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This paper concentrates on authority and the responsibility to protect. The paper's principal finding is that states during and after the Cold War have strongly supported the restrictions in international law on the use of armed force. The humanitarian crises, civil wars, and conflicts in the 1990s and 2000s reinforced state suspicion of power not regulated by international law. States have resisted any step - unilateral interventions, assigning responsibility for human protection in the event of state inaction to the Security Council, or working around the Council in extraordinary situations - that could diminish the nominative power of the law. The recent internal strife in Kenya, Darfur, and Kyrgyzstan has shown that the concept enjoys a high profile, but its practical influence is quite limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing American dominance and power in the world has frustrated various countries, societies, and individuals, and some have argued that this anger at American hegemony was the cause of September 11th. These people, such as Benjamin Barber, argue that Western cultural and economic imperialism are reshaping the world at the expense of various other cultures. As the American empire grows, it spreads its culture throughout the world, creating a more homogeneous world. This paper will focus on the growth of the American empire by examining American foreign policy and the use of force during the Clinton administration. From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. intervened or initiated the use of force in several places, including the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti. Why did the Clinton administration make these foreign policy decisions? Was it part of an attempt to spread American hegemony throughout the world or not? Or, as many have argued, were Clinton’s foreign policy decisions a result of his domestic problems and his own personal ambitions and goals? This paper will seek to understand what motivated President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to initiate the use of force or to intervene in the intrastate conflicts of other countries from 1993 to 2000. In order to answer this question this paper will focus on one possible theory?diversionary war theory. Diversionary war theory is based on the idea that leaders of nation-states will use foreign conflict involvement to divert domestic attention away from internal problems. Many have criticized this theory, including Blainey 1998 and Levy 1989, but others have found evidence of a moderate link between variables like leader popularity and the diversionary use of force, such as Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal 1991, and Morgan and Bickers 1992. Clinton faced a number of domestic distractions during his Presidency, most significantly his ongoing difficulties involving his alleged affair, and he may have felt the need to use foreign policy to divert attention away from these problems. Clinton has also has been quoted a number of times as saying that domestic politics is more important to him than international politics, and he may have used foreign policy to divert attention away from his domestic problems. This paper will focus on three specific independent variables: presidential approval, economic measures, and the media focus during the six months prior to the decision to use force or intervene. As the U.S. continues its dominance in the world, it is important to understand the motivations behind American foreign policy. Many people in the world today are less than satisfied with the U.S. hegemonic role in the world, because some of them believe that the U.S. is acting only in its own self-interest with no regard for how their actions affect the rest of the world. It is important to understand the reasons behind American foreign policy in order to determine whether the U.S. is a selfish and self-interested nation. This is a small step towards that goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto presents a productive line of inquiry into the ‘potential’ for oppositional politics immanent to contemporary biopolitical production or Empire. Hardt and Negri recognize the global operations of a different paradigm of power that has become immanent to the social field in its entirety through the intensification and generalization of apparatuses of disciplinarity. The concept of Empire or biopolitical production describes a modality of subsumption where power invests in the very (re-)production of life itself by entirely permeating consciousness and corporeality of individuals-agentic subjectivities with needs, minds, bodies and relations that allow the ‘imperial machine’ to develop more intensively and extensively throughout the latticework of social structures. Hardt and Negri suggest that the critical strategies that informed oppositional politics under the regime of modern sovereignty such as place-based politics, politics of use-value, politics of the Signifier, politics of identity/hybridity/difference (implicitly or explicitly relying on some form of externality/outside from which to make or challenge ontological claims), are not only ineffective but are indeed the very strategies and procedures that are captured and deployed to intensify the affects of the imperial economy of command. Instead, they demand that we attend to the itinerant dimension of desire and productivity of the ‘multitude’ (a non-localizable common name), its infinite capacity for deterritorialization and miscegenation, in any endeavor to resist or counter-actualize the tendencies of Empire. They argue that the question of oppositional politics cannot begin by taking recourse to a unified, whole(-some) subjectivity or identity, since these are transpersonal effects of interpellation by the imperial machine, but needs to pursue the nomadism of multiple becomings or metamorphoses that constitute new terrains of possibility and the invent new democratic forms that take us beyond the Empire. Haraway’s cyborg manifesto, which provides us with a post-gender, post-human fable of becoming, can be read as a call for a continuous constituent project of radical metamorphoses that allows this multitude to actualize its potentialities. However, this paper will depart from the dominant feminist interpretation of the cyborg as a figure of representation-a metaphor, and as the quintessential postmodern icon, because the logic of metaphoricity operates by establishing equivalences between relatively distinct things whereas becoming bears primarily on potentiality, in terms of what may or may not come to pass. What is crucial about cyborg politics isn’t simply the hybridity of machine/organism and fable/social reality, whereby technology emancipates the woman from her corporeal body. Neither is the cyborg a general model that stands out and above the bodies that will subsequently come to occupy it with `better or worse fitting. Haraway posits the cyborg figure precisely to confront matrices of codes, or a semiology of command that unfolds within contemporary social relations of science and technology which has systematically produced gender domination, and ‘woman’ as difference. The cyborg figure comes together (it has no birth or an innocent origin) and inhabits the Empire, but in a modality that is always partial (thus constantly open to connection and thus mutation) as well as transgressive. It is temporality is not developmental but pertains to condensation, implosion and fusion that allows the proliferation of selves that are impossible to be captured within any grid of redundant boundaries. In this paper, I will examine the cyborg as a modality of becoming by reading the cyborg manifesto, employing Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualizations of machine, desire and becoming-woman, to sketch the contours of oppositional politics within Empire. References Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Scizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972) -A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). Haraway, Donna, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991). -Modest_Witness@Second Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997). Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike other forms of violence mobilized by non-state actors, terrorism has drawn a response from states that is remarkable in its scope. To begin with, responses have utilised all of the tools of statecraft, deploying both ?hard power? (military, intelligence, police and law enforcement actions) and ?soft power? (i.e. governance measures recast as ?counter-terrorism? initiatives, including border security, arms control and counter-terrorist financing initiatives, etc.). Further, these tools have been exercised across levels of state interaction, such that multilateral, regional, sub-regional and bilateral contacts have impacted domestic polities. Finally, these interactions often involve the provision of material assistance or expertise from one state to another. In sum, as terrorist violence has been perceived to be a byproduct of state failure, there has been an effort to build the state, to enable it to do what it must in order to suppress terrorism. While there is much variation in the way that this ?state-building? is proceeding, we may paraphrase Tilly: the ?war on terror? is making states, as states are making the ?war on terror.? In a way, this is good news for human rights, as it offers the promise of protecting citizens from non-state violence of a particularly brutal kind. But this view may be (at best) optimistic and (at worst) naïve, given the record of human rights abuses perpetrated by states. With this concern in mind, I pose the question: what kind of states might emerge out of this process of ?state building through counter-terrorism? and what are the human rights implications of these developments? The first part of the paper describes the extent to which the ?war on terror? has been conceived and prosecuted as a ?state-building? exercise. I argue that, through the elaboration of counter-terrorism regimes in areas such as border security and finance, we are seeing the emergence of global standards against which to assess state capability to suppress terrorism. Beyond the articulation of such standards, I illustrate their implementation across the states of South and South-East Asia. The second part of the paper identifies the human rights concerns that arise from this process. Implementing counter-terrorism policies has long been acknowledged to pose challenges to democratic countries, but further concerns arise from the globalization of counter-terrorism standards. In evaluating these, I survey the ways in which an appropriate balance between human rights and counter-terrorism imperatives can be built into processes of state-building. Again, I illustrate my argument with examples from the states of South and South-East Asia. In concluding, I offer some observations about the impact of global counter-terrorism initiatives for containing other forms of non-state violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does unipolarity select for unilateralism? Theories that derive the behavior of a hegemonic state -and particularly with respect to unilateralism - exclusively from the distribution of relative power are notoriously underdetermined; neorealism suggests that leading states use asymmetries in power to their unilateral advantage, whereas the hegemony literature suggests that leading states leverage potentiall temporary advantage into locking in a favorable institutionalized status quo. This paper argues that the current American response these competing international logics is mediated by political-intellectual traditions about American power. The paper will address why certain unilateral/multilateralist foreign policy traditions are priveleged at certain times, and how these traditions determine - or provide a casual condition for - how the United States responds to structural pressures towards international institutions and cooperation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Events around the globe since the end of the East-West ideological rivalry have been those of conflicts, many of which have precipitated unfettered violation of the sanctity of state sovereignty in the definitive character of Pax Ameriocana - an American centredness - often clothed in the garb of ‘Multilateralism’. The situation has caught the world - especially Third World countries - in the middle of a miscontrued duel between the United States and its allies with so much power and the rest with too little ‘sense’; such that betrays earlier promises and expectations of freedom, mutual respect and justice associated with the ‘new world order’. Among the several questions that thus beg for answers are: What were the underlying features of the vision of the ‘new world order’? How have they been preserved or sabotaged? Can genuine peace be realised under the present unipolar world that is structured in the definitive cahracter of Pax Americana? What kind of memory does this give about the defunct Cold War world order? To what extent has the image of the United Nations suffered a severe banter in the light of contemporary events in international affairs? What is the nature of the discontents the situation generates in Africa? To what extent does the continent absorb a disproportionate share of the burden of the ‘new world order’? This paper seeks to interrogate the incresing failue of the once eulogiosed ‘new world order’ that is now left in the wounds of American centredness with a view to showing how Africa absorbs a disproportionate burden of its hegemony and power construction. The paper intends to do this by combining theoretical and policy analysis with reference to specific incidents around the globe. Even though it does not intend to prescribe solutions, the paper will nevertheless advance an informed guess about the future, such that will lead to a better understanding of the hidden pious talk the ‘new world order’ depicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate between advocates of partition and power sharing as alternative solutions to ethnic civil wars is frequently clouded by a failure to distinguish the different goals of ethnic rebellions. This paper challenges the widely held implication that ethnic conflict is synonymous with separatism by showing how a third of the largest scale ethnic rebellions are fought for control over the state. It puts forward the thesis that ending these state capture conflicts requires a very different set of arrangements from ending separatist fights. In particular, the political ambitions of groups seeking to capture the state are not likely to be mollified by instituting separation of populations--regardless of the positive effects separation might have for security--or through negotiating autonomy. Further, when power sharing accords are forced on groups whose political objective is separation from the state, such arrangements are likely to effect only a pause in conflict before a future resumption of separatist violence. The paper warns against one size fits all solutions, and notes that accords are likely to succumb to revisionist violence in cases in which the political goals of combatants are not taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Cold War came to an end, UN peacekeeping changed suddenly and dramatically. Traditional principles of peacekeeping were discarded, peacekeeping missions were deployed in the midst of ongoing civil conflicts, and the number of missions doubled in a few short years. While other studies have examined this shift in terms of changing distributions of power, norms and ideas, and the roles of specific UN actors, this paper treats the post-Cold War transformation of peacekeeping as an agenda-setting problem, and employs a garbage can model of organizational choice (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984, Olsen 2001) to analyze it. The garbage can model portrays organizational agenda setting as the contingent byproduct of the coupling of previously disconnected streams of problems and solutions, rather than the result of efficient rational decision making. The model is used to explain how peacekeeping came to be defined, and placed on the UN Security Council’s agenda, as an appropriate solution to problems for which it had previously been considered inappropriate, or not considered at all. The UN fits the defining criteria of organized anarchies, to which the garbage can model can be expected to apply: unclear preferences, opaque organizational processes, and fluid participation. Drawing on Kingdon’s adaptation of the garbage can model, this paper explains changes in peacekeeping as the result of the linking of a solution stream (peacekeeping) to a problem stream (post-Cold War civil conflicts) in the context of a policy window created by the end of the Cold War. Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 1 (March 1972), pp. 1-25. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternative, and Public Policies (NY: Harper Collins, 1984.) Johan Olsen, Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics, American Political Science Review 95, 1 (March 2001), pp. 191-198. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Observers of the current world scene reach strikingly divergent conclusions when characterizing today?s world order. Although there is much talk of a unipolar power structure, many are not convinced identifying a multitude of power centers, which is only temporarily and superficially veiled by the extraordinary superiority of the U.S. military. Some perceive the United States as ?the New Rome,? while others see a hegemon in ongoing decline. In a more normative vein, some depict the unmatched power of the U.S., and the high-handedness that comes with it, as a threat to world peace and an obstacle to the solution of common problems such as the management of climate change; others argue just the opposite describing the U.S. as the ?indispensable nation? and U.S. power, and the willingness to use it, as the decisive factor for order and stability in the international system. These opposing views are not only a matter of factual and evaluative differences, i.e. differing opinions on what is the case or what states of affairs are desirable; rather, they are firmly rooted in the existence of a multitude of concepts of hegemony in International Relations ? conceptualizations and definitions of which many who employ them are hardly aware of. The aim of this paper is to develop a first an idea about how to make. use of this multitude of conceptualizations via a metatheoretically guided conceptual analysis in general. What should follow from this analysis is a systematic overview and categorization of the most influential approaches to the phenomenon of power concentration, or hegemony, in world politics. The literature on the topic will be analyzed using a set of guiding questions as for example ?Which conditions have to be met for a state to be considered a hegemon?? or ?How do hegemons behave and why??. The goal of the paper is not confined to unearthing the divergent theoretical ideas that are present in the current scholarly and journalistic discourse on hegemony and power asymmetry. By clarifying, reconstructing, and systematically comparing the concept of hegemony, the paper ultimately seeks to contribute to a better understanding of hegemony itself. Eventually, a reformulated and multidimensional concept of hegemony will be presented in order to provide coming research with a clear idea about its descriptive and normative connotations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Western European hegemony and power. The focus, however, is not European hegemony over other parts of the world but over non-European immigrants INSIDE of contemporary Europe itself. The paper is a case study of recent Danish legal, educational, and political attempts to better the integration of particularly Muslim immigrants in Denmark. My focus is on how Europe is constructed through these discourses on Muslim immigrants - and how the immigrants in turn are often constructed as alien to European values and norms. By denaturalizing the concepts which these discursive representations rely on (the citizen, the European, the immigrant, etc.), I tease out the silencing or forgetfulness of these representations (for example that Europe is complicit in creating a world of inequality). And based on a close textual reading of the law, the political initiatives, the mandatory civic courses for immigrants, etc., I argue that non-European immigrants in Denmark are kept in a state of eternal Diaspora inside of Europe - despite an official rhetoric of integration. The ambition is to unpack and politicize the Euro-centrism which informs discourses on Europe and which naturalizes the idea of Europe as a moral, acting subject under extreme pressure from Muslim immigrants. Finally, I discuss the theoretical implications of my study which transgresses the national (Danish) and speaks to the construction of regional or international identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on Susan Strange’s ideas, this paper points to the usefulness of the distinction between relational and structural power in analyzing inter-state monetary power relations. While relational power is the ability of one state to influence another state’s behavior directly, structural power refers to one state’s power to indirectly influence others by controlling the monetary structures within which they must operate. In this paper, I argue that structural power in the global monetary system influences outcomes in a wider range of areas than even Strange identified. I explore this broader significance through a brief examination of 1) colonial currency relations in the first half of the 20th century as well as 2) the structural power that the US derives from dollarization today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Never has humanity had so many instruments and mechanisms at its reach to protect human rights. Yet, the passage from a defensive attitude of negation of the state’s responsibilities for gross human rights violations to one of transparency and acceptance of monitoring by international multilateral bodies and civil society organizations has not come easily. Despite persistent high levels of human rights violations, Brazil enters the twenty-first century with an institutional structure that will promote the advance of a society more respectful of human rights. Indeed, the official recognition of the gravity and centrality of human rights for national development has broken the hegemony of the state in the realm of justice and engaged the participation of non-state actors in the construction of a more just and democratic Brazil. In a new context of shared responsibilities, the Brazilian government has argued that human rights norms are not against but rather complementary to sovereignty, reinforcing the idea that there is an effective gain in legitimacy attached to the norm. This paper will argue that there are concrete gains in following a human rights agenda, even in a country like Brazil. In this perspective, I suggest that there is now a political economy of human rights in the sense that a mosaic of actors have entwined norms and interests in promoting the cause. In Brazil, perhaps as in the case of other developing, emerging democracies, the interests are gains in international legitimacy (imported legitimacy), as well as the desire for development at home. The process is neither evident nor self-assuming, and this paper is aimed at retracing the sociology of power embedded in the construction of a human rights discourse and regime in Brazil during the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Along with the domestic-foreign frontier, the distinction between public and private spheres of human activity constitutes a fundamental tool for delineating that which constitutes International Relations. In this paper, I argue that the visibilization of non-hegemonic voices requires that such boundaries be broken, primarily due to the constraints that asymmetrical relations of power and hegemony place upon marginal points of view in the field. In particular, I explore the everyday world and quotidian practice as privileged spaces in which to observe peripheral forms of knowledge. Making use of conceptual insights derived from feminist and postcolonial thinking, among others, I discuss the importance of such non-monolithic spaces for bringing into focus new questions and issues occulted by dominant IR discourses. In this sense, everyday life is observed as the principal site of agency for marginal voices, in which the indeterminate nature of power/knowledge relations can be brought to light. Finally, the paper analyzes distinct ways in which globalization links quotidian practices to national, regional and global processes. I conclude that the examination human activity taking place in everyday life constitutes an important tool for a comprehensive understanding of global politics today, in particular in the periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As non-sovereign bodies, international organizations like the United Nations lack the power to coerce, bribe or buy compliance with international norms. Their only source of power is their capacity to mobilize support on the basis of legitimacy. The paper examines theories of power to set out the role of legitimate power in governance and looks at how it has been and could be used by international organizations and civil society to constrain the actions of hegemons. By examining the role of legitimation as part of the creation and maintenance of international regimes, the paper will argue that evidence will show that hegemons have needed international legitimacy in order to maintain their own power and that, as a result, organizations that can convey it will have their own kind of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional theories of alliance formation emphasise the distribution of power or the balance of threats in determining when alliances will be created. While these theories offer important insights and have the advantage of parsimony, they are underdetermining when it comes to the question of alliance form and quality. After World War II, for example, the United States formed the multilateral NATO alliance to deter the threat of Soviet invasion in Europe. However, in Asia it only responded to perceived Soviet and Chinese threats with a series of ‘hub and spokes’ bilateral alliances. Neither power nor threat-based realism can easily explain this difference in form, nor why European allies were consulted in military planning and given intelligence by the US (features of qualitative multilateralism), while Asian allies were not. This paper argues that to understand the patterns of alliance formation in post-war Asia and the Pacific, it is critical to incorporate non-materialist variables such as culture and identity. In particular, a careful analysis of the official primary source documents that describe the creation of US alliances in the region ? especially the formation of ANZUS in 1951 - shows the important ways in which ideas and assumptions based on race and ‘civilization’ influenced key policy makers and shaped their expectations of would-be allies. Drawing on a rich literature in diplomatic history and sociology the paper makes a broader argument for the inclusion of race as a factor in our analysis of national security decision making in International Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how scientific research is conducted under shifting economic and political conditions. Two political trends ? the continuing spread of liberalized markets and the increasing perception of physical insecurity ? have led to changes in the how research is funded and directed, as well as in how the resulting knowledge is owned or controlled. The paper looks at conflicting and complementary interests of the public (the epistemic communities of scientists, the national publics, and a poorly defined global public), firms, and states by examining the case of national security, public, and proprietary interests in the global field of biomedical research. The paper will provide a theoretically informed discussion of power as the capacity to take advantage of research and its results (or to prevent others from taking those advantages). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eastern enlargement of the EU is one of the most ambitious, yet under-theorized, projects the EU has undertaken in its four- decade long history. Accession negotiations between the candidate countries and the EU were far from being an obvious, naturally flowing process. On the contrary, they were characterized by many difficulties and, more often than not, required significant political will to find mutually acceptable compromises. Thus the result, the accession treaty, reflects a certain ambiguity and mismatching purposes. The area of border control policy extension illustrates these tensions particularly well with the lack of lifting border checks on the new internal borders between old and new member states after accession coupled with the enforcement of the new eastern borders of the EU. In the paper I re-examine the incorporation of east European applicant countries into the EU’s border control policy. I adopt a comparative policy design perspective, theorized by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram , which focuses on the casual link between policymaking processes and subsequent policy designs and emphasizes the importance of different contextual issues within which policy-makers take decisions. Tracing the institutional, political, social and discursive contextual dynamics and translation processes, through which the design of border control provisions of the accession treaty emerges, allows me to identify which specific contextual instances determine the way the Schengen acquis has been extended and clarify why the accession treaty inhibits a degree of inconsistency in the domain of border control policies. The paper is an attempt to re-think EU enlargement from the perspective of border security policy and moves beyond conceptualizations that describe enlargement as a historical or a legal-technical pre-determined process. Instead, I unravel the border control policy measures of the treaty design and re-root them in the environment surrounding the accession talks. Eventually the paper suggests that a different distribution of political power between the EU and the applicants, a different institutional set up of the accession talks and a different social construction of the target population could have produced a radically different accession treaty design that addresses the same problem: the incorporation of candidates to the Schengen acquis, in particular, and the conclusion of EU enlargement, in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the balance of power is generally considered to be a central theory in the field of international relations, it is also widely acknowledged to be an extraordinarily elusive concept because it is both ambiguous and protean. This paper has two main aims. The first is to identify the very different ways that the concept has been drawn upon in the theoretical literature and it focuses on neo-realism, the English school, classical realism and Marxism. In the second part of the paper these divergent approaches will be drawn upon in order to develop a pluralistic framework that will make it possible to examine the balance of power in different geographical and historical contexts. In particular, the aim will be to establish a framework that makes it possible to throw light on the role played by the balance of power in the very different processes of system reproduction and system transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the role of ideational factors in order to obtain a more effective understanding of Israel’s decision to engage in the Oslo peace process in 1993. Traditional understandings of foreign policy have tended to focus on materialist explanations; that is, explanations that focus on what individuals or particular groups have to gain by engaging in a specific policy. This paper goes beyond such understandings by focusing on the role of ideas held by individuals (in this case, Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin) as the main determinant of foreign policy. In order to address a key criticism of Constructivist analyses, this study will take into account the role of power, by arguing that ideas cannot be translated into policy until the individual holding them can obtain institutional power through domestic political structures. In addition, in order to rule out any explanations based solely on power, the case study will illustrate that similarly placed individuals (namely, Yitzhak Shamir) faced the same domestic and external contexts, thus highlighting the role of individuals’ ideas in determining policy. Thus, the paper will contribute to a better perception of the construction of foreign policy, by critiquing traditional theoretical understandings of how policy is made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do the psychological traits of the leader affect the process of decision making? Janis’s seminal work on groupthink suggests that there is a likely connection, though most of his focus is on the phenomenon of groupthink itself and not the characteristics of leaders. Other scholars (Tetlock, Hermann and Preston, Kaarbo, Garrison, Rosati) have made similar suggestions. However, very little empirical work has investigated the connection. This paper will do so using a variety of methods and data. I will build on existing research on groupthink from Schafer and Crichlow, who quantitatively investigated the effect of groupthink phenomena on the outcomes of 30 cases of decision. They conducted 30 case studies and coded each for the occurrence of many different groupthink variables at both the structural level of the group and the information processing stage of decision making. In addition, they solicited expert ratings on the decision outcomes in terms of national interests and international conflict. Each of these sets of variables will function as dependent variables in this paper, essentially investigating the effect of psychological traits on the occurrence of groupthink and on the quality of the decision outcome. On the psychological side of the equation, I will include quantitative variables from the operational code, which assess things such as conflict orientation and strategic propensities (Walker, Schafer and Young), and from the psychological traits developed by Peg Hermann, which include: complexity, distrust, nationalism, task/affiliation, control, need for power, and self confidence. The psychological traits are assessed using new automated software that content analyzes spontaneous verbal material from the subject. To avoid endogeneity and to allow for learning and trait changes over time, verbal material is taken from the three-month window immediately preceding the onset of the decision-making process. Multiple models will be considered using OLS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the logic of current international politics (power politics)? In my paper, I try to analyze and understand the contemporary logic of international politics  particularly the logic of power politics. I argue that after 911, the world has turned into a power political state of mind, in which securitization seems to be a way of rule. From the perspective of power politics, international order seems to have elements of both an imperial and hierarchic system. The framework for analysis of this paper has three interlinked dimensions and elements. Firstly, the sphere of national security thinking provides the overall setting. The indefinable content of immanent national security explains the origins of securitization, of which forms the second element of the paper. I argue that securitization is both a useful tool for analysis and a way of ruling in existing world politics. With the help of securitization the politics and interests of national security is executed that results in hegemonic order. In the paper, my attempt is to explain why the combination of national security, securitization and hegemonic order constitutes a model, which explains, at least in part, the current logic of world politics . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the relationship between power and knowledge in the context of the construction of security in Australia. Specifically, it seeks to apply critical theoretical approaches to security to the Australian government’s security discourse regarding asylum-seekers in 2001 and terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2002. It is argued in this paper that perceptions of the provision of security are central to the political legitimacy of states. In particular, specific actions on the part of governments may be enabled by perceptions among their citizens that these actions maintain or further their security. If we accept this point, then the crucial question becomes: how do certain meanings of security come to resonate with particular populations in particular contexts? It is argued here that we can further our understanding of this process through acknowledging relationships between power and knowledge, and specifically the role of governments in creating contexts in which particular meanings of security become resonant. Through applying such an approach to the Australian government’s depiction of asylum-seekers and its response to terrorist attacks in New York and particularly Bali, we can move towards a greater understanding of the ways in which security is constructed and of the relationship between security and political legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conducts an initial exploration of the links between European Union (EU) social exclusion policy and economic integration. The paper outlines the historical development of the social exclusion concept, and locates the EU interpretation of social exclusion in that historical context. Understanding that the EU’s interpretation is a moving target, the paper nonetheless identifies current core principles of EU social exclusion policy, including in particular the exchange of best practice. Finally, the paper conducts a preliminary analysis of EU-sponsored projects that attempt to combat social exclusion. Based on this outline and analysis, the paper argues that while EU social exclusion policy involves a broad variety of non-state, state, and sub-state actors, those actors are encouraged to a narrowly delimited model of social inclusion, thereby discouraging some salient forms of social inclusion. In other words, the EU legitimizes a particular definition of inclusion amongst social actors. EU social exclusion policy therefore augurs a new dynamic of cultural hegemony: hegemony through regional economic integration. As such, the paper links to current discussion of transnational norms and their potential to influence, inspire, or reproduce domestic power dynamics. Yet the paper takes a critical stance toward such norms, for example by revealing that the principles anchoring EU social exclusion policy hold close affinities to corporate management principles of competitiveness. Thus, the paper questions the supposed limits of regional economic integration, and suggests that such integration involves a larger cultural and ideological project that produces hegemonic definitions of social practices. Of particular importance is EU encouragement of the culture-ideology of consumerism. At the same time, the EU-sponsored projects illustrate that the broad array of social actors implementing EU social exclusion policy have some agency relative to the Commission and other Brussels-based institutions. As a result, they possess some power to influence the cultural impact and ideological content of EU social exclusion policy and European integration more generally. While EU social exclusion policy encourages a culture-ideology of consumerism, the agents involved in policy implementation may stem this tide. Students of international organization(s) and of cultural politics can find dynamics of great interest in contemporary European societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between cross-cultural consumption and identity formation. Actions of consumption are public in nature and therefore reflect, in Erving Goffman?s words, a type of ?social front.? It is this social front which serves to form identity. This paper utilizes Goffman?s social theory as methodology to connect the specific action of cross-cultural consumption to identity formation. The formation of identity is a negotiated narrative which is constructed, contested, and always in flux. In addition, the consumption of ?symbols of modernity? entails (in Michel de Certeau?s words) a type of ?secondary production.? This ?secondary production? not only produces a hybridized identity but also challenges hierarchies of social space. In taking such a stand, this paper seeks to counter the works of three prominent scholars. On the issue of identity, this paper stands counter to the essentialist arguments of Samuel P. Huntington and Bernard Lewis. On the issue of cross-cultural consumption, this paper argues against Thomas L. Friedman?s global homogenization paradigm. Using Egypt as a case study, this paper examines how the act of consumption of ?symbols of modernity? results in a hybridized identity, which challenges hierarchies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that incomplete contracting generates for the states willing to cooperate a kind of bargaining problem that ressembles the problem of compliance but should be considered as distinct; the problem of residual control. The first part of the paper offers a theoretical discussion in which I isolate the specificity of residual control problems and highlight its importance for the explanation of institutional design preferences and outcomes. I demonstrate how asymetries of power play a critical role in this process. In the second part of the paper, I explore the pertinence of the theory of incomplete contracting and residual control in a case study of NAFTA-EU relations. Immediatly after the creation of NAFTA, several proposals for the future of the transatlantic trade relations were made. Scenarios for a NAFTA-EU free-trade agreement were rapidly discarded and bilateral initiatives were pursued with very different outcomes: Mexico signed an interim FTA with the EU in 1997, EU-US proposals for New Marketplace and Partnerships did not materialize, and Canadians and Europeans have recently launched negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement of a new generation. This paper compares the institutional preferences of the three NAFTA members as they are articulated in their discussion with their european partner over trade relations. More precisely, I argue that preferences regarding the future of the trade partnerships with Europe can best be explained by the measure by which the original NAFTA contract addressed, or failed to address, residual control rights in a context of asymetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will discuss some of the theoretical and explanatory insights of my research, pertaining to US soft power and the nature of world order. The definition of soft power I adopt is a socially constitutive one, and the role of soft power in international regimes and institutions: legitimating rules, generating symbolic power, structuring the social contexts of negotiation, will be discussed. This theory of soft power is developed as a critique to dominant accounts such as Nye’s, as well as conventional neorealist and neoliberal explanations of the way the US achieved and maintained hegemony. I adopt insights from theories of social power within the hierarchical systems to give a better account of the way the US has shaped its international role. This paper will focus on the theoretical rethinking of soft power and a historical focus rather than presenting a critique of the current US administration’s foreign policy. Sarah E. Graham Australian National University. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critique of the current ‘displacement of politics’ within international relations. Drawing upon Liberal commitment to the historical and cultural superiority of its own civilizational norms, we can presently observe a project to re-define international politics. A central element in this project is the implementation of a Liberal blueprint as a means to provide stability and order and to eradicate conflict, struggle and violence. The paper will focus on the alteration in the discourse on war and violence within which these practices are embedded today. As part of the Liberal project, this discourse re-introduces a ‘discriminatory concept of war’ into global politics. Warfare, or more precisely, the use of armed force, is therefore turned from an expression of the Political as an agonistic confrontation between equals, to the instrumental administration of force for inscribing a particular Liberal order of global politics against an ‘axis of evil’ and other ‘rogue states’. In order to formulate this critique and in order to outline the possibility of a different discourse on the use of force, this paper will draw upon and develop Carl Schmitt’s work on the Discriminatory Concept of War and on the spatial order of global politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English School and its master concept ?international society? is currently enjoying a renaissance. The paper seeks to sustain this revitalization by suggesting how a firmer grasp of the School?s potential can be achieved by situating its contribution in the context of sociological World Society Theory. This move promises to heighten its theoretical reflexivity as well as its awareness of the non-political context of modern politics. The viability of an updated English School approach is discussed in the light of an empirical challenge: the implications of the unipolar power structure that privileges the United States in the contemporary states system. It can be argued that unipolarity introduces a degree of systemic hierarchy conflicting with central English School premises, i.e. the importance of shared intersubjective norms and anarchical state equality. The paper argues that unipolarity does indeed challenge evolving international society but also that it is unlikely to obstruct the emergence of a world order based on differentiated and interactive governance frameworks. A reflexive English School approach contributes fruitfully to our understanding of this development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Please contact me at rgb27@cam.ac.uk for a copy of this paper if necessary. This paper looks at prominent politicians’ perceptions of a hegemonic power and its role in the international system from inside and outside that power. The aim of the paper is to discuss and compare elite perceptions with International Relations theory concerning hegemony. An important reason to study elite perceptions is debate with theory. Where do schemes of individual actors and academic theories of explanation agree and diverge? This paper compares Aristide Briand (1862-1932), Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937) and Winston Churchill (1874-1965) on their views of Great Britain in the international system 1890s-1920s. At the time Britain ruled the biggest empire ever, enjoyed complete naval supremacy giving it mastery of world trade and finance, and overseas interventions. Yet, at the same time, Britain was strangely detached from the conflicts of the lesser great powers next door on the European Continent and without a European-size army. Research into the development of the three’s perceptions of the international system shows distinctive perceptions of questions as the role and legitimacy of Great Britain and other great powers. Chamberlain with an excellent British-French-German education in history and political science clearly saw Britain’s entanglement in Continental conflicts and urged concerted great power action for managing the international system. Churchill was introduced to international affairs as officer and correspondent on the Frontier in India, Sudan and South Africa before 1900. Here he developed a strong sense of the British Empire as centre and guardian of the international system according no legitimacy to neither other great powers nor smaller state or non-state actors. Churchill was preoccupied with maintaining the hegemonic image of the Empire, against colonised and the rising US challenge. French perceptions show the importance of invasion danger and security dilemma on the European Continent. Perceptions remind theory of the subjectivity of the international system and hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the broadest sense, this paper will examine relationships between the functioning of global international organizations and the distribution of power among member states. Practically speaking, I shall concentrate on the United Nations and discuss the impacts of the three hegemonies, that is, (1) the economic hegemony of the OECD countries (or perhaps the G-7, if this is really what the economic power cluster amounts to), (2) the ideological hegemony of the liberal-democratic-neoliberal-West, and (3) the military hegemony of the United States. Overlapping membership among states constituting the three hegemonies amounts presently to what Gramsci would identify as a historical bloc (blocco), that within broad limits accounts for the main currents and directions of contemporary world affairs. This historical bloc also controls the United Nations, normatively, materially and programmatically. The paper will describe the hows and whats of this. Gramscian analysis, however, invites consideration of anti-hegemonic activities, and these, within the United Nations, account for much of the politics that play out within and around the organization. Because the politics of anti-hegemonism tend to render the United Nations a less than useful instrument of hegemonic imposition, global hegemony today is increasingly imposed via extra-UN devices and channels, thereby marginalizing the world organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the power relationship among crisis adversaries on the extent of mediation efforts, the effectiveness of various styles of mediation, and the impact of mediation on crisis management and conflict resolution. Its methodology is both cross-national and experimental. Its objective is to advance our understanding of the circumstances in which mediation is likely to make a difference in managing international crises, by far the most pervasive and serious form of disruptive interactions among states in the international system. Our previous work in this area (Wilkenfeld et al. 2003) has laid the groundwork for the present analyses by examining the circumstances in which crises are likely to be mediated, and the style of mediation most closely associated with successful crisis outcomes. In the present paper, we add consideration of an additional factor?the relative power of crisis actors. Our findings indicate that mediation, particulary manipulative mediation, does have a significant impact on crisis dynamincs and outcomes, but this impact is significant only in asymmetric crises. Mediation is more likely to occur when crisis actors are equal powers, but its effect in this symmetric power context is greatly reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provisional Title: ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Coalition Warfare.’ (September 11 & the changing nature of IR / the relationship between theory and practice) Theorising coalition warfare to date has failed to provide comprehensive or convincingly definitive explanations for why military coalitions are formed, how common agendas are set, and through what means multinational capabilities are realised. This paper intends to contribute to filling the gaps in our current understanding of the phenomenon. Based upon ongoing doctoral research, it will examine three competing perspectives or ‘images’ of coalition warfare utilising international relations ‘levels of analysis’. It regards the phenomenon at the system, state, and ‘organisational’ levels while concurrently providing structural, procedural and ‘organisational’ explanations for coalition behaviour. In evaluating existing theories pertaining to alliances and exploring alternative explanations it aims to contribute to a more complete interpretation of why and how nations join together in combination against threats and an identification of the factors crucial to optimum coalition performance. The paper will contain a strong empirical base, drawing on thoroughly researched cases of coalition warfare during the Second World War and the 1956 Suez War. It emphasises throughout the importance of working with allies to attain national security goals and the serious consequences that may result from coalition failure. By considering this highly pertinent topic with reference to a post 9/11 environment, it aims to contribute to our wider understanding of the current practice of international affairs and to reappraise IR theories that date from the Cold War to explain politico-military alignments between states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Organization of the Democratic Peace matters. Interdemocratic institutions are particularly suited to block escalation pathways in world politics. By this, they prevent political conflicts among their member states to result in war. This is the core argument of the present paper. It builds on findings from three fields of research which still wait for integration: (a) the liberal analysis of the democratic peace, (b) systemic approaches to international institutions, and (c) new quantitative studies of armed conflicts between states beyond the democratic peace proposition. In a nutshell, the paper sets out to identify three core contributions of international institutions to peaceful conflict management. International institutions can be used to overcome the security dilemma among states and to tame power competitions. They sustain international cooperation under conditions of anarchy and forestall the recourse of governments to unilateral self-help strategies. Finally, international institutions increase the autonomy of issue areas, which decreases the risks of destabilizing spill-over effects from other international policies. In the paper, it is stated that these three core functions are extra-ordinarily well performed by interdemocratic institutions. Therefore, interdemocratic institutions can be considered the missing link in the explanation of the democratic peace. The paper presents preliminary evidence for its core claims from two case studies on the management of security relations between France and Germany on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises the way that IR has understood the concept of hegemony. Obviously IR realists of the HST school reduce hegemony to leadership and the operation of power. However, those, like Cox, who seek to bring in a more social conception of hegemony from the work of Gramsci still limit the role of hegemony and conceive of it in a historicist manner. This paper argues for a critical realist conception of hegemony as rooted in the reproduction and cohesion of underlying social structures and generative mechanisms. The functional need to secure the unity of the social formation then finds its expression through the various hegemonic projects which are emergent from this. The paper argues for two distinct but connected notions of hegemony as structural unity of the social formation and the emergent realisation of this through concrete hegemonic projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge is power, but so is emotion. This paper will highlight how state rituals use the language of emotion to generate nationalism. Certainly, this is obvious. Public holidays evoke patriotic pride: Independence Day. But emotions are not just positive in these state-sanctioned events. England, America and China have each celebrated a ‘National Humiliation Day’, which was sanctioned by the monarch/president in wartime. China re-instituted this custom in 2001in its National Defence Law. The paper will do two things: it will genealogically chart the emergence of this curious custom by reading back from the present’s centralized state rituals for the nation, to religious events for the monarch in the past. It will argue that the odd overlap between the wartime activities of the Church of England and the Chinese government shows that we need to understand identity as a positive/negative feeling: the nation is linked to humiliation. Secondly, it will explore the temporality of these events: National Humiliation *Day*. Just as shame generates pride, time generates place: the day generates the nation. The paper will conclude that international politics is framed by emotions like shame and pride. It uses the odd juxtaposition of early modern Anglo-America and late modern China to highlight the tension between the particular and the general in identity and violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While international relations scholars have long sought the causes of war, issues that arise after the fighting stops have garnered comparatively little attention. In this paper, I address a fundamental problem that all victorious states must face. That is, what exactly is prudence in victory? Is a moderate or lenient peace more likely to provide a stable post-war environment, or should the vanquished suffer a harsh, punitive peace that prohibits the state from ever rising to again disturb international stability? The conventional wisdom, emanating from the logic of the balance of power, is that defeated states should be treated moderately. While the proposition of moderation in victory may sometimes be appropriate, it is not specified well enough to explain the various ways victorious states have treated defeated states. I challenge the conventional wisdom by exploring the range of options that victors have with regard to a vanquished foe, from engagement to dismemberment, and provide a model to explain post-war settlements. In doing so, I show why victorious states sometimes choose more punitive settlements and, by extension, that punitive settlements can provide a more stable post-war environment under certain conditions. Prudence in victory, it follows, should not be measured by the means of a settlement, as many suggest, but by the consequences of the settlement for the post-war international system. While asking many similar questions that the literature on war termination presents, this paper seeks to go beyond explaining how wars end and explains both the causes of victorious states’ management strategies and the consequences of the settlements reached. To illustrate the argument, I present several cases of great power war settlements. This focus may provide insight regarding the most recent case of a defeated great power. While recent events have altered the US-Russia strategic relationship, Russian potential to destabilize the post-Cold War international system should not be dismissed and how the US continues the process of managing a defeated Russia will, at least to some extent, determine if this crippled giant goes the way of post-WWI or post-WWII Germany. Moreover, while not as likely to affect system stability but possibly more pressing in the current international system, applying this research to cases of regional or lesser powers may provide insight into the correct way for the US and other great powers to manage defeated states such as Iraq. Since war is not likely to disappear and the potential pitfalls of victory are all too obvious, critically and constructively examining the notion of prudence in victory is especially important given the context of US global leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first highlights the value of Gramscian concepts to avoid the pitfalls of structuralism. Yet, most IR scholars drawing on Gramsci tend to concentrate on dominant political-economic forces and structures. They recognize the importance of subaltern forces, but these are not their primary focus. Cultural studies approaches deepen the analysis of subaltern forces, as agent of change in their own rights. Analyzing the dialectical relationship between political discourses (theories) and practices emerging from social movements and organic-intellectuals, the paper examines the role of cultural and socio-economic struggles, the processes taking place within and among subaltern forces, and how they challenge dominant structures of power and the neoliberal common sense. Based on fieldwork research, it draws from the experiences of sociopolitical forces (anti-FTAA movements), rooted in specific historical context, insisting on the need to avoid a solely state-centric approach. This analysis of the practices and knowledges of subaltern forces challenges the dominant understanding of hegemony and counter-hegemony in the field of IR. It also questions the role as intellectuals in reproducing these dominant understandings and power relations, by highlighting the assumptions that intellectuals tend to make about subaltern forces, but which not necessarily reflect the complexities of their day-to-day practices in resisting dominant structures of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the exercise of power by Indonesia and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. It argues that the two regional great powers have had a traditional sense of entitlement over their immediate neighborhood and it analyzes whether they have sought to establish hegemonic orders in parts of the Southeast Asian region. The paper claims that Indonesia and Vietnam have exercised power in three distinct ways and examines their respective actions in East Timor, Indochina and as members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Moreover, it notes the absence of regional hegemony in the post-Cold War by discussing the transformation in Vietnam?s exercise of power in Indochina since 1989 and Indonesia?s loss of regional standing since 1997. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the connections between dress and embodied resistance practices in an effort to analyze the ways in which clothing not only demarcates a form of bodily disciplinarity but how it also compliments and enhances both the resistant and productive aspects associated with the aesthetics of self-making. Thus the metaphor of the mannequin will be deployed as a juxtapositional concept enabling me to explore how dressing the body functions to capture the body as an absorptive, reflective surface of power while simultaneously recasting the body as a surface of resistance and struggle. My aim is to create a theoretical context to explore the ways in which embodied resistance practices constantly operate to exceed and evade representational capture. The inspiration for this project comes from one of the leaders of the women's peace initiative in Liberia and her intriguing declaration that this T-shirt made me strong. She was of course referring to the shirts that the women had designed and worn during their protests to halt the civil war in Liberia. This paper interrogates how "enfashioning" the body reveals power's productive capacities to create subjectivities that simultaneously reflect and deflect efforts to be cast as the mere effect of a knowable, disciplinary, and constraining power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of global governance often entails a far too unitary reading of the concepts involved. In order to better theorise the field, empirical studies of different forms of governance in their context are sorely needed. This paper turns to the area stretching from Turkey, via Iran and Central Asia to Pakistan and Afghanistan. While these are now, at least nominally, sovereign Westphalian states with a uniform exercise of rule within, the Westphalian model did not arrive in a political vacuum. The introduction of a new set of political concepts is always negotiated against those already in place. The paper argues that only by turning to the tradition of governance existing prior to the introduction of a Westphalian model can we understand the exercise of political power in these states. Before the introduction of Westphalian concepts of governance, these states were a symbiosis of Turko-Mongolian nomadic dynasties and Persian sedentary bureaucracies. This created a particular way of governing subjects and relating to other states. By drawing on existing anthropological and historical literature, the paper explores the concepts of "global governance" that held the ground in Eurasia for 1000 years, and that may hold the key to understanding these states and their place in contemporary global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on the economic causes of civil conflict has so far ignored the role of foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper begins to fill this gap. A closer look at the effects of FDI on the processes of political violence is justified by the foreign investors' potential for a two-fold impact: economic and political. On the one hand, investors wield the power to transform the economies of developing countries, thus changing economic inequalities and creating opportunities for grievance and for greed among domestic groups. On the other hand, investors themselves are strategic players with the goal to maximize profits and the ability to alter their environment through political channels. Still, only investors in some economic sectors have both the incentives and the ability to exercise political power in their host states. This paper investigates how the strategic interaction between foreign investors and host country actors influences the probability of civil conflict. It identifies the types of FDI that are likely to alleviate the risk of civil conflict (service sector FDI), as well as those investments that exacerbate it (primary and, sometimes, manufacturing FDI). Analyses using a new data set of industry-level FDI stock and flows lend some empirical support to the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the intellectual origins of NATO operational planning doctrine and how it has migrated to other international organisations such as the EU and the UN. It argues that some of the key concepts it contains - centres of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations and end-?states - are increasingly difficult to apply in the modern crisis response operations armed forces are tasked to undertake. In this sense, doctrinal ideas stretching back to the days of Clausewitz are coming near their point of culmination not because they are invalidated but because political guidance no longer allows for them. The paper concludes with some thoughts on the implications of this state of affairs in terms of the strategic instrumentality of crisis response operations and the structure of politico-?military relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the next twenty years, two trends will have a major impact on global governance: China's rise as a military power and the ability of regional multilateral institutions to effectively address disputes. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is attempting to build a security community but various internal and external challenges serve as an impediment to resolving the most complex issues. One clear example of the intersection of China's rise and the ability of multilateral organizations to impact regional security is the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Therefore, this paper will examine the intersection of these two trends by focusing on prospects for dispute resolution between China and ASEAN. The paper will outline the various dialogue mechanisms between China and ASEAN and discuss the efficacy of those mechanisms for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the period leading up to the Gleneagles G8 in 2005, both popular and elite attitudes to the cancellation of third world debt underwent a transformation. In 1990 debt cancellation was seen as morally neutral, the unfortunate result of the incorrect assessment of financial risk; defaulting on debt was seen as morally questionable. By the summer of 2005, however, an interesting transformation had taken place. By the time the G8 met the debate had been transformed to the extent that debt cancellation now occupied the moral "high ground", third world debt cancellation had become a moral imperative, and few dared speak out against it. This paper explores how this transformation came about by exploring the involvement of transnational advocacy networks in the ongoing contest to define the rules and practices governing finance. It takes the case of the campaign for the cancellation of third world debt and examines how nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations, as diverse as Jubilee 2000 and the World Economic Forum, were important in reframing the debate and how normative ideas were invoked in this process. These events provide a way into addressing the question of the power of normative ideas in underpinning the rules and practices governing financial relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper represents the early stages of a new project that explores China's search for 'responsible' great power status through the case study of Sino-African aid relations. China has become less hesitant about its intentions of attaining the status of a 'responsible great power' in recent years, and it is often argued that part of its desire to play a more prominent role is manifest in its aid policies to the developing world. In the context of Sino-African relations, China's quest for natural resources and propping up of autocratic regimes has been subject to much scrutiny. It is, however, important to keep in mind that China is also under pressure to provide assistance to the developing world in a 'responsible' manner which befits the status of a 'responsible' great power as defined by the Western powers which continue to dominate International Society to this day. In this paper, I seek to analyse Chinese policy discussions on international aid and explore how Western norms of 'responsible' aid have made inroads into China. Its findings will help us better understand how the Chinese leadership conceptualises what a 'responsible' great power should do, and the extent to which such thinking is influenced by Western discourses. This, in turn generates interesting implications on debates of legitimacy in contemporary International Society, as well as who (especially in China's eyes) is bestowed with the moral authority to bestow recognition of a 'responsible' great power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenging the traditional US position, China was able to broaden its economic orbit in Asia-Pacific. The regional economic structure has become more China-centred in recent years. Australia, an important regional middle power, is no exception in this regard: For several years, Beijing has been ahead of Washington in trade with Australia. This trend, however, has not resulted in greater Chinese influence on Australian security affairs. In contrast, Canberra has even strengthened its security ties with Washington in recent years. It is a telling example about the limited fungibility of power. This paper is going to inquire, i) why China has failed to transfer its economic power into the security sphere, ii) what rationale and processes have prevented a shift of Australia's allegiance away from the US and iii) what general lessons this poses for global power shifts. Obviously, statistics are a good indicator for shifting power capabilities, but power also has to be seen as a relational ability to make others to do (or want) what one want. The allegiance of states, i.e. the relations of middle powers to dominant powers are therefore a very apt measurement about de facto power shifts in specific international areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power Transitions in the international system are often associated with the outbreak of violence. Power Transition Theory (PTT) sees two important variables at work: a) a transition or a prolonged period of parity between the dominant power and a new rising contender and b) dissatisfaction with the status quo of the international order on the part of the contender. While the majority of the PTT school is rather deterministic and does not offer policy prescriptions, there are at least three different ways for a declining hegemon to deal with an impending power transition. He can ignore it, resist it or accept it. As soon as it is accepted, in principle the task becomes managing the power transition in a peaceful way. One possible template, the Concert of Europe, was able to prevent the outbreak of great power wars for more than a generation by providing a cooperation framework, which was based on shared norms and procedures. In this paper we explore the possibility of utilizing a modernized concert of powers as a framework for managing the probable transition of power in the not too distant future as well as the advent of a multipolar system in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a tendency adopted by scholars and international actors today that sovereignty must be put apart in cases of human security, therefore international intervention can be justified as a solution to re-establish domestic order. This paper aims to discuss two dimensions of the United Nations state-building processes in post conflict societies. Firstly, is to explore when international intervention should stop intervening and let the local society(ies) deal with their own problems of representation. Secondly, to verify in which ways this shift should take place in order to provide a peaceful transition from international to local power. Concerning this former point, and aware of the complexity of societal structuration process within each country, the goal here is to understand the variables that can change or influence the process of hegemonic groups to achieve the state's power (and control) for the next years. The argument here, following some trends of the actual literature, is that the process of state-building should evaluate the internal configuration and strengthen institutions of each countries in order to bring social representants together to dialogue, in which should result in a less turbulent transition from the international to national power-sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting from a four-dimensional definition of media power, this paper examines media-driven changes in warfare by looking at NATO's intervention in Kosovo and the War on Terror. It clarifies that, besides well planned media strategies which resulted from the lessons learnt in previous military interventions, politicians and military personnel found themselves in continuous need of adjusting those same media strategies and even of making changes to the military strategies. The paper therefore argues that media operations are necessary to win contemporary conflict and not simply an option. As well established concepts like propaganda, news management, and public relations do not account for this story, a new concept is introduced: "media warfare." Finally, two important elements of "media warfare" are clarified on the basis of the case analysis: (1) that the presence, in the international market, of different media of different nationalities and ownerships, is a crucial "conditioning" variable increasing media power and (2) that the media has a determinant role in the evolution of warfighting practices aimed at the reduction of casualties - and more generally of risks - or at least of related images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some belligerents engaged within a civil conict seek the services of an international intermediary, while others resist all forms of outside interference? Moreover why do some dialogue processes result in the conclusion of an agree- ment, while others fail to locate a solution? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at the distribution of power within civil conict. Utilizing recently released data that codes the relative strength of rebel movements, in as- sociation with geo-referenced variables that record the location of conict zones, this paper represents the first attempt to combine new disaggregated civil war data with the study of conict mediation. The results suggest that stronger rebels are more likely to force the state to accept a mediation process, and ultimately to agree a settlement. Moreover certain features that have been shown to facilitate the forming of weak insurgent groups, such as mountainous terrain, are shown to decrease the likelihood of mediation incidence and success. Taken together the results represent an important addition to both the civil war and the mediation literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]