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The subtext of this extended commentary for the 2024 Policy Studies Yearbook in Politics & Policy is the crucial role that liberalism and civil rights must play in U.S. foreign policy if America is to be on the right side of history. Our explicit subject is the conflux of elite and populist forces that constantly work against such liberal‐democratic engagement. It is no secret that today's MAGAism ("Make America Great Again") wears many of the same antiliberal stripes as did postwar McCarthyism, which was its direct progenitor. Thanks largely to the center‐right resistance of President Eisenhower, McCarthyism was ultimately held in check domestically. Unfortunately, that was not the case on the side of U.S. foreign policy, where tenacious strains of antiliberalism had a very long shelf life. Thus, McCarthyism ended up having its most durable impact in the developing world, where cozy relations with highly reactionary regimes were considered necessary in the face of communist inroads. At a time when liberalism was hitting its full stride on American soil, U.S. foreign policy was exporting a very different America abroad, and especially in Asia. Even domestically, the waspish virulence of McCarthyism was never eradicated. It simply hibernated, and in 2016, it came back with a vengeance in the even more truculent form of Trumpism. Once again, xenophobic populism is laying claim to U.S. foreign policy and savaging liberal internationalism. The entrenched progressivism that stood its ground against McCarthyism has long since eroded. MAGAism faces no obstacle comparable to the dynamic liberalism of the 1950s or the counterculture of the 1960s. Seen from the perspective of January 6, 2021, the old McCarthyism looks tame by comparison. Related Articles: Craig, Stephen C., and Jason Gainous. 2024. "To Vote or Not to Vote? Fake News, Voter Fraud, and Support for Postponing the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election." Politics & Policy 52(1): 33–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12577. Haar, Roberta N., and Lutz F. Krebs. 2021. "The Failure of Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in the Trump Administration." Politics & Policy 49(2): 446–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12399. Skidmore, Max J. 2023. "Abortion—Reactionary Theocracy Rises in America, While Declining Elsewhere." Politics & Policy 51(3): 437–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12534. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ironic as it may seem, one of the major victims of America's diplomatic retreat from Pakistan has been India. China has filled the void of U.S. disengagement, solidifying its grip on Pakistan and locking India in a two-front vise that it cannot cope with on its own. India has no choice but to reach out for alliances with liberal nations it shunned in its Non-Aligned days. This radical policy shift is capped, however, by the ideological constraints of Modi's BJPism. That is the main reason why India has refused to abort its military and economic ties with Russia. A similar anti-liberalism led Imran Khan, the ex-prime minister of Pakistan, to seek an anti-Western accord with Russia. Conversely, Pakistan's current leadership is trying hard to repair its U.S. relations. Following the lead of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, this extended commentary favors robust U.S. engagement with all of South Asia but qualifies that case by stressing that the wrong kind of engagement would end up serving the cause of Sino-authoritarianism. What is needed is moral realism, which avoids the ethical blight of both Kissingeresque realism and globalist irrealism. Pakistan is ripe for this post-globalist realism because it affords no clean and neat "right" choices yet is far too important to abandon. Such cases compel us to search for lesser evils: the best available bad choices we can locate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once again, the world is polarizing along ideological lines and this time India can neither stand aside nor stand alone. In the face of China’s mounting provocations and patent military superiority, Narendra Modi knows that India has no choice but to seek security through Sino-resistant channels like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), in league with America, Japan, and Australia. It is no accident that India’s most dependable allies are liberal democracies. This puts Modi in a stupendous ideological bind. The Davos globalism he has courted in the past was so economistic that his domestic repression was all but ignored. Now, however, he is playing in a liberal international league where his style of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) autocracy will not be condoned. His fate as well as India’s hinges on how he navigates a post-globalist geopolitics that is presently defined by the moral realism of the Biden Doctrine. Keywords: Foreign policy, Geopolitics, Security, India, United States, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Quad Realism, China, Narendra Modi, Biden Doctrine, BJP autocracy, Davos globalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The benefits of today's Indo-globalization have bypassed those most in need: the nearly 70% of the workforce that remains in agriculture. Only about 1.3 million of the total workforce have a tangible stake in India's vaunted New Economy. While that globalized sector lifts the aggregate economy toward nearly double digit growth, there will be little of China's labor-intensive industrialization to take up the slack as 70 million Indians enter the workforce over the next five years. This is a country with more indigenous billionaires than any except the US, yet one in three of the 1.1 billion population subsists on less than $1 per day. These are not the wages of substantive democracy, or even sustainable plutocracy. Globalized India will sink or swim by how well it negotiates its coming clash between haves and have-nots. Talk of a “Shining India” almost always omits reference to the rising scourge of Naxalism in the derelict countryside. The rural meltdown has reached such a scale that the usual Naxalite question must be reversed. Instead of asking how the movement became so widespread, we should ponder why it is not wider still. There is no doubt that the Other India will fight back against globalization on these terms. The only question is whether this resistance can be brought into the fold of mainstream Indian politics, thereby producing a uniquely democratic Indo-globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the history of conflict between Europeans and Islams. It is reveal that many had saw the targeting of America as geopolitical blowback for US unilaterlism. However, Islamist movements ceased to regard Europe as a mere way station in route to the real target of their native countries and the new generation of Euro Islamists was starting to view Europe itself and the West generally less as a temporary sanctuary than a target in its own right. Moreover, the real war on terrorism must be fought dialogically and will be won or lost in the civil Islamic domain by keeping focus steadfastly on the red zone of uncivil Islamism.

This article critiques the "Beijing Consensus" that Joshua Ramo proposes as the ideal model for the entire developing world. The political dynamics of Sino-globalization have been given too much of a free ride by neoliberals. For investors with the right guanxi, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been a guarantor of profitability in an almost mercantile sense. The fact that the CCP is also an instrument of monumental oppression is not just incidental to this arrangement. The specifically anti-democratic nature of CCP authority is in fact its strongest recommendation, since this power is on loan to transnational corporations (TNCs) for the right price. Not only has the CCP made the "trains run on time," but, more to the point, it has given the TNCs an inside track. They in turn have become de facto lobbyists for Beijing in Washington. The TNC/CCP symbiosis that defines Sino-globalization has resulted in a worst-of-both amalgam that has taken China from one of the lowest income differentials in the world to one of the highest. The unrest this spawns will eventually erode one of the main sources of China's globalist appeal: its presumed political stability. By then, however, Sino-globalization will have migrated to other cheap labor reservoirs. It is the model itself, rather than the PRC, that poses the greatest threat to liberal democratization in coming decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information regarding neoglobalism. This intervention will argue, however, that globalism was not so much killed as transformed by 9/11. There is no easy exit from the vicious cycle of terror whereby Empire generates the enemy it requires, and vice versa. This self-sustaining dialectic may be the most novel feature of neoglobalist foreign relations. Armed globalism had its trial run in the Gulf War but only got its permanent marching orders after 9/11. Despite a litany of denials from Washington, the subsequent war on terrorism is obviously the war on Islamism that Margaret Thatcher and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi prescribed.

Reflects on the wars to fight terrorism. Importance of securitization for the U.S.; Improbability of Osama bin Laden's terrorists group Al Qaeda network; Highlights of a conference on terrorism in April 2000.

Discusses the significance of U.S. foreign policies to Islam and its followers. Role of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence in cultivating fundamentalist leaders like terrorist group Taliban; Contribution of the U.S. to Taliban's rise; Number of inhabitants in Kurdish villages who were killed by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

Focuses on Islamic terrorism as power politics. Reaction of the U.S. on the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the military base Pentagon in the U.S.; Islamic response to steps taken by the U.S. against terrorism; Details of the U.S. directed globalization after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The end of the cold War offered unprecedented opportunities for human rights diplomacy, but was also the triumphant moment of neoliberal globalism. For four decades the realist suppression of idealism had been justified in terms of Cold War exigencies. Now, once again, liberal "basics" were expelled in the name of a specious realism. Less doctrinaire realists, however, are starting to integrate human rights and power politics in accord with Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power." To sacrifice this moral realism on the altar of neoliberalism would be, in soft power terms, to lose the world by conquering it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given its close ties with Confucianism. East Asian exceptionalism could be defined as the inversion of Max Weber's doctrine that Confucian values inhibit rationality and lead to economic stagnation. That revaluation, which has contributed to an inversion of 'Orientalism' as it relates to East Asia, becomes a core premise of what may be called the Singapore model of East Asian development theory. Another premise of that model is the primacy given to economic over political development, i.e., over democracy. In opposition to this reactionary turn, and in the light of current revisionism in Japanese studies, this article follows Kim Dae Jung in positing a 'Korean model' which challenges prevailing assumptions of East Asian exceptionalism. It is argued that Korea's record of democratic development over the last 15 years deserves a more affirmative response than has been allowed by some of the most vocal American Koreanists. This model, moreover, affirms Kim's belief in an organic rather than exogenous explanation of Korea's political development. It is argued that Korea, rather than Japan, offers the best available prototype for Asian political development in its 'post-exceptional phase, and that Korea's emerging political culture -- in striking contrast to Singapore's -- bears witness to the fact that economic development can be consistent with liberal-democratic objectives. In Kim Dae Jung's opposition politics, and now in his presidency, one finds a rare balance of political and economic priorities. In the long run the 'Korean Model' could prove far more important for East Asia than anything the IMF has to offer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epidemiologic data and animal models have demonstrated a correlation between dietary fat composition and colon cancer risk. We have previously found that dietary fat alters cell proliferation in rat colon, which may influence the risk of colon cancer. Growth factors, including insulin-like growth factor (IGF) I and II, regulate the cell cycle in most mammalian tissues. Hence, we measured IGF-I and IGF-II receptor expression in colonocytes from Sprague-Dawley rats fed diets containing either beef tallow (BT) or corn oil (CO) at 12, 30 or 37% of energy for 4 wk. Quantitative reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) using an internal standard was used to examine the relative expression of both IGF-I and II receptor mRNA in three sections of the colon. The IGF-I receptor protein was also measured by Western immunoblot. In the distal colon, IGF-I receptor gene expression and protein increased significantly as the percentage of CO increased. In both proximal and middle colon, an increased percentage of BT resulted in significantly increased IGF-II receptor expression. In the proximal colon, IGF-II receptor expression decreased with increasing CO concentration, whereas in the middle colon, rats fed 37% CO had significantly higher IGF-II receptor expression than rats fed 12 or 30% CO. IGF-II receptor gene expression in proximal colon decreased with increased fat quantity, independently of fat source, whereas in the middle colon, increased fat quantity resulted in increased IGF-II receptor expression. Thus IGF-I and IGF-II receptor mRNA and IGF-I receptor protein level in colon mucosa were significantly altered by dietary fat source and quantity, thereby suggesting a potential influence of dietary fat on the endocrine regulation of colon cell mitogenesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the political limits of glocalization theory. Movement of culture beyond the global/local polarity; Normality of glocalism in cultural studies; Definition of glocalization; Dependency of political fatalism on localist postmodernism.