based on aggregate group‐based data.What this paper adds Every student has their own unique SRL process that varies from the average in non‐trivial ways.We offer a credible method for mapping the individualized SRL process.SRL dynamics vary across time scales. That is, the trait dynamics are different from the state dynamics, and they should be supported differently.Implications for practice and/or policy Personalization can best be achieved if based on unique person‐specific idiographic methods.Supporting learning and SRL in particular can be more efficient when we understand the differences across time scales and persons and apply insights accordingly.The general SRL average should not be expected to work for everyone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are all familiar with judgements about the persistence of people. Furthermore, we tend to structure certain attitudes and practices around such judgements because we think that personal identity matters for the relevant practical concerns. Response‐dependence views try to accommodate that personal identity matters by letting relevant attitudes and practices determine the personal identity relation for a particular person. This paper argues that genuine response‐dependence views are not well positioned to accommodate the connection between personal identity and what matters. Rather, if we accept such a connection, this supports normative‐facts‐first views, according to which relevant normative facts determine personal identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: Basic self disturbance is a putative core vulnerability marker of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The primary aims of the Self, Neuroscience and Psychosis (SNAP) study are to: (1) empirically test a previously described neurophenomenological self‐disturbance model of psychosis by examining the relationship between specific clinical, neurocognitive, and neurophysiological variables in UHR patients, and (2) develop a prediction model using these neurophenomenological disturbances for persistence or deterioration of UHR symptoms at 12‐month follow‐up. Methods: SNAP is a longitudinal observational study. Participants include 400 UHR individuals, 100 clinical controls with no attenuated psychotic symptoms, and 50 healthy controls. All participants complete baseline clinical and neurocognitive assessments and electroencephalography. The UHR sample are followed up for a total of 24 months, with clinical assessment completed every 6 months. Results: This paper presents the protocol of the SNAP study, including background rationale, aims and hypotheses, design, and assessment procedures. Conclusions: The SNAP study will test whether neurophenomenological disturbances associated with basic self‐disturbance predict persistence or intensification of UHR symptomatology over a 2‐year follow up period, and how specific these disturbances are to a clinical population with attenuated psychotic symptoms. This may ultimately inform clinical care and pathoaetiological models of psychosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]