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Many recent studies find that international political conflictâ€"operationalized in a variety of waysâ€"harms trade. Well-known cases help to underscore these general findings. For example, Cold War tensions helped to undermine East-West trade, and trade between India and Pakistan slowed sharply in the years after partition. On the other hand, however, trade between adversaries also appears to vary substantially across cases. Indeed, trade can sometimes flourish despite intense political rivalry. In the current relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, for example, China has become Taiwan’s largest trading partner despite persistent political tension across the Taiwan Strait.How can we explain variation in the extent to which states trade with their adversaries? Building on existing literature, I develop a framework through which to understand how domestic coalitions concerning trade with an adversary are likely to form. While some actors are likely to favor or oppose trade for purely economic reasons, those without a direct economic stake in the relationship are likely to focus more on the political and security consequences of trade with the adversary. In this framework, two variables emerge as central in determining a country’s trade policy with an adversary: the relative political strength of internationalist versus protectionist economic interests, and whether those concerned primarily with politics believe trade will have positive or negative political and security externalities. I use the framework to develop several testable hypotheses, and evaluate them via short case studies of three contemporary rivalries: China/Taiwan; India/Pakistan; and North Korea/South Korea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]