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We consider whether and under what conditions it is morally illicit to profit from poverty. We argue that when profit counterfactually depends on poverty, the agent making the profit is morally obliged to relinquish it. Finally, we argue that the people to whom the profit should be redirected are those on whom it counterfactually depends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peter Singer is well known to have argued for our responsibilities to address global poverty based on an analogy with saving a drowning child. Just as the passerby has a duty to save that child, we have a duty to save children 'drowning' in poverty. Since its publication, more four decades ago, there have been numerous attempts to grapple with the inescapable moral challenge posed by Singer's analogy. In this paper, we propose a new approach to the Singerian challenge, through offering a different explanation for why our intuitions about rescuing a threatened person in front of us are more demanding than our intuitions about rescuing those living under equally threatening conditions of poverty. We argue that understanding the underlying motive or mechanism by which people come to endorse intuitions about duties of assistance undermines our confidence in the validity and robustness of some of the highly demanding intuitions that Singer relies on. This, in turn, puts serious limitations on the normative and practical reach of Singer's analogy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indigenous and non-indigenous communities in Latin America make land claims and support them with a variety of arguments. Some, such as Zapatistas and the Mapuche, have appealed to the "ancestral" or "historical" connections between specific communities and the land. Other groups, such as MST in Brazil, have appealed to the extremely unequal distribution of the land and the effects of this on the poor; the land in this case is seen mainly as a means for securing a decent standard of living for members of disadvantaged groups. Although there is a large literature on the history as well as the social and political dimensions of land contestations and conflicts in Latin America, the question of whether the land claims put forward by disadvantaged groups can be morally justified has not been adequately examined. In this essay, we investigate the scope and limits of appeals to what we shall call assistance-based, contribution-based, and benefitting-based moral reasons with respect to land claims made by these disadvantaged groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The DDE yields counterintuitive verdicts about certain cases: it may deem it permissible to kill a certain number of people when they are not used as means and their death is not intended, but deny that killing fewer of these people is permissible if that requires intending their death, or using them as means. To accommodate the judgement that we may kill the lesser number in such cases, supporters of the DDE may appeal to Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility ( PSP). The principle says, roughly, that if it is permissible to kill n people when not intending their death, or using them as means, then it is permissible to kill n − m people in a way that does involve intending their deaths, or using them as means, as 'secondarily permissible' (where m > 0). In this article I argue that appealing to the PSP to solve the puzzling cases of the DDE is generally misleading and that it fails in particular cases. The crux of my argument is that the PSP allows killings that go against the grain of the DDE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we investigate whether non-culpably benefiting from wrongdoing or injustice generates a moral requirement to disgorge these benefits in order to compensate the victims. We argue that a strong requirement to disgorge such benefits is generated only if other conditions or factors are present. We identify three such factors and claim that their presence would explain why the normative features of certain types of cases of benefiting from wrongdoing differ from cases of benefiting from simple misfortune or bad luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay we argue that an agent's failure to assist someone in need at one time can change the cost she can be morally required to take on to assist that same person at a later time. In particular, we show that the cost the agent can subsequently be required to take on to help the person in need can increase quite significantly, and can be enforced through the proportionate use of force. We explore the implications of this argument for the duties of the affluent to address global poverty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The constraint against harming people in order to save yourself and others seems stronger than the constraint against harming people as a consequence of saving yourself and others. The reduced constraint against acting in one type of case is often justified with reference to the intentions of the agent or to the fact that she does not use the people she harms as a means. In this article I offer a victim-centered account. I argue that the circumstances in which the people to be harmed find themselves are significant in distinguishing morally between two instances of harming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Pogge argues that affluent people in the developing world have contribution-based duties to help protect the poor. And it follows from Pogge's most general thesis that affluent people are contributing to most, if not all, instances of global poverty. In this article I explore two problems with Pogge's general thesis. First, I investigate a typical way in which affluent people would be contributing to global poverty according to Pogge: that affluent countries use their superior bargaining power to get poor countries to accept trading schemes that are unduly favourable to the affluent. I suggest that this type of relation is best understood as exploitation, and that Pogge's general thesis is better understood as a thesis about how affluent people exploit poor people rather than about how they contribute to poverty. Second, I argue that the exploitation does not have the normative content of doing harm. Although exploiting people is often morally wrong, it is not at all clear how demanding exploitation-based duties are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When suggesting that we-the affluent in the developed world-are legitimate targets of defensive force due to our contribution to global poverty one is likely to be countered by one of two strategies. The first denies that we contribute to global poverty. The second seems to affirm that we contribute, and even that we have stringent contribution-based duties to address this poverty, but denies that such contribution makes forcible resistance permissible. Those in this second group employ several argumentative strategies. In this paper I investigate these strategies for denying the force-related implication of contribution to poverty. I do not argue for political violence or for the permissibility of targeting the affluent, I merely investigate a conditional: if contribution to global poverty generates stringent duties to address it, then this contribution implies permission on the part of the victims to defend themselves with force, or for third parties to use force on their behalf. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we explore what sacrifices you are morally required to make to save a child who is about to die in front of you. It has been argued that you would have very demanding duties to save such a child (or any adult who is in similar circumstance through no fault of their own, for that matter), and some examples have been presented to make this claim seem intuitively correct. Against this, we argue that you do not in general have a moral requirement to bear more than moderate cost to save even a child who is just in front of you. Moreover, we explain why you have a much more demanding moral requirement in certain cases by appealing to the notions of undue risk and cost sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented which discusses the impact of affluent countries' trade policies of granting subsidies to domestic producers and placing tariffs on imports on developing, or poor, countries. An overview of the moral and ethical aspects of international commerce, including the role that rich nations putatively play in contributing to the poverty in developing nations, is provided.

In this paper I argue that mere causal contribution to harm is morally significant on two counts: a) innocent aggressors have a duty to bear additional costs to help protect their potential victims, as compared to the duty innocent bystanders are expected to bear, and correspondingly; b) it is permissible to use more force against innocent aggressors, as used in self-defense and defense of others, than innocent bystanders. The paper has two parts. First I aim to demonstrate the intuitive plausibility of this proposal and what I call 'the asymmetrical fair share procedure.' According to this procedure, innocent aggressors have a duty to take on a fair share of the harm if dividing it is possible, and a fair share of the risk of being harmed if redistribution of harm is impossible. In the second part, I develop a contractual account explaining why mere contribution is morally significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the use of force in self-defence. It states that the use of force can be permissible depending on the proportionality condition or the success condition for a victim to defend herself or himself from culpable aggressors. It mentions that in a victim-centered view, defensive force is used to protect a person against disrespectful harm. Meanwhile, in aggressor-centered view, there is a reduced claim on protection which exercises disproportionate force.

An essay is presented on the democratic right to do wrong thesis (DRTDWT). It explores the DRTDWT by assuming that the conduct of an individual or collective agent can indeed be wrong and can be known by third parties. It discusses the importance of facts regarding the presence of uncertainty whether some policy would involve wrongdoing. It suggests that employing military force and establishing limits to democratic decision making could prevent democratic society from engaging in wrongdoing.

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person - and his moral culpability for that harm - impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I ponder the moral status of conditional threats, in particular the extent to which a threatened party would be permitted to use (lethal) defensive force. I first investigate a mugger case before turning briefly to the more complicated issue of national defence in the face of an invading army. One should not exaggerate the level of protection people under threat owe their conditioned killers simply because what is extorted is of little value. After all, either the conditional threat is willing to kill for something she has no claim on at all, or, if she has a just claim on it – or good reason to believe that she has – she is willing to kill to (re)acquire something of not much worth. In both cases the moral culpability of the conditional threat could be seen as reducing her claim on protection from harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1975 John Harris envisaged a survival lottery to redistribute organs from one to a greater number in order to reduce number of deaths as a consequence of organ failure. In this paper I reach a conclusion about when running a survival lottery is permissible by looking at the reason prospective participants have for allowing the procedure from a contractual perspective. I identify three versions of the survival lottery. In a National Lottery, everyone within a jurisdiction is a candidate for being a donor for everyone else, disregarding all differences between individuals' eventual possibility of needing an organ. In a Group Specific Lottery, it is a question of running a lottery among members of a specific group who share the same probability of getting organ failure. In a Local Lottery one randomises among individuals who are already in need of a new organ but who happen to be compatible and in need of different organs. While the first is vulnerable to considerations of fairness, it is difficult to perceive a feasible way to implement the second option that does not come with a host of unwelcome consequences. I argue, however, that it is permissible to run Local Lotteries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the heart of the current debate about immigration we find a conflict of convictions. Many people seem to believe that a country has a right to decide who to let in and who to keep out, but quite often they appear equally committed to the view that it is morally wrong to expel someone from within the borders of their country if that would seriously jeopardise the person in question. While the first conviction leads to stricter border controls in an attempt to prevent would-be immigrants from entering the country illegally, the latter conviction ensures that aliens with a legitimate claim on protection will not be removed forcibly. It is not strange, therefore, that the task of pinning down a morally sound immigration policy is such an elusive enterprise. In this paper I take it for granted that no electorate would be prepared to accept the kind of policy they ought to, and that we in consequence will continue to let in as few immigrants as is currently the case. Given this constraint I argue against two common assumptions concerning a viable immigration policy. First, granted that certain conditions are satisfied, professional smugglers should not face legal sanctions for bringing asylum seekers to a potential host country. Second, countries that limit immigration should not treat people seeking family reunion preferentially or on a par with other immigrants, but rather act so as to maximise the number of refugees allowed to enter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A riddle in the ethics of war concerns whether lethal defensive force may be justifiably used against aggressing soldiers who are morally innocent. In this essay I argue that although there might be reasons for excusing soldiers as individuals, one may be justified in using defensive force against them provided that they have initiated threatening behavior and that our interpretation of that behavior as threatening is reasonable. I go on to investigate various implications of being in conflict with aggressing soldiers who are morally innocent, arguing that different restrictions apply to the use of defensive force when the aggressors cannot be held morally responsible for being aggressors. My argument has important practical implications both for deciding whether to go to war and for deciding how to fight a just defensive war. Concerning the ongoing Iraq war, for example, it suggests that if it were only a matter of killing culpable members of the Republican Guard, invasion could perhaps have been justified. Since any attack would involve killing innocent conscripted soldiers as well as innocent civilians, however, there were good reasons to wait to see whether options other than intervening militarily would become available. If we are engaged in a just defensive war, my argument implies that we must accept a higher level of risk and more harm if we can assume that the aggressors are innocent rather than morally responsible for their harmful or threatening behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addresses the question in the ethics of war as to who shall be given immunity in acts of defensive force. The author argues against the view that the mere fact that some people are not combatants is enough to justify granting them immunity. He suggests, instead, that although civilians are not combatants, and not a threat to the defending party, there might be relations between civilians and the soldiers making it permissible to kill the former to impede the aggression of the latter. However, when there are no such relations, civilians do enjoy immunity, and should not be victims of war, intended or otherwise.

The main thesis of the article is that one's responsibility to render assistance is not affected by having contributed to the situation by causing harm. I examine ways in which contribution to need is morally significant. Although contribution is relevant with regard to certain features, such as questions of blame, compensation, and fair distribution of the cost of assistance, I argue that contribution should carry no weight when assessing our duty to assist people in severe need if we can do so at little cost. If this is true we have reason to suspect that it is redundant to know whether or not we have in fact contributed to the need of the global poor when assessing our duty to address global poverty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I explain the asymmetry between innocent aggressors and their (innocent) victims, and attempt to separate justified and unjustified defensive force when both parties are innocent. I propose the principle of initiating behaviour, which states that: 'In order for one person to be justified in using defensive force the other party must initiate the apparently threatening behaviour, but the defendant's interpretation of that behaviour, as being threatening, would have to be reasonable.' We can thereby maintain the view that there is a significant relation between an act being justified and which party ought eventually to be given priority in a conflict situation. If we know that an act is justified, we know that we have to give preference to its agent when there is a choice between imposing equal harm on him or her and his or her victim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explains the reasons for accepting and rejecting a contract for killing a person. Explanation on the categories of permissible killing; Redistributive aspect of contractual killing; Classes of contractual killing.