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China's burgeoning economic and security activities abroad have given rise to suspicions and criticisms of its intentions. As Buddhism is a shared faith and heritage among many Chinese; an integral part of national identities of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia; a proud legacy in India; and a major religion in Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan, winning over the trust and friendship of neighboring Buddhist countries has emerged as an important Chinese diplomatic initiative, especially under the current Xi Jinping leadership's enterprise to revive the Silk Road. Having over 245 million Buddhists, 28,000 Buddhist monasteries, 16,000 temples, and 240,000 Buddhist monks and nuns makes the promotion of Buddhism a rich source of soft-power, or "soul power," for China, generated from its heavy investments in building Buddhist institutions and engaging Buddhist groups in these countries. However, there are external and domestic challenges in using Buddhism as a Chinese foreign policy vehicle. The paper analyzes what the objectives of China's Buddhist diplomacy are; which personnel, organizations, or state bureaus in China make China's Buddhist diplomacy; how is it carried out; what the targeted institutions and personnel in the affected countries are; the reactions from these countries; and the extent to which a Communist regime is able to carry out its promotion of Buddhism in Asia despite its professed atheism. The analysis is conducted through the spectrum of two major perspectives in international relations literature: neo-realism and constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on South Asia's role in China's Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative. Given the saliency of this MSR enterprise as part of ChinesePresident Xi Jinping’s “One-Belt-One-Road” strategy, how this ambitious scheme impacts China’s relations with South Asian states along the MSR’s route, i.e. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh, merits investigation. The fate of the MSR will be determined by China’s relations with these states, since South Asia is in the middle of major sea-lanes between East/Southeast Asia and Middle East/Europe. The study examines the intentions and executions of China’s MSR projects in South Asia, evaluates the political and economic calculations of participating in the MSR for regional states, and identifies actions taken by them that can decide the initiative’s success. Politically, reactions of South Asian states to the MSR are explained as: fear of expanding Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean for India; and attempts by which Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh use China to counteract possible domination by India. Economically, two MSR pathways for South Asian states are analyzed: increases in Chinese infrastructure investments; and expansion in South Asia-China trade; both of which are reducible by loans owed to China, or “strings”/conditions attached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to foreign demands for concessions and territories, China’s last imperial court in the early twentieth century executed reforms to strengthen fiscal, personnel, military, and cultural control over its frontier regions. However, in so doing, it provoked an awakening of the national consciousness of the elites of non-Han ethnic minorities there. Much has changed over the past 100 years regarding the governance of China’s frontier territories of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, with the diffusion of nationalist claims among increasing numbers of the ethnic minority populace, heightened focus of foreign actors on the humanitarian and rights situations of the ethnic minorities, and greatly extended reach and firmer grip of the central government. What remained unaltered is the “state integration” purpose of Chinese regimes, as manifested in the practices of “internal colonialism” or “ethnic assimilation,” which has led to grievances and resistance by China’s ethnic minorities against the Chinese state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper provides a political analysis on two territorial disputes that South Korea has with Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima and with China over Iŏdo/Suyan Rocks, as well as on their implications for the Northeast Asia region, focusing on the roles of sub-state actors and the United States as a third party trans-national actor. It mainly explores why South Koreans consider territorial claims by Japan and China such an affront as to require strident demonstration of ownership, especially since they already exercise effective control over the territories under dispute. It also explores what actions the South Korean government would take in the event of maneuvers or attempted landings by security forces or nationalists/fishing boats from China on Iŏdo or Japan on Dokdo. Employing Robert Putnam's Two Level Game Framework, the paper provides comparative insights on how these cases have been developed to date through interactions between Level I, official negotiators, and Level II, sub- and trans-national actors. The two cases demonstrate that the state is not a unified actor, and non-state actors' nationalistic collective sentiment has played (and will play) a greater role in shaping the directions of (potential) conflicts over Dokdo and Iŏdo. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) was vexing for China-Japan relations. As such, the five years since Koizumi left office, particularly the change in Japan's ruling party, were initially expected, and sometimes perceived, to realize a half-decade of recovery and reconciliation in Sino-Japanese ties. While tensions did decrease, “icebergs” blocking improvement in relations have not completely thawed, and may harden again. Competition for political and economic influences and interests in the same region, concern over one another's future security posture and relations with Taiwan, territorial disputes, misunderstanding about the other's historical sensitivities and feelings of distrust, occasionally manipulated by nationalists, still pervade the relationship. Therefore, though there is mutual desire, indeed a necessity, for cooperation on many issues affecting both countries, this typically couples with a disconcerting or anxious feeling towards the other's intentions that results in competitiveness. There are deep roots to this need/fear complex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few years, China has promoted all kinds of regional and sub-regional cooperation in Asia. This research finds that the extent of China's drive for institutionalization of cooperative regional multilateral processes is affected by two primary considerations: (1) distribution of power among the forum participants, and whether the major players are well-disposed towards China or not so; and (2) the importance of the issues that the specific forum is set up to deal with to the political, economic or security interests of China as well as other participating states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the theories on how Taiwan would handle the issue of its independence and sovereignty from China. Recognition of Taiwan's independence by China; Forceful integration of Taiwan into China; Comparison of Taiwan's state with that of Mongolia and Tibet.