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The article probes into the official Chinese and Indian perspectives on the first and second rounds of post-Cold War North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion. The outline of the debate over NATO expansion in the West and its theoretical implications are explored. It presents a comparison of the assessments in Beijing and New Delhi of the first and second rounds of the expansion. The implications of the serial expansions for the role and functions of the organization and the type and nature of alignments that may emerge are cited.

The article discusses Pax Americana II, the period after the Cold War, and the strategic choices of Japan. It states that the transformation of the international system from bipolar to unipolar results in a more assertive U.S. policy. It cites the decision of the U.S. government to restore its alliance with Japan and initiate talks with China to prevent the financial market crisis. It offers an overview of the defense policy of the Japanese government.

China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War northeast Asia is shaped primarily by four key factors: realpolitik or balance of power politics, economic interdependence, nationalism and political leadership. How these factors figure out and how they combine with each other would shape the course of China's foreign policy toward either accommodative/cooperative or assertive/aggressive direction. Depending on whether Chinese realpolitik is more constrained by economic interdependence or more dominated by nationalist reactions, China's foreign policy would swing between cooperative and assertive courses. However, considering a firm consensus within Chinese leadership on the necessity of continuous economic growth for its political legitimacy, it is predicted that China would rather pursue a prudent realpolitik guided by balance of power politics and constrained by increasing economic interdependence. As a result, an accommodative/ cooperative course of behavior is more likely to be the normal course of China's foreign policy, though there still remains a possibility of swift swings toward assertive and aggressive course of behavior when vital Chinese nationalist interests are challenged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information and communication technology (ICT), an important enabler of soft power, has become one of the most fungible and useful forces at all political levels in the post-Cold War world. The digital divide, as a byproduct of information age, is a multidimensional phenomenon that encompasses three distinct aspects: global divide, social divide and democratic divide (Norris 2001). Few doubt that the potential impact of new ICT may potentially level the playing field allowing nations with moderate levels of development, like China, to catch up with postindustrial societies. This paper reviews China?s ICT development since China started its modernization process at the end of the 1970s. China is leapfrogging into the global information age by bridging its gap in network access with industrialized societies and shortening its own domestic gap between information rich and poor. But can China deal with the third aspect of digital divide ? the difference between those who do, and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilize and participate in public life? Using both quantitative and qualitative data, the author argues that China, as a showcase of the information revolution, presents a dilemma in its ICT developments. On the one hand, ICT has had leveling effects on China?s international status as a rising power in global affairs; on the other hand, ICT may further expose China?s unattractiveness in what Nye defines soft power such as political values and policies (Nye 2004). This paper suggests: 1) while soft power plays a increasingly important role in the current world, the spread of ICT is changing the idea of what we look for in China?s capabilities of national image building in the networked world ? international broadcast power; 2) while it faces many new challenges and opportunities in the global information age, China has to adjust its relations with a varieties of international actors, especially non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and Netizens; 3) while it integrates itself into marketization, globalization and informatization, China is caught between preserving its ?old? national identity and projecting its ?new? identity in the ICT-enhanced democratization trend; 4) while it succeeds in multiplying its access to a variety of channels of global communication, China still has a long way to get its dominant culture and ideas closer to prevailing global norms. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Taiwan was the most conflictual issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Ross, 1995). How the dynamics of the “strategic triangle” consisting of the U.S., Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How is the U.S. “strategic ambiguity” policy to be explained? Neorealists may argue that there was a tacit agreement between Beijing and Washington that so long as cooperation was imperative, the status quo in U.S.-Taiwan relations was temporarily acceptable. Revisionists such as Robert S. Ross, however, hold a more sophisticated view that even in the midst of cooperation, the ongoing conflict required continuous negotiations and mutual adjustment between the U.S. and P.R.C. (Ross, 1995). Nevertheless, few study, if any, have provided theoretical answers to the questions that under what conditions the equilibrium of status quo holds, how the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan will affect the equilibrium outcomes of the game, and how the so-called strategic ambiguity policy is to be explained? By developing a game theoretic model, this paper will provide theoretical answers to those unresolved questions, drawing out both theoretical and policy implications. A historical examination of the interactions between the U.S., Mainland China, and Taiwan since the Korea War will be done to further illustrate the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is an investigation into the construction of US and Chinese identities within the context of their interactions with one another in the Post-Cold War context. Traditional research in this area has thus far tended to rely on individualist and positivist assumptions, with a distinct lack of attention being paid to the role of culture, identity, language, or emotion: each of which I believe is fundamental to understanding the interactions that have taken place between the US and China. As such, I aim to highlight some of the unquantifiable factors that tend to be overlooked by rationalist theories. Using specific case studies which allow a more thorough, empirical example of how these states interact with one another at particular junctures, I hope to link the theoretical world with one of policy. The core concepts relate to an investigation into the relationship between foreign policy and political identity, and attempt to gain a greater understanding into the complexities of this bilateral relationship too often simplified for the purposes of other theoretical paradigms. One of my primary aims is to provide a link between representations of identity, and policy choices and their implementation. Another key aim is to direct attention to the effect of culture and emotions on cross-cultural negotiations in ‘crisis’ situations.I propose to analyse the political discourse in each states’ foreign policy documents as a means of identifying the shared ideas and analytical frameworks by which policy makers analyse the relationship, generate policy options, and then choose from in their actions/reaction. By highlighting the evolution of discursive constructions over a given time period it enables me to highlight how key events are responded to in official policy discourse. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The disintegration of the USSR, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of fifteen independent states in Eurasia substanitially reduced certain forms of international tension on a global level. As the rigid hierarchy of the Soviet bloc diffused, new forms of pluralism and regional variation emerged on a global level. As the leading regional power in the post-Soviet space, Russia in the early years of the post-Soviet disintegration assumed that its military predominance would automatically translate into policy dominance. But the Russian assumption of a grand policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus gradually devolved into a situation where Russia was conducting numerous parallel but not always complementary bilateral foreign policies. Focusing on Russian foreign policy toward this region, this paper analyzes how Russia's bilateral relations with the Central Asian states are complicated by inconsistent and conflicting policies of third party states, particularly Iran, China, India, and the U.S. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-Japan alliance has not only survived, but also strengthened in the post-Cold War era, against some realists? predictions otherwise. However, economic reality during the same period has been reduction of Japanese dependence on the United States market and increasing integration of Japan with the Asian markets including China. Unlike the Cold War years, when Japan-Soviet economic relations were nearly negligible, this new comprehensive security environment requires a careful balancing on the part of Japan. Success of such efforts is also subject to the political leadership that can overcome bureaucratic stalemates at home. This paper will review Japan?s domestic debates about China and Japan?s strategy to deal with rising China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and foreign policy analysts have debated over strategies of global governance. In order to maintain economic and political stability in the international system, the United States must integrate Russia and China in ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Indo-U.S. triangular relationships in the post-Cold War era since India's 1998 nuclear tests, with specific focus on Indian perceptions of its relations with the U.S. and China as well as its role in the strategic triangle. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]