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Motivated by examples from the energy sector, we consider market equilibrium problems (MEPs) involving players with nonconvex strategy spaces or objective functions, where the latter are assumed to be linear in market prices. We propose an algorithm that determines if an equilibrium of such an MEP exists and that computes an equilibrium in case of existence. Three key prerequisites have to be met. First, appropriate bounds on market prices have to be derived from necessary optimality conditions of some players. Second, a technical assumption is required for those prices that are not uniquely determined by the derived bounds. Third, nonconvex optimization problems have to be solved to global optimality. We test the algorithm on well-known instances from the power and gas literature that meet these three prerequisites. There, nonconvexities arise from considering the transmission system operator as an additional player besides producers and consumers who, e.g. switches lines or faces nonlinear physical laws. Our numerical results indicate that equilibria often exist, especially for the case of continuous nonconvexities in the context of gas market problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The announcement of New Industrial Policy in July 1991 marked a paradigm shift in the overall macroeconomic policies followed in India from greater control and regulations to the free rein of market forces. Subsequently, there has been a paradigm shift in the competition regulation in India, with the establishment of the Competition Commission of India. The underlying motive behind the regulatory changes has been to increase competition in all spheres of economic activities. Given this background, the present study intends to assess whether the changes in policy regimes could bring out the desired output in terms of heightened competition in various spheres of the manufacturing sector, specifically across various subsectors in the manufacturing sector. These are important not only from a consumer point of view but also to identify the areas of concern for vigilant policy implementation. Using multiple indicators of concentration, we find that despite the increase in competition across various subsectors, concentration levels remain high for many subsectors. We observed high levels of concentration in seven of the twenty-nine subsectors studied and in another three high-moderate concentration levels noticed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frictionless consumer choices and price competition are often associated with competitive markets and vanishing equilibrium profits. We discuss vanishing profits in competitive screening markets like insurance. We assume symmetric firms which exhibit constant returns to scale. Consumer heterogeneity creates the possibility of adverse selection. Firms can offer multiple contracts in equilibrium and (importantly) in any deviation. Nash equilibrium profits vanish if each consumer has a unique optimizing bundle at equilibrium prices or, more generally, if there exists a linear ordering of contracts that dictates the preferences of firms whenever consumers are indifferent between multiple optimal contracts. Of particular interest, equilibrium profits vanish if, for each agent, indifference curves are steeper than iso-profit curves. The results extend to Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibria. We provide examples of economies where there exists an equilibrium with strictly positive profit and show that these examples are robust (hold for an open set of economies). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern mainstream macroeconomics is characterised by its reliance on a general equilibrium framework of Walrasian origins, which is crucially associated with perfect competition and statics. To cope with the real economy, macroeconomics has been "forced" to introduce imperfections and frictions of various kinds into the perfectly competitive model. This raises, argues the paper, significant conceptual and analytical difficulties and tensions. There exist, however, other views of competition and markets which could provide more solid and fruitful foundations to the analysis of the macro-economy. After a selective examination of some contributions to the development of the notion of perfect competition, the paper looks at how modern mainstream macroeconomics dealt with general equilibrium and deviations from it. The paper argues that these alleged deviations from the perfectly competitive case should rather be regarded as inherent features of market economies. Dealing with them more satisfactorily requires calling on a different view of the working of the economy instead of trying to correct and amend the imaginary case of perfect competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a theoretical model to study how changes in the durability of the goods affect prices of stolen goods, the incentives to steal and the equilibrium crime rate. When studying the production of durable goods, we find that the presence of crime affects consumer and producer surplus and thus their behaviour, market equilibrium, and, in turn, the social optimum. Lower durability of goods reduces the incentive to steal those goods, thus reducing crime. When crime is included in the standard framework of durable goods, the socially optimal durability level is lower. When considering different stealing technologies, perfect competition either over-produces durability or produces zero (minimum) durability. The monopolist under-produces durability. The model has a clear policy implication: the durability of goods, and the market structure for those goods, can be an effective instrument to reduce crime. In particular, making the durability of a good contingent upon that good being stolen is likely to increase welfare. We also study the incentives to develop and use this optimal technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Novel electricity market negotiation strategy based on economic analysis. • Proposed methodology enables managing the negotiation risk. • Combination between internal data and sectorial data analysis. • Case study based on real data from the Iberian electricity market. • Proposed methodology achieves higher profits than state of the art approaches. Abstract Current approaches for risk management in energy market participation mostly refer to portfolio optimization for long-term planning, and stochastic approaches to deal with uncertainties related to renewable energy generation and market prices variation. Risk assessment and management as integrated part of actual market negotiation strategies is lacking from the current literature. This paper addresses this gap by proposing a novel model for decision support of players' strategic participation in electricity market negotiations, which considers risk management as a core component of the decision-making process. The proposed approach addresses the adaptation of players' behaviour according to the participation risk, by combining the two most commonly used approaches of forecasting in a company's scope: the internal data analysis, and the external, or sectorial, data analysis. The internal data analysis considers the evaluation of the company's evolution in terms of market power and profitability, while the sectorial analysis addresses the assessment of the competing entities in the market sector using a K-Means-based clustering approach. By balancing these two components, the proposed model enables a dynamic adaptation to the market context, using as reference the expected prices from competitor players, and the market price prediction by means of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). Results under realistic electricity market simulations using real data from the Iberian electricity market operator show that the proposed approach is able to outperform most state-of-the-art market participation strategies, reaching a higher accumulated profit, by adapting players' actions according to the participation risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Production of meat and processing of meat products is a very signifi cant part of the food industry. In order to secure economic growth and development, especially in the meat industry, it is very important to provide free competition for the business entities that operate within it. Therefore, the main purpose of this study was to measure market concentration using the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), in order to determine the competition level in the Serbian market. Furthermore, the HHI should provide evidence of any business entities that hold monopolistic or oligopolistic positions on the market. Moreover, another aim of this study was to defi ne to what extent business entities in the Serbian meat industry export products and goods to international markets. The 350 companies that reported the highest revenues during 2013-2017 and which are registered in this sector were studied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine a model of a perfect competitive homogeneous good market with a network structure. Such a structure is typically important for energy resources: natural gas, oil and electricity. Local markets are connected by transmission lines with limited capacities and given cost functions for capacity increments. We consider the total welfare optimization problem and provide a method that determines optimal investments in the transmission system expansion for some types of the networks. In particular, we study the case where the market is divided into two submarkets with binding transmission line flow constraints between the submarkets. We obtain efficient algorithms for determination of the transmission systems optimal expansion. We conclude with the impact of the results and the outlook to future studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1920s, seaborne cargo liability regimes have introduced a small number of mandatory rules into international carriage of goods by sea, through the Hague–Visby Rules, to restrict freedom of contract. These rules worked within a limited scope to offset imperfect competition in the shipping markets. However, the recent Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules attempted to extend this scope of seaborne cargo liability regime, which seems to be more extensive than is desirable. This article compares and examines the shipping sub-sectors’ environment and maritime economics over the past century up to date. The new business patterns of the shipping sub-sectors, the rising influence of developing countries, and the containerisation are creating new shipping environments for this area of law. Compared with previous decades, imperfect competition is only found in a smaller number of areas within the shipping markets nowadays. This article argues that only a limited scope of application is needed for international seaborne cargo liability regime. Thus, these new economic and political realities call for innovative modifications to the recent rules regarding the scope of application, and future regime should refocus international uniformity on a limited scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In agricultural systems the value of environmental inputs can be measured using the production function approach whereby the marginal contributions of factors are associated with a shadow value under perfect competition and rationality assumptions. However, empirical studies show that inefficiency in production is common indicating that the rationality assumption is not met. Furthermore, substantial evidence exists to suggest that the contributions of environmental inputs in particular may be differentiated across the efficiency distribution. This means that the frontier technology may not be an appropriate reflection of the technology in use by inefficient enterprises. This article presents the use of conditional regression quantiles to consider how the value of environmental inputs, measured by their contributions to production, vary across efficiency quantiles. We employed a case study of rangelands beef production in Australia to consider how environmental health differentially contributes to production values across efficiency quantiles. Our approach generates detailed insights into the nature of environmentally-sourced technical inefficiency and suggests that conditional quantile regression approaches are ideal for consideration of issues wherein substantial heterogeneity exists limiting the information content of conditional mean based analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to illustrate, for the first time, the performance of optimal perfectly competitive investment strategies based on option games in dry bulk shipping. Using a dataset of the Capesize market development over the period January 2000–May 2013 the author derives the stochastic dynamic equilibrium in that market. Moreover, the author examines the effect of newbuildings completion delays and finds that moving from completion delays to no time-to-build reduces the trigger value. The current analysis brings about additional insights and helps explain the existence of boom-and-bust cycles in shipping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the strategic behavior in an imperfectly competitive cellulosic biofuel supply chain. An optimization-based supply chain model is used to obtain long-run planning outcomes, based on which we develop market models considering both perfect and imperfect competitions. The equilibrium among stakeholders in the multi-echelon supply chain can be obtained by solving a collection of first-order conditions associated with their profit-maximization problems. For the imperfect competition, the model, additionally, allows firms with significant market share at different segment of the supply chain to exercise market power. We apply the models to an illustrative case study of California. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study optimal contracting by a monopolistic seller of investment goods to a time-inconsistent consumer and, in doing so, introduce asymmetric information to the model of . We find (1) the below-marginal-cost-pricing rule may fail for a low-value consumer; (2) the firm's profit is no longer unaffected by the consumer's short-run impatience, as the latter is sophisticated. We find that there is an important threshold value of short-run patience. When the consumer's short-term patience is below this level, then, as the patience increases, the firm suffers. When the consumer's short-run patience is above this threshold, then, as it increases, the firm benefits. Finally, we show that unlike monopoly, perfect competition with asymmetric information achieves the first-best outcome. (JEL D03, D82, D91 ) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

School choice advocates often assume that market-like competition will create a dynamic K–12 educational environment that will result in improved outcomes. We critically examine this assumption and draw on the literature on market failure and social dilemmas to demonstrate that the market metaphor in a public schooling context has limited utility. We then compare K–12 education to an unlikely context—the National Football League (NFL). We use this comparison to generate a number of insights into how parental choice might be leveraged within the K–12 education system to improve outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We consider two game-theoretic models of the generation capacity expansion problem in liberalized electricity markets. The first is an open loop equilibrium model, where generation companies simultaneously choose capacities and quantities to maximize their individual profit. The second is a closed loop model, in which companies first choose capacities maximizing their profit anticipating the market equilibrium outcomes in the second stage. The latter problem is an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. In both models, the intensity of competition among producers in the energy market is frequently represented using conjectural variations. Considering one load period, we show that for any choice of conjectural variations ranging from perfect competition to Cournot, the closed loop equilibrium coincides with the Cournot open loop equilibrium, thereby obtaining a 'Kreps and Scheinkman'-like result and extending it to arbitrary strategic behavior. When expanding the model framework to multiple load periods, the closed loop equilibria for different conjectural variations can diverge from each other and from open loop equilibria. We also present and analyze alternative conjectured price response models with switching conjectures. Surprisingly, the rank ordering of the closed loop equilibria in terms of consumer surplus and market efficiency (as measured by total social welfare) is ambiguous. Thus, regulatory approaches that force marginal cost-based bidding in spot markets may diminish market efficiency and consumer welfare by dampening incentives for investment. We also show that the closed loop capacity yielded by a conjectured price response second stage competition can be less or equal to the closed loop Cournot capacity, and that the former capacity cannot exceed the latter when there are symmetric agents and two load periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El poder de mercado, o el monopolio, de una empresa constituye una de las justiicaciones típicas para aplicar regulación económica en un mercado, sea a priori mediante medidas estructurales o a posteriori mediante derecho de competencia. La razón hay que buscarla en el modelo de competencia perfecta, visto como el ideal de funcionamiento del mercado por la corriente dominante de la teoría económica. En el presente artículo se propone una explicación alternativa para las fuentes del poder de mercado, utilizando la perspectiva del descubrimiento del proceso de mercado. De tal análisis se podrá concluir que el proceso competitivo se puede asimilar a la búsqueda del poder de mercado por los emprendedores, y este poder al control de un recurso único. Ello tiene importante impacto a la hora de decidir sobre la regulación. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines profit efficiency and its determinants in Indian commercial banks during the post-reform period by using a stochastic frontier approach (SFA), specified by Battese and Coelli (1995). For the purpose of specifying the parameters in the SFA, translog functional form has been adopted. Assuming banking markets are not perfectly competitive, alternative profit function is estimated. Intermediation approach has been employed to define bank inputs and outputs. An unbalanced panel data of 103 commercial banks for the period 1996–2008 have been constructed for the empirical analysis. All the required data for the analysis were obtained from various publications of the Reserve Bank of India. The study found that profit efficiency of Indian commercial banks is increasing over the study period. However, on average, Indian banks could meet only three-fourths of their profit-generating potentialities relative to the best-practice bank, due to technical inefficiency, which is arising within the banks. Among the bank groups, it is revealed that the state-owned banks are relatively more efficient than their counterparts. The technical inefficiency effects model shows that bank-specific, market, and organizational characteristics play an important role in determining the profit efficiency of banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In the maritime industry, the stakeholders comprising the port authorities, shipping companies, and port operators often compete and collaborate within an ecological system. This paper investigates the competition and cooperation strategies amongst three parties: two major container hub ports and the shipping companies. This research develops a game theoretic network design model which considers three scenarios: (i) perfect competition between the hub ports, (ii) perfect cooperation between the hub ports, and (iii) cooperation between the shipping companies and the hub ports as a whole. The scenarios are tested using empirical data from two leading Asian hub ports: Singapore and Hong Kong. An interval branch and bound is designed to solve the models. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Simple Cournotmodels of divestiture tend to generate incentives to divest which are too strong, predicting that firms will break up into an infinite number of divisions resulting in perfect competition. This paper shows that if the order of divestitures is endogenized, firms will always choose sequential, and hence very limited, divestitures. Divestitures favor the larger firm and the follower in a sequential game. Divestitures in which the larger firm is the follower generate greater industry profit and social welfare, but a smaller consumer surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partners evaluation and selection in order to create a business partnership in virtual enterprise ia an activity that will lead first to increase enterprises competitiveness and on the other hand to increase de enterprise adaptability to market demands. In this paper two partner's assessment methods are analyzed (the notes system method and the weighted point evaluation method) in order to create a selection partners tool to achieve a business partnership. Also, this paper illustrates how can be knowledge bases built at the enterprise level for partner's selection and validation. The knowledge-based system for the partners evaluation and selection presented in this paper was realized at the PREMINV Research Centre from University „Politehnica‟ of Bucharest, in a university - small and medium sized enterprise partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies a Ricardian model of international trade with a continuum of products in a general equilibrium model in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition. It provides a bridge between trade models based on perfect competition and models based on imperfect competition. Compared with a model based on perfect competition, the incorporation of fixed cost leads to the result that an increase of domestic labor may increase the relative wage of the domestic country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Hi-tech products, the demand rate, the component cost as well as the selling price usually decline significantly with time. In the case of perfect competition, shortages usually result in lost sales; while in a monopoly, shortages will be completely backordered. However, neither perfect competition nor monopoly exists. Therefore, there is a need to develop a replenishment model considering a hybrid of perfect competition and monopoly when the cost, price and demand are decreasing simultaneously. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis are carried out to illustrate this model. The results show that a higher decline-rate in the component cost leads to a smaller service level and a larger replenishment interval. When the component cost decline rate increases and the selling price decline rate decreases simultaneously, the replenishment interval decreases. In perfect competition it is better to have a high service level, while for the case with monopoly, keeping a low service level is better due to complete backordering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article surveys some arguments brought forward in defense of the theory of perfect competition. While some critics propose that the theory of perfect competition, and thus also the theory of the firm, are logically flawed, (mainstream) economists defend their most popular textbook model by a series of apparently different arguments. Here it is examined whether these arguments are comparable, consistent and convincing from the point of view of philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the move of the European Commission (EC) to replace the dominance standard, which has been into force in 1990, with a recast test. The author cites the aim of the Commission in adopting the new method including the desire to close a possible enforcement gap under the dominance test and most importantly the methodological framework it possesses. Moreover, the historical background of the adoption of the dominance standard is presented as well as the reason as to why it was chosen as opposed to any other competition-based tests that prevailed during the time. Also provided is explanation of the concept dominance.

The article discusses the marginal impact of exchange of information and collusion to concentrated markets. The author introduces the nature of information exchange and evaluates its role. He defines the exchange of detailed information as means for creating platforms for subsequent collusive agreements. This suggests that objections to the exchange of information is not practicable unless the decision making of business enterprises is influenced. Moreover, the effects of the exchange of information that are considered to be welfare improving and not a restraint to the competitive process. Also pointed out is the link between exchange of information and switching cost.

An essay is presented on relationship between competition and consumer credit in the competitive credit markets in the U.S. It introduces competition stories like the story between lenders for customers, lending technologies driven by regulatory arbitrage and product innovation. These stories depict and explain fully the above-named relationship. It cites three approaches embodied in the pending regulatory reforms to regulate the consumer credit transactions.

Abstract: This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and “smallness” properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Boards of trade have the position of being the fundamental structures, in which the prices of the primarily vital goods - firstly, the agricultural products - that are essential for the maintenance of social life are determined, are the mostly widespread/ concrete examples of the "market" concept in daily life, which can be defined as the every sort of environment that enables making the economic decisions by the method of meeting the customers and dealers of goods, services and factors of production. The elimination of the factors hindering the validity of the perfect competition conditions to dominate on agricultural product markets and enabling the mechanisms that allows the aforementioned to be functional is closely engaged with effective institutionalization of boards of trades within these principles, and the optimization of the societies' production possibilities and the effective usage of sources will only be able to be realized be means of these efforts. The exposition of the definition, functions and the location of the boards of trade in the economics literature and examination of their improvement processes in Turkey and the world may reveal positive results from the point of view of the lighting the way for the efforts of reorganizing/ rehabilitating the agricultural sector of our country, which gained acceleration parallel to the global increase in the prices of agricultural products, developing proposals of solutions within the context of regional development problems and generating new goals/ productions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the comparison of the enforcement system of the sector-specific regulation and competition law enforcement in the telecommunications sector. The sector-specific remedies acts are concentrating on industrial policy while the competition law enforcement focuses on the market strength of telecom providers. The first set of remedies are the placing of limitation on (pre-) accessible significant market power (SMP) provided for in the Access and Interconnection Directive and the implementation of the Universal Service Directive (USD) in telecom. Information includes the examination of the regulatory configurations results, studied the challenges for SMP remedies and the potential of number portability (NP) under the USD, and co-regulatory procedure remedies.

This paper proposes a textual analysis of Marshall's theory of firm pricing behavior under competitive conditions. Average cost and marginal cost pricing theories have very distinct origins as they are rooted, respectively, in the classical and marginalistic theory of competition. I analyze to what extent and under which circumstances the two theories joined in the work of Alfred Marshall; and I argue that, even though only partial evidence can be found to support the adoption of the notion of marginal cost pricing by Marshall, he developed some concepts, such as the distinction between short and long periods and the notion of quasi-rents, which turned out to be fundamental for the joint acceptance of marginal cost and average cost pricing principles by the Marshallian school. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the relation between oligopoly and perfect competition, more specifically the problem of emergent instability when the number of competitors increases, as pointed out by several authors. A process of mixed short and long run dynamics is set up. In the short run the competitors are subject to capacity limits due to fixed capital stocks, in the long run they may renew these stocks and so in the moments of reinvestment have access to a constant returns technology. The evolution of the system depends on the number of competitors, the interval between their entry on the market, and the durability of capital. The main result is a theorem showing that if capital has a durability of more periods than the spacing of reinvestment times among the firms, multiplied with their total number, then the system always contracts to the Cournot equilibrium state. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to shed new light on the debate about the appropriateness of the Kaizuka rule, a Samuelson type of efficiency rule for public inputs, for the provision of firm-augmenting public inputs. Firm-augmenting public inputs are commonly included in public infrastructure modelling. Design/methodology/approach - In the microeconomic social surplus framework, and assuming perfect competition, the paper analyses how firm-augmenting public inputs should be provided in order to maximise the welfare of consumers and producers. For this purpose, the paper develops a social surplus efficiency rule, i.e. the Boadway rule. Afterwards the question what the characteristics of firm-augmenting public inputs mean for its efficient provision is examined. Findings - The findings show that under perfect competition an omniscient government is unable to efficiently provide firm-augmenting public inputs due to the characteristics of finn-augmenting public inputs but not due to inappropriate efficiency rules. Research limitations/implications - The findings show that future research would be ill advised to model public infrastructure as a firm-augmenting public input. Practical implications - Policy conclusions drawn from models that include firm-augmenting public inputs, such as fiscal competition and endogenous growth models, should be reconsidered. Originality/value - The paper makes a strong case that firm-augmenting public input is not a viable concept for modelling public infrastructure. Rather, firm-augmenting public inputs are similar to free goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the economic model of the aggregate supply and demand for global oil market. It states that the monthly supply and demand were accordant to the economic theory if the bases are world demand and non-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) demand. It argues that the use of perfect competition as a theoretical assumption for the basis of oil supply model is impractical.

Abstract: The problem of price determination for an EOQ model under perfect competition is of central importance in the field of inventory control and management, especially for such kind of models which study the dynamics of the market economy over time. In this paper, an attempt has been made to analyze and compute the price of a unit item of inventory for an EOQ model for deteriorating items under the perfect competition as an important market structure. Along with the optimization technique, the marginal revenue and marginal cost approach has been employed to determine the price of a unit item of inventory. The present work is presumably believed to provide theoretical as well as applicable insight for marketing experts and inventory managers engaged in this field. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This article reconsiders whether the Cournot equilibrium really becomes a perfect competition equilibrium when the number of competitors goes to infinity. It has been questioned whether the equilibrium remains stable with an increasing number of firms. Contraindications were given for linear and for isoelastic demand functions. However, marginal costs were then taken as constant, which means adding more potentially infinite-sized firms. As we want to compare cases with few large firms to cases with many small firms, the model is tuned so as to incorporate capacity limits, decreasing with an increasing number of firms. Then destabilization is avoided. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This response is a defense of neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics contains more than the perfectly competitive model: much of it concerns the problems of market failure including public goods, externalities, imperfect structure, and asymmetric information. The article acknowledges that economic models are abstract, but argues that abstraction can be useful, and that full-blown utility theory is not required to gain insights from the concepts. Neoclassical economics helps us understand how the world works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper argues that Keynes's theory of aggregate employment assumes perfect competition (understood as price-taking, in the modern sense promoted by Joan Robinson in her 1934 article) in the markets for current output and for existing capital-goods. The degree of competition, to which Keynes makes a single cryptic reference, refers to the social and institutional obstacles to the free movement of resources, associated mainly with closed shops of entrepreneurs and workers. Keynes is here invoking an older, Marshallian, concept of competition. The implication is that the received understanding of the terms 'expectation' and 'liquidity' in The General Theory needs revision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an economy producing n symmetric goods (where n is an integer number equal or greater than one), monopolistic competition produces smaller output and employment than perfect competition. The inferiority of the equilibrium is directly related to the number of goods produced and to the returns of labour on production (when there is just one good perfect competition and monopoly are equivalent). Therefore, inter-industry coalitions among monopolistic competitors approach the economy to the perfect competition equilibrium. In the limit, when all monopolistic competitors collude, the ex ante recognition of symmetries implies an identical equilibrium than perfect competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on the theoretical modifications of the concept of external economies built by Marshall. The history of external economies was at its crossroads in the thirties, when the Symposium on Increasing Returns took place in Cambridge. Sraffa formulated the main criticism against external economies by pointing to its lack of compatibility with perfect competition, statics and partial equilibrium. I shall try to show that the construction of parametric external economies by John Chipman (1970) is the logical outcome of the controversy on returns, opposing Sraffa to Marshall, Pigou, Shove and Robertson (1930). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Market power and adverse selection are prevalent features of the market for pre-paid health plans. However, most of the literature on adverse selection considers extreme cases: either perfect competition or monopoly. If instead health plans are horizontally differentiated, then (i) profits derived from each low risk are higher than from each high risk and (ii) when the profits derived from each high risk are negative (cross-subsidization), a health authority as informed as the health plans can implement a Pareto-improvement. Both local and global deviations from cross-subsidization are addressed within a Nash equilibrium framework. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

While a large body of literature examines the environmental impact of trade on the environment, this discussion focuses largely on the context of inter-industry trade. Empirical evidence has long suggested that an increasing share of international trade takes the form of intra- rather than inter-industry trade. In an attempt to fill this gap, the present paper uses a price-setting duopoly model of intra-industry trade to highlight the environmental consequences of trade liberalization when oligopolistic rivalry rather than comparative advantage drives international trade. We find that the environmental impact of trade liberalization depends mostly on two factors, namely, on the nature of pollution (i.e. whether it is local, transboundary or global) and on which country liberalizes trade (i.e. whether it is the ‘clean’ country or the ‘dirty’ country). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increased competition has led to organisations facing the challenge of implementing quality management to achieve best practice, while at the same time having to address the need for innovation management to develop new products, services and processes. The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between quality management and innovation management from a perspective that recognises the full contribution of quality management to academia and praxis. The research question in the paper is, how can organisations use their existing quality models to achieve their innovation management objectives? A multiple- and segmented-case analysis is used to show, first, how organisations have applied quality models based on quality objectives and, second, how the same organisations have used these quality models to achieve innovation objectives. The findings show that the concepts of a quality-innovation continuum and that of quality as a preceding foundation for innovation can help organisations reconceptualise and reapply their quality models to achieve innovation objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that exchange rate models rooted in the theory of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and balanced trade are fundamentally mis-specified, as evidenced by the disjuncture between: (1) the empirical evidence, which largely refutes PPP; and (2) the empirical result that ‘real’ productivity shocks are associated with observed secular trends in exchange rates. In the former case we have a theory without convincing evidence, and in the latter case we have empirical evidence in want of a consistent theory. If looked at from the perspective of a ‘cost of production’ theory of prices, such empirical results might not be so theoretically anomalous. So-called ‘real’ variables (especially productivity and unit labor costs), let in through the side door as ‘shocks’ to PPP equilibrium, may in fact be part and parcel of the formation of prices of production on an international scale through capitalist competition. The primary conclusion is that the empirical evidence supports a cost of production theory of the terms of trade and the real exchange rate. The empirical evidence in support of the Balassa–Samuelson model of the exchange rate is re-interpreted in this light. In this interpretation, parity holds only in terms of rates of return on investment which, in the classical tradition, are presumed to equalize across industries internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the issues related to new welfare economics and value judgments. The new welfare economics was born in the year 1930. It is now known as orthodox welfare economics. It was the work of theorists such as Nicholas Kaldor, Tibor Skitovsky, and John Hicks which helped in creating the new welfare economy. It has been demonstrated by the theorists of the new welfare economics that the state must necessarily fail in its efficiency-maximizing task unless it eliminates failure by resorting to its own arbitrary value judgments. It is shown by welfare economics that any conclusion about changes in social welfare needs a judgment about distribution, which cannot be scientific and value free, but it is essentially a moral, extraeconomic value judgment. According to the first theorem of the new welfare economics, conditions of perfect competition with no externalities and no interdependencies of consumer utilities will take society to a Pareto optimal situation.

Abstract: Presently, electricity markets are characterized by a small number of suppliers with distributed resources. These market suppliers can easily be identified because their geographic location is known. Essentially, two or three of them compete for leading the market whereas the rest of them follow. Hence, it is necessary to study the market structure as ologopolistic competition rather than perfect competition. This paper studies market producer decisions in a dynamic sequential framework by using discrete event system simulation (DESS) also known as discrete control theory. Two-player ologopolistic market structure is presented in this paper. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article highlights the study of model competition involving newspapers of different circulation sizes in metropolitan areas in the U.S. Such model competition was developed in 1970's by James N. Rosses, economics professor at the University of Stanford. It aims to recognize the emerging sort of competition substitutes for the more traditional direct competition found in the markets. Meanwhile, the importance of competition is its role in the fostering the marketplace with ideas. It has found out that competition has its own place in the market and gives the marketplace a functioning democracy. On the other hand, several other studies have found out that competition offers benefits and effects on competitions.