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This paper addresses a critical gap in telecom regulators' awareness of the climate impact of their policy decisions and highlights the substantial potential of broadband technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGe). Empirical evidence shows that broadband can achieve a GHGe reduction of approximately 15–20%, a notable efficiency given its relatively low direct emissions of around 0.4–1.0% of global emissions. This analysis substantiates the premise that effective telecom policy serves as robust climate policy. The paper argues for a global alignment of telecom and climate policies, advocating for an integrated approach that acknowledges the deep interdependencies between these sectors. Key policy recommendations include targeted subsidies for broadband in rural areas, strategic spectrum allocation, and comprehensive incentives for green technology adoption across consumers, industries, and governments. The goal is to prompt a reevaluation of policy frameworks, urging advanced economies to harness the full potential of digital infrastructure to combat climate change. • Broadband technologies contribute only about 0.4–1.0% of direct GHGe within the ICT sector, underscoring their efficiency as sustainable technologies. • Broadband adoption can enable a significant reduction in GHGe, estimated at 15–20%, by facilitating low-carbon consumer behaviors, optimizing industrial practices, and enhancing government services. • There is a significant gap in awareness among telecom regulators about the climatic consequences of their decisions. • Targeted education and collaboration initiatives are essential to increase awareness and integrate climate considerations into telecom policy. • The pressing nature of the climate crisis necessitates translating academic findings into concrete policies. • This includes removing regulatory barriers to network investments, optimizing spectrum allocation for energy-efficient technologies, and developing comprehensive incentive programs for consumers, industries, and governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we investigate the long-term effects of climate change on the mobility of working-age people. We use a world economy model that covers almost all the countries around the world, and distinguishes between rural and urban regions as well as between flooded and unflooded areas. The model is calibrated to match international and internal mobility data by education level for the last 30 years, and is then simulated under climate change variants. We endogenize the size, dyadic, and skill structure of climate migration. When considering moderate climate scenarios, we predict mobility responses in the range of 70–108 million workers over the course of the twenty-first century. Most of these movements are local or inter-regional. South–South international migration responses are smaller, while the South–North migration response is of the "brain drain" type and induces a permanent increase in the number of foreigners in OECD countries in the range of 6–9% only. Changes in the sea level mainly translate into forced local movements. By contrast, inter-regional and international movements are sensitive to temperature-related changes in productivity. Lastly, we show that relaxing international migration restrictions may exacerbate the poverty effect of climate change at origin if policymakers are unable to select/screen individuals in extreme poverty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is one response to the challenges faced by agriculture due to climate change. As with other sustainability transitions, technological innovation is highlighted as playing a critical role, however, the adoption and diffusion of technological innovations in OECD countries is slow. The aim of this paper is to identify key socio-economic barriers, in terms of supply and demand, that inhibit the adoption and diffusion of CSA technological innovations in Europe. To achieve this aim, a theoretical framework is constructed based on a literature review of socio-economic barriers effecting adoption and diffusion. This framework is explored with data from semi-structured interviews with CSA technology providers and members of agricultural supply chains, such as farmers associations and consumer goods producers (the end-users of the technology). Data was collected on the barriers they experienced, with interviews conducted in the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Italy. This data was thematically coded and categorised to identify key barrier typologies. The results demonstrate that barriers exist on both the demand (user) and supply (technology provider) sides. The paper provides recommendations for increasing the adoption and diffusion of CSA technological innovations, as well as implications for the CSA and innovation literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically examines whether government ideology and government fragmentation have influenced the process of CO²-emission reductions in the time period 1992-2008. Using data from 19 OECD countries, I find that (1) right-wing governments are associated with emission reduction to a smaller extent than center and left-wing governments and (2) emissions are higher the more parties are in government. On the other hand, the distinction between majority and minority governments has no significant influence on emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across the OECD, Canada's record on CO emissions is particularly poor, with overall emissions up 32% over the 1990-2007 period. The current paper seeks to better understand this situation by making systematic comparisons of Canada with other OECD countries. For Canada overall, the rapid increase in emissions over the 1990-2007 period can be explained by several factors, including major population growth, increased affluence (although to a lesser extent than elsewhere in the OECD), a continued dependence on fossil fuels, while continuing to increase its overall demand for energy. While the energy intensity of Canada's economy has declined somewhat over recent years, it actually lagged behind most OECD countries on this front and remains one of the most energy intense economies in the world (2nd highest in the OECD on our indicator of energy intensity). While there are many factors responsible for this, Canada's particularly energy-intensive industrial structure is certainly relevant, as is the importance of its primary sector relative to most developed nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: There is concern that climate change may greatly increase the costs of providing water infrastructure in rich countries, but the estimates available cannot be compared across countries. This paper develops and applies a top-down approach to estimate the costs of adapting to climate change on a consistent basis for different climate scenarios. The analysis separates (a) the costs of maintaining service standards for a baseline projection of demand, and (b) the costs of changes in water use and infrastructure as a consequence of changes in climate patterns. The engineering estimates focus on the direct capital and operating costs of adaptation without relying upon economic incentives to affect patterns of water use. On this assumption, the costs of adaptation are 1–2% of baseline costs for all OECD countries with the main element being the extra cost of water resources to meet higher level of municipal water demand. There are large differences in the cost of adaptation across countries and regions. Adopting an economic approach under which water levies are used to cap total water abstractions leads to a large reduction in the burden of adaptation and generates savings of $6–12 billion per year under different climate scenarios. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

For many decades, the production of industrial goods was concentrated in the Northern hemisphere, while energy resources were abundantly available in a limited number of developing countries and those with centrally planned economies. In this context, the security of energy supply was mainly understood as a secure procurement of cheap energy resources to the industrialised world. Military forces have been constantly upgraded and deployed to ensure geopolitical interests, including the control of energy resources. Nowadays, the depletion of oil and gas reserves, the growing concerns about global climate change along with the emergence of new energy demand centres in South and East Asia and the continuing political tensions in several major energy-exporting and -transit countries raise the question of possible alternative strategies to safeguard global energy security. It is vital to change the old paradigm. But what could be the new paradigm? This paper attempts to contribute to this debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]