*GROUP identity, *TAIWANESE people, *SURVEYS, *NATIONALISM, *NATIONAL character
Abstract
The article examines the fundamental aspects of China's unification with Taiwan using survey data collected in Taiwan. The researcher considers the island residents' changing national identity and policy preferences regarding Taiwan's future relations with China. The survey revealed that less than 10% of the residents subscribe to the greater Chinese nationalism, while the majority of them sees the island as an independent and separate political entity from the Chinese mainland.
Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has been engulfed in waves of both democratisation and integration with mainland China. These two waves have pulled identity reconstruction in Taiwan in two different directions. In the process of democratisation, a shift to a majoritarian system encouraged a Taiwanese renaissance on the political platform and consequently led to the deconstruction of Chinese identity. On the other hand, in the 1990s, with the high mobility of capital and people across the Taiwan Strait, close economic ties could have put the brakes on Taiwan independence movements. Hence, this paper uses random coefficient models to explore how the democratic transition and increasing cross-strait relations brought about psychological and structural mechanisms that motivated people to opt for identity change in Taiwan. It also attempts to investigate how people dealt with the dissonance between rising Taiwanese nationalism and the economic interests that deterred a radical Taiwanese identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
This paper explores how and why China has been perceived as an economic threat in Taiwan through an examination of Taipei's post-Cold War economic policy with respect to the mainland. While Taipei's restriction on trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait until mid-2008 was widely considered a failure by both opponents and supporters of closer cross-Strait economic ties, this analysis points to an overlooked function of Taiwan's economic policy that was not just about tackling the problems of the security externalities or promoting the island's economic development. What appeared to be an ineffective policy can be understood as a successful boundary-drawing practice that discursively constituted a vulnerable Taiwan under Chinese economic threat, hence conducive to the (re)production of Taiwanese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]