To what degree was the shift to direct taxation in the WWI period intentional, to serve a party program and meet popular political calls for equity? To what degree was this shift strategic, to permanently increase state capacity and the power of national government to intervene in economic affairs? These are large and complex questions, and this paper is an initial effort to examine whether or not the Wilson Administration and Democratic congressional leaders sought to advance goals other than expedient war financing. Some scholars have attributed to Democratic leaders goals of wealth redistribution (or retribution) and building national capacity for economic policymaking, both fiscal and monetary. Economic historian Elliot Brownlee claims Wilson oversaw the creation of a "democratic-statist tax regime" (2000). Did the Wilson Administration seek to build state capacity while retaining democratic accountability via party government in the area of public finance, particularly taxation? An affirmative answer would require evidence of clear goals and a legislative agenda to remake taxation policy, as well as consensus on policy and state building within the Democratic Party and its leaders.Alternate explanations could include functional, evolutionary, or expediency explanations for the rise of direct income taxation as efficient, flexible and politic to raise revenues, especially in times of crisis. Political Scientist John Witte focuses on pluralist politics as the best explanation of the tax policy formulation and implementation. that "no one controls tax policy" and politicians tend to "confer as many benefits on as many groups as is politically feasible" (1985).World War I was financed in the U.S. with what Elliot Brownlee calls a "soak the rich" approach to taxation as part of "Wilson's program of party government" (1993, 2000). President Wilson and Democratic leaders in Congress did seem to share a belief in progressive income taxes as generally desirable, but this paper demonstrates that there was no policy consensus between the Administration and Leadership in the House or a Democratic Party program concerning the purposes of taxation. Revenue acts were secured through negotiations with regular Democratic leaders in Congress, enabled by strong powers of committee chairs and prerogatives of the House. These rules or customs made extraordinary finance possible but empowered the legislative over the executive.Southern Democrats in the House led by Claude Kitchin perhaps sought permanent redistribution, even taxing wealth as sectional retribution. Although at least one scholar narrows Kitchin's intention on excise profits taxation to paying for war debts after hostilities end, not indefinitely (Arnett 1937). Senate Finance Chair Simmons was a fiscal conservative sympathetic to business concerns over the 1917 revenue legislation, which triggered a confrontation between the houses of Congress. Wilson and McAdoo shared those views to some degree, but did not develop a zealous program to achieve tax justice. Tariff revision, banking reform aimed at the trusts was a greater imperative; specific tax initiatives were only developed by McAdoo directly in response to war needs. Initial war finance proposals from the Administration included regressive taxes and provisions to broaden the bases of income taxation, which appear more expedient than Democratic. Wilson and McAdoo were initially cautious and then embraced progressive taxes primarily for their efficiency in funding war, along with a broad array of other taxes that could quickly deliver revenue. Income taxation became appealing to them on equity and efficiency grounds... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]