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The purpose of this study was twofold. First, to explore middle and high school students' intuitively-based (mis)conceptions in probability, particularly availability and representativeness heuristics. Second, to investigate teachers' awareness of these intuitively-based (mis)conceptions and the effectiveness of their instructional practices to support students' understanding of probability beyond heuristics. The participants were two middle school mathematics teachers, three high school mathematics teachers and their students. Data were collected through a diagnostic test administered to students as a pretest and posttest, interviews with the teachers and two students from each class and classroom observations. The findings indicated the existence of intuitively-based (mis)conceptions regarding availability and representativeness heuristics among middle and high school students. In general, the teachers did not consider the students' intuitions and difficulties in probability in their instructions. Not only did they rarely guide students to analyze and solve the tasks coherently and deliberately, but they also did not discuss students' intuitively-based (mis)conceptions. The results highlighted that if teachers do not attend to student thinking and change their instructional practices accordingly, their knowledge about students' difficulties will not necessarily help students overcome their intuitions and attain a probabilistic way of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The many studies with coin-tossing tasks in literature show that the concept of randomness is challenging for adults as well as children. Systematic errors observed in coin-tossing tasks are often related to the representativeness heuristic, which refers to a mental shortcut that is used to judge randomness by evaluating how well a set of random events represents the typical example for random events we hold in our mind. Representative thinking is explained by our tendency to seek for patterns in our surroundings. In the present study, predictions of coin-tosses of 302 third-graders were explored. Findings suggest that in third grade of elementary school, children make correct as well as different types of erroneous predictions and individual differences exist. Moreover, erroneous predictions that were in line with representative thinking were positively associated with an early spontaneous focus on regularities, which was assessed when they were in second year of preschool. We concluded that previous studies might have underestimated children's reasoning about randomness in coin-tossing contexts and that representative thinking is indeed associated with pattern-based thinking tendencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that the judged probability of an event depends on whether its description mentions examples ("What is the probability that a randomly chosen Italian businessman will travel during the next month to Warsaw, Budapest, Prague or some other European city?") or does not mention examples ("What is the probability that a randomly chosen Italian businessman will travel during the next month to a European city?"). Here, we examined descriptions that mention examples and manipulated whether these are relatively similar (e.g., Warsaw, Budapest, Prague) or diverse (e.g., Warsaw, Marseilles, Helsinki). Four experiments (N = 1112) revealed a diversity effect: Overall, descriptions with diverse examples received higher probability judgments than descriptions with similar examples. We discuss several possible mechanisms for this effect, such as that descriptions with diverse examples prompt fuller representations of the target category or that the effect is driven by a representativeness or proximity heuristic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A representativeness heuristic (RH) refers to a shortcut in decision making, one or two subdimensions of which have been found to impact construction workers' unsafe behaviors prominently. To reduce workers' reliance on representativeness heuristic effectively, two key questions should be clarified: (1) whether all subdimensions of the representativeness heuristic influence workers' decision making, and (2) whether such a heuristic is more or less prevalent in certain groups. However, both issues remain unresolved. To fill in these research gaps, the current study collected data using a questionnaire survey from 194 Chinese workers in eight construction projects. After a series of analyses, the results revealed that (1) all subdimensions of the representativeness heuristic had potential to impact construction workers' decision making; and (2) workers' reliance on the representativeness heuristic had an initial downtrend followed by an uptrend as age and education level increased, whereas seniority and type of work were not related to this heuristic. The research findings are helpful for safety organizations to manage their diverse workforces. Devoting prevention resources to workers of particular age and education background groups is recommended to reduce the representativeness heuristic and improve the safety performance of construction sites further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do politicians use the representativeness heuristic when making judgements, that is, when they appraise the likelihood or frequency of an outcome that is unknown or unknowable? Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that facilitate judgements and decision making. Oftentimes, heuristics are useful, but they may also lead to systematic biases that can be detrimental for decision making in a representative democracy. Thus far, we lack experimental evidence on whether politicians use the representativeness heuristic. To contribute to and extend the existing literature, we develop and conduct a survey experiment with as main participants Dutch elected local politicians from the larger municipalities (n = 211). This survey experiment examines whether politician participants display two decision-making biases related to the representativeness heuristic: the conjunction error and scope neglect. We also run the experiment with a student sample (n = 260), mainly to validate the experimental design. Our findings show that politician participants neglect scope in one scenario and that they display the conjunction error in two of three scenarios. These results suggest that politician participants use the representativeness heuristic. Conversely, our third conjunction error scenario does not find evidence for politician participants displaying this bias. As we discuss in the article, the latter may be an artifact of our experimental design. Overall, our findings contribute fundamentally to our understanding of how politicians process information and how this influences their judgements and decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few centuries, women in Western countries have achieved revolutionary advancements in terms of civil and social rights. Nevertheless, women continue to be underrepresented in leadership positions, and this major issue needs to be tackled. In the present research, comprising two studies, we aimed to test the role of gender stereotype salience in affecting the extent to which individuals view women and men as being close to the 'politically involved individual' prototype and its influence on the intention to vote for women and men. In both studies, we found that the increased perceived likelihood of a target to participate in politics when described as a real man (Study 1) or as stereotypically masculine (irrespective of his/her sex, Study 2), in respect to the other conditions, mediated participants' willingness to vote for them in case of candidacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multiple epistemological programs make use of intuitive judgments pertaining to an individual's ability to gain knowledge from exclusively probabilistic/statistical information. This paper argues that these judgments likely form without deference to such information, instead being a function of the degree to which having knowledge is representative of an agent. Thus, these judgments fit the pattern of formation via a representativeness heuristic, like that famously described by Kahneman and Tversky to explain similar probabilistic judgments. Given this broad insensitivity to probabilistic/statistical information, it directly follows that these epistemic judgments are insensitive to a given agent's epistemic status. From this, the paper concludes that, breaking with common epistemological practice, we cannot assume that such judgments are reliable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is broadly assumed that political elites (e.g. party leaders) regularly rely on heuristics in their judgments or decision-making. In this article, I aim to bring together and discuss the scattered literature on this topic. To address the current conceptual unclarity, I discuss two traditions on heuristics: (1) the heuristics and biases (H&B) tradition pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky and (2) the fast and frugal heuristics (F&F) tradition pioneered by Gigerenzer et al. I propose to concentrate on two well-defined heuristics from the H&B tradition—availability and representativeness—to empirically assess when political elites rely on heuristics and thereby understand better their judgments and decisions. My review of existing studies supports the notion that political elites use the availability heuristic and possibly the representativeness one for making complex decisions under uncertainty. It also reveals that besides this, we still know relatively little about when political elites use which heuristic and with what effect(s). Therefore, I end by proposing an agenda for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this commentary, I first discuss the strengths of the target paper and provide suggestions for future research. I proceed to point out an important limitation of the target study as well as contribute considerations relevant to measuring stereotypes in music. Finally, I present a novel theoretical account to explain music stereotyping, namely, the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which I discuss within the broader framework of the behavioral economics of music. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a novel integrated approach incorporating grey relational analysis, corresponding correlation test, with vector autoregression and panel vector autoregression models to examine the representativeness heuristic and anchoring effects in carbon markets. The grey relational analysis and corresponding correlation test measure the representativeness heuristic in eight pilot carbon markets. The vector autoregression and panel vector autoregression models detect the anchoring effects in eight pilot carbon markets and the overall carbon market. The study first explores the representativeness heuristic and anchoring effects in China's carbon markets. Taking the 2014–2021 United Nations Climate Change Conferences (COP20–COP26) as an event, the proposal of China's carbon emissions peak and carbon-natural targets, as well as the establishment of China's national carbon market as three events, the empirical results demonstrate that Hubei, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing six pilot carbon markets were found to exhibit the representativeness heuristics for the COP21. Hubei, Shenzhen, Beijing, and Chongqing carbon markets were found to exhibit the representativeness heuristics for the proposal of China's carbon emissions peak and carbon-natural targets, and the establishment of China's national carbon market. Anchoring effects were found to exist in Guangdong, Tianjin, and Chongqing carbon markets, while no anchoring effect has been found to exist in the overall carbon market. Investor sentiment is one of the crucial factors affecting carbon prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In classic examinations of the representativeness heuristic, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) presented adult participants with a description of an individual who fit their stereotype of a typical engineer. Importantly, even when participants were told that the individual was drawn from a sample of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers, they estimated that the individual was an engineer at very high levels, showing that they relied almost exclusively on the personality description. Relying on the representativeness heuristic can lead to base-rate neglect and, thus, biased judgments. Two experiments provide insight into the development of the representativeness heuristic in young children using an adaptation of the classic lawyer–engineer problem. Experiment 1 ( N  = 96) established that 3- to 5-year-olds can use base-rate information on its own, and 4- and 5-year-olds can use individuating information on its own, to make inferences. Experiment 2 ( N  = 192) varied the relevance of the individuating information across conditions to assess the pervasiveness of this bias early in development. Here 5- and 6-year-olds, much like adults, continue to attempt to rely on individuating information when making classifications even if that information is irrelevant. Together, these experiments reveal how the representativeness heuristic develops across the preschool years and suggest that the bias may strengthen between 4 and 6 years of age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current experiment sought to demonstrate the presence of wishful thinking—when wishes influence beliefs—in young children. A sample of 77 preschoolers needed to predict, eight times in a row, which of two plastic eggs, one containing one toy and the other containing three toys, would be drawn by a blinded experimenter. On the four trials in which the children could not keep the content of the egg drawn, they were equally likely to predict that either egg would be drawn. By contrast, on the four trials in which the children got to keep the content of the egg, they were more likely to predict that the egg with three toys would be drawn. Any effort the children exerted would be the same across conditions, so that this demonstration of wishful thinking cannot be accounted for by an effort heuristic. One group of children—a subgroup of the 5-year-olds—did not engage in wishful thinking. Children from this subgroup instead used the representativeness heuristic to guide their answers. This result suggests that having an explicit representation of the outcome inhibits children from engaging in wishful thinking in the same way as explicit representations constrain the operation of motivated reasoning in adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UK bookies (bookmakers) herd geographically in less-affluent areas. The present work shows that UK bookies also herd with the special bets that they advertise to consumers, both in their shop window advertising and on TV adverts as shown to millions of viewers. I report an observational study of betting adverts over the 2014 soccer World Cup. Bet types vary in complexity, with complex types having the highest expected losses. Bookies herded on a common strategy of advertising special bets on two levels: by almost exclusively advertising complex bet types with high expected losses, and by advertising representative events within a given complex bet type. This evidence is most consistent with bookies' advertising targeting a representativeness heuristic amongst bettors. Bookies may know how to nudge bettors toward larger losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Over 500 incidents potentially being an offensive foul in basketball were analyzed. [•] Defenders often fall intentionally to increase the chances to get an offensive foul. [•] Further analysis shows that intentional falls seem to affect the team negatively overall. [•] Both rational reasons and biased decision making lead defenders to intentionally fall. [•] Referees’ mistakes are either rational or due to the representativeness heuristic. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Rational decision making under uncertainty requires forming beliefs that integrate prior and new information through Bayes’ rule. Human decision makers typically deviate from Bayesian updating by either overweighting the prior (conservatism) or overweighting new information (e.g. the representativeness heuristic). We investigated these deviations through measurements of electrocortical activity in the human brain during incentivized probability-updating tasks and found evidence of extremely early commitment to boundedly rational heuristics. Participants who overweight new information display a lower sensibility to conflict detection, captured by an event-related potential (the N2) observed around 260 ms after the presentation of new information. Conservative decision makers (who overweight prior probabilities) make up their mind before new information is presented, as indicated by the lateralized readiness potential in the brain. That is, they do not inhibit the processing of new information but rather immediately rely on the prior for making a decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: People tend to think that streaks in random sequential events are rare and remarkable. When they actually encounter streaks, they tend to consider the underlying process as non-random. The present paper examines the time of pattern occurrences in sequences of Bernoulli trials, and shows that among all patterns of the same length, a streak is the most delayed pattern for its first occurrence. It is argued that when time is of essence, how often a pattern is to occur (mean time, or, frequency) and when a pattern is to first occur (waiting time) are different questions and bear different psychological relevance. The waiting time statistics may provide a quantitative measure to the psychological distance when people are expecting a probabilistic event, and such measure is consistent with both of the representativeness and availability heuristics in people’s perception of randomness. We discuss some of the recent empirical findings and suggest that people’s judgment and generation of random sequences may be guided by their actual experiences of the waiting time statistics. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Using sequences of coin flips as a model of serial independent events, we asked schoolchildren in grades 1 through 5 to estimate the likelihood of the next flip. Most children in each grade expected short patterns to continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of airline crashes on fares and enplanement over the period 1984–1997. Empirical evidence suggests that none of the large carriers seem to initiate price wars with other large rivals involved in crashes, suggesting mutual forbearance. In contrast, small carriers raise their fares in response to small rivals’ crashes, perhaps commanding higher premiums due to their perceived higher safety level and in anticipation of consumer switching. Further estimation results suggest that only a small fraction of passengers form perceptions about crashes according to the representativeness heuristic. Moreover, large rivals’ crashes are associated with no consumer switching across other large carriers but are associated with enplanement losses for small carriers. The findings suggest that consumer perceptions raise important concerns about the challenges that carriers, especially the smaller ones, may face in depicting their true safety level to consumers whose vision may have been blurred by representativeness bias. Nevertheless, although consumers do not necessarily treat crashes as random events, large carriers may breathe a sigh of relief about the extent of consumer panic and overreaction. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Two studies examined the relationship between authoritarianism, cognitive style and heuristic processing. Focusing on cognitive-experiential self-theory, Study 1 shows that authoritarianism is related to Epstein’s dimension of faith in intuition, but not need for cognition, even when controlling for individual differences in need for structure. Study 2 confirms that authoritarianism is related to greater heuristic processing. The discussion suggests ways in which individual differences in cognitive style and heuristic processing may account for established effects of authoritarianism. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Probability theory has long been taken as the self-evident norm against which to evaluate inductive reasoning, and classical demonstrations of violations of this norm include the conjunction error and base-rate neglect. Many of these phenomena require multiplicative probability integration, whereas people seem more inclined to linear additive integration, in part, at least, because of well-known capacity constraints on controlled thought. In this article, the authors show with computer simulations that when based on approximate knowledge of probabilities, as is routinely the case in natural environments, linear additive integration can yield as accurate estimates, and as good average decision returns, as estimates based on probability theory. It is proposed that in natural environments people have little opportunity or incentive to induce the normative rules of probability theory and, given their cognitive constraints, linear additive integration may often offer superior bounded rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In three studies we looked at two typical misconceptions of probability: the representativeness heuristic, and the equiprobability bias. The literature on statistics education predicts that some typical errors and biases (e.g., the equiprobability bias) increase with education, whereas others decrease. This is in contrast with reasoning theorists’ prediction who propose that education reduces misconceptions in general. They also predict that students with higher cognitive ability and higher need for cognition are less susceptible to biases. In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the equiprobability bias increased with statistics education, and it was negatively correlated with students’ cognitive abilities. The representativeness heuristic was mostly unaffected by education, and it was also unrelated to cognitive abilities. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through an instruction manipulation (by asking participants to think logically vs. rely on their intuitions) that the reason for these differences was that these biases originated in different cognitive processes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis ( Kahneman & Frederick, 2002 ) and the exemplar hypothesis ( Juslin & Persson, 2002 ), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as prototype similarity, relative likelihood, or evidential support accumulation (ESAM; D. J. Koehler, C. M. White, & R. Grondin, 2003); cue-based relative frequency; and exemplar memory, implemented by probabilities from exemplars (PROBEX; P. Juslin & M. Persson, 2002). Three experiments with different task structures consistently demonstrate that exemplar memory is the best account of the data whereas the results are inconsistent with extant formulations of the representativeness heuristic and cue-based relative frequency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]