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Bilateral investment treaties ( BITs) are legal instruments used by developing and transition countries to provide investor protection and, by extension, promote higher levels of inward foreign direct investment ( FDI). While the link between BITs and FDI has been extensively studied, little is known about the impact of the treaties on different forms of investment. Motivated by this observation, we examine the effects of BITs on vertical and horizontal FDI. We find that BITs are more positively related to vertical than to horizontal FDI. We also find that BITs tend to act as stronger substitutes for better institutions in the case of vertical relative to horizontal investments. The findings inform BIT strategies that are compatible with development objectives in developing and transition countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically investigates how cross-country differences in the quality of human capital, as they are captured by the conventional measures of international test score differences, influences the patterns of foreign direct investment. Using panel data covering 32 countries during the period between 1985 and 2004, this paper finds that a host country's quality of educational attainment plays an independent role in attracting foreign direct investment. In particular, the quality of human capital influences horizontal foreign direct investment, even after accounting for the roles of skill and factor endowments, trade costs, investment costs, and country-size and income effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the productivity of parent firms for multinational enterprises in Taiwan. The current research specifically examines the potential differences in productivity effect between FDI toward developing (vertical FDI) and developed countries (horizontal FDI) and between electronics and non-electronics firms. Using panel data on Taiwan firms from 2000 to 2005, results obtained using propensity score matching (PSM) show thatmultinational firms experience a higher productivity following their FDI in developing countries. A time lag exists in productivity gain of investment to developed countries, and is relevant only to electronics firms. Employing the generalized method of moment of the panel fixed model to control for problems of endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity, the empirical finding suggests that productivity effect caused by investing in developing countries remains significantly positive. A lagged productivity-enhancing effect is also found after FDI in developed countries for both electronics and non electronics firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if and only if there is business-stealing (Amir et al., 2014). The excessive entry prediction has been derived primarily for closed economies and using a welfarist benchmark. We extend this framework and allow for (1) horizontal FDI in a multi-period setting and (2) interest group-based government behaviour. Opening the market to greenfield investments from abroad tends to aggravate the entry distortion. Moreover, market opening may reduce welfare if a more pronounced entry distortion dominates the gain in consumer surplus. Finally, a government, which places sufficiently little weight on the interests of consumers, will object to market opening, even if welfare rises. • Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if there is business-stealing. • Allowing for horizontal FDI aggravates the excess entry problem. • Nonetheless welfare rises in market equilibrium, but may fall if entry is restricted. • A government maximising a political support function may restrict FDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]