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Demonstrative determiners create a joint focus of attention of speaker and hearer on a particular set of entities in a given context. Despite their omnipresence, very little is known with regard to the online integration of demonstrative determiners during comprehension. Here we investigated whether the N400 reflects meaning differences introduced by determiners. We analyzed whether previously established differences – between correct, contingent, world-knowledge and semantic violations in bare plural generic sentences – were modified by the addition of demonstrative determiners. Off-line ratings suggested that the correct sentences in the generic version (e.g. Zebras are stripy ) become less sensible when adding a demonstrative determiner (e.g. These zebras are stripy ). In contrast, contingent sentences – that is, sentences with predicates that are true for a subgroup of exemplars but not for all – become more sensible than correct sentences if a demonstrative determiner is added (e.g. These trousers are stripy ). Both semantic and world-knowledge violations slightly improve in sensibility if demonstrative determiners are added ( These ladybirds/journeys are stripy ). None of these differences was reflected in the N400 amplitude. Instead, the previous findings using the bare plural generic sentences were fully replicated, showing largest N400 amplitudes for semantic violations, followed by contingent and world-knowledge violations and finally the correct sentences. This suggests that demonstrative determiners are not automatically integrated during meaning comprehension. Implications with respect to the processes that are reflected in the N400 will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The combination of adjectival passives with adverbial modifiers poses a problem for current adjectival conversion analyzes of the adjectival passive. An influential proposal by Kratzer (1994, 2000) has been to explain the appearance of adverbial modifiers by assuming adjectival conversion not only at the lexical but also at the phrasal VP level. The present article develops an alternative account for the semantics of adjectival passives and their combination with adverbial modifiers and contrasts it with the verbal passive case. It takes adjectival passives in German to be a grammatical means for generating contextually shaped states of the subject referent that result from an (possibly complex) event type provided by the verb plus additional predicative material. The structural condition that allows adverbial modifiers to take part in the formation of the event type predicate is that they attach structurally low (V-adjuncts). The pragmatic condition is that they provide an informative restriction to the resulting state type. The article provides evidence from different domains of the grammar--prosody, syntax and semantics--that point to the particular structural status of adverbial modifiers in adjectival passives (V-adjuncts) as opposed to verbal passives (VP-adjuncts). These findings are corroborated by two psycholinguistic experiments that test the different syntactic and semantic status of adverbial modifiers in adjectival and verbal passives. On this basis, the article develops a compositional semantics for adjectival passives and their adverbial modifiers. In more general terms, the study provides an interesting test case for exploring the semantics of the verbal cluster in German. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge is particularly relevant because it is related to the principle of compositionality during sentence comprehension. Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, and Petersson (2004) challenged the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge. Here, we investigate how linguistic and non-linguistic violations are processed in a setting adapted from Hagoort et al., whilst in contrast to Hagoort, keeping the critical word identical. In line with the findings by Hagoort et al., our results showed largest N400 amplitudes for semantic violations ('Journeys are stripy'), followed by non-linguistic world-knowledge violations ('Ladybirds are stripy') and contingent sentences ('Trousers are stripy'), and finally by correct sentences ('Zebras are stripy'). Traditional fractional area and relative criterion measures of peak and onset latencies showed no effect of violation type. Interestingly, the semantic violation condition crossed a fixed criterion earlier than the word-knowledge violation condition. In conclusion, our data suggests that the question regarding the distinction between linguistic- and non-linguistic knowledge in terms of language integration remains open. Implications for future studies addressing the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent experimental studies have shown that people code time in terms of a mental timeline which typically runs from left to right or from back to front. Determining the cognitive function of this mental timeline for language processing, however, is still an unsettled issue. Whereas the studies of Ulrich and Maienborn (2010) and Ulrich et al. (2012) argue against an automatic activation of the mental timeline for the interpretation of tense and temporal adverbials at sentence level, Sell and Kaschak (2011) observe an automatic activation for the processing of past- and future-related sentences in small stories. The present paper reports the results of three experiments which examine the processing of sentences with retrospective and prospective verbs (e.g., to remember , to regret vs. to expect , to announce ) in present tense, which locate a second, embedded event in the past or the future. When temporal information was task-relevant, a space–time congruency effect emerged (Experiment 1). This suggests that the mental timeline is not only linked to overtly deictic linguistic material but may also be construed in a more intricate way through the compositional construction of sentence meaning. The congruency effect disappeared, however, when temporal information was task-irrelevant (Experiments 2 and 3), suggesting that the mental timeline is not functionally involved in the cognitive processing of these especially demanding two-event sentences. The results of the present study support the conclusion that the relevant factor driving an automatic activation of the mental timeline is not the number of linguistically expressed events, but might rather be the number of sentential units. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The metaphoric mapping theory suggests that abstract concepts, like time, are represented in terms of concrete dimensions such as space. This theory receives support from several lines of research ranging from psychophysics to linguistics and cultural studies; especially strong support comes from recent response time studies. These studies have reported congruency effects between the dimensions of time and space indicating that time evokes spatial representations that may facilitate or impede responses to words with a temporal connotation. The present paper reports the results of three linguistic experiments that examined this congruency effect when participants processed past- and future-related sentences. Response time was shorter when past-related sentences required a left-hand response and future-related sentences a right-hand response than when this mapping of time onto response hand was reversed (Experiment 1). This result suggests that participants can form time–space associations during the processing of sentences and thus this result is consistent with the view that time is mentally represented from left to right. The activation of these time–space associations, however, appears to be non-automatic as shown by the results of Experiments 2 and 3 when participants were asked to perform a non-temporal meaning discrimination task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘‘Comments are very welcome!’’ This basic attitude and the many ways of implementing it contribute immensely to the fascination of engaging in scientific research. I am grateful to Theoretical Linguistics for providing a public platform for this kind of scholarly exchange and I thank all commentators for their thoughtful, stimulating, and often challenging contributions to my target article. My response will address two main issues that are raised by the commentaries. The first issue is shaped by a cluster of questions relating to ontology. The second issue concerns questions of methodology pertaining in particular to the problem of judging data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Donald Davidson’s seminal work ‘‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’’ (1967) event arguments have become an integral component of virtually every semantic theory. Over the past years Davidson’s proposal has been continuously extended such that nowadays event(uality) arguments are generally associated not only with action verbs but with predicates of all sorts. The reasons for such an extension are seldom explicitly justified. Most problematical in this respect is the case of stative expressions. By taking a closer look at copula sentences the present study assesses the legitimacy of stretching the Davidsonian notion of events and discusses its consequences. A careful application of some standard eventuality diagnostics (perception reports, combination with locative modifiers and manner adverbials) as well as some new diagnostics (behavior of certain degree adverbials) reveals that copular expressions do not behave as expected under a Davidsonian perspective: they fail all eventuality tests, regardless of whether they represent stage-level or individual-level predicates. In this respect, copular expressions pattern with stative verbs like know, hate, and resemble, which in turn differ sharply from state verbs like stand, sit, and sleep. The latter pass all of the eventuality tests and therefore qualify as true ‘‘Davidsonian state’’ expressions. On the basis of these empirical observations and taking up ideas of Kim (1969, 1976) and Asher (1993, 2000), an alternative account of copular expressions (and stative verbs) is provided, according to which the copula introduces a referential argument for a temporally bound property exemplification (= ‘‘Kimian state’’). Considerations on some logical properties, viz. closure conditions and the latent infinite regress of eventualities, suggest that supplementing Davidsonian eventualities with Kimian states may yield not only a more adequate analysis of copula sentences but also a better understanding of eventualities in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study offers a discourse-based account of the Spanish copula forms ser and estar , which are generally considered to be lexical exponents of the stage-level/individual-level contrast. It argues against the popular view that the distinction between SLPs and ILPs rests on a fundamental cognitive division of the world that is reflected in the grammar. As it happens, conceptual oppositions like “temporary vs. permanent” or “arbitrary vs. essential” provide only a preference for the interpretation of estar and ser . In addition, the evidence for an SLP/ILP impact on the grammar turns out to be far less conclusive than is currently assumed. The study argues against event-based accounts of the ser/estar contrast in particular, showing that ser and estar pattern alike in failing all of the standard eventuality tests. The discourse-based account proposed instead assumes that ser and estar both display the same lexical semantics (which is identical to the semantics of English be , German sein , etc.); estar diers from ser only in presupposing a relation to a specific discourse situation. By using estar a speaker restricts his or her claim to a specific discourse situation, whereas by using ser , the speaker makes no such restriction. The preference for interpreting estar predications as denoting temporary properties and ser predications as denoting permanent properties follows from economy principles driving the pragmatic legitimation of estar's discourse dependence. The analysis proposed in this article can also account for the observation that ser predications do not give rise to thetic judgments. The proposal is couched in terms of the framework of DRT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negation comprehension is a time-consuming, resource demanding process. This study investigates whether additional time to process the negation operator eases negation integration. In Experiment 1 we analysed N400 amplitude in sentences of the following types: correct sentences (Zebras are (not) stripy), world-knowledge violation sentences (Ladybirds are (not) stripy) and semantically violated sentences (Thoughts are (not) stripy). In Experiment 2, the negation was pre-pended to the actual sentence using an introductory statement (It is (not) true that ladybirds are stripy) to provide additional processing time to deal with the negation operator. Crucially, in both experiments the N400 amplitude was larger for semantic and world-knowledge violations than correct sentences irrespective of the negation operator. Taken together, our study suggests that allowing additional time to process the negation operator alone - before encountering the information that completes the negated proposition - has no beneficial influence on on-line negation integration as reflected in the N400. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several reaction time (RT) studies report faster responses when responses to temporal information are arranged in a spatially congruent manner than when this arrangement is incongruent. The resulting space–time congruency effect is commonly attributed to a culturally salient localization of temporal information along a mental timeline (e.g., a mental timeline that runs from left to right). The present study aims to provide a compilation of the published RT studies on this time–space association in order to estimate the size of its effect and the extent of potential publication bias in this field of research. In this meta‐analysis, three types of task are distinguished due to hitherto existing empirical findings. These findings suggest that the extent to which time is made relevant to the experimental task has a systematic impact on whether or not the mental timeline is activated. The results of this meta‐analysis corroborate these considerations: First, experiments that make time a task‐relevant dimension have a mean effect size of d = 0.46. Second, in experiments in which time is task irrelevant, the effect size does not significantly deviate from zero. Third, temporal priming studies have a surprisingly high mean effect size of d = 0.47, which, however, should be adjusted to d = 0.36 due to publication bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several pieces of evidence suggest that our mental representations of time and space are linked. However, the extent of this linkage between the two domains has not yet been assessed. We present the results of two experiments that draw on the predictions of the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, Psychological Review 97:253–270, 1990 ). The stimulus and response sets in these reaction time experiments were related to either time or space. The obtained stimulus–response congruency effects were of about the same size for identical stimulus–response sets (time–time or space–space) and for different stimulus–response sets (time–space or space–time). These results support the view that our representations of time and space are strongly linked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In two experiments using the action–sentence–compatibility paradigm we investigated the simulation processes that readers undertake when processing state descriptions with adjectives (e.g., Die Schublade ist offen/zu. [The drawer is open/shut]) or adjectival passives (e.g., Die Schublade ist geöffnet/geschlossen. [The drawer is opened/closed]). In Experiment 1 we did not find evidence for action simulation, not even in sentences with adjectival passives. The results were different in Experiment 2, where the temporal particle noch (still/yet) was inserted into the sentences (e.g., The drawer is still closed). Under these circumstances readers mentally simulated the action that brought about the current state for sentences with adjectival passives, but the action that would change the current state for sentences with adjectives. Thus, comprehenders are in principle sensitive to the subtle differences between adjectives and adjectival passives but highlighting the temporal dimension of the described states of affairs seems a necessary precondition for obtaining evidence for action simulation with sentences that describe a state. We discuss implications for future studies employing neuro-psychological methods. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Several studies support the psychological reality of a mental timeline that runs from the left to the right and may strongly affect our thinking about time. Ulrich and Maienborn (Cognition 117:126-138, ) examined the linguistic relevance of this timeline during the processing of past- and future-related sentences. Their results indicate that the timeline is not activated automatically during sentence comprehension. While no explicit reference of temporal expressions to the left-right axis has been attested (e.g., *the meeting was moved to the left), natural languages refer to the back-front axis in order to encode temporal information (e.g., the meeting was moved forward). Therefore, the present study examines whether a back-frontal timeline becomes automatically activated during the processing of past- and future-related sentences. The results demonstrate a clear effect on reaction time that emerges from a time-space association along the frontal timeline (Experiment 1). However, this activation seems to be nonautomatic (Experiment 2), rendering it unlikely that this frontal timeline is involved in comprehension of the temporal content of sentences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the embodied cognition debate, an effect of motion verb associated speed information has previously been detected using eye-tracking, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and reaction times (RT). The latter, for instance, was implemented by Wender and Weber (1982), who observed that participants were faster in detecting motion in sentences associated with fast motion compared to sentences associated with slow motion after having formed mental images of the sentences' content. It remains open whether the reported effects of speed are associated with automatic lexical-semantic retrieval processes or whether they reflect higher top-down cognitive processes. To answer this question, the paradigm by Wender and Weber (1982) was adopted and further elaborated in the present study. In Experiment 1 visualization instructions were eliminated. Additionally, the stimulus material was manipulated in regards to the agent of the described movement (human vs. object motion) in order to determine the representation's modality (visual vs. motoric). In Experiment 2, the task to detect motion was replaced by the task to judge sensicality. The results suggest that the prompt to perform mental imagery is not a precondition for the engagement of modal representations in this speed of motion paradigm and that the involved representations' modality is visual rather than motoric. However, the modal representations' involvement is dependent on the task. They thus do not seem to be part of the invariant semantic representation of manner of motion verbs. • Modal representations of motion verbs' speed information are task-dependent. • Detecting motion in sentences is presumably based on visual representations. • Modal representations might facilitate decisional processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]