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The state of Indiana has the most stringent voting requirements in the nation, as voters are presently required to present a photo identification issued by the federal or state government in order to cast a ballot. Similar laws have been proposed and pursued in many other states, typically related to charges of vote fraud, and often times tied into the divisive debates on undocumented immigrants or African American felons. However, very little empirical evidence exists about the effects of voter identification laws. Although a theoretical and Constitutional debate has developed, few studies have empirically tested the real world consequences of voter identification laws on the disenfranchisement of various subgroups in the electorate. In this study, we assess whether all eligible voters have equal access to valid photo identification, or if some segments of the population are being uniquely harmed by Indiana voter ID laws. To answer this question we fielded a unique public opinion survey in 2007 in the state of Indiana to determine the impact of voter identification laws on several demographic groups of voters; African Americans, the elderly, the less educated, and the poor. Specifically, we asked registered voters and eligible non-registered adults whether or not they had a current and up to date ID card issued by the state of Indiana containing their full name. Examining a variety of demographic variables, we find consistent and statistically significant evidence that White, college educated, upper income, and middle-aged voters in Indiana are more likely to have valid ID. Because we present data for actual registered voters, the findings go far to suggest that voter identification laws in Indiana disenfranchise many citizens who are entitled to full voting rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that a government enforced shift to mandatory mail voting could lead to lower levels of efficacy and perhaps lower levels of participation, despite the promise of lower costs making it easier to vote. Contrary to previous theories about the costs of voting, specifically related to absentee voting, we argue that when voters are forced to switch to vote-by-mail, as opposed to simply having it as an option, the possibility exists for a backlash against the political system. Indeed, our results suggest that many polling place voters were opposed to the transition to mail balloting and many voters raised questions about government accountability under such a system. Through multivariate regression analysis, we model political efficacy and likelihood of turnout, to determine what impact, if any, a mandatory vote-by-mail system has on the voting public. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2001 Republican Latino candidate for mayor Orlando Sanchez won 73% of the heavily Democratic Latino vote in Houston while in Miami, Cuban Democrat Manny Diaz won 70% of the staunch Republican Latino vote. In 2003, Green Party candidate for mayor Matt Gonzalez captured 66% of the Latino vote in San Francisco while in Colorado Springs a majority of Latinos voted for Republican Lionel Rivera. These elections renew the debate over Latino vote preference, and call into question whether Latinos follow partisan cues or ethnic cues when casting a ballot. I argue that while party is still an important predictor of vote choice, for Latinos with a high degree of shared ethnicity, party ties are less significant than ethnic attachment. Using a unique survey fielded by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute in 2002, I model crossover vote preference for Latino candidates in California and New York using probit and ordered probit regression. While strong partisans were significantly less likely to crossover and vote for the ethnic candidate of the opposing party, Latino voters who scored high on ethnic attachment were significantly more likely to ditch their party for the Latino candidate. By incorporating more flexible measures of ethnicity (as opposed to a dichotomous measure), this paper finds that, in addition to SES and party, ethnicity can be an important predictor of candidate preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using official validated vote records from the Registrar of Voters, we examine voter turnout among Latinos and non-Latinos following the 2001 redistricting effort. Specifically, we compare turnout rates for Latinos that were districted out of, or into, a Latino district. In California, district boundaries shifted significantly in areas where the Latino population was becoming a majority to protect incumbent non-Latino office holders. In most instances, these Latinos were shifted to neighboring districts that already had Latino representatives. If the chance to elect a Latino candidate is a mobilizing force, we expect that Latinos shifting into Latino-held districts will be more likely to vote than in previous years. We test this proposition by modeling voter turnout in 2002 (election under new districts) among registered voters in Los Angeles and Orange Counties to determine if Latinos who moved into or out of Latino-represented districts are more or less likely to vote. In this naturally occurring experiment, there are four possibilities confronting a voter after redistricting: (1) Moved from non-Latino to Latino district; (2) Moved from Latino to non-Latino district; (3) Stayed in Latino district; (4) Stayed in non-Latino district. All other things being equal, we find that Latinos who moved from a non-Latino to Latino district were significantly more likely to vote, while non-Latinos who moved for the first time into a Latino district, were less likely to vote. Probit models are estimated using county registrar records from California. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partisan gerrymandering has long been used to secure the election and reelection of candidates from particular political parties. While there can be no doubt that efforts along these lines have been successful, questions arise concerning how this tool influences the political behavior of constituents in the affected districts. One element of this secondary effect concerns the mobilization prospects of potential co-partisan electorates. Reformers of the electoral system have often claimed that the creation of safe partisan seats drives down voter turnout, in ways that can significantly shape the electorate for up-ballot elections. That is, while virtually ensuring the partisanship of the winner, such districts may result in the suppression of voter turnout by reducing the incentive to turnout in safe districts. In this effort, we assess whether gerrymandered districts suppress voter turnout by removing the incentive to vote or whether members of the advantaged party turn out as part of the winning team. To estimate the influence of partisan majority districts on individual level voter turnout, we compare the actual turnout of voters over multiple elections. The data utilized is a universe of registered voters in five California counties - Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Ventura, and Riverside, as of December 2000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using official validated vote records from the Registrar of Voters, we examine voter turnout among Latinos and non-Latinos following the 2001 redistricting effort. Specifically, we compare turnout rates for Latinos that were districted out of, or into, a Latino district. In California, district boundaries shifted significantly in areas where the Latino population was becoming a majority to protect incumbent non-Latino office holders. In most instances, these Latinos were shifted to neighboring districts that already had Latino representatives. If the chance to elect a Latino candidate is a mobilizing force, we expect that Latinos shifting into Latino-held districts will be more likely to vote than in previous years. We test this proposition by modeling voter turnout in 2002 (election under new districts) to determine if Latinos that moved into Latino districts are more or less likely to vote. In this naturally occurring experiment, there are four possibilities confronting a voter after redistricting: (1) Moved from non-Latino to Latino district; (2) Moved from Latino to non-Latino district; (3) Stayed in Latino district; (4) Stayed in non-Latino district. All other things being equal, we find that Latinos who moved from a non-Latino to Latino district were significantly more likely to vote, while non-Latinos who moved for the first time into a Latino district, were less likely to vote. Probit models are estimated using county registrar records from California. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors recently approved a plan for redistricting that essentially maintains the existing districts and constituencies, only one of which (the First District) is predominantly Latino and has a Latino representative. A challenge to this plan with the US Attorney General's Civil Rights Division is currently pending, wherein the Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association (LACCEA) has offered its own plan for redistricting. In the alternative plan, districts are drawn in a way intended to preserve communities of interest, and to facilitate the election of a second Latino candidate of interest from the San Gabriel Valley (the Third District). We evaluate both plans on the dimension of how each will influence individual Latino voter turnout, and hence the ability of Latinos to influence electoral outcomes. Using Registrar of Voters data for the universe of registered voters in Los Angeles County, we offer several summary statistics and probit analyses that show that the alternate plan proposed by the LACCEA is superior to the Status Quo plan approved by the County. Specifically, Latinos will be able to affect electoral outcomes in District 3 under the LACCEA plan, and maintain their ability to influence electoral outcomes in District 1. Under the Status Quo plan, Latinos will be limited to affecting outcomes in the First District only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 2000 Presidential election voter education and mobilization has witnessed a renaissance in targeted contact and segmented messaging. Candidates, political parties, and interest groups have taken advantage of advances in electronic databases to divide and subdivide the electorate into different groups, and have different messages and messengers for each subgroup of voters. For decades, scholars and practitioners have known that personalized campaign appeals are more effective. Labor unions, religious leaders, military veterans, and racial and ethnic community leaders have typically been used by campaigns to make a stronger, more personalized, and perhaps more trusting connection with voters. This paper takes up the question of whether or not personalized or segmented contact during a campaign is more successful at convincing voters than "generic" contact, or no contact at all.Using data from a national survey of Latino registered voters in 2004, we examine the impact of being contacted by a co-ethnic messenger on support for the Republican and Democratic parties. While some previous studies have examined voter turnout or vote choice, this paper examines the deeper implications of co-ethnic contact, including support for public policy and candidate favorability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using ANES data from 1964 - 2000 we examine the impact of district-level competitiveness on political efficacy and trust in government. With an overwhelming number of the contests are uncompetitive, scholars have wondered what impact the lack of competition has had on voter attitudes. From a normative standpoint, many scholars have argued that competitive elections are essential to democracy because they make elected officials more responsive to the citizenry, raise awareness of important issues, engage voters in debates on issues of the day, and provide opportunities for turnover in representation, holding members of Congress accountable to the public. Theoretically, we should expect this to have a positive result on efficacy and trust.On the other hand, always being in a district where your co-partisan wins could increase satisfaction with your member of Congress while bitterly fought campaigns might become negative and turn voters off from the electoral process and both parties, resulting in lower levels of efficacy and trust. In this paper, we study the effects of electoral competition on citizen efficacy and trust in government by examining elections to the House of Representatives over the last 40 years. We find that competitive elections have both a positive and negative effect on efficacy, which has changed markedly over time. The time series data we employ and the different results by decade indicate that this issue is well worth re-examining. Although previous papers haven take up the relationship between competitiveness and efficacy or trust, few have asked whether the relationship has changed over time, let alone reversed. Our findings suggest this is the case. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]