Search

We study how economic crises relate to the likelihood of experiencing regime changes 'from within'; that is, transitions brought about, in part or fully, by actors in the incumbent regime. While historically common and influencing the political trajectories of many countries, such processes are far less studied than regime transitions forced by non-incumbent actors, such as coups or revolutions. We synthesize previous arguments and further specify how crises can incentivize leaders to change the regime from within due to two mechanisms. First, crises create windows of opportunity for leaders to pursue transitions they inherently prefer, for instance through self-coup. Second, crises sometimes allow opposition actors to mobilize and threaten the regime, forcing incumbents to liberalize. We leverage new data on timing and mode of regime change for more than 2000 regimes from about 200 countries, during the period 1789–2018. Employing different measurement strategies, estimators, control variables and other specification choices, we find fairly robust evidence that economic crises are related to transitions from within. However, when we distinguish between liberalizing and non-liberalizing guided transitions, we only find that economic crises systematically relate to the latter, suggesting that the window of opportunity mechanism may be especially pertinent in many contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that cross-national variability in homicide rates is strongly influenced by state history. Populations living within a state are habituated, over time, to settling conflicts through regularized, institutional channels rather than personal violence. Because these are gradual and long-term processes, present-day countries composed of citizens whose ancestors experienced a degree of "state-ness" in previous centuries should experience fewer homicides today. To test this proposition, we adopt an ancestry-adjusted measure of state history that extends back to 0 CE. Cross-country analyses show a sizeable and robust relationship between this index and lower homicide rates. The result holds when using various measures of state history and homicide rates, sets of controls, samples, and estimators. We also find indicative evidence that state history relates to present levels of other forms of personal violence. Tests of plausible mechanisms suggest state history is linked to homicide rates via the law-abidingness of citizens. We find less support for alternative channels such as economic development or current state capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some countries make the costly decision to relocate their capital city? Existing research offers four general explanations for this momentous action: administrative functionality, economic development, environmental degradation, and national integration. We offer a less sanguine, political explanation: capital relocations offer autocratic leaders a way to mitigate different security threats, including coups, popular protests, and foreign interventions. Using original data on capital relocations in 202 polities after 1789, we test several implications of our argument, at different levels of analysis. First, we show that autocracies are much more likely to relocate their capitals than democracies. Second, using different indicators of internal and external threats, we find that autocracies more likely relocate their capitals when breakdown is looming. Third, running subnational analyses, we find evidence that capitals are relocated to smaller cities and areas less susceptible to urban development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does democracy matter for normatively desirable outcomes? We survey results from 1,100 cross-country analyses drawn from 600 journal articles published after the year 2000. These analyses are conducted on 30 distinct outcomes pertaining to social policy, economic policy, citizenship and human rights, military and criminal justice, and overall governance. Across these diverse outcomes, most studies report either a positive or null relationship with democracy. However, there is evidence of threshold bias, suggesting that reported findings may reflect a somewhat exaggerated image of democracy's effects. Additionally, democratic effects are more likely to be found for outcomes that are easily attained than for those that lie beyond the reach of government but are often of great normative importance. We also find that outcomes measured by subjective indicators show a stronger positive relationship with democracy than outcomes that are measured or proxied by more objective indicators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present a business case for democracy, focusing on the impact of democracy on economic growth. This relationship is widely studied, and results have been less robust for growth than many other development outcomes such as literacy or infant mortality. I discuss four factors pertaining to data quality and modelling choices, suggesting that several previous studies have underestimated the growth-benefits of democracy. I further discuss the relationships between democracy and economic crises and variation in economic performance. By mitigating abysmal economic outcomes and ensuring more stable performance, democracy is generally of benefit to risk-averse entrepreneurs, investors, workers, and consumers alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized shapes welfare state development. Institutionalized parties allow politicians to overcome co-ordination problems, avoid capture by special interests and form stable linkages with broad social groups. These features both enable and incentivize politicians to pursue extensive welfare policies. The study employs measures of party institutionalization and welfare state features to study these proposed relationships. Even when accounting for country- and year-fixed effects and plausible confounders such as electoral system, unionization, regime type and state capacity, the authors find clear relationships between party institutionalization and more extensive and universal welfare states. Focusing on universalism, they find that the relationship is more pronounced when constraints on executives are strong and in democracies, but that it also exists in autocracies. Further, when disaggregating party institutionalization and evaluating mechanisms, the linkages that institutionalized parties form with social groups constitute one important, but not the only relevant, factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to reconcile competing positions in an important debate about the relationship between regime type and human development. We contend that this empirical relationship is contingent upon issues of conceptualization and measurement in democracy. First, the relationship is more likely to be perceived when democracy is measured in a nuanced fashion, taking account of gradations of democracy and autocracy. Second, some aspects of democracy – those associated with competitive elections – are more strongly associated with human development than others. Third, the components of electoral democracy interact in a reinforcing manner. Finally, the impact of democracy on human development is a distal relationship that depends upon a country's entire regime history. Our approach draws on several new datasets that interrogate change across a century, enhancing empirical leverage on this important question. To measure human development, we employ the Gapminder project, covering most sovereign countries from 1900 to 2012. To measure democracy, we draw on Varieties of Democracy data, which measure democracy in a highly differentiated fashion for most sovereign countries from 1900 to the present. An extensive set of analyses offer strong corroboration for the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite decades of research, there is no consensus on the relationship between democratic institutions and risk of civil war. We alleviate measurement issues and theoretical ambiguity in much existing work by theoretically and empirically unpacking core features of democracy and their relationship to civil war. We distinguish between institutions that impose vertical constraints on leaders from the population at large, and institutions that allow various groups, including non-incumbent elites, to place horizontal constraints on leader behavior. Both types of democratic institutions, we argue, help leaders overcome commitment problems related to potential agents of rebellion, thus reducing civil war risk. This is particularly so when these institutional mechanisms reinforce each other. Using precise institutional indicators from Varieties of Democracy, we disentangle and separately measure the dimensions of interest. Both vertical and (especially) horizontal constraints mitigate civil war risk, but only clearly so when both types of constraining institutions co-exist in so-called liberal democracies. Absent constraints from a capable parliament or independent judiciary, improvements to the freeness and fairness of elections do not mitigate civil war onset. Malgré des décennies de recherche, il n'existe aucun consensus sur la relation entre les institutions démocratiques et les guerres civiles. Nous atténuons les problèmes de mesure et l'ambiguité théorique de nombreux travaux existants en analysant les caractéristiques fondamentales de la démocratie et leur relation avec les guerres civiles dun point de vue théorique et empirique. Nous distinguons les institutions qui imposent des contraintes verticales aux dirigeants par le biais de la population globale de celles qui permettent á divers groupes, y compris aux élites qui ne sont pas au pouvoir, dimposer des contraintes horizontales pour le comportement des dirigeants. Nous soutenons que ces deux types d'institutions démocratiques aident les dirigeants á surmonter les problèmes dengagement liés aux agents rebelles potentiels, réduisant ainsi le risque de guerre civile. Cela est particulièrement vrai lorsque ces mécanismes institutionnels se renforcent mutuellement. Nous nous appuyons sur des indicateurs institutionnels précis issus de V-Dem pour dégager et mesurer séparément les dimensions dintérêt. Les contraintes verticales et horizontales atténuent toutes deux le risque de guerre civile, mais uniquement lorsque les deux types dinstitutions contraignantes coexistent dans des démocraties dites libérales. En l'absence de contraintes émanant dun parlement compétent ou d'un système judiciaire indépendant, les améliorations apportées á la liberté et á l'équité des élections n'atténuent pas le risque de déclenchement de guerre civile. A pesar de las décadas de investigación, no hay consenso sobre la relación entre las instituciones democráticas y el riesgo de una guerra civil. Minimizamos los problemas de medición y la ambiguedad teórica en gran parte del trabajo existente desentrañando de manera teórica y empírica los rasgos fundamentales de la democracia y su relación con la guerra civil. Realizamos una distinción entre las instituciones que imponen restricciones verticales a los líderes de la población en general y las instituciones que permiten a varios grupos, incluidas las elites no tradicionales, imponer restricciones horizontales al comportamiento de los líderes. Sostenemos que ambos tipos de instituciones democráticas ayudan a los líderes a enfrentar los problemas de compromiso relacionados con los posibles agentes de la rebelión a fin de reducir el riesgo de una guerra civil. Esto es particularmente cierto cuando dichos mecanismos institucionales se refuerzan entre sí. Mediante indicadores institucionales precisos de variedades de democracia (Varieties of Democracy, V-Dem), esclarecemos y medimos por separado las dimensiones de interés. Tanto las restricciones verticales como las horizontales minimizan el riesgo de una guerra civil, pero solo cuando ambos tipos de instituciones restrictivas coexisten en lo que conocemos como democracias liberales. En ausencia de las restricciones de un parlamento competente o de un poder judicial independiente, las mejoras en la libertad e imparcialidad de las elecciones no reducen la posibilidad de que se desate una guerra civil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit the hypothesis that a Weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth. Theoretically, we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterarguments. Empirically, we use new measures capturing various Weberian features in countries across the world, with some time series extending back to 1789. The evidence base from previous large- N studies is surprisingly thin, but our extensive data enable us to move beyond the problematic cross-country correlations used in previous studies. Hence, we conduct tests that control for country-specific characteristics while ensuring sufficient variation on the slow-moving bureaucracy variables to enable precise estimation. Our analysis suggests that previous cross-country regressions have vastly overstated the strength of the relationship. While this casts uncertainty on the proposition that there is an effect of Weberian bureaucracy on growth, our further analysis suggests that—if an effect exists—it may operate in the short term and be stronger in recent decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a temporally fine-grained data set on regimes, defined as the formal and informal rules essential for selecting leaders. The data set comprises more than 2,000 regimes from 197 polities, 1789 to 2016. We highlight how the frequency of breakdowns and particular modes of breakdown have followed cyclical rather than monotonic patterns across modern history. The most common breakdown modes, overall, are coups and incumbent-guided regime transformations. Furthermore, we report robust evidence that low income, slow or negative growth, and intermediate levels of democracy predict a higher likelihood of regime breakdown. Yet, by running change-point analysis we establish that breakdown risk has cycled substantively across periods of modern history, and the aforementioned explanatory factors are more clearly related to breakdown during certain periods. When disaggregating different breakdown modes, low income is related to, for example, breakdown due to popular uprisings, whereas intermediate democracy levels clearly predict coup-induced breakdowns and incumbent-guided transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While some scholars suggest that rural groups contribute to welfare state expansion, we highlight their incentives to restrain it. The ability of rural groups to achieve this preference hinges on their power resources, but also on the electoral system. We propose that in majoritarian systems, rural groups can often veto welfare legislation. In proportional systems this is less feasible, even for resource-rich groups. Instead, agrarian groups sometimes accept welfare legislation in return for other policy-concessions in post-electoral bargaining. We illustrate the argument with British and Norwegian historical experiences, and test the implications using panel data from 96 democracies. We find evidence that resourceful agrarian groups effectively arrest welfare state development in majoritarian systems, but not in proportional systems. As expected, the electoral system matters less for welfare state expansion when agrarian groups are weak. The results are robust to using alternative estimators, measures, samples and model specifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is leadership succession highly institutionalized in some polities but not in others? We propose that the size of the polity constitutes a key explanatory factor. Specifically, we argue that an institutionalized process of succession is more likely to be adopted in larger polities because there are more elite actors vying for power, making it difficult for a single actor to consolidate power, hold it indefinitely, and pass it on to his heirs. To test this argument, we construct a global index centering on observable features of leadership succession. The index, drawing on data from the Archigos project, covers most sovereign countries from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. A battery of cross-national tests shows a positive and robust association between polity size and the institutionalization of leadership succession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several prominent accounts suggest that democratic transitions are more likely to take place when opposition to the incumbent regime is led by certain social groups. We further develop the argument that opposition movements dominated by industrial workers or the urban middle classes have both the requisite motivation and capacity to bring about democratization. To systematically test this argument, we collect new data on the social composition of antiregime opposition movements, globally from 1900 to 2006. We find that movements dominated by one of these urban groups more often result in democracy, both when compared to other movements and to situations without organized mass opposition. As expected, the relationship is stronger in urban than rural societies, and in more recent decades. When further differentiating the groups and accounting for plausible alternative explanations, the relationship between industrial worker campaigns and democratization is very robust, whereas the evidence is mixed for middle-class campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political leaders often have private incentives to pursue socially wasteful projects, but not all leaders are able to pursue these interests. We argue that weaker accountability mechanisms allow autocratic leaders to more easily realize wasteful projects than democratic leaders. We focus on one particular project, skyscraper construction, where we obtain objective measures comparable across different contexts. We test different implications from our argument by drawing on a new dataset recording all buildings exceeding 150 m, globally. We find that autocracies systematically build more new skyscrapers than democracies. Furthermore, autocratic skyscrapers are more excessive than democratic ones, and—in contrast with democracies—autocracies pursue skyscraper projects to about the same extent in rural/poor and urban/rich societies. When investigating different mechanisms entailed in our argument, the link between regime type and skyscraper construction seems due in large part to stronger vertical accountability mechanisms and more open information environments in democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset (Historical V-Dem) contains about 260 indicators, both factual and evaluative, describing various aspects of political regimes and state institutions. The dataset covers 91 polities globally – including most large, sovereign states, as well as some semi-sovereign entities and large colonies – from 1789 to 1920 for many cases. The majority of the indicators come from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, which covers 1900 to the present – together these two datasets cover the bulk of 'modern history'. Historical V-Dem also includes several new indicators, covering features that are pertinent for 19th-century polities. We describe the data, coding process, and different strategies employed in Historical V-Dem to cope with issues of reliability and validity and ensure intertemporal and cross-country comparability. To illustrate the potential uses of the dataset we describe patterns of democratization in the 'long 19th century'. Finally, we investigate how interstate war relates to subsequent democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars continue to debate whether economic development affects regime type. This article argues that a clear relationship exists between development and the electoral component of democracy, but not – or at least less so – between development and other components of broader understandings of democracy. This is so because development enhances the power resources of citizens and elections provide a focal point for collective action. The theory is tested with two new datasets – Varieties of Democracy and Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy – that allow us to disaggregate the concept of democracy into meso‐ and micro‐level indicators. Results of these tests corroborate the theory: only election‐centred indicators are robustly associated with economic development. This may help to account for apparent inconsistencies across extant studies and shed light on the mechanisms at work in a much‐studied relationship. Further analysis shows that development affects electoral democracy by reducing electoral fraud, election violence and vote buying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and (b) solve credible commitment problems on promises of future distribution, thereby mitigating probability of regime breakdown. We test three implications from the argument, drawing on a novel dataset on welfare state programs and including 140 countries with time series from the 1880s. First, we find that autocracies are no less likely than democracies to have old-age pension programs. But, second, autocracies have less universal pension programs than democracies. Third, pension programs effectively reduce the probability of autocratic breakdown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary We investigate whether democracy enhances the skills and knowledge of citizens through improving education quality. This, in turn, could have ramifications for other development outcomes such as economic growth. We offer the first systematic cross-national study on democracy and education quality. Democracy is widely regarded as superior to autocracy in terms of providing access to education, and several studies find that democracy enhances educational enrollment and years of schooling. Yet, we do not know whether democracies provide better education . We argue that democracies should not too readily be expected to outperform autocracies on education quality. First, it is inherently difficult to implement quality-enhancing education reforms, even for well-intentioned (democratic and autocratic) governments with ample resources. Second, education quality is less visible to voters than, e.g., expanding education enrollment, making quality-enhancing policies a less attractive option for office-seeking democratic politicians. We employ a recent dataset comparing international student tests for 128 countries, from 1965 onward. While democracies typically provide “more” education than autocracies, we find no systematic evidence that democracies offer better education. The result is very robust and holds in both cross-section and panel specifications. The null-relationship is not explained simply by democracies providing education access to more (and different types of) children than autocracies, and it appears both in rich and poor and in low- and high-capacity states. We also present relevant nuances: for instance, autocracies display more variation in education quality outcomes than democracies, and we find some evidence that democracy may be associated, more specifically, with better reading skills. In sum, this study provides new insights to the democracy and education literature, where extant studies often report strong links between democracy and various education outcomes not directly related to education quality, and informs literatures linking democracy to development outcomes such as growth via effects on human capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the emancipatory theory of democracy, the use of time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data and models for democracy and democratization and the criticism of revised modernization theory,

The notion that cultural characteristics influence political regimes remains popular, despite mixed supporting evidence. In particular, democracy is argued to emerge and thrive in countries where liberal or freedom-oriented values (so-called self-expression values) are widespread. Inglehart and Welzel, for instance, report such an effect, mainly drawing inferences from cross-country comparisons. Yet cross-country correlations between self-expression values and democracy could stem from different processes. Reinvestigating this relationship, this article finds no empirical support when employing models accounting for sample-selection bias, country-specific effects and the endogeneity of values to democracy. Self-expression values do not enhance democracy levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize existing democracies. In contrast, this study finds indications that a country’s experience with democracy enhances self-expression values. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Most studies of democratic developments are limited to the period after World War II. However, political regimes varied according to different aspects of democracy long before the establishment of modern liberal mass democracies. We come down strongly in favor of collecting disaggregate and fine-grained historical data on democratic features. Based on a distinction between competition, participation, and constraints on the executive, we discuss previous attempts at historical measurement and address the specific challenges that pertain to scoring political regimes in, first, the “long 19th century” and, second, medieval and early modern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars champion broad conceptualizations of democracy where distribution of economic resources is an integral part, whereas several prominent arguments drawing on narrower conceptualizations of democracy still assume that progressive redistribution is central to democratic politics. We empirically analyse individual opinions on whether progressive taxation and redistribution are among democracy's central characteristics. While many citizens around the world associate democracy with redistribution, we find that surprisingly few consider redistribution among the most central characteristics of democracy. We further analyse what factors affect individuals’ propensity to consider redistribution among democracy's most important features. Running multi-level models, we find that having lived under a communist regime and − although less robust – currently living under democracy make individuals less likely to hold this notion. However, individuals with more to gain from progressive redistribution (that is, little education and belonging to lower classes) are more likely to hold it. We discuss how our findings help shed light on two puzzles in comparative politics; (I) why do democracies not promote more redistributive policies than autocracies, and (II) why is there no net relationship between income inequality and democratization? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We argue that women's political empowerment (WPE) should enhance economic growth, by facilitating technological innovation. • We find robust evidence that WPE is positively related to subsequent GDP per capita growth, across 182 countries and 221 years. • The estimated relationship is sizeable: Improvements in WPE correspond to large long-runs gains in economic development. • Consistent with our proposed mechanism, WPE is also robustly related to total factor productivity growth, a proxy for technological change We investigate whether and how women's political empowerment relates to technological change, the main driver of long-term economic growth. We argue that three aspects of empowerment – descriptive representation, civil liberties protection, and civil society participation – advance technological change and thereby economic growth through (a) increasing the number and variability of new ideas introduced in the economy and (b) improving the selection of more efficient ideas. Drawing on data from 182 countries and 221 years, we test various implications from our argument. Women's political empowerment is positively related to subsequent economic growth. This relationship persists across various model specifications and when accounting for different potential confounders. The three sub-components of empowerment are also, individually, related to growth, although not as strongly as the aggregated concept. The relationship is retained across different contexts, but is clearer for "Non-Western" countries and in earlier time periods. We also find evidence that women's political empowerment enhances technological change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that democracy enhances technological change, the most important determinant of long-term economic growth. It first presents an argument on how and why dictators restrict civil liberties and diffusion of information to survive in office, even if this reduces their personal consumption. The argument predicts that autocracies have slower technological change than democracies, which in turn impairs GDP per capita growth rates. These and other implications from the argument are tested empirically, and so are implications from alternative explanations on the association between democracy and technological change. Drawing on an extensive global dataset, with some time series going back to the early 19th century, the paper reports robust evidence that democracy increases not only technology-induced growth but also net economic growth rates. Notably, the results hold when accounting for the endogeneity of democracy, country-fixed effects, and sample-selection bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incumbents voluntarily leaving office after losing elections is a hallmark of democracy. Hence, the most prominent binary democracy measure (Democracy–Dictatorship/Alvarez–Cheibub–Limongi–Przeworski [DD/ACLP]) requires observed alternation in power to score regimes democratic. Such “alternation rules” may, however, lead to underestimating democracy’s effect on economic growth. As strong economic performance reduces the probability of incumbents losing democratic elections, young democracies with high growth may falsely be coded dictatorships; their popular governments have yet to lose an election. We identify the expected bias using different tests, for example, when following Przeworski et al.’s advice to re-estimate relationships after re-coding multi-party regimes without alternation as democratic, or when employing differences in information about alternation from different time points to contrast original DD estimates with our “real-time” DD estimates. We present resembling arguments on how alternation rules may bias democracy’s estimated relationships with civil war onsets and coups, but find fewer empirical indications of biases here. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Objectives This article investigates whether economic growth and income level affect revolution attempts and successful revolutions. Methods The article conducts a statistical analysis, mainly using panel data logit models, on a data set including 150 countries with time series from 1919 to 2003. Results Low short-term growth increases probabilities of both attempted and successful revolutions. There is some evidence that higher income levels mitigate revolution attempts, but this is not robust and further analysis indicates that any association may stem from oil income more specifically. There is no net effect of income level on successful revolution, but high income seemingly reduces probability of successful revolution more in democracies than in dictatorships. Although revolutions occur more frequently after 'J curves' and 'decremental deprivation patterns,' this is largely due to economic crises and not the more complex growth patterns as hypothesized by, respectively, Davies and Gurr. Conclusion Low short-term economic growth induces revolutions, whereas the impact of income level is less clear and seemingly contingent on factors such as regime type and source of income. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates whether and how changes in issue focus in election campaigns affect voting intention, even if no preference change takes place, and whether such effects vary systematically across different groups of voters. Evidence is reported from two survey experiments of Norwegian voters, where respondents were treated with information drawing their attention towards issues pertaining either to immigration or the environment. Although irrelevant for policy learning or persuasion, this information strongly increased the support of particular parties. More specifically, parties with 'ownership' of the issues involved gained votes. Certain types of voters were more likely to change voting intentions post-treatment than others, but which types crucially depended on the issue area under focus. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the issue focus of campaigns is very important for vote choice. Hence, one should expect that, for instance, even 'neutral' political news coverage at or close to election day could affect voters in predictable ways. Furthermore, one should expect different parties to fight hard to steer the focus of campaigns towards issues where they have ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: This paper discusses how regime type and state capacity may interact in affecting economic growth. The empirical analysis finds a positive and robust effect of democracy on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, a continent historically characterized by weak-capacity states. Furthermore, the paper identifies a robust interaction effect between democracy and state capacity on growth, both in Africa and globally; the effect of democracy on growth increases when state capacity is reduced. Democracy is estimated to have a positive effect on growth in weak-capacity states, but not in high-capacity states. Additionally, the results indicate that state capacity enhances growth only in dictatorships. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Electoral rules and form of government have important economic effects, for example on taxation and public spending. However, there are no robust results in the literature when it comes to their effect on economic growth. This paper investigates whether electoral rules and form of government affects economic growth by applying panel data techniques on a very extensive dataset. There is no robust effect of presidentialism or parliamentarism on growth. However, there is very robust evidence for a positive, and quite substantial, effect of Proportional Representation (PR) electoral rules on economic growth. This is partly due to PR systems’ propensity to generate broad-interest policies, like universal education spending, property rights protection and free-trade, rather than special interest economic policies. Also semi-proportional systems seem to enhance growth relative to plural-majoritarian systems. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article discusses methodological problems related to operationalizing substantive definitions of democracy. The article argues that index-constructors need to be particularly conscious of measurement level issues. If not, their indexes may face severe reliability and validity problems, which in turn may bias empirical analyses utilizing the indexes. The article focuses particularly on the "effective democracy" measure developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. The measure has been used by Inglehart and Welzel in several studies, particularly for empirically testing hypotheses deduced from their version of modernization theory. These tests have generated very strong results in favor of the theory. The article is sympathetic to Inglehart and Welzel's goal of capturing "substantive" rather than "formal" democracy, but is critical of the specific measure proposed. The measure has several unfortunate theoretical and distributional properties; the empirical scores generated by the measure are often highly misleading. Empirical analysis suggests the index is biased, and that rich, Western countries are particularly favored. Utilization of the measure in statistical analysis may therefore lead to false inferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the new editors discuss their goals for the journal, changes to the journal format, and the possibility for authors to submit their articles online.

Unidimensional measures of democracy fail to account for the complex and varied nature of political systems. This article disaggregates the concept of democracy and proposes a multidimensional conceptualization to account for this variation in institutional configurations. Three theoretically informed dimensions are featured: participation, electoral contestation, and constraints on the executive. The three dimensions constitute a cube covering all regime types, in which we place countries using V-Dem data from 1789 to 2019. This cube of democracy patterns reveals several interesting observations. We trace historical patterns of democratization and discuss how countries across the world have taken different paths at different times. Our conceptualization shows that political systems with a similar score along a unidimensional scale are often quite distinct. In addition, across the globe for 200 years, certain configurations of political institutions rarely occur. Furthermore, our approach reveals interesting patterns of regime convergence and divergence over time. Finally, we show that the typical pathways to democracy have changed since 1789. This multidimensional conceptualization ultimately opens up new avenues for research in which institutional variation and change can be studied in greater detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on the topic of developments in central fields of political science in Nordic countries.

• Autocratic leaders are more likely to adopt an economic model of development centered on heavy industry. • Three factors distinguish democratic and autocratic regimes: social base, security concerns, and policy tools. • We test this hypothesis using a dataset spanning 200 years and over 150 countries. • Industrialization stands out as one of the few areas where autocracies may enjoy a significant advantage over democracies. A large literature addresses the impact of regimes on domestic policies and outcomes, e.g., education, health, inequality, redistribution, public spending, wages, infrastructure, volatility, productivity, and economic growth. This study focuses on another vital outcome – industrialization – that has yet to be systematically explored using cross-country data. We argue that autocratic leaders are more likely to adopt an economic model of development centered on heavy industry because of three factors that distinguish democratic and autocratic regimes: different social bases , different security concerns , and different policy tools. Accordingly, autocracies have stronger incentives and better capabilities to pursue a rapid and comprehensive course of industrialization. We test this hypothesis using different measures of industrialization in a dataset spanning 200 years and most countries of the world. After a comprehensive series of tests, we conclude that industrialization stands out as one of the few areas where autocracies may enjoy a significant advantage over democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]