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Cognitive processes such as aberrant salience and the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias are implicated in the development of delusions. Self-referential thinking is implicated in this process; however, it is unknown how it may interact with aberrant salience and JTC bias in individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (SSDs). This study examined associations of self-referential thinking with aberrant salience, JTC bias, and delusion severity, and whether self-referential stimuli led to an increase in aberrant salience and JTC bias in SSDs (n = 20) relative to psychiatrically healthy controls (n = 20). To assess aberrant salience and JTC bias, participants were asked to complete both self-referential and neutral versions of the Salience Attribution Test (SAT) and the Beads Task, as well as self-report measures of aberrant salience and JTC bias. Self-referential task condition interacted with clinical group to predict JTC beads task scores, such that participants with SSDs exhibited greater levels of JTC bias than psychiatrically healthy controls during the neutral task condition, when controlling for levels of motivation, cognitive insight, and functioning. Self-referential thinking was significantly associated with aberrant salience, JTC bias, and delusion severity. This experiment examined trait-level relationships between variables, so does not provide information about state-level interrelationships and would benefit from replication using more dynamic methods such as ecological momentary assessment. These findings highlight the interrelationships between self-referential thinking, JTC bias, aberrant salience, and delusion severity, in individuals with SSDs, and support the interactive role of self-referential thinking in predicting JTC bias. • Those with psychosis have greater levels of cognitive biases than controls. • Self-referential stimuli increased biases for only control participants. • Self-referential thinking at baseline is higher in groups with psychosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every day, we are faced with the conflict between the temptation to cheat for financial gains and maintaining a positive image of ourselves as being a “good person.” While it has been proposed that cognitive control is needed to mediate this conflict between reward and our moral self-image, the exact role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty remains elusive. Here we identify this role, by investigating the neural mechanism underlying cheating. We developed a task which allows for inconspicuously measuring spontaneous cheating on a trial-by-trial basis in the MRI scanner. We found that activity in the nucleus accumbens promotes cheating, particularly for individuals who cheat a lot, while a network consisting of posterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, and medial prefrontal cortex promotes honesty, particularly in individuals who are generally honest. Finally, activity in areas associated with cognitive control (anterior cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus) helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. Thus, our results suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual’s moral default. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negative emotions increase self-focused attention, a core feature of depression and anxiety-related disorders. However, the cognitive mechanisms associated with the tendency to self-focus—and, conversely, with the ability to voluntarily disengage attentional resources from the self and direct them towards the external environment—remain poorly understood. Thus, this study aimed to examine whether a specific cognitive control mechanism that directs attention between self-generated thoughts and external information might moderate the relationship between dysphoria and maladaptive self-referential thinking. Results showed that dysphoria increases the frequency of rumination, self-blame, and catastrophising, especially for participants who have more difficulty in switching from self-generated thoughts to information provided by the environment. These results shed new light on the cognitive mechanisms underlying maladaptive self-referential thinking associated with dysphoria. More specifically, this specific cognitive mechanism might play a key role in the maintenance or amplification of a depressed mood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The ability to ponder the future is a hallmark of human imagination. Neuroimaging research so far has focused on episodic prospection, or thinking about hypothetical future personal events. What has received no attention is semantic prospection or contemplating hypothetical future world events. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we show a number of functional dissociations in the brain when comparing future and past thinking across personal and non-personal conceptual domains. In the prefrontal cortex, the processes of information integration and self-referential thinking in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex were differentiated from those pertaining to generative construction along the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex and adjoining regions in the superior frontal gyrus. Dorsal parts of the lateral inferior parietal lobe showed lateralization effects as a function of the divergent or convergent nature of the retrieval process corresponding to whether the accessed information referred to hypothetical or real events. While ventral parts of the bilateral inferior parietal lobe were preferentially engaged during both personal past and personal future thinking, dissociations between the areas involved in personal past versus personal future thinking were found along the medial parietal wall. All in all, these findings provide novel and critical insights into the complex interactions between different processes involved in prospective and retrospective thought as modulated by the type of processed content. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]