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This article reviews the vast literature on Russia’s transformation into a “militocracy”—a state in which individuals with career experience in Russia’s various force structures occupy important positions throughout the polity and economy—during the reign of former KGB lieutenant colonel Vladimir Putin. We show that (1) elite militarization has been extensively utilized both to describe and explain core features of Russian foreign and domestic policy; and (2) notwithstanding its widespread usage, the militocracy framework rests on a rather thin, and in some cases flawed, body of empirical research. We close by discussing the remaining research agenda on this subject and listing several alternative theoretical frameworks to which journalists and policymakers arguably should pay equal or greater attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant paradigm for understanding contemporary Russia holds that Vladimir Putin's tenure in office has been accompanied by a massive influx of former KGB and military personnel - so-called "siloviki" - into positions of power and authority throughout the polity and economy. Claims of extensive elite militarization, however, are largely based on the analyses of only one research program and, moreover, the validity of the estimates produced by that research program is open to question on numerous grounds. In this article, we review existing research on elite militarization in Russia; discuss a series of conceptual and empirical issues that need to be resolved if valid and meaningful estimation of military-security representation is to be achieved; introduce new findings; and evaluate the totality of existing evidence regarding whether the Russian state under Putin deserves to be labeled a militocracy. We find that the most straightforward reading of existing data indicates that the percentage of siloviki in the political elite during Putin's first two terms as president was approximately half of that which has been widely reported in both scholarship and the media, and also declined during the Medvedev presidency. In addition, our analysis of a broader cross section of the elite estimates military-security representation during the Putin presidency to have been lower still. Overall, existing data paint a less alarming picture of the depths to which siloviki have penetrated the corridors of power since 2000 than has been commonly portrayed and thereby cast doubt on Russia's status as an "FSB state." On the other hand, past trends also provide some basis for expecting that the numbers of siloviki will once again rise during Putin's current presidential term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The child-rearing scale (CRS) as a measure of authoritarianism holds promise for cross-cultural public opinion research but its validity beyond the Western and, in particular, American context has never been investigated. We address this gap by studying the scale's validity in Russia, a particularly interesting case due to its long history as a left-wing authoritarian regime. We also combine data from mass and elite surveys conducted in 2020 to explore the structure and performance of the CRS across different subpopulations. Using these data, we replicate the overall structure of the scale and confirm its validity. However, we also show that some indicators perform differently across masses and elites. Our findings suggest that the CRS is a valid measure of authoritarianism outside the United States but also show that its external linkages can vary across specific groups, depending on the country under examination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Vladimir Putin took over the presidency, analysts have highlighted the large numbers of siloviki—those with experience in the military and security agencies—who have been recruited into government service. Two political scientists investigate this trend by reexamining previously published findings and using an original data set. Claims of the ‘FSB-ization of power’ under Putin and an underappreciated trend in elite formation under Putin—the increasing presence of business representatives in the government and society at large—are considered. The article examines the implications of its findings for Russia's future political development, particularly in terms of stability and democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization has sparked renewed interest in the diffusion of ideas and norms across boundaries. Although much work has focused on diffusion at the macro-level and on the groups that transmit ideas, few researchers have studied the cognitive processes of political elites as they weigh the merits of various foreign-inspired models. Drawing on a series of original, in-depth interviews with Russian parliamentarians and high-ranking bureaucrats conducted in 1996, this paper makes two contributions to the study of individual-level borrowing in the Russian context. First, the openness of Russian elites to foreign borrowing is investigated; despite the public rhetoric about Russia's uniqueness, a substantial number of Russian elites are willing to borrow from foreign experience – particularly from models of European welfare capitalism. Second, three explanations of why policy-makers prefer to emulate some countries rather than others are tested – because they are similar to their own country either geographically, historically or culturally (comparability); because they have geostrategic prominence (prestige); or because they excel economically and/or politically (performance). Comparability and prestige are found to be of lesser importance than performance to Russian elites when considering the merits of various foreign models. Given that Russia closely approximates a most-likely case for validating explanations stressing comparability, this suggests that the array of foreign ideas that could become part and parcel of Russia's transition process is probably wider than is usually assumed. It also implies that, in general, the regional dimension of diffusion plays a smaller role than previously theorized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deals with a study which analyzed the extent of turnover among political elites in Russia's emergence as an independent state. Role of elite turnover in the democratic consolidation of Russia Federation according to elite theorist Gaetano Mosca; Data and methods; Definition of political elite; Exploration of regime-supporting and regime-challenging activities; Comparison with other democratic transitions; Conclusion.

The author reflects on the assassination of Russia's liberal politician Boris Nemtsov in 2015. He mentioned the report "Putin War" on Russia's invasion of Ukraine which was written by Nemtsov at the time of his murder. He also noted the statement of Nemtsov about the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law and Accountability Act, which the U.S. Congress passed in 2012 and signed into law by President Barack Obama.