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In order to tackle democratic backsliding in EU member states, the European Commission proposed a new financial conditionality in May 2018 that would allow the suspension of EU funds in cases of systematic rule of law infringements. This article seeks to evaluate the Commission's proposal in terms of its chances at successfully deterring or redressing such infringements. Drawing on both the literature on EU enlargement and on international sanctions, we identify a list of scope conditions for conditionality in order to systematically evaluate the institutional design and analyze the context of application of the proposed rule of law conditionality on EU funds with regard to its expected effectiveness. We find that the current proposal would indeed improve the speed and likelihood of sanctions compared to existing mechanisms, but lacks in the determinacy of conditions and procedures, thus undermining its perceived legitimacy and chances of success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to better understand the dynamics of international cooperation on democracy promotion with authoritarian regimes, this article looks into the processes and results of negotiations on democracy (promotion) between the European Union (EU) and two of its North African neighbours (Morocco, Tunisia) in the decade leading up to the Arab uprisings. Asking if, how, and to what effect the EU and its Mediterranean partners have negotiated issues related to democracy promotion, it analyses official documents issued on the occasion of their respective association council meetings in 2000-2010. It shows that partners have indeed addressed these issues since the early 2000s, however, without engaging in substantive exchanges. Most of the time, conflicts have been neither directly addressed nor resolved. Where there are traces of actual negotiations leading to an agreement, these are clearly based on a logic of bargaining rather than arguing. These findings challenge the picture of harmony and cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Furthermore, they point to the low quality of these exchanges which reinforces the dilemma of international democracy promotion in cooperation with authoritarian regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in bringing about democratic change in the European Union (EU)'s neighbourhood starts with the EU's limited effectiveness in shaping outcomes of international negotiations according to the ambitious objectives it pursues. This paper argues that this is not primarily a problem of a lack of actorness, however. The EU does have one message and speaks with a single voice but pursues conflicting goals. Rather than the lack of internal cohesiveness, it is the ENP's substantive inconsistency in seeking to promote effective and democratic governance that undermines the EU's external effectiveness. While the ENP conceives of the two objectives as complementary, the democratization of (semi-)authoritarian countries entails the risk of their destabilization at least in the short run. As a result, promoting effective and democratic governance become conflicting objectives. The lower the level of political liberalization and the higher the instability of a country, the more ineffective the EU is in asserting a democratic reform agenda in the ENP Action Plans, clearly favouring stability over change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arab spring has highlighted once more the European Union's failure to bring about democratic change in the Middle East and North Africa through its Mediterranean democracy promotion policy. However, Arab authoritarian countries engage to different degrees in cooperation on democracy promotion, giving the EU more or less influence on domestic institutional change related to political participation, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. A comparison of domestic change and cooperation in Morocco and Tunisia in 2000–2010 shows that the EU has been instrumental in supporting and potentially reinforcing domestic reform initiatives. Yet the EU cannot trigger domestic institutional change in the first place. The degree of political liberalisation determines the fit between the domestic political agenda and external demands for reforms. It reflects different ‘survival strategies’ between political inclusion and exclusion and is therefore a scope condition for rather than the result of cooperation and change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]