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The digital transfer of the mind to a computer system (i.e., mind uploading) requires representing the mind as a finite sequence of bits (1s and 0s). The classic "stored-program computer" paradigm, in turn, implies the equivalence between program and data, so that the sequence of bits themselves can be interpreted as a program, which will be algorithmically executed in the receiving device. Now, according to a previous proof, on which this paper is based, a computational or algorithmic machine, however complex, cannot be free (in the sense of 'self-determined'). Consequently, a finite sequence of bits cannot adequately represent a free mind and, therefore, a free mind cannot be digitally transferred, quod erat demonstrandum. The impossibility of making this transfer, as demonstrated here, should be a concern especially for those who wish to achieve it. Since we intend this to be a rigorous demonstration, we must give precise definitions and conditions of validity. The most important part of the paper is devoted to explaining the meaning and reasonableness of these definitions and conditions (for example that being truly free means being self-determined). Special attention is paid, also, to the philosophical implications of the demonstration. Finally, this thesis is distinguished from other closely related issues (such as other possible technological difficulties to "discretize" the mind; or, whether it is possible to transfer the mind from one material support to another one in a non-digital way). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the greatest aspiration of the transhumanist movement: achieving immortal life through a procedure known as mind uploading. This procedure consists in keeping our minds fully and indefinitely operative after death by transferring them to a non-biological substrate that allows man to be liberated from his bodily confinement. My main thesis is that the mind uploading project presupposes a secular eschatology, consummating the Promethean utopia according to which human beings could redeem themselves, expelling God definitively from their existential horizon. On this basis, the paper offers meaningful contrasts between the uploading as secular eschatology and the Christian tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the more radical transhumanist proposals for future human being envisions the uploading of our minds to a digital substrate, trading our dependence on frail, degenerating "meat" bodies for the immortality of software existence. Yet metaphor studies indicate that our use of metaphor operates in our bodily inhabiting of the world, and a phenomenological approach emphasizes a "hybridity" to human being that resists traditional mind/body dichotomies. Future scenarios envisioning mind uploading and disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) share an apocalyptic category with more traditional religious eschatologies, though they differ markedly in content; therefore, the insights of embodied cognition and their uptake in technological innovation are considered as they apply to theological concerns. Theology often functions in debates over the technological future to critique or to caution. However, theologians may learn from their technological dialogue partners when it comes to the future of embodiment and its implications for the construction and practice of theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans have long wondered whether they can survive the death of their physical bodies. Some people now look to technology as a means by which this might occur, using terms such 'whole brain emulation', 'mind uploading', and 'substrate independent minds' to describe a set of hypothetical procedures for transferring or emulating the functioning of a human mind on a synthetic substrate. There has been much debate about the philosophical implications of such procedures for personal survival. Most participants to that debate assume that the continuation of identity is an objective fact that can be revealed by scientific enquiry or rational debate. We bring into this debate a perspective that has so far been neglected: that personal identities are in large part social constructs. Consequently, to enable a particular identity to survive the transference process, it is not sufficient to settle age-old philosophical questions about the nature of identity. It is also necessary to maintain certain networks of interaction between the synthetic person and its social environment, and sustain a collective belief in the persistence of identity. We defend this position by using the example of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan Buddhist tradition and identify technological procedures that could increase the credibility of personal continuity between biological and artificial substrates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of pre- serving personal identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The computational mind paradigm proposes that the mind is an information-processing system equivalent to a Turing machine. Some proponents of this view hope to emulate the mind using methods such as symbolism, connectionism or more biological models. In the present work, the following question is posed: is a computational mind capable of deciding (yes or no) whether a proposed emulation of the mind is indeed an emulation of the mind? It is argued that this is not possible. Intuitively, the reason a computational mind cannot recognize an emulation of itself is for much the same reason that a set of scales cannot weigh itself. In this article, a formal argument for this stance is given by noticing the following: for a computational mind to recognize an emulation of itself, it must be capable of deciding whether two Turing Machines (namely, itself and the proposed emulation) are functionally equivalent. This task is uncomputable, and thus there cannot exist a computational procedure in the mind that is capable of recognizing an emulation of itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential long-term benefits and risks of technological progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and related fields are substantial. The risks include total human extinction as a result of unfriendly superintelligent AI, while the benefits include the liberation of human existence from death and suffering through mind uploading. One approach to mitigating the risk would be to engineer ethical principles into AI devices. However, this may not be possible, due to the nature of ethical agency. Even if it is possible, these principles, extrapolated to logical conclusions, may not favour human survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]