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Cloud computing brings important benefits and it is expected to play a key role in facilitating the uptake of emerging technologies and applications, including artificial intelligence, blockchain, and high-performance computing. Despite its potential to deliver cost and time-efficient services, the majority of businesses in the EU have still not implemented cloud computing. This illustrates the need for a more widespread adoption of the technology. Yet, recent regulatory initiatives may obstruct the uptake of cloud services. This is arguably because such initiatives do not reflect a proper understanding of the market, which our paper intends to provide. To that end, the paper examines what cloud computing is and how it works. It subsequently discusses the EU's attempts to regulate cloud computing, including the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act, and the Data Act proposal. Our analysis demonstrates that the logic of these instruments and the obligations they establish do not fit the characteristics and workings of cloud computing. The paper concludes by noting that future regulation must mirror the specificities of the cloud, which has a value chain and traits that differ significantly from other digital services, most notably online platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA), an EU Regulation establishing obligations for gatekeeper platforms in order to protect fairness and contestability in digital markets, will soon start to apply. In addition to the DMA, other (EU and national) instruments regulate platform conduct. Though the DMA explicitly provides that it will apply without prejudice to those other instruments, it is doubted whether it will merely complement them. In certain cases, the DMA may qualify as lex specialis, thereby prevailing over other regulations. In other cases, based on the principle of supremacy, the DMA may override national instruments that pursue legitimate interests other than fairness and contestability. There may also be occasions where the DMA may render certain tools devoid of purpose when this was not the intention of the legislator. In all the above cases, the DMA would not complement (but could possibly endanger) the effectiveness of the existing regime. Given the avalanche of legislative proposals for platforms, addressing potential conflicts between the DMA and other rules is essential to protect legal certainty and to ensure that the regulatory regime that governs harmful platform conduct reaches its full potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU competition watchdog is increasingly being called upon to deal with cases involving firms that rely heavily on the collection and processing of consumer data. While several decisions explicitly mention that access to large reserves of customer information may affect the competitive process, the European Commission has meticulously refrained from examining concerns that may arise from data-related practices. This hands-off approach may be attributed to the choice of the Commission to ignore the specific conditions of data-driven markets in an attempt to avoid tackling controversial practices the effects of which are not easily measurable. A cautious approach that seeks to sidestep the negative implications of over-enforcement may benefit fast-moving markets. However, 'quick fixes' and failure to take account of the specific conditions that determine how data-driven markets work in practice run the risk of producing erroneous results, to the detriment of competition and consumer choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]