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During the last decade the two largest democracies of the world, i.e., India and US have been constantly coming closer. Advent of satellite channels and beginning of economic liberalization program in India has generated a keen interest in U.S. affairs. US has become the hottest destination for Indian software professionals. Sociologists have been expressing deep concern regarding Americanization of Indian youth because of channels like MTV and Hollywood movies. 911 attacks on US and ensuing war on terror have been extensively covered and scrutinized by Indian media. Indian media has a love-hate relationship with US. On the one hand Indian media admires American democracy, entrepreneurship and rule of law, on the other it is portraying war on terror as hegemonistic design intended to turn international politics completely unipolar. While deepening commercial ties and joint military exercises between the two countries are being welcomed by all sections of media, certain quarters are vehemently critical of US attack and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The reason Indian government dithered, debated and ultimately decided not to send troops to Iraq can be attributed to media?s vociferous opposition. Bush administration?s unstinted support to Musharraf government in Pakistan is being termed by Indian media as the most glaring example of ?double standards? in war against terror. Indian media accuses that in spite of having full knowledge of terrorist camps in Pakistan, Bush administration has refused to take penal actions against Pakistan. This paper will deal with how media has covered America?s war on terror and what impact it has had on Indian public opinion and decision making process. The perception of Indian media regarding the burgeoning American hegemony in new world order will also be analyzed in this paper. The paper will make suggestions regarding what role media can play in bringing these two countries together in their mutual fight against terror. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing American dominance and power in the world has frustrated various countries, societies, and individuals, and some have argued that this anger at American hegemony was the cause of September 11th. These people, such as Benjamin Barber, argue that Western cultural and economic imperialism are reshaping the world at the expense of various other cultures. As the American empire grows, it spreads its culture throughout the world, creating a more homogeneous world. This paper will focus on the growth of the American empire by examining American foreign policy and the use of force during the Clinton administration. From 1993 to 2000, the U.S. intervened or initiated the use of force in several places, including the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Haiti. Why did the Clinton administration make these foreign policy decisions? Was it part of an attempt to spread American hegemony throughout the world or not? Or, as many have argued, were Clinton’s foreign policy decisions a result of his domestic problems and his own personal ambitions and goals? This paper will seek to understand what motivated President Clinton’s foreign policy decisions to initiate the use of force or to intervene in the intrastate conflicts of other countries from 1993 to 2000. In order to answer this question this paper will focus on one possible theory?diversionary war theory. Diversionary war theory is based on the idea that leaders of nation-states will use foreign conflict involvement to divert domestic attention away from internal problems. Many have criticized this theory, including Blainey 1998 and Levy 1989, but others have found evidence of a moderate link between variables like leader popularity and the diversionary use of force, such as Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal 1991, and Morgan and Bickers 1992. Clinton faced a number of domestic distractions during his Presidency, most significantly his ongoing difficulties involving his alleged affair, and he may have felt the need to use foreign policy to divert attention away from these problems. Clinton has also has been quoted a number of times as saying that domestic politics is more important to him than international politics, and he may have used foreign policy to divert attention away from his domestic problems. This paper will focus on three specific independent variables: presidential approval, economic measures, and the media focus during the six months prior to the decision to use force or intervene. As the U.S. continues its dominance in the world, it is important to understand the motivations behind American foreign policy. Many people in the world today are less than satisfied with the U.S. hegemonic role in the world, because some of them believe that the U.S. is acting only in its own self-interest with no regard for how their actions affect the rest of the world. It is important to understand the reasons behind American foreign policy in order to determine whether the U.S. is a selfish and self-interested nation. This is a small step towards that goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) could be seen as an assertion and reinforcement of the hegemony of the United States over the Internet. By United States I mean not just the US Government, but also its industry, its technology and in many respects the values associated with a liberal democratic order in communications. The paper will describe and investigate the nature of his hegemonic system, making it clear that simplistic notions of US dominance imposed on an unwilling world don’t get one very far. What we see instead are several self-reinforcing cycles of the sort that made Silicon Valley the world capital of IT innovation and Hollywood the world capital for filmmaking: network effects and agglomeration economies and first-mover advantages. The hegemonic system did not follow traditional national lines. The Internet protocols were victorious in a standards war that pitted TCP/IP against protocols (OSI) that were backed not only by European governments and European telecommunications operators, but also by the US Department of Commerce and many US telephone companies. The early Internet community was international in scope; although it was centered in and mostly populated by US computer scientists, it embraced several European and Asian institutes. These non-US technologists were outside the mainstream in their own countries and both the US and the non-US technologists often showed more allegiance to their own epistemic community than to their governments. Nevertheless, when it came time to privatize and commercialize the Internet the US government did retain the ability to control the terms of the governance transition because US military and civilian contractors were operating the centralized naming and numbering spaces. More significantly, despite its initial promise that it would fully privatize ICANN, the US reneged and retained indefinitely an unusual form of unilateral contractual control over what is ostensibly an international organization. Not much later, concerns about security and terrorism post 9-11 reinforced the decision to keep a US grip on the root of the Internet, making the relationship between ICANN and the USG a delicate matter. In addition to clarifying the historical emergence of US dominance of the Internet this paper will have three parts: * First, by way of factual background, it will analyze the institutional relationships between ICANN and the US government. * Second, it will explore and describe the ways in which assertions of the identity of a distinct Internet community interact with regional/cultural and national identities in the politics of ICANN. In developing this analysis, a critique of academically romantic notions of diversity and difference will emerge. * Third, it will explore the extent to which ICANN’s creation was a direct challenge to the hegemony of traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), especially the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It will pay particular attention to the efforts of the ITU to undermine ICANN’s legitimacy and assert a role for traditional IGOs in Internet governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthony A. Loh Department of Political Science Vanderbilt University (615) 343-6046 Email: anthony.a.loh@vanderbilt.edu The events of 9/11 helped expose the underlying incompatibilities between an emerging American hegemony and the Westphalian system of international relations. In much of International Relations literature, the assumption is that the international system is given, while the distribution of power can take the form of multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity. Yet in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003, the United States has clearly consolidated its post-Cold War triumphant gains in political, economic and military leverages over the rest of the world, including its allies in Western Europe. It has sought to fill the void left by the former Soviet Union. A new systems structure appears to be emerging that is centered on the United States, and anti-hegemonial coalitions that could sufficiently balance it are becoming more difficult to assemble, although sub-state actors like Al Qaeda cell groups have risen to attempt to check the hegemon through insidious means and transnational networks. It is time for Waltzian claims to receive yet another nuanced revision or perhaps a complete rejection. At the highest level, systems structure may no longer be anarchical, whereas at the lowest (sub-state) level, it remains to be so. This paper explores the significance of these structural changes for international politics. There has been a near-explosion of IR literature on the United States becoming a new imperium. The central question addressed here is how this new American imperium differs from traditional-type territorial empires and what is its significance for U.S.-East Asian relations in the 21st century. The paper looks at the potential shifts in U.S. policies in South and North Korea, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, Taiwan, and China. These East Asian states have been watching closely the military and political outcome of the 2003 Iraqi war. The implications of American unilateralism ? with its doctrines on regime change and strategic preemption ? worry them. Some of them are authoritarian regimes and are regarded by the United States as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. The shift in post-9/11 U.S. strategy from containing peer competitors to dealing with terrorist threats have lifted some pressures on China, but the neoconservative agenda to remake the international order will be sure to bear on regional security and stability. How will the United States deal with North Korea in light of the Iraqi campaign of 2003? Some East Asian states have already seen the need to revise their traditional relationships with the United States. South Korea, in its drive for reunification, might abandon its reliance on U.S. security umbrella and turn to China as the new power broker. Japan, America’s staunchest ally in the region, might choose to remilitarize rather than continue to rely on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Still other East Asian states might be polarized into pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. camps, especially since there is little cohesiveness among them to begin with. The limits of U.S. military power are particularly felt in the East Asian context. Yet the question that concerns all of East Asia is how the U.S., with its global military supremacy, would exercise its political rule as a neoimperial power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses an emerging interaction between bilateral and multilateral security arrangements for conflict resolution in Asia since the 1990s by emphasizing the correlation of Asian hegemony management with foreign policy strategies of the US, China and Japan. As protracted conflicts of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have threatened regional prosperity and stability, regional security institutions have become an important policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Detecting nascent multilateral institution-building in Asian regional security, this paper asks how and why US-led bilateral alliances interact with multilateral security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN-Plus-Three. In order to examine this puzzle, the paper focuses on three points: (1) foreign policy strategies of three countries, (2) domestic interests concerning the feasibility and legitimacy of supplementing bilateralism with multilateralism in Asian security, and (3) impacts of Asian hegemony management on establishing regional security institutions. The paper compares the three countries’ preferences to regional security by focusing on the relationship between bilateralism of the US-led alliances and multilateralism. It then tries to demonstrate that both the dynamics of Asian hegemony management and the policy preferences concerning bilateralism and multilateralism are essential in understanding regional security arrangements in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Observers of the current world scene reach strikingly divergent conclusions when characterizing today?s world order. Although there is much talk of a unipolar power structure, many are not convinced identifying a multitude of power centers, which is only temporarily and superficially veiled by the extraordinary superiority of the U.S. military. Some perceive the United States as ?the New Rome,? while others see a hegemon in ongoing decline. In a more normative vein, some depict the unmatched power of the U.S., and the high-handedness that comes with it, as a threat to world peace and an obstacle to the solution of common problems such as the management of climate change; others argue just the opposite describing the U.S. as the ?indispensable nation? and U.S. power, and the willingness to use it, as the decisive factor for order and stability in the international system. These opposing views are not only a matter of factual and evaluative differences, i.e. differing opinions on what is the case or what states of affairs are desirable; rather, they are firmly rooted in the existence of a multitude of concepts of hegemony in International Relations ? conceptualizations and definitions of which many who employ them are hardly aware of. The aim of this paper is to develop a first an idea about how to make. use of this multitude of conceptualizations via a metatheoretically guided conceptual analysis in general. What should follow from this analysis is a systematic overview and categorization of the most influential approaches to the phenomenon of power concentration, or hegemony, in world politics. The literature on the topic will be analyzed using a set of guiding questions as for example ?Which conditions have to be met for a state to be considered a hegemon?? or ?How do hegemons behave and why??. The goal of the paper is not confined to unearthing the divergent theoretical ideas that are present in the current scholarly and journalistic discourse on hegemony and power asymmetry. By clarifying, reconstructing, and systematically comparing the concept of hegemony, the paper ultimately seeks to contribute to a better understanding of hegemony itself. Eventually, a reformulated and multidimensional concept of hegemony will be presented in order to provide coming research with a clear idea about its descriptive and normative connotations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once the most important whaling nation (70 percent of world whaling), the United States has become, in under a century, the champion of the struggle to save the whales. This paper reflects on the American role in the transformation of the International Whaling Commission into an anti-whaling regime. It seeks to analyse the American construction of a ‘green hegemony’ in this issue-area, paying particular attention to the external vs. internal dimensions of this process. Three aspects come under scrutiny: -Externally, the American position is at odds with its stance on most other multilateral environmental treaties. How did the whales become the chosen issue of the US’s international environmental policies? -The role of non-state actors. American environmental NGOs have proved particularly important in altering the negotiating position of the state at the table of the IWC. The paper explores how the state-NGO relationship impacts on the elaboration of an international environmental policy -Internally, the US position sits uneasily with the whaling cultures of its ‘first nations’, which continue to whale under the ‘aboriginal subsistence’ exception. How does this affect the continuance of the US’s position as hegemon? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development and regulation of high technology are defining features of modern capitalist economies. The U.S. and the European Union represent the richest markets for technological innovation, and transatlantic disputes over technology-related issues ? such as nuclear power, biotechnology, and information technology - make headlines on a regular basis. These disputes also reveal fundamental differences in thinking about risk management and the role of American hegemony in governing risk. America is often responsible for the creation and global diffusion of new technologies, and it deliberately attempts to impose its own free-market, science-based approach to the regulation of technology-related risks. Europe offers a competing approach, largely based on the precautionary principle, which involves a broader societal-based conception of risk. This paper investigates this principled debate by first developing a comprehensive analytical framework for the major competing approaches to governing such technologies. It then applies this framework to the question of America’s potential and real power (hegemonic or otherwise) to influence global technology governance. The paper also assesses the possible challenges America faces in this domain from Europe and other countries, particularly in the developing world. It concludes by examining the extent to which the U.S. and Europe will be able to reconcile their differences and thus facilitate a global regime for balancing knowledge diffusion and technology regulation, possibly through the use of technological fixes, public-private partnerships, and transnational actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the conventional understanding of the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions, which emphasizes the preponderance of U.S. and English power in the form, design, and inclusive nature of the institutions. Andrew Moravscik’s Liberal theory offers an inside-out framework that cuts to the foundation of foreign policy decision making and provides the greatest purchase on explaining the style and substance of the Accords, besting both hegemonic stability theory and neo-liberal institutionalism. Applied to this instance of cooperation, Liberal theory both examines the alleged onset of American hegemony and demonstrates why the post-World War II superpowers’ preferences should be understood as superior and inextricably bound to a palpable domestic-level preference structure. This paper brings to bear extensive archival, biographic, and secondary-source research combined with quanitative methodology to analyze this instance of cooperation. I conclude that liberal theory has unappreciated purchase in the budding literature on informal institution building and calls for a synthesized approach to understanding institution construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America is widely recognized to be a powerful hegemon today. It is important to understand what the American approach to arms control might be like over the next twenty years. Will it mirror the departures of the current Bush administration, or will it go off on different trajectories? Using the broad definition of arms control that is found in the official U.S. State Department arms control and disarmament glossary, this paper offers a historically informed discussion of how the United States got to the point it is today in arms control and where it may go from here. This is not an attempt at prediction or forecasting so much as a discussion of plausible possibilities and relevant trends. Focusing on weapons of mass destruction, and especially on nuclear weapons, I conclude that arms control is not dead in American diplomacy but is evolving. The paper describes that evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current debate on the post-9/11 world is heavily concentrated on the foreign policy of the United States; that is, it is based on the reductionist approach (Waltz 1979). The nature and potential change of the international system has been ignored. It is clear that the current hegemony of the United States in international system justifies one to ask whether international system is changing from anarchical towards hierarchical. This is a big question of high theoretical, empirical and practical value. In order to find any answers to that question, a lot of extensive and intensive systematical research is required. Therefore, instead of suggesting a solid thesis, the present paper is a survey of ideas and findings on which the suggested project might be based on. First, the paper discusses the basic concepts of the systemic approach as introduced by Waltz (1979) as well as his analysis of the existing international system both before and after the end of the Cold War. Second, the problematic of the study of power in international system is briefly discussed. Third, major features of the current international system are examined. It is maintained that some clear features of hierarchical international system can be recognized; at least it is possible to share Tim Dunne?s (2003) view that even if the present tendencies do not establish ?a new global order but altogether they have forced us to confront its becoming.? It is claimed that the United States? position as the lead state of the emerging hierarchical system is based on its overwhelming military power (the ?command of the commons? as suggested by Posen 2003), the strategic doctrine and political will to use that power, and the justification obtained for war on terrorism from the 9/11 attacks. War does not disappear from the new system, but instead of anarchy, there is only one enmity; that between the terrorists (and the rogue states that support them)) and the defenders of freedom, of which the United States is the leader. ?War on terrorism? is the ordering principle of the new system; it is the United States?s function to define the terrorists, whereas the others? function is to support the United States in this war. Finally, it is suggested that more research into the basic issues of the new system is required, particularly on 1) theory and analysis of international system/politics in Waltzian sense, looking beyond his ideas by adopting more recent knowledge and approaches of the field; and 2) the bases and mechanisms of the present international system, with emphasis on military and ?constructionist? power, with main reference to international law and war on terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperate with its policies: the use of different forms of power in obtaining cooperation from other states in exercising economic sanctions against a target state. Most of the literature on cooperation operate on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the US (leader/patron state) in their cooperation and non-cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and the US War Against Iraq, respectively. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power (Krause 1991) is a much better and more comprehensive framework in understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US. There are three main objectives of this study: (1) to shed more light on the cooperation process, (2) to challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states? cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and (3) to challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational choice, in the discipline. This study attempts to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when this does not look as the best interest to that state, i.e., that state?s first preference is not to cooperate or that state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Similarly, this study also aims at showing why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be the best interest to the client state. My working hypothesis is that Turkey?s cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin?s (1992) game theoretical model is a good framework to look at the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic power. A comprehensive framework of different forms of power relationship between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To realists, unipolarity is short-lived and conflict-ridden; other states will ally against the preemininent state, thus restoring the balance of the system. Yet, historical evidence suggests that unipolar periods have been more than just short-lived interludes, and that states sometimes tolerate unipolarity. Why? This paper identifies historical instances of such tolerance, and suggests an answer to their longevity beyond hegemonic stability theory. By overlooking the normative aspects of hegemony, hegemonic stability theory confuses unipolarity and hegemony. A hegemon is a pre-eminent power in a unipolar power, but not all unipolar systems are hegemonies. Unipolarity is exercized through military and economic power; hegemony also involves normative power. Implying: if a pre-eminent power is non-hegemonic, it will be perceived as acting only in its own self-interest; other states will then ally against it, establishing a balance of power. However, if a pre-eminent power is also a hegemon, it will be perceived as acting in the interest of the entire system; other states may then consider it legitimate and refrain from balancing ? in which case unipolarity may persist. The paper also discusses US foreign policy, in particular since 9/11 and the war in Iraq, in the light of this view of hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since September 11, 2001, people, especially in the United States, have been asking for answers and seeking explanations for why the terrorist attacks of that day happened. Among the responses offered we find some people believing that the cause of such events can be attributed to such feelings as jealousy and differences in culture. While these may have a role to play in the reasons for such attacks, these are not the only reasons. Those explanations are easy to create but far more difficult for researchers to believe. This paper is an attempt to examine the role that the states viewed as the victims of such hostilities actually has to play in them. During a period of hegemony, a hegemon is much like a parent or other authority figure and the other states in the international system are much like the children or subordinates. From psychological and organizational studies and literature we know that children and subordinates often respond negatively and destructively to inconsistent parenting or management. Should states controlled by people be viewed any differently? Can the international system be compared to families and organizations in this way? With the range of influence possessed by a hegemon, particularly at its height, one can expect to see hegemons attacked more frequently than other states. From previous studies, we know that these attacks increase as hegemons exhibit greater vulnerability, but nothing indicates why some hegemons are attacked more frequently than others at similar points in their positions as hegemons. The hypothesis examined in this paper is that hegemons with greater degrees of inconsistency between their foreign policies and their foreign policy rhetoric, as well as greater inconsistencies between policies, are the victims of outside attacks more frequently than other hegemons at similar points in their positions as hegemons. If this is correct, it can help shed some light on the role of policy making and policy makers in both the cause and solution of such international events as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the struggle at the World Trade Organization(WTO) over attempts to launch negotiations on a comprehensive set of rules regarding state treatment of foreign investors. The paper looks at the various attempts to push this agenda at WTO ministerial meetings starting with that in Singapore in 1996 and concluding with the September 2003 ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico where once again proponents will try to reach agreement to launch negotiations. The paper looks at why powerful proponents of such rules, in particular members such as the EC, Japan(and to a lesser extent the United States) and other developed country members (along with international business organizations) have had such difficulty in forging a consensus. Several factors are identified including: 1.The growing role and impact of developing country members in the WTO and the strong opposition of leading countries such as India 2. The erosion of the hegemony of the Washington consensus on trade and investment liberalization in the discourse around globalization and economic development. 3. The transnational campaign of opposition to the negotiation of investment rules at the WTO of a coalition of development, environmental and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Research material has been gathered via interviews with NGO representatives, officials of the WTO secretariat and national representatives to the Working Group on Trade and Investment at the WTO, established in 1997 as a compromise to study the issues surrounding investment rules after the Singapore ministerial meeting. In addition the submissions, minutes and reports of the Working Group for the last six years have been analyzed. Finally the dynamics of the discussions among WTO members, and the NGO campaing at the Cancun ministerial, where this issue is expected to generate major conflicts, will be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The virtue of the ‘variety of capitalism’ approach (Hall & Sockice, 2001) is that it challenges the notion that capitalist globalisation apparently entails the growing impotence of nation states and the increasing homogenisation of social formations. There are, however, a number of analytic problems with this approach, which this identifies. Apart from an inadequate and misleading conceptualisation of the relationship between state and market in the era of globalisation, the most severe problem is to treat all the advanced capitalist states as equal units of analysis. This occludes the overwhelming power and penetrative capacity of the American state and capital vis a vis even the other leading capitalist states in the world today. On the basis of this critique, the paper argues that European capitalism must be theorised within the framework of American neo-imperialism. In this light, the paper critically examines various recent attempts to theorise the nature of American empire and points the way to a more adequate theorisation. The paper presents historical and empirical evidence that challenges the presumption that the material base for the maintenance of American hegemony has eroded. But this does not mean that contradictions for the American imperium and neo-liberal globalisation do not exist. But strategic advance for the left in this context will have to entail far more than defending or extolling existing European models of capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has a long-standing interest in the political events of South Asia. This paper focuses on the continuity and change in the nature of U.S. hegemony in this region after the end of Cold War, and more particularly after September 11. Having witnessed the collapse of the state in Afghanistan and the potential for state failure in a nuclear Pakistan, the concerns relating to this region are extensive. Religious fundamentalism, social and political instability, cross-border terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental crisis are just few of the problems addressed in the paper. The variety of potential dangers emanating from this region makes this region and U.S. policy towards it a paramount concern for both theory and practice of international relations. At the theoretical level, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the continued use of the neo-realist theory is justified, based on its record of past policy successes and failures. One of the core arguments against neo-realism is that its level of analysis is too rigid, thus failing to recognize internal constraints in state affairs, particularly the social and cultural factors. After examining the foundation and application of the neo-realist policies of the U.S. toward the region, this paper evaluates the success or failure of U.S. policy in terms of addressing the important concerns of the region. This evaluation is based on an analysis of the stated goals compared to the results of policy actions. The paper concludes with suggestions for a more realistic understanding of the problems in South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was to declare war on terrorism. The aspects of this war that have received the most attention have been the unilateral and military nature of the US response. What has been overlooked is another part of the Bush administration’s reaction: an effort to reconfigure the international norm of sovereignty as it applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The US has adopted the view that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their sovereign right to autonomy over their territory. This has been accompanied by an effort to persuade or compel the international community to accept this view as well, as can be seen in US efforts to garner international support in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. This raises several theoretical questions, which this paper will try to address. First, is this merely a hegemon acting to reshape the international community to suit its national interests? Realists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree about the value of international institutions; will a dominant state reject institutions that it doesn’t think serve its interests, or will it try to modify them to avoid the costs of creating replacements? Constructivists and proponents of the English School argue that the shared rules, interests, and values of the international society of states will influence the behavior of its members. US behavior over the last two years includes elements that support each of these views; it has adopted a with us or against us approach, but at the same time has worked to persuade other states to revise the norm of sovereignty. Second, can a state unilaterally reshape international norms? The US appears to be trying to change shared understandings of when states retain the sovereign right to non-intervention by other states. The US is tacitly arguing that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their right to internal autonomy, because they have not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. (This effort on the part of the US is not entirely new; during the 1990s the US government tried to shape international attitudes toward rogue states, but without arguing that these states had forfeited sovereignty.) While some studies have examined the role of individuals and international organizations in shaping international norms, the role of the state in reshaping international norms deserves further attention. This paper will contribute to this inquiry. It will examine the efforts the US has made to persuade other states to adopt a similar stance toward state sponsors of terrorism, and responses by other states and the international community in forums such as the UN and regional organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role do ideas play in the establishment and maintenance of hegemony? The proposed paper seeks to answer these questions by building upon the model of international relations (Role Realignment theory) described in International Political Science Review 24/1 (January 2003), and refined in The Precarious Balance Revisited: The War on Terrorism and System Transformation (CEISA/ISA Conference, Budapest, 26-28 June 2003). The paper will explore the proposition that this theory sheds light on the process of endogenous norm generation in international relations. The model incorporates ideas/ideology as endogenous variables alongside traditional measures of power in a closed-system model that emphasizes the process dynamics through which ideas/ideologies compete for acceptance/dominance in international relations. The four major variables (foreign policy role elements) are operationalized using metrics that can be tested historically, producing an explanatory rather than a normative theory. Findings will emphasize U.S. foreign policy role behavior and its impact on America’s leading role in world affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the broadest sense, this paper will examine relationships between the functioning of global international organizations and the distribution of power among member states. Practically speaking, I shall concentrate on the United Nations and discuss the impacts of the three hegemonies, that is, (1) the economic hegemony of the OECD countries (or perhaps the G-7, if this is really what the economic power cluster amounts to), (2) the ideological hegemony of the liberal-democratic-neoliberal-West, and (3) the military hegemony of the United States. Overlapping membership among states constituting the three hegemonies amounts presently to what Gramsci would identify as a historical bloc (blocco), that within broad limits accounts for the main currents and directions of contemporary world affairs. This historical bloc also controls the United Nations, normatively, materially and programmatically. The paper will describe the hows and whats of this. Gramscian analysis, however, invites consideration of anti-hegemonic activities, and these, within the United Nations, account for much of the politics that play out within and around the organization. Because the politics of anti-hegemonism tend to render the United Nations a less than useful instrument of hegemonic imposition, global hegemony today is increasingly imposed via extra-UN devices and channels, thereby marginalizing the world organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coercive diplomacy has generally focused on scenarios where there is a hegemon present (generally the United States) and the target state is a non-WMD power. But this seems to be a very restrictive model and needs to be examined in the present-day context. One of the basic characteristics of the successful conduct of coercive diplomacy is a high degree of credibility of the threat that would be carried out in the absence of the target state’s acquiescence to the demands of the hegemon. In the recent war with Iraq, the United States maintained its credibility by carrying out its threat to use force. But there is a lot more at stake here. Since September 11, 2001, the idea of regime change in certain countries has become more and more attractive to several sections of the Bush administration, in spite of a lack of a clear policy on this. Besides Iraq, there are several other countries where coercive diplomacy might be applied by the U.S. with the objective of regime change and/or a change in the WMD status of the target state. Iran, Syria, and North Korea are seen as future candidates. The ostensible objective for this course of action by the United States (either unilaterally, or in conjunction with members of the international community) is to reverse the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by these countries. This paper examines if and how coercive diplomacy can be carried out in a situation where the target state has reached a certain level of WMD capability and weaponization. Besides the Gulf campaign this year, the other recent example of coercive diplomacy was seen in South Asia after the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In that situation, India launched a massive mobilization of troops on the border with Pakistan, demanding an end to support for separatism in Kashmir. The mobilization ended almost a year later with questionable results. Nuclear deterrence in the Indian subcontinent was the main reason why India couldn’t go ahead with its threat. This is a very clear contrast with the Iraq example. A scenario where both sides have weapons of mass destruction would impede on the credibility of the threats of the hegemon. This weakens the tangibility of power enjoyed by it. With the help of potential cases like Iran, North Korea, this paper looks at how the effectiveness of coercion by the hegemon is damaged in such circumstances, and tries to propose a model through which future cases of coercive diplomacy could be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops the argument that hegemony in 21st century global society will be exercised not by the United States but by an emergent transnational configuration, in which the U.S. state plays the leadership role on behalf of an emergent global capitalist historical bloc. At the helm of this historic bloc is a transnational capitalist class grounded in new global circuits of accumulation. The paper provides new data on transnational capitalist class formation. It the goes on to critique state-centric conceptions of hegemony in extant literature, calling for a more faithful rendition of the Gramsian notion of hegemony as a relationship among social classes and groups, not states per se. Given the process of globalization, these classes and groups are increasingly transnational in character. The paper concludes with a discussion of alternative scenarios for world order in this post-nation-state phase of global hegemony, and the prospects for potential counter-hegemonies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perhaps nowhere has the shift from divergence toward convergence in politics, economics, and development thinking been more acute than in Latin America, home from the 1950s through the 1980s to leftist revolutionary movements of varying scope and coherence, as well as the native soil of a series of distinguished social scientists (e.g., Raúl Prebisch, Pablo González Casanova, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Jorge Castañeda) who offered influential critiques of liberal modernization theory. At the outset of the 1990s, this convergence was seen by many as reflective of the political and economic norms promoted by the region’s hegemonic power, the United States. It was thought by many Washington policymakers that the remaining challenge was merely for the United States to translate its victory in the realm of democratic norms and ideas and market practices into mutually beneficial, tangible results. However, this process of translation was not unproblematic. The wave of political and economic reforms that swept Latin America and the Caribbean produced disappointing results, and frustration throughout the hemisphere is high. Today, the fierce and wide-ranging ideological debates of the past have been superseded by a much narrower but still sometimes very heated discussion over the flaws, limits, and insecurity of globalization; the need for further reforms; and the search for a development strategy capable of producing sustained growth and greater equity. There are strong fears that the region, so full of promise in the early 1990s, may face a considerably darker future in the early twenty-first century. However, while some U.S. policymakers share this alarm, the actual policies of the regional hegemon remain unchanged and continue to push for ever-deeper market reforms and fuller accommodation to the forces of globalization. This paper explores the sharpening contradictions in the Americas between the hegemonic vision of the United States and the actual political economy of discontent in Latin America and the Caribbean. It does this by closely examining two spheres of politics, ideology, and power presently in contention: 1) development strategy and 2) the redefinition of security. Based on this conceptual and empirical discussion, the paper concludes by reflecting upon the broader implications of these contradictions for U.S. hegemony in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper hopes to examine the way that US counter-drug policy affects nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago. The illegal drug trade has created a dangerous backdrop in everyday life. Recent publications have labeled Trinidad and Tobago not only as the newest narco-state, but have also claimed that it has become the "murder capital of the Caribbean." Arguably, US policies surrounding what has been called the most glaring threat to Caribbean security have an effect on individual Caribbean nations in regards to their self perception, perception of the other and self-projection. These three components which are adopted as the components of nationalism can either be strengthened, weakened or remain unchanged in response to the strong policy influence of the hemispheric hegemon. The pressure from the US coupled with domestic pressures to cohere with national ideals, can create dissonance between effective drug policies and national autonomy. Since it is accepted that the illegal drug trade cannot be resolved in a singular manner, developing nations must navigate this trade-off. As such, this paper will explore this policy relationship between the US and Trinidad and Tobago with the objective of determining whether or not US drug policies have shaped nationalism for the developing country, and why. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically how American linguistic hegemony in the case in the case of Educational Testing Service (ETS) diverged and penetrate American norms and values. Unlike the old days, the international order had reached stability to some extent. Although traditional military powers still consider as crucial element to one nation, military conflicts are more likely to deal with peaceful manners. This paper shows how American hegemony has transformed into cultural hegemony. Among many forms of cultural hegemony, it particularly focuses on American linguistic hegemony. Educational Testing Service (ETS), as the world's largest administrator of standardized test, provides renowned English proficiency tests such as TOEFL, TOEIC and GRE. Although it represents itself as a non-profit organization, this seems unreliable considering tremendous amount of profits it makes every year. Not only economically but also politically, ETS plays an important role to penetrate American norms and values. This paper will mainly analyze how the U.S penetrates American value through language in East Asian countries where English is not their first or second language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to highlight a conceptual difficulty in Washington's perspectives toward China, exploring key grounds of the U.S. thinkers in modern history and today. It compares the views with Beijing's current thoughts and approach in initiating what Beijing once called a "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development." This paper then runs a case study of Beijing's multilateral practice in the context of East Asian regionalism in order to assess what Washington may need to refocus on. The central argument maintains that the difficulty of the U.S. to draw a practical policy toward China is attributed to a conceptual difference between Washington and Beijing in thinking of how leadership is obtained and exercised. It points out a limit on the power-oriented nature of Washington to simplify the complexity surrounding Beijing's approach; it especially highlights the insufficient attention of Washington to China's role and impact on neighboring states in the process of regional integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US hegemonic endurance within the liberal international postwar order through an analysis of the impacts of the functioning of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into world politics. The analysis aims to determine whether the WTO contributes to locking in the US-centered postwar order or produces relative gains that implicate shifts in economic might that may eventually unsettle such order for changing the distribution of power within it. The findings indicate that the functioning of the WTO produces bases for relative economic gains unfavorable to the US, thus setting grounds for shifts in the distribution of power that may unsettle the existing international order. Such findings are consistent with neorealist approaches to hegemonic decline regarding the erosion of hegemony and with a neoliberal institutionalist reading of the endurance of the US-centered postwar order. Findings are inconsistent with the neorealist understanding that the international order mirrors the distribution of power and is prone to be challenged if the hegemon experiences relative decline. Contemplating the first stage of a four-stage framework of analysis, this paper sets the basis for continuing research by assessing whether the WTO distributes evenly the effects of its functioning. The analysis is based on WTO data on trade disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, Norwegian strategic culture has been about national defence, presupposing a close or special relationship with the United States. During the Cold War this was also the case in other small and medium sized European countries. The paper analyses the various types of US hegemonic power at work in Norway and how they are converted into influence over the specific content of Norwegian strategic culture and security policy, using a practice-based approach. Within IR theory, hegemony is generally understood as the power of one state to generate consent and support from other states through a combination of coercion, incentives and references to shared norms. In Norway, US influence is based on benevolent hegemony and ideational hegemony and institutionalized in bilateral military practices that have been developed over time. The paper argues that the reproduction of these practices in social structures is shaping Norwegian strategic culture. In principle, the lack of an immediate threat against Norway after 1991 could have loosened Norwegian-US ties and encouraged, firstly, a strategic culture more detached from territorial defense, and, secondly, a more European type of strategic culture. Though Norway participated in the US-led military operation in Afghanistan and had a military presence in post-war Iraq, these contributions were withdrawn in late 2005. To what extent does this indicate a breech away from a declining US hegemonic influence and a development towards a distinct Norwegian strategic post-Cold War strategic culture where the bilateral relationship is less central? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to contribute to the debate over the state of American hegemony by looking at the US current account deficit (CAD). The growth of the latter has continued almost unabated since 1982 reaching the epic proportions of 6.15 percent of GDP in 2006. As a result, the US national economy has become increasingly dependent on imports of foreign goods and foreign capital which has not been used for productive investment but has helped sustain both high government spending and mass consumption. What has made this possible is the special position of the dollar as the world's key currency which confers on the US the right of seigniorage - the privilege to profit from the use of the dollar as international reserve, invoice, and vehicle currency as well as to accumulate debt in its own currency. However, the paper dollar - the present day key international currency - is backed neither by gold nor by a large and growing productive economy since asset price inflation has in the meantime replaced production as the main source of income generation in the US. In addition, the accumulation of external deficits over the years has turned the one time world's biggest creditor into the world's biggest debtor. How can then the continued willingness of foreigners to accept payments in dollars and to invest in dollar-denominated assets be explained? This paper argues that the mythology surrounding the 'growing' US economy has transcended into a peculiar common sense that has helped sustain the status quo so far. However, this informal dimension of US hegemony emanates from a formal one - social forces and institutions that constitute its material basis. Thus, this paper further argues that the phenomenon of the US CAD can acquire its full meaning only in an analysis of the structural changes in the US and global economy that have been underway in the post-World War II period including the shift from production- to finance-led mode of accumulation along with the transnationalization of production and finance. The argumentation in this paper proceeds as follows. Productive power was the original basis of US hegemony. The postwar regime of intensive accumulation known as Fordism relied on the mass production-mass consumption nexus grafted on the coordinated rise in productivity and wages that was further supported by the government's management of aggregate demand. However, because of certain idiosyncratic features of the American economy and business model, since the late 1960s, the US has been plagued by recurrent crises of overcapacity and overproduction often more severe than those experienced by its Western European and Japanese junior partners. Falling profitability and weakening competitiveness encouraged diversion of savings and investment to finance and led to the erosion of the production-led mode of accumulation. The outward economic expansion of US Transnational Corporations has also contributed to the hollowing out of the US domestic economy and thus not only to the worsening competitiveness of the latter but also to its growing internal and external indebted-ness. While the domestic base of mass production disintegrated, the Fordist social norm of mass consumption was strengthened and maintained through the importation of foreign-produced consumer durables as reflected by the ballooning trade deficit. These tendencies were made coherent and sustained by the privileged position of the US dollar as 'the Money of all money' (De Brunhoff, 1978) which conferred upon its owner the right of seign-iorage whose 'spoils' broadly defined to include not only seigniorage income and the benefits derived from the large-scale recycling of American debt, but also the ability to profit from ex-change rate manipulation of the dollar gave further impetus to the erosion of the US productive economy... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is based on the assumption that the development of cyberspace, just like the processes of regional integration, have taken a growing importance in our societies. As such, this paper analyses the role of the United States in the formulation and implementation of a regional policy of cybersecurity in the Americas. The prime objective of this paper aims at refining the bond between the nature of the regional institutions and the possibilities of development of a regional policy as regards to cybersecurity. The second objective consists in taking part in the theoretical debates in international relations as for the role played by these processes of regional integration in the "securization" of cyberspace. Finally, the third objective is to understand the role of a hegemon in the development and the implementation of a regional policy of cybersecurity. We wish, through the case study of this paper, to further verify the promises of the theory of co-operative hegemony developed by Pedersen (Pedersen, 1998 and 2002 ; Mace and Loiseau, 2005). This theory proposes an explanation of the major advantages of the presence of large powers in a process of regional integration. MACE, Gordon and LOISEAU, Hugo. "Cooperative Hegemony and Summitry in the Americas", Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 47, Number 4, Winter 2005, 107-134.PEDERSEN, Thomas. Germany, France and the Integration of Europe: A Realist Interpretation, London, Cassell/Pinter, 1998.PEDERSEN, Thomas. "Cooperative Hegemony : Power, Ideas, and Institutions in Regional Integration", Review of International Studies, 2002, 28, 677-696. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the complex relationship between the United Nations and the United States under the two Bush Administrations. The key point of comparison is the role of the United Nations in each Bush’s war against Iraq. It pays particular concern both to the perceived legality of each military operation as well as the political relationship each President had with the world body. From this point the paper will expand to examine the role of the US in UN peacekeeping, in the creation of the international criminal tribunals, in environmental protection and sustainable development, and the personal relationship each President had with the Secretary-General. The most significant variables which will explain the similarities and differences between the two Bush Administrations are the a) American Exceptionalism and what Edward Luck calls American Exemptionalism; b) the relative domestic attitudes of the American public toward the UN; c) the role of the United States as global hegemon as well as the leading “norms entrepreneur”, to use the words of John Ruggie; d) the different challenges the US and the UN faced in these two periods; e) the historical development of the UN and perceptions of its proper role in world affairs, with an eye toward the intervening Clinton Administration. It will conclude with some thoughts about the future of the relationship between the United Nations and the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the basis and extent of American hegemony since WWI, with a special emphasis on the broad post-WWII patterns of American foreign policy since acquiring its system dominant position. After cursorily reviewing the rise of American power after WWI due to American dominance of the petrochemical industrial base of power (eg., approximately 70% of world oil production was U.S.-based through WWII; now it’s approximately 10%), the paper examines how well this dimension of power explains or even determines U.S. policy. I will examine several policy events across the 1950s through the present period to evaluate the strength of the argument that petrochemical concerns dominate American politics, both in their domestic and the more important foreign aspects. These instances include: President Eisenhower’s decision to raise tariffs on Venezuelan oil imports in order to appease domestic producers, thereby accelerating American peak oil production and foreign dependence; the nexus among the oil and auto industries in American domestic politics and policy influence (eg., National City Lines case, lack of alternatives or efficiencies absent international competitive pressures); the formal deputization and immunization from U.S. anti-trust laws of American oil companies following the Iranian coup by the White House, NSC and State department; stimulation of Saudi excess production in 1980s vis a vis the endgame with the Soviet Union; BTC pipeline diplomacy in the 1990s; and the War on Terror’s second Iraq war and Libyan and Venezuelan relations. The analysis will effectively cross the fields of political economy, security studies and domestic interest group analysis, and conclude with an assessment of whether the U.S. can ever evolve beyond the petrochemical industrial basis of its power. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Obviously, this is not the paper that I had intended to deliver on the 1930s panel, "American (Under) Balancing of Power: Neoclassical Realism, the Roosevelt Administration, and the Road to World War II." Both that paper and the present paper will be chapters 1 and 3, respectively, in my current book project, The Primacy of Power: Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy. This book presents a neoclassical realist theory to explain variation in United States grand strategy from the years immediately preceding its entry into World War II until the present. The theory provides an explanatory and descriptive framework for how the top leaders of the United States assess international threats and opportunities; adjusts national security policies in response to those threats and opportunities; and then mobilizes the human and material resources necessary to implement those policies. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, for much of the past six decades the United States has pursued policies broadly consistent with the expectations of neoclassical realism. In other words, the ultimate causes of U.S. grand strategic behavior lay in the international system. The international system, however, can only influence any state's foreign and security policies through the medium of decision makers' calculations and perceptions. This means that threat perception and the preliminary identification of policy options is rarely objectively efficient or predicable based solely on systemic factors, at least in the short-run. Finally, once leaders have identified threats and their preferred strategies for redressing them, they still face the task of mobilizing domestic political support and extracting the necessary resources from civil society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building from the theories of Antonio Gramsci, this paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach to examine the discursive constructs through which the post-1945 US state has projected global power from the mid-1970s through the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. It argues that neoconservative intellectuals and assorted partnersâ€"in alliance with state powerâ€"constructed a “historical bloc” that tenuously sustains cultural hegemony through translation of “cold war” into “war on terror.” In what manner does the framework of Global War on Terror (GWOT), or the “Long War,” provide a material, political, and cultural foundation for the perpetuation of United States military-industrial power? How is it that many people in the US fear the purported threat of an “Islamic empire,” while most do not question the existence of “American empire”? Amid renewed geopolitical incursions in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, the imprint of neoconservatism continues to facilitate the rearticulation of civilizational discourses ventilating support for global war against “Islamo-fascist” terrorism as a commonsense reformulation of anti-Soviet/communist struggle. Beginning with examination of neoconservative-affiliated literature such as Commentary magazine (1945-present), this paper will provide a textual reading of the ideologies sustaining the last half-century of Western imperialism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As immigrants and their allies confront the burgeoning culture of nativism in the United States, they face the problem of how to counter anti-immigrant hostility without re-entrenching the formations of state and capitalist power that have helped spawn antagonism against immigrants. Recent political theory suggests that activism in the mode of identity politics represents a particularly dangerous pitfall for immigrants, since politicized identity, according to these arguments, buttresses the authority of capitalism and the state. Wendy Brown, for instance, argues that the politicization of identity insulates from contestation the social forces generating the experiences of "injury" that today tend to form the basis of politicized identities, as well as legitimating the state in its supposedly impartial role providing compensation and retribution. In turn, William E. Connolly contends that failing to affirm the contingent character of identity, and denying its constitutive relation to difference, reinforces the essentialist assumptions of cultural unity perpetuating the inherited form of the nation-state, which, for Connolly, is unable to provide a democratic context for controlling global capitalism. In both these ways, a response to neo-nativism defining and celebrating specific identities for immigrants would seem likely to reinforce "hegemony," or the production of state and capitalist power through popular consent to authority generated by cultural identities and the everyday practices that give those identities vitality. Yet a sustained opposition to nativism would seem to demand challenging state policies that feed anti-immigrant sentiment, such as security operations that demonize "illegal aliens" and other "foreigners," as well as capital's efforts that exacerbate such resentments by weakening economic prospects for the US-born through de-industrialization and attacks on social welfare programs.Theories of the role played by politicized identity in the production of hegemony, however, may themselves be in need of critical re-thinking through more careful consideration of immigrants' experiences. This paper provides an inquiry specifically into the fructuous role that immigrants' personal life histories can play in bringing those experiences to light. Attending to these stories, I argue, makes it more possible not only to formulate a self-consistent, radically democratic response to the mounting hostility toward immigrants in US political culture, but also to refine the conceptions of hegemony and its sources in politicized identity that inform such a response. This paper, then, argues for a certain methodological approach to critical social theory in the present age of mass immigration, imperialist globalization, and a progressive politics geared largely toward the claims of identity. I draw on elements of Gramsci's thought regarding the crucial role played in the development of counterhegemonic projects by subaltern "common sense," or those conceptions of self and world that encode practically efficacious notions of how power works and contain at least an anticipatory sense of how to contest it. I also consult more recent theory regarding the politics of narrative. Hence, treating immigrants' life stories as a politically salient form of common sense, I outline a method of inquiry that would allow these stories to invigorate the critique of identity politics as a mode of hegemony today, and thus to sharpen an assessment of how certain strategies to counter neo-nativism might reproduce or genuinely challenge hegemony. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because power defines relations among individuals and political communities, it is an important concept in the social sciences. If we accept Max Weber's suggestion that politics is essentially about allocation and distribution of power, then power is the concept of Political Science and International Relations discipline. But is power found in resources or in relationships? Is it located in structure or agency? In discussing the social nature of power, the paper will advance a conception of power based on the writings of Hannah Arendt. Understanding the nature of power in contemporary world affairs is crucially important both for the U.S. and the future of international order. The development of post-Cold War international relations, the process of European integration, and the inability of the United States to translate its material strength into desired political outcomes have put into question any conception of power based entirely on quantifiable material resources, whether military, economic, or technological. Although power is a 'contested concept', it had been absent from scholarly debate in International Relations for some time. This paper is a critical reflection of the paradox of American power and its implications for American security and global order. It focuses on the neo-conservative conception of American power that informs the foreign and defense policies of George W. Bush's Administration. According to this conception, U.S.' material preponderance coupled with America's universal values, give Washington the means and right to reshape world order. The paper argues that this view of power is deeply mistaken and can only lead to dysfunctional policies and practices. Material resources are not irrelevant to power but do not automatically produce political influence. Effective influence depends on more than military coercion. It depends on the degree to which a state's policies and practices are accepted as legitimate by other states and by international public opinion. The failure of neo-conservative policy-makers to grasp the social nature of power threatens to undermine the effective pursuit of American interests and national security, while gradually weakens the international society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The premise of being the world?s only superpower that has animated U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War is based on an illusion: the view that vastly superior military and economic capabilities among nations translates into virtually unchallengeable power. This paper elucidates how the United States in the presumed era of unipolarity is being challenged by polyarchic forces, and recommends an adaptive and constructive response. The emergent structure of world politics features the global hegemony of the United States within a polyarchic field of actors ? nation-states, subnational groups, terrorist networks, transnational religions, multinational enterprises, global and regional institutions. The cross-pressures to which countries are subject in this partially unipolar, partially polyarchic, system makes for fickle alignments and adversary relationships, in which today?s ally may well be tomorrow?s enemy, and one?s coalition partner on one issue may be one?s determined opponent on another issue. The United States continues to be the most influential actor, and often its cooperation or opposition can determine the fate of other nations? policies and programs. But as the twenty-first century progresses, the United States will hardly be in a position, even on matters affecting global peace and security, to call all the shots ? metaphorically or literally. As the United States, increasingly frustrated in its efforts to exercise the prerogatives of global hegemon, takes on a unilateralist mode of asserting and defending its interests, it will only exacerbate the polyarchic forces that are the sources of its frustration. A U.S. policy that combines ?modular multilateralism? with support of norms and structures of international accountability can reverse the decline in respect for U.S. leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the diffusion of the Internet from the United States to the world at large. The Internet forms a Wallersteinian system with the United States as the core country and both a periphery and a semiperiphery. It is necessary to understand this situation in order to understand how to design policies to counteract situation like the international digital divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the law turn in American labor studies, which argues that a hegemonic judiciary now defines the boundaries of collective action in the United States. I argue that this ignores the impact of military suppression on collective action, as well as other institutional actors. I propose an alternative model that includes institutional facotrs (the presidency, party alliances, administrative capacities, and Congress), state interests (national defense and economic recovery), and societal pressures (labor insurgency and employer resistance). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two aspects of the politics of post-September 11 U.S. foreign policy are addressed. First, the development of an expansive and aggressive Bush Doctrine, including an emphasis on preemptive or preventive war, is traced. Second, the revival of a positive discourse on U.S. empire and hegemony within policy and opinion circles is explored. This paper surveys and categorizes a range of interpretations of these developments, primarily but not exclusively from the political left, that seek to explore elements of continuity and change in the foreign policy approach of the Bush administration. An argument is put forward about the importance of distinctive “policy currents” within U.S. ruling circles, and the distinctive economic, political, and ideological forces to which they give expression. The development of the policy current associated with the Project for a New American Century is explored as an important case in point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the terrorist attack on the United States, the most generalized indicator of inter-American relations was the looming possibility of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, this paper asserts two central ideas: first, at least for a time, 9/11 has recast the terms of U.S. hegemony in the Americas more towards a security agenda and, second, U.S. priorities may suggest that the security aspects of hegemony will be used to make fewer economic concessions in negotiations over regional integration. The war on terrorism is an instrument to increase U.S. power and this has implications for hegemony in the Americas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ?war on terrorism? is both a series of institutional practices and an accompanying set of political narratives. Understanding how American counter-terrorism functions as an exercise in hegemony requires an appreciation of the ways in which the language of ?war on terrorism? has been produced, deployed, used and misused in public political rhetoric. In this paper, I argue that the language of the ?war on terrorism? is not simply a neutral reflection of policy debates and the realities of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Rather, it is a very carefully and deliberately constructed?but ultimately, artificial?discourse that is specifically designed to make the war seem reasonable, responsible, and ?good?, as well as to silence any forms of knowledge that would challenge the exercise of power. More than just ?public diplomacy? or propaganda, the effects of the discourse are to normalize, legitimize, and in a sense, actualize its institutional practice. The ?war on terrorism? is co-constituted by its discursive dimensions; it is a crucial element in the ongoing construction of American hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subsequent to Spain?s departure in 1976, Western Sahara has since been illegally occupied by Morocco, which has prevented the implementation of UN resolutions; an unbearable stalemate has persisted ever since. A referendum on self-determination for the Sahrawi people has been postponed since 1992 due to UN failure, Morocco?s intractable demands and delaying tactics, as well to France and the United States, which provided steadfast support to Morocco. To purportedly overcome this stalemate, Kofi Annan and James A. Baker have in 2001 proposed the Moroccan-inspired ?third way,? which Sahrawis and Algerians rejected. Although France and the United States favored the so called ?third way? they could not impose it because of strong opposition. Since the end of the cold war and the eclipse of the non-aligned from the international scene, and since 9/11, Algerian-American relations have improved considerably while Morocco?s strategic significance has declined, even if Morocco still remains a US ally and receives consequential backing. However, because of its impressive hydrocarbon resources and its potential market, Algeria, which has surmounted its crisis, has progressively gained more strategic weight as a pivotal state in the region. In this paper, we analyze the Western Sahara conflict from a geopolitical perspective. The major focus is on US role in this protracted dispute. After 9/11 and in a period of tension between France, Morocco?s patron, and the United States, we postulate the hypothesis that the US seeks to favor a solution, such as the Baker Plan II, which offers a ?compromise??since the plan foresees a referendum after a 4-year transition period?that, while decidedly, pro-Moroccan offers Algeria and POLISARIO a way out of the stalemate. Acceptance of Baker Plan II by all parties would reawaken the Arab Maghreb Union. Because the Western Sahara conflict is seen, not as a problem of international law or self-determination, but as an obstacle to efforts to achieve other goals, US hegemonic power might at last nudge Morocco to accept the Baker Plan II, which both Algeria and POLISARIO agreed to, and eventually allow the holding of the referendum on self-determination, assuming that such scenario is not seen as threatening the stability of the Moroccan monarchy. The United States would still strongly safeguard Morocco?s interests in a likely independent Sahrawi state and facilitate Moroccan investments through the establishment of a regional trade bloc that includes Algeria and Tunisia?and in due course Libya. This will conceivably bring stability to this region, traditionally France?s ?chasse gardée,? and will thus serve the political and economic interests of the United States and the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]