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The expression “spiritual, but not religious” (SBNR) has gained considerable traction among sociologists of religion and culture, media outlets, and the broader public in recent years. Though the expression itself has achieved wide appeal, few studies have explored what SBNRs believe about God, religion, or spirituality. This paper uses survey data from Wave IV of the Baylor Religion Survey (2014) and draws from the theory of “cultural omnivorousness” to show that SBNRs have significant sociotheological differences when compared to those who are both religious and spiritual (RAS). The expression “spiritual, but not religious” is more than a manifestation of religious deinstitutionalization or “believing without belonging.” Rather, being “spiritual, but not religious” involves sociotheological boundary work that distinguishes SBNRs from traditional monotheists. When compared to RAS respondents, SBNRs are more likely to view God as a higher power or cosmic force instead of a personal being and are more likely to adopt an individualistic ethic as opposed to finding moral authority in God or Scripture. By examining the historical context and sociotheological characteristics of SBNRs, this paper locates a boundary between SBNRs and RAS monotheists and offers theoretical reasons why SBNRs engage in sociotheological boundary work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does society work? How do groups emerge within society? What are the effects of emotions and memory on our everyday actions? George Homans, like us, had a perspective on what society is, except that he was a sociologist. Homans theory, which is an exchange theory, is based on a few propositions about the fundamental actions of individuals, and how values, memory, and expectations affect their behavior. In this paper, as Homans predicted, our main interest and purpose are to find out whether these propositions lead to the emergence of groups. To do so, computationally, Based on Homans' prepositions, we provide the opportunity for each agent to exchange with other agents. That is, each agent transacts with familiar agents based on his previous history with them and transacts with newly found agents through exploration. The importance of our work is that we have scrutinized the consequences of an actual sociological theory through the eyes of simulation. At the end of our investigation, we discuss other possible directions for further research. • In this paper, we tried to give a quantitative answer to the question whether the Homans' theory was incomplete? • Our work aims to interpret Homans' sociological theory in algorithmic and arithmetic form. • We tried to interpret how important each part of the theory is with their absence consequences and find their accordance with some known sociological facts. • The simulation results show that Homans' propositions actually had direct effects on the structure of the network and gives a reasonable model to derive social groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Drawing on fieldwork at a forecasting office of the National Weather Service, this paper analyzes the sociocognitive organization of meteorological perception and expertise via the notion of “screenwork” in the hopes that it may provide a common constructivist ground on which sociologists and neuroscientists will be able to comfortably study visual perception at work. Three key intersecting areas of research are examined in the process: the practice of looking, visual expertise, and visual decision-making. The paper concludes by employing the metaphor of the collage to further elaborate on the link between screenwork and expert visualization. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper is an emic, interview-based study of computer scientists’ and sociologists’ accounts of the functions of citations in their writing. Twelve informants took part in the research, commenting upon their citations in one of their own articles. Informants were not provided with functional checklists, and were free to ascribe as many functions to each citation as they wished. Eleven citation functions are identified and described, and evidence of inter- and intra-disciplinary similarities and differences is provided. While the computer scientists used citations to direct their audience to further reading more often, the sociologists’ texts featured more cases of critical citations. The type of paper informants were writing (e.g. theoretical/empirical), the anticipated audience, and the publication outlet resulted in intra-disciplinary differences. Over half of the citations in both fields were said to have more than one function. The insights and implications of the study are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In this paper I examine the relationship between historians, philosophers and sociologists of science, and indeed scientists themselves. I argue that (i) they co-habit a shared intellectual territory (science and its past); and (ii) they should be able to do so peacefully, and with mutual respect, even if they disagree radically about how to describe the methods and results of science. I then go on to explore some of the challenges to mutually respectful cohabitation between history, philosophy and sociology of science. I conclude by identifying a familiar kind of project in the philosophy of science which seeks to explore the worldview of a particular scientific discipline, and argue that it too has a right to explore the shared territory even though some historians and sociologists may find it methodologically suspect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests that the failure to integrate history and philosophy of science properly may be explained by incompatible metaphysics implied by these fields. Historians and sociologists tend to be historicists, who assume that all objects of research are variable in principle, while philosophers look for permanent and essential qualities. I analyse, how the historicists and essentialist approaches differ with regard to the research objects of general history, history of science and science itself. The implied historicism makes some radical pronouncements by Latour on ontological variance understandable. I will also consider, whether there could be something like a historicist philosophy of science. The historicisation of the natural world proves most challenging, but both certain traditional disciplines and some recent advances in physical and life sciences indicate compatibility with historicism. One should note that historicism does not alter how ‘truth’ is understood. Historicism does not question the reality of objects either; only their eternality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years growing sociological interest in new forms of cultural distinction has led some to argue that the advantages previously conveyed by the consumption of ‘high’ culture ‘or ‘omnivorousness’ are being overwritten by the possession of what has been termed ‘emerging cultural capital’. So far, though, this term has only been discussed in passing within empirical work and remains in need of further analytical specification. This special issue seeks to both critically interrogate and develop this concept by bringing together the work of leading cultural sociologists around four key themes: the role of age and generation in the formation of cultural capital; the power of visual display for distinction; the significance of new elite cultures; and the need for methodological pluralism to apprehend the expressions and mechanisms of distinction. This editorial introduction outlines the descriptive terrain on which the concept of emerging cultural capital has rested until now before exploring the common themes that sit across all five papers in the special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural eclecticism has been the focus of most sociological debates pertaining to cultural practices since the publication of Richard Peterson's first articles on the topic. Underlying these debates surrounding results, the prevailing definitions and methods are particularly striking for their… eclecticism. And although it is not explicitly stated, it appears that sociologists disagree over the parameters of inquiry – how the object of study is constructed and all manner of methodologies, rather than over hypotheses and whether or not they are valid. In this paper, we shall extend and systematize assertions that appear in various works on omnivorousness. Our aim is to determine the theoretical implications of the three groups of choices that seem critical in statistical methods of studying cultural eclecticism: choices concerning indicators of taste; methods of constructing a scale of cultural legitimacy; and indicators of cultural omnivorousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This paper considers an aspect of culture rarely formally studied by sociologists: the organization of sensory experience. • We develop and employ a novel technique aimed at measuring music experience. • We analyze the dimensionality of the distribution of reported experiences. • Analyses reveal three dimensions of experience, which appear to stretch between poles that correspond to binaries of embodied experience. The theories of William James and John Dewey regarding the nature of experience suggest that there is an aspect of the organization of culture that sociologists have not yet studied formally, namely the structuring of sensory experience. We propose a way of trying to measure respondents' experience of "textural" music, as opposed to their preferences, evaluative judgments, or associations. We employ a novel data-gathering approach as part of 61 in-depth interviews, and then analyze the dimensionality of the distribution of reported experiences. We find three dimensions, all of which seem to touch upon fundamentally meaningful binaries of embodied experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A classic experiment by Milgram shows that individuals can route messages along short paths in social networks, given only simple categorical information about recipients (such as “he is a prominent lawyer in Boston” or “she is a Freshman sociology major at Harvard”). That is, these networks have very short paths between pairs of nodes (the so-called small-world phenomenon); moreover, participants are able to route messages along these paths even though each person is only aware of a small part of the network topology. Some sociologists conjecture that participants in such scenarios use a greedy routing strategy in which they forward messages to acquaintances that have more categories in common with the recipient than they do, and similar strategies have recently been proposed for routing messages in dynamic ad hoc networks of mobile devices. In this paper, we introduce a network property called membership dimension, which characterizes the cognitive load required to maintain relationships between participants and categories in a social network. We show that any connected network has a system of categories that will support greedy routing, but that these categories can be made to have small membership dimension if and only if the underlying network exhibits the small-world phenomenon. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Between 2001 and 2006 there was an ‘epidemic’ of complete withdrawal from daily life among numerous children in refugee families seeking asylum in Sweden. It became embedded in many distinct controversies, including the politics of immigration, and acrimonious disagreements between pediatricians dealing with individual families, and government-employed sociologists commissioned to report on what was going on. Most of the cases resolved themselves when an amnesty was agreed in 2006, although there remain many doubts about the statistics. After describing this phenomenon, the paper proposes a (non-exclusive) model called Imitation & Internalisation. Most of the children may have begun by imitating others who had fallen ill, but soon internalized it to the extent that it became an integral part of their psychophysical and social constitution. The model can be applied to phenomena as diverse as hypnotism, the placebo effect, and catching faith by association with believers (Pascal’s wager). [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Genotype–environment interaction (G×E) refers to situations in which genetic effects connected to a phenotype are dependent upon variability in the environment, or when genes modify an organism''s sensitivity to particular environmental features. Using a typology suggested in the G×E literature, we provide an overview of recent papers that show how social context can trigger a genetic vulnerability, compensate for a genetic vulnerability, control behaviors for which a genetic vulnerability exists, and improve adaptation via proximal causes. We argue that to improve their understanding of social structure, sociologists can take advantage of research in behavior genetics by assessing the impact of within-group variance of various health outcomes and complex human behaviors that are explainable by genotype, environment and their interaction. Insights from life course sociology can aid in ensuring that the dynamic nature of the environment in G×E has been accounted for. Identification of an appropriate entry point for sociologists interested in G×E research could begin with the choice of an environmental feature of interest, a genetic factor of interest, and/or behavior of interest. Optimizing measurement in order to capture the complexity of G×E is critical. Examining the interaction between poorly measured environmental factors and well measured genetic variables will overestimate the effects of genetic variables while underestimating the effect of environmental influences, thereby distorting the interaction between genotype and environment. Although the expense of collecting environmental data is very high, reliable and precise measurement of an environmental pathogen enhances a study''s statistical power. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: While neuroscientists, cognitive anthropologists, and behavioral psychologists have begun to examine the dialectical relationship between space and cognition, sociologists have remained curiously silent. Sociologists concede that cognition affects our relationship to space, but seem less willing to explore how space might affect us cognitively. In this paper I argue that the spatial configuration of our environment facilitates particular cognitive modes. I examine what I call structured versus unstructured spaces. I also focus on the structuring of space and whether that structuring is imposed or implied. The structure of the space and the articulation of that structure interact to produce different modes of thought. This relationship between space and cognition has important implications for how and, perhaps, why we use culture. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]