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Sentences φ and ψ are cognitive synonyms for one when they play the same role in one's cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to 'dead parrot' series: sequences of sentences φ 1 , ... , φ n where adjacent φ i and φ i + 1 are cognitive synonyms while φ 1 and φ n are not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won't do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn't satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3).Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State spaces are, in the most general sense, sets of entities that contain information. Examples include states of dynamical systems, processes of observations, or possible worlds. We use domain theory to describe the structure of positive and negative information in state spaces. We present examples ranging from the space of trajectories of a dynamical system, over Dunn's aboutness interpretation of fde, to the space of open sets of a spectral space. We show that these information structures induce so-called hype models which were recently developed by Leitgeb (2019). Conversely, we prove a representation theorem: roughly, hype models can be represented as induced by an information structure. Thus, the well-behaved logic hype is a sound and complete logic for reasoning about information in state spaces. As application of this framework, we investigate information fusion. We motivate two kinds of fusion. We define a groundedness and a separation property that allow a hype model to be closed under the two kinds of fusion. This involves a Dedekind–MacNeille completion and a fiber-space like construction. The proof-techniques come from pointless topology and universal algebra. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate synonymy in the strong sense of content identity (and not just meaning similarity). This notion is central in the philosophy of language and in applications of logic. We motivate, uniformly axiomatize, and characterize several "benchmark" notions of synonymy in the messy class of all possible notions of synonymy. This class is divided by two intuitive principles that are governed by a no-go result. We use the notion of a scenario to get a logic of synonymy (SF) which is the canonical representative of one division. In the other division, the so-called conceptivist logics, we find, e.g., the well-known system of analytic containment (AC). We axiomatize four logics of synonymy extending AC, relate them semantically and proof-theoretically to SF, and characterize them in terms of weak/strong subject matter preservation and weak/strong logical equivalence. This yields ways out of the no-go result and novel arguments—independent of a particular semantic framework—for each notion of synonymy discussed (using, e.g., Hurford disjunctions or homotopy theory). This points to pluralism about meaning and a certain non-compositionality of truth in logic programs and neural networks. And it unveils an impossibility for synonymy: if it is to preserve subject matter, then either conjunction and disjunction lose an essential property or a very weak absorption law is violated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people make deontological decisions, although they often lead to overall unfavorable outcomes? One account is receiving considerable attention: deontological judgments may signal commitment to prosociality and thus may increase people’s chances of being selected as social partners–which carries obvious long-term benefits. Here we test this framework by experimentally exploring whether people making deontological judgments are expected to be more prosocial than those making consequentialist judgments and whether they are actually so. In line with previous studies, we identified deontological choices using the Trapdoor dilemma. Using economic games, we take two measures of general prosociality towards strangers: trustworthiness and altruism. Our results procure converging evidence for a perception gap according to which Trapdoor-deontologists are believed to be more trustworthy and more altruistic towards strangers than Trapdoor-consequentialists, but actually they are not so. These results show that deontological judgments are not universal, reliable signals of prosociality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]