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AbstractWhile the concepts of containment and degrading are distinct in their tactical implications, both have been integral to U.S Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) operational approach since its inception in 2007. This paper aims to elucidate this strategic transformation over the period of 2018 to 2023, employing an evaluative framework that incorporates threat assessment, strategic intent, and a cost-benefit analysis. By scrutinizing AFRICOM’s Situation Reports, this study establishes a correlation between the Flintlock military exercises in West Africa and the establishment of the Danab Special Commando Brigade in Somalia with the overarching containment and degrading strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States no longer constitutes a monolith in determining Africa's future. In fact, no single country does—not Russia, not China. Africa has options, well noted in welcome statements by Department of State Secretary Antony Blinken: "Africa does not need to pick sides." Africans see double standards in US policy ("do as we say, not as we do"). Understandably, they turn to other options in seeking better outcomes for their countries. Partners such as the Russian Federation may seem unsavory to the United States, but rhetoric alone will not persuade Africans to drop them. High-level VIP visits leave them largely indifferent. Private sector investment could succeed where public efforts leave a dubious record. If US investors can overcome risk aversion, they may supplant or complement a public sector that Africans find unresponsive to their needs and wishes. Encouraged and energized, US investors could meet Africa's challenges, and mutually benefit from its rewards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wider context of US foreign policy as a whole is sometimes missing, but Gasbarri has, while not saying the last word on the subject, made a significant contribution to our knowledge of how the Cold War in Africa ended and how US policy to Africa changed as it did so. Having identified a gap in the relevant historiography, Gasbarri has produced a well-ordered, clearly written, and for the most part a sophisticated account of the ending of the Cold War in Africa and how it affected US foreign policy in the years 1988 to 1994. US Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War In Africa: A Bridge Between Global Conflict and the New World Order, 1988-1994: By Flavia Gasbarri. [Extracted from the article]

Between 1808 and 1820, the United States transformed the foreign slave trade from a legitimate form of commerce into a capital crime. This transformation reflected the determination of the American public and their representatives to extricate the United States from participation in the foreign slave trade. Yet, in the spring of 1824, a group of U.S. senators refused to approve the renomination of a customs collector who had sought to suppress the illegal slave trade emanating from his home district. A few weeks later, this same group of senators effectively scuttled the anti-slave trade treaty that the Monroe administration had negotiated with Great Britain. This article will expose why this group of lawmakers opted to weaken the nation's ability to suppress the illegal traffic. It will argue that – as members of William Crawford's faction – they set aside their ideological support for suppressing the foreign slave trade in order to secure the allegiance of another senator, James D'Wolf of Rhode Island, and then, with D'Wolf's crucial assistance, strike a blow against John Quincy Adams, who was one of Crawford's intraparty rivals in the upcoming presidential election of 1824. But the fallout from this particular deal – or "corrupt bargain," as such political horse-trading would soon come to be known – was not limited to the election. On the contrary, Crawford's faction had severely undermined the federal government's effort to suppress the slave trade in an ultimately futile effort to hurt Adams. This article will therefore reveal how even popular policy measures were vulnerable to electoral ambitions and that seemingly small political deals could have longstanding and widespread repercussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, the United Nations has been actively disseminating seventeen (17) sustainable development goals (SDGs). The agenda calls for global partnerships for what it called "peace and prosperity for people and the planet". SDG number sixteen (16) seeks to promote peace, justice and institutional efficiency. This seems to be a long and complex process when it comes to Africa. The African continent is the most fragile in terms of sustainable development given that most of its regions are conflict-torn. When it comes to peace and stability as a prerequisite to sustainable development, it is clear that the northern, western, and Horn regions are now the most unstable in the whole continent. Amidst all this, the United States Africa Command was created in 2007 to safeguard peace, bring stability and provide prosperity in the region. Drawing on source materials, mainly from the US Department of Defense and its Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), along with the AFRICOM Posture Statements to Congress of 2018 through 2022, this paper argues that the creation of the US Africa Command did not achieve any of the set mission goals. To the contrary, it was an attraction factor to terrorist groups which spread all over the region. Through several datasets, the paper also shows that more threats became imminent and more countries were plunged into bloodshed. More failed states in the region would make it impossible for the implementation of any of the 2030 Agenda's SDGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Africa Research Bulletin, the US has agreed to withdraw its troops from Niger following talks with the country's military-appointed prime minister. The decision to withdraw comes after the military regime in Niger terminated a cooperation agreement with the US. Protests have taken place in Niamey and Agadez calling for the departure of US troops, and Niger has shifted its alliance towards Russia since a coup in July 2023. Russian military instructors have arrived in Niger to train the country's army. [Extracted from the article]

A deadly attack by al-Shabaab militants on a hotel near the presidential palace in Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of three people and the injury of 27 others, including civilians and soldiers. The attack broke a period of relative calm in the city and demonstrated the continued ability of al-Shabaab to strike despite military efforts against them. The group claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that the hotel served as a shelter for government officials and military officers. The United States and the African Union mission in Somalia condemned the attack, and the Somali government arrested 16 suspects, including the alleged mastermind, in connection with the incident. Al-Shabaab also carried out attacks on military bases in Busley and Bar Sanguni, resulting in casualties on both sides. The group has been able to seize control of several towns and villages in central Somalia, leading to concerns about the government's military setbacks in the region. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses developments in the foreign policy of the U.S. in Africa as of October 2020. Also cited are the adverse policies of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump for Africa like his travel ban on African countries like Nigeria, the need to reset U.S. policy in Africa that is focused on economic justice, African youth, and democracy to avoid further disengagement, as well as the economic developments in the region with the support of several countries like China, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and India.

The logic of "risk" is increasingly important in the study of global health politics. One recent contribution has even argued that risk is beginning to replace security as the defining logic of health governance and policy. Others dispute this on the basis that risk and security have always operated together in the "securitization" of disease. This article constitutes a theoretical intervention into this burgeoning debate. Does a stronger appreciation of risk warrant the diminishment of security? Are we looking at the "riskification" of health rather than "securitization"? Or would this miss the way these two logics might be complimentary or intertwined in ways that we are yet to theorize? I argue that the global health and securitization literatures are better served by an explicit consideration of risk and security logics in interplay, or never entirely encompassed by the other, nor in complete alignment, yet never truly separate. To do this, I propose a reconceptualization of the central problem—exceptionalism—that allows for risk to be understood as a form of exceptionalist politics. I demonstrate the validity of this approach through an otherwise "easy case" of securitization: the US response to the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the arrival of African diplomats in the U.S. in 1960. He mentions the impact of black diplomats from newly independent nations in Africa, the issue of their presence in a racially segregated Washington, D.C., and presents instances of discrimination against ambassadors and their staff.

This article considers the opportunities that emerged during the 1950s for American interests in Africa through consideration of a unique story, that of Congresswoman Frances Bolton and her trip to Africa in 1955. Frances Payne Bolton (b. 1885, d. 1977) heiress to the Payne family Standard Oil fortune, and one of United States' longest serving Congresswomen, made a significant though largely unrecognized contribution to shaping America's cold war perspectives and policies on Africa. Following the United States' development with Congolese uranium of the atomic bomb in the early 1940s, Americans intensified their commercial and political interests in Africa. They did so in the context of rising African nationalism and continent-wide struggles for liberation from European colonial powers. American leaders then found themselves in a deeply ambiguous position vis-à-vis Africa and Africans, caught as they were between paying deference to European paternalist interests in the continent and largely unfulfilled aspirations to deal with the looming civil rights movement on the domestic front. The principal focus of the article is a consideration of Bolton's remarkable and unprecedented three month tour of the African continent in 1955. During a critical period in African states' struggles to gain independence, Bolton was deeply engaged in cultivating America's growing interest in economic and political opportunities in postcolonial Africa As chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, her 'Special Study Mission to Africa, South and East of the Sahara' included stops in twenty-four countries and, meetings with African political leaders as well as colonial officials. Upon her return over the next year or so, Bolton penned a report of mission for Congress, and made a fascinating film chronicle - Africa: Giant with a Future, 1955. The article seeks to highlight significant facets of Bolton's trip, and its influence on how Americans in and outside of government perceived Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is keen to capture Africa's value to bolster U.S. economic growth and political influence. It mentions Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018 allocated fund to create the new International Development Finance Corp. It also mentions racist sentiments embeds their local communities within global systems of economic and political power.

Abstract The past decade has witnessed a sea change in U.S. military engagement in Africa. With the establishment of a new permanent command, significant increases in security assistance, and the pioneering of new tactics driven by technical innovations in intelligence analysis and drone warfare, the U.S. military has become an integral player in the continent's security. Nevertheless, there exist few assessments of the extent to which increased U.S. military engagement is paying dividends. This article examines how the current U.S. military strategy in Africa is different from those in the past and whether it is meeting the stated U.S. objectives of neutralizing transnational threats while contributing to the continent's political stability. It finds that U.S. performance is mixed, with recent successes at containing the spread of al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliated groups coming at the potential detriment of longer-term regional security. The article concludes with recommendations aimed at helping the armed forces of the U.S. and other regional actors better fight terrorism while managing political risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The army base in Bulo Marer, 120 kilometres southwest of the capital Mogadishu "came under al-Shabaab attack", the AU force known as B ATMIS b said in a statement on I Facebook i and I Twitter i . B Dozens are thought to have died in a military base raid by al-Shabaab militants. b Islamist al-Shabaab fighters attacked an B African Union b military base in Somalia on May 26th, the AU force said, without initially specifying if there were any casualties. The May 26th attack came less than a week after al-Shabaab issued a communique following an eight-day summit from May 8th-15th and pledged to challenge the second phase of an offensive against the militant group to be conducted jointly by Somali troops and regional forces. [Extracted from the article]

Since 9/11, the American policy towards Africa has been strongly influenced by national security interests and in particular by the fight against international terrorism and Islamic radicalisation. Traditionally, the American Africa policy has been the result of bureaucratic policymaking with the Pentagon and the State Department playing prominent roles. The paper argues that in the current century, evangelical Christian lobby groups have gained increasing influence on policymaking on Africa. Because policymaking has been influenced by a number of different actors, the American Africa policy may appear incoherent and ambiguous if judged narrowly on the expectation that it only aims to take care of US national security concerns and economic self-interests. The paper concludes that Africa was important to the United States during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama because of the combination of strong security interests and strong domestic lobby groups that have pressured to place Africa on the US foreign policy agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's cultural assistance, the use of cultural resources such as film and education to accelerate modernization, to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1953-1961. It explores the possible explanations behind Eisenhower administration's hesitance to offer aid to Guinea which include his conviction that the Soviet Union attached more weight to political tactics, the fear that countries would become permanently dependent and the administration's ideological atachment to the free market. Also discussed is the administration's differentiation between communist infiltration and nationalism.

The article focuses on the national security and foreign relations of the U.S. and Africa, and mentions developing better U.S. status of forces protections in Africa. Topics discussed include preventing the conclusion of a multilateral status of forces agreement (SOFA) within the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP); problems that can arise when sending U.S. forces into countries with which the U.S. has not negotiated a SOFA; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) model.

This essay explores the white supremacy American group known as the Citizens' Council, focusing on their efforts to travel to Southern Africa in the 1960s to meet with Whites in South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and South-West Africa (Namibia). It compares decolonization with the impact of civil rights legislation in both the Southern States and Southern Africa, both areas known for their institutionalized racism. It compares American black freedom movements with those in Africa.

There is a convergence of interests, a sufficient degree of trust and the collective capacity to establish a strategic partnership between the United States and Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there has been growing recognition of the militarisation of US foreign policy in Africa, especially following the establishment of a dedicated, regional combatant command (Africa Command, or AFRICOM) in 2007. At the same time knowledge of the extent and aims of US military activities in Africa remains murky, especially when compared to other regions such as the Middle East and Europe. This article begins by conceptualising AFRICOM as a geopolitical assemblage, an approach we believe useful for analysing its composition and emergence. Next we discuss the challenges involved in tracing the US military’s evolving presence in Africa and the methods utilised in our analysis. Following this we present three case studies: the first compares the composition and geographies of manned and unmanned aerial surveillance assemblages, the second details logistics infrastructures and the military’s use of contractors to develop logistical capabilities across the continent, the third examines growing counterterrorism entanglements in West Africa. We conclude with some observations concerning the divergence between purported aims and the focus and outcomes of the US military’s presence in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The flier for the conference on "African American and United States Foreign Policy" convened at Boston University on October 26-28, 2010 is reminiscent of how mainstream academia ignores the role of Malcolm X in influencing United States policies towards Africa through his actions and speeches in the United States, in Africa, in Great Britain, and at the United Nations. This essay seeks to remedy this shortcoming by demonstrating that very few, if any, African American have been more effective than Malcolm X in influencing, directly and indirectly, United States Africa policies. Using a qualitative explanatory case study methodology, the paper shows that it was Malcolm X's Black Nationalism and peace through power and coercion paradigms that underlay how and why he pushed American policymakers to rethink their policies towards Africa, and direct African leaders to take appropriate positions toward the United States' agenda at the United Nations, and in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores on the effective response of the U.S. policymakers to the problem of violent religious extremism particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It highlights the effort of the African governments to prevent or eliminate killings and harassing people who live in the vicinity of suspected extremists. It also cites the dominance of Christian government against Islam.

While the concept of soft power was coined by US scholar Joseph Nye in the early 1990s, the scholarly analysis of the US soft power in Africa remains scarce. This article seeks to engage with the question of soft power arising from US policies, political values and cultural exports in Africa. It employs both primary and secondary data, and focuses on the soft power impact of AGOA and PEPFAR on African perspectives on the US, as well as the impact of US popular culture, brands and educational exchange. The article found that, despite surveys pointing to increasing anti-US sentiments globally in the 21stcentury, Washington still wields significant soft power in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the significance of the Africa Command (AFRICOM), one of nine unified combatant commands of the U.S. Armed Forces that is responsible for military operations and military relations with 53 African nations, in the nation's transformational diplomacy. It looks at the history of the relations between the U.S. and Africa from the Barbary Wars of the early 19th century to the onset of the Cold War, during which the Navy was engaged in Africa in pursuit of commercial, humanitarian trade and strategic interests. It aslo explores President George Bush's decision behind the establishment of AFRICOM, and the reorganization of its command structure between 2007 and 2008.

Recently, much has been written about the role of African agency in the continent's emergent relationship with China. Some scholars have argued that previous writing on the subject of Sino-African relations presented an unbalanced picture in which an all-powerful China subjugated weak African states, thereby replicating previous Orientalist tropes about Africa. More recent scholarship by Corkin, Mohan, and others, however, has focused on the significant power of African political elites in shaping the nature of relations with China. This Article seeks to conceptualize the nature of the power relations between China and African states by examining concepts deployed in these scholarly debates. We then test these concepts through case studies of Angola and Zambia--two of the African states with which China has been most engaged and two major commodity exporter monoeconomies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that US policy toward Africa was characterized by continuity during the cold war has recently been challenged by scholars who argue that President John F. Kennedy embarked on an African policy that was distinct from his predecessors. This may be true for black Africa, but Kennedy’s support for African nationalism did not extend to South Africa. This article reveals that Kennedy’s cold war priorities ensured continuity in US policy toward the apartheid state and, in some cases, additional cooperation as cold war crises increased the perceived importance of South Africa as an ideological and strategic ally and bastion against communism on a rapidly changing continent. This article also explores the role South Africa’s apartheid government played in this cold war alliance. The ruling National Party recognized its importance to US foreign policy goals and used this to stave off serious American criticism of its racial policies, deflect attention in the United Nations, and ensure continued economic and military cooperation with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]