Search

Some of the best-known social scientific theories of risks are those that have been elaborated by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. Although their arguments differ greatly, they agree in seeing the technologically induced risks of today’s “Risk Society” as global—so pervasive that they transcend all socioeconomic as well as geopolitical and national boundaries. Most empirical work, however, provides greater support for a theoretical tradition exemplified by Short and Erikson. In this paper, we argue that many of the technological mega-risks described by Giddens and Beck as “transcending” social boundaries are better described as “Titanic risks,” referring not so much to their colossal impact as to the fact that—as was the case for the majority of the victims on the Titanic—actual risks are related to victims’ socioeconomic as well as sociogeographic locations. Previous research has shown this to be the case with high-risk technologies, such as nuclear energy and weaponry, and also with localized ones, such as toxic waste disposal. This article illustrates that the same is true even for the most genuinely “global” risks of all, namely those associated with global climate disruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of reactions to nuclear facilities have found consistent male/female differences, but the underlying reasons have never been well-clarified. The most common expectations involve traditional roles--with men focusing more on economic concerns and with women (especially mothers) being more concerned about family safety/health. Still, with changing gender roles, women are becoming economic providers as well as caregivers; past studies have not actually examined the interaction of employment and gender effects. This study examines a rural county where issues of risk and economic interest were both salient--a county where a nuclear waste site had been proposed but where an existing nuclear power plant was a major employer. Overall, concern levels expressed by employed mothers did not differ significantly from those in the rest of the sample, but further analyses revealed a sharp contrast: In the half of the county that was home to the existing nuclear power plant, where economic concerns could be expected to be more salient, over 90 percent of the employed mothers expressed low levels of concern; in the other half of the county, closer to the potential risks of the proposed nuclear waste site, almost 90 percent of the employed mothers expressed high levels of concern. No such differences are found for other sociodemographic groups. This county may or may not be unique; what the findings show is that the interplay of geography, gender roles and risks should receive more attention in other contexts, as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macrostructural analyses have long dominated the field of social theories of modernity, with the work of Habermas, Giddens, and Beck providing influential cases in point. Empirical studies, however, have raised questions about the applicability and empirical soundness of macrostructural approaches to risks, technology, and nature, and U.S.-based sociologists have offered alternative theories that have been identified in some studies as providing better predictions and explanations than the macrostructural analyses. Informed by all of the above theories, this article examines the “Atoms for Peace” program, which established the civilian uses of nuclear energy, providing one of the central scientific and technological achievements of modernity. Given the mixed results of nuclear technology development, the mid-range, structurally informed perspectives of Short and other U.S.-based sociologists do appear to provide the best interpretations, both for the “Atoms for Peace” program and for the broader legacy of the technological and environmental risks of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nuclear power industry has generated heated disagreement about the public control of potentially hazardous private investments. During the early years of nuclear power-from the mid-1950 to the mid-1970s--the industry was largely self-regulating by today's standards. The broader public was largely excluded from policy decisions but also expressed relatively few concerns about the technology. Over the past decade, the situation has changed substantially with one key factor being a substantial change in the public reaction to nuclear power. National samples began to show concerns about "nearby" nuclear facilities in the mid-to-late 1970s, although nuclear power remained acceptable in the abstract until the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Surveys since that time show widespread opposition to nuclear power. The opposition cannot be explained as being due to a loss of faith in science and rationality; instead it appears to reflect a rational response to personal values that are different from those found among nuclear industry supporters in combination with a loss of trust in the nuclear industry and the federal agencies that regulate it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]