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I study if industrial decarbonisation yields elevated perceptions of political and economic unfairness. Decarbonising industry is central for the Green Transition, but it will disproportionately affect regions where brown sectors, which have been made uncompetitive, are concentrated. I contribute to studies on political consequences of the Green Transition by exploring perceived unfairness as one outcome from these uneven effects. In regions where industrial decarbonisation and employment declines in brown sectors have been greater than in other regions, residents may feel that they have disproportionately borne the economic costs of industrial decarbonisation for their country, and may consider their governments to have neglected their interests. I test these expectations in 60 West European regions using past (2013–2018) employment and CO2 emissions trends from the three most carbon-polluting sectors, as proxies for industrial decarbonisation accompanied by employment declines in brown sectors, and combined them with micro-level data from the European Social Survey (2018). I find that regions exhibit elevated perceptions of economic and political unfairness only when they experience both relative CO2 emissions and employment decline in these sectors. As perceived unfairness underpins some of the political discontent observed today, this finding highlights the need for Green Transition policies that minimise labour market disruptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Automation has permeated workplaces and threatens labour in the production process. Concurrently, European governments have expanded workfare which imposes stringent conditions and sanctions on unemployed workers after the onset of austerity. We explore how automation risk affects workfare support. Recent research finds that most routine workers 'survive' in their routine jobs. Despite avoiding unemployment, routine workers may face the threat of status decline as automation erodes the value of routine work. They may respond by differentiating themselves from lower-ranked social groups such as unemployed workers. Such boundary drawing may manifest views that the unemployed are less deserving of welfare. We thus posit that routine workers may support workfare to assuage their fears of status decline. We further explore if worsening economic hardship, proxied as rising unemployment rates over time, increases their support for workfare. We conducted pooled and multilevel analyses using data from the European Social Survey. We find that routine workers significantly support workfare. We also find that routine workers support workfare when economic hardship worsens, but oppose it when conditions ameliorate. Findings suggest that status threat is an important channel by which automation risk may affect workfare support, but its impact depends on social context, hence yielding country-differences. Worsening economic hardship may exacerbate routine workers' status decline fears, and intensify their harsh views against unemployed workers. Automation risk may thus have a greater impact on workfare support under such conditions. Policymakers can use these findings to assess how workfare may be publicly received and under various economic conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]