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BackgroundPatient and Public involvement (PPI) in health care occupies a central place in Western democracies. In England, this theme has been continuously prominent since the introduction of market reforms in the early 1990s. The health care reforms implemented by the current Coalition Government are making primary care practitioners the main commissioners of health care services in the National Health Service, and a duty is placed on them to involve the public in commissioning decisions and strategies. Since implementation of PPI initiatives in primary care commissioning is not new, we asked how likely it is that the new reforms will make a difference. We scanned the main literature related to primary care-led commissioning and found little evidence of effective PPI thus far. We suggest that unless the scope and intended objectives of PPI are clarified and appropriate resources are devoted to it, PPI will continue to remain empty rhetoric and box ticking.AimTo examine the effect of previous PPI initiatives on health care commissioning and draw lessons for future development.MethodWe scanned the literature reporting on previous PPI initiatives in primary care-led commissioning since the introduction of the internal market in 1991. In particular, we looked for specific contexts, methods and outcomes of such initiatives.Findings1. PPI in commissioning has been constantly encouraged by policy makers in England. 2. Research shows limited evidence of effective methods and outcomes so far. 3. Constant reconfiguration of health care structures has had a negative impact on PPI. 4. The new structures look hardly better poised to bring about effective public and patient involvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws parallels between the market trend in the English NHS and Polanyi's (1957) The Great Transformation: The political and economic origins of our time, Beacon Press: Boston (originally published in 1944 in the United States as The Great Transformation, Rinehart: and Co: New York, and in 1945 in England as Origins of our time, Gollancz: London) account of how the rise of markets provokes a self-protective counter-reaction that tries to re-embed economic relations in social relations. We report findings from a qualitative study of NHS contracting, which examines the recent move to harder-edged contracts with greater use of financial penalties and incentives. In practice, use of these techniques tended to be confined to nationally-mandated sections of the contract rather than emerging from local bilateral agreements, and when things went wrong the parties relied more on cooperative behaviour than on the provisions of the contract to find solutions. Making the current contracting system work depended more on existing relational networks than on the incentive structures created by recent 'marketisation' initiatives, but the inability of the market to evolve as expected has encouraged policy makers to publish plans for further radical reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws parallels between the market trend in the English NHS and Polanyi's (1957) The Great Transformation: The political and economic origins of our time, Beacon Press: Boston (originally published in 1944 in the United States as The Great Transformation, Rinehart: and Co: New York, and in 1945 in England as Origins of our time, Gollancz: London) account of how the rise of markets provokes a self-protective counter-reaction that tries to re-embed economic relations in social relations. We report findings from a qualitative study of NHS contracting, which examines the recent move to harder-edged contracts with greater use of financial penalties and incentives. In practice, use of these techniques tended to be confined to nationally-mandated sections of the contract rather than emerging from local bilateral agreements, and when things went wrong the parties relied more on cooperative behaviour than on the provisions of the contract to find solutions. Making the current contracting system work depended more on existing relational networks than on the incentive structures created by recent 'marketisation' initiatives, but the inability of the market to evolve as expected has encouraged policy makers to publish plans for further radical reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The use of contracts is vital to market transactions. The introduction of market reforms in health care in the UK and other developed countries twenty years ago meant greater use of contracts. In the UK, health care contracting was widely researched in the 1990s. Yet, despite the changing policy context, the subject has attracted less interest in recent years. This paper seeks to fill a gap by reporting findings from a study of contracting in the English National Health Service (NHS) after the introduction of the national standard contract in 2007. By using economic and socio-legal theories and two case studies we examine the way in which the new contract was implemented in practice and the extent to which implementation conformed to policy intentions and to our theoretical predictions. Data were collected using non-participant observation of 36 contracting meetings, 24 semi-structured interviews, and analysis of documents. We found that despite efforts to introduce a more detailed (‘complete’) contract, in practice, purchasers and providers often reverted to a more relational style of contracting. Frequently reliance on the NHS hierarchy proved to be indispensable; in particular, formal dispute resolution was avoided and financial risk was re-allocated in compromises that sometimes ignored contractual provisions. Serious data deficiencies and shortages of skilled personnel still caused major difficulties. We conclude that contracting for health care continues to raise serious problems, which may be exacerbated by the impending transfer of responsibility to groups of general practitioners (GPs) who generally lack experience and expertise in large-scale, secondary care contracting. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Objectives: To establish how quality indicators used in English community nursing are selected and applied, and their perceived usefulness to service users, commissioners and service providers. Methods: A qualitative multi-site case study was conducted with five commissioning organizations and their service providers. Participants included commissioners, provider organization managers, nurses and service users. Results: Indicator selection and application often entail complex processes influenced by wider health system and cross-organizational factors. All participants felt that current indicators, while useful for accountability and management purposes, fail to reflect the true quality of community nursing care and may sometimes indirectly compromise care. Conclusions: Valuable resources may be better used for comprehensive system redesign, to ensure that patient, carer and nurse priorities are given equivalence with those of other stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives To explore the ‘added value’ that general practitioners (GPs) bring to commissioning in the English NHS. We describe the experience of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in the context of previous clinically led commissioning policy initiatives. Methods Realist evaluation. We identified the programme theories underlying the claims made about GP ‘added value’ in commissioning from interviews with key informants. We tested these theories against observational data from four case study sites to explore whether and how these claims were borne out in practice. Results The complexity of CCG structures means CCGs are quite different from one another with different distributions of responsibilities between the various committees. This makes it difficult to compare CCGs with one another. Greater GP involvement was important but it was not clear where and how GPs could add most value. We identified some of the mechanisms and conditions which enable CCGs to maximize the ‘added value’ that GPs bring to commissioning. Conclusion To maximize the value of clinical input, CCGs need to invest time and effort in preparing those involved, ensuring that they systematically gather evidence about service gaps and problems from their members, and engaging members in debate about the future shape of services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: This paper examines NHS secondary care contracting in England and Wales in a period which saw increasing policy divergence between the two systems. At face value, England was making greater use of market levers and utilising harder-edged service contracts incorporating financial penalties and incentives, while Wales was retreating from the 1990s internal market and emphasising cooperation and flexibility in the contracting process. But there were also cross-border spill-overs involving common contracting technologies and management cultures that meant that differences in on-the-ground contracting practices might be smaller than headline policy differences suggested. Methods: The nature of real-world contracting behaviour was investigated by undertaking two qualitative case studies in England and two in Wales, each based on a local purchaser/provider network. The case studies involved ethnographic observations and interviews with staff in primary care trusts (PCTs) or local health boards (LHBs), NHS or Foundation trusts, and the overseeing Strategic Health Authority or NHS Wales regional office, as well as scrutiny of relevant documents. Results: Wider policy differences between the two NHS systems were reflected in differing contracting frameworks, involving regional commissioning in Wales and commissioning by either a PCT, or co-operating pair of PCTs in our English case studies, and also in different oversight arrangements by higher tiers of the service. However, longterm relationships and trust between purchasers and providers had an important role in both systems when the financial viability of organisations was at risk. In England, the study found examples where both PCTs and trusts relaxed contractual requirements to assist partners faced with deficits. In Wales, news of plans to end the purchaser/provider split meant a return to less precisely-specified block contracts and a renewed concern to build cooperation between LHB and trust staff. Conclusions: The interdependency of local purchasers and providers fostered long-term relationships and cooperation that shaped contracting behaviour, just as much as the design of contracts and the presence or absence of contractual penalties and incentives. Although conflict and tensions between contracting partners sometimes surfaced in both the English and Welsh case studies, cooperative behaviour became crucial in times of trouble. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: This paper examines NHS secondary care contracting in England and Wales in a period which saw increasing policy divergence between the two systems. At face value, England was making greater use of market levers and utilising harder-edged service contracts incorporating financial penalties and incentives, while Wales was retreating from the 1990 s internal market and emphasising cooperation and flexibility in the contracting process. But there were also cross-border spill-overs involving common contracting technologies and management cultures that meant that differences in on-the-ground contracting practices might be smaller than headline policy differences suggested.Methods: The nature of real-world contracting behaviour was investigated by undertaking two qualitative case studies in England and two in Wales, each based on a local purchaser/provider network. The case studies involved ethnographic observations and interviews with staff in primary care trusts (PCTs) or local health boards (LHBs), NHS or Foundation trusts, and the overseeing Strategic Health Authority or NHS Wales regional office, as well as scrutiny of relevant documents.Results: Wider policy differences between the two NHS systems were reflected in differing contracting frameworks, involving regional commissioning in Wales and commissioning by either a PCT, or co-operating pair of PCTs in our English case studies, and also in different oversight arrangements by higher tiers of the service. However, long-term relationships and trust between purchasers and providers had an important role in both systems when the financial viability of organisations was at risk. In England, the study found examples where both PCTs and trusts relaxed contractual requirements to assist partners faced with deficits. In Wales, news of plans to end the purchaser/provider split meant a return to less precisely-specified block contracts and a renewed concern to build cooperation between LHB and trust staff.Conclusions: The interdependency of local purchasers and providers fostered long-term relationships and co-operation that shaped contracting behaviour, just as much as the design of contracts and the presence or absence of contractual penalties and incentives. Although conflict and tensions between contracting partners sometimes surfaced in both the English and Welsh case studies, cooperative behaviour became crucial in times of trouble. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]