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When discussing the French Revolution and Napoleon in his lectures from 1933 to 1939, Alexandre Kojève had in mind events in Russia. The clash between the "old order," with its Masters, and the worker Slaves corresponded for him more with the images of pre-revolutionary Russian journalism than with the wigged aristocrats and French bourgeoisie of the end of the eighteenth century. In his lectures, behind Napoleon, as a revolutionary emperor, there exists, however secretly or openly, the figure of Stalin, with his plans for the "building of socialism in one country," his five-year plans, collectivization, and terror. Kojève's ontology and anthropology diverge both from Hegel's version of the two as well as with Marxism, incorporating different theses from Nietzsche and Heidegger's Daseinanalytik. Just as in The Phenomenology of Spirit, terror plays a central role in interpreting revolution, yet it is conceived in the spirit of a Heideggerian "being-toward-death." The relation between Master and Slave begins with fear of death, and it is destroyed by fear of death in the face of revolutionary terror. In this article, Kojève's philosophy converges with the various versions of "left Nietzscheanism," which were particularly widespread in prerevolutionary Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent contributions to the politics of identity and the rise in authoritarianism or "fascist creep" are criticized for their failure to take account of psychoanalytic insights into the libidinality of belonging, othering, and hating. In this context, crucial distinctions between the interlinked processes of oppression, suppression, and repression are outlined. Despite its substantial flaws, Wilhelm Reich's 1933 essay on fascism is credited for its emphasis on the erotic underpinnings of authoritarianism and its associated phenomena. It is regretted that subsequent psychoanalytic and psychoanalytically-oriented critiques relevant to the rise of fascism have usually ignored the significance of libidinality. It is further suggested that the erotics of identity and belonging, as well as the ubiquitous dynamics of domination/subjugation, should be examined via a psychoanalytic (and materialist) reconsideration of Hegel's discussion of the master/slave dialectic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article enquires into the rationale of cultural studies from a Nietzschean perspective. Contrary to some views, I will show that Nietzsche's writing is inimical to the aims of the institutional project of cultural studies. The central feature of my argument is Nietzsche's idea of the 'reactive force' of slave morality that separates an 'active force' from what it can do. This idea aptly describes the representation of power in cultural studies. The relationship between active and reactive forces in Nietzsche's philosophy is complex and certain nuances will be glossed over for want of space, but the aim is to show that 'fiction' plays a decisive role in this separation. In contrast to this, and drawing on Alexander Nehamas' study of Nietzsche's philosophy, I will argue that the fictional character exemplifies what Nietzsche sees as the highest achievements of art and literature inasmuch as they can be understood as active forces. Whilst I do not examine the concept, this article can be understood as an apology for creativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Situating Kleist's novella in the context of contemporary philosophical responses to the French Revolution (Kant, Hegel), this article suggests that Kleist's text is unique in taking revolution not merely as its theme but also as its mode of presentation. At the core of revolution is the loss of referential stability and the realization that words are not anchored in an extra-linguistic world of facts and objects but are held in place by open-ended systems of association and regularity without further foundation or solidity. Kleist's writing is seen both to intensify linguistic instability and ambiguity and to articulate different political and psychological responses to the revolutionary unmooring of meaning. In this context, the promissory act of betrothal is read as a sign through which the text self-reflexively explores the possibility of social and linguistic connectedness in the absence of established meanings and conventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]