Search

A synergistic perspective to selecting the right project portfolio is the key to realizing strategic organizational objectives. Based on the theory of the composite system, this paper identifies the factors that affect the science of project portfolio selection (PPS) and investigates the synergistic relationship among the organizational strategic objective subsystem, the project portfolio subsystem and the environment subsystem, which collectively constitute the composite system of project portfolio selection. Utilizing the concept of order parameters, an order parameter system is built for each subsystem to reflect the synergistic relationships in the composite system of PPS. The PPS model is constructed based on the degree of synergy in the composite system by describing the order degree of the subsystem and the synergy degree of the composite system, which helps to quantify the synergistic relationships among these subsystems. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed model are demonstrated and validated by a case study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a prefabricated construction supply chain (PCSC) consisting of a project contractor who shoulders the on-site assembly task and orders prefabs from a prefabricated factory. To mitigate the heavy double handling costs associated with early and late delivery of prefabs, the project contractor requires the right quantity and exact type of prefabs are carried to construction sites according to its assembly schedule. This is known as just-in-time purchasing (JITP). However, JITP may increase the pressure on the prefabricated factory to hold excessive inventory or to compress production time. For these reasons, the prefabricated factory may be reluctant to switch to JITP. To initiate the operation of JITP and establish a win-win outcome, side-payment contracts including a delivery-time dependent subsidy and two constant transfer terms are designed as coordinate schemes. Employing Stackelberg, we explore participants' optimal decisions. The results show that the JITP yields higher profit for PCSC, and the proposed contracts are capable of achieving a win-win coordination. In particular, the constant transfer cost term is relatively equitable to participants, while the constant cost-sharing transfer term outperforms the constant transfer cost term under a high double handling cost. Moreover, the prefabricated factory earns more profit when the double handling cost for early or late delivery is high. Some managerial implications are also obtained and help to strengthen cooperation among participants and promote the sustainable development of the PCSC. • The effect of just-in-time purchasing on double handling costs is investigated by mathematical model. • Information sharing between participants under just-in-time purchasing is considered and quantified. • The different contract combinations are employed to provide participants with various coordination schemes. • Just-in-time purchasing yields higher profits for the prefabricated construction supply chain. • Side-payment contracts can resolve profit conflicts between participants arising from just-in-time purchasing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a prefabricated construction supply chain (PCSC) consisting of a project contractor who shoulders the on-site assembly task and orders prefabs from a prefabricated factory. To mitigate the heavy double handling costs associated with early and late delivery of prefabs, the project contractor requires the right quantity and exact type of prefabs are carried to construction sites according to its assembly schedule. This is known as just-in-time purchasing (JITP). However, JITP may increase the pressure on the prefabricated factory to hold excessive inventory or to compress production time. For these reasons, the prefabricated factory may be reluctant to switch to JITP. To initiate the operation of JITP and establish a win-win outcome, side-payment contracts including a delivery-time dependent subsidy and two constant transfer terms are designed as coordinate schemes. Employing Stackelberg, we explore participants' optimal decisions. The results show that the JITP yields higher profit for PCSC, and the proposed contracts are capable of achieving a win-win coordination. In particular, the constant transfer cost term is relatively equitable to participants, while the constant cost-sharing transfer term outperforms the constant transfer cost term under a high double handling cost. Moreover, the prefabricated factory earns more profit when the double handling cost for early or late delivery is high. Some managerial implications are also obtained and help to strengthen cooperation among participants and promote the sustainable development of the PCSC. • The effect of just-in-time purchasing on double handling costs is investigated by mathematical model. • Information sharing between participants under just-in-time purchasing is considered and quantified. • The different contract combinations are employed to provide participants with various coordination schemes. • Just-in-time purchasing yields higher profits for the prefabricated construction supply chain. • Side-payment contracts can resolve profit conflicts between participants arising from just-in-time purchasing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]