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Did the financial and economic crisis (2008/2009) induce a permanent shift to more economic intervention in the advanced democracies? Three relevant theoretical perspectives are considered. First, the crisis could have led all governments to intervene more, irrespective of their partisan composition. Second, voter demand could have shifted towards more intervention due to the crisis, again inducing all governments to expand economic intervention. Third, increasing salience of economic issues could have led to an accentuation of partisan differences in economic policy which should have led to an expansion of economic intervention under left governments only. We present data from a new index of economic intervention, which show that governments increased economic intervention during the immediate crisis but returned to liberalization afterward. Similarly, statistical analyses show that partisan differences disappear during the acute crisis but return thereafter. Hence, the financial and economic crisis did not constitute a game‐changer in economic policymaking in advanced democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Did electoral competition shape the policies of the fourth Merkel government? We answer this question in five steps. First, we theoretically discuss under which conditions electoral competition affects public policies. Only in publicly salient issue areas in which opposition parties advocate credible alternatives and only if policy satisfaction influences voting intention will the government modify its policies. Next, we identify the two most salient issue areas, climate change and the Corona pandemic. Third, opposition parties offered credible alternatives, the Greens (and the Left) in climate policy and the FDP (and the AfD) regarding Corona management. Fourth, governing parties could not be certain to participate in the next government. Furthermore, voting intention for the Christian democrats as leading party of the government was related to policy success, while the Greens (and the Left) and the FDP (and the AfD) could benefit from dissatisfaction with climate change policy and Corona management, respectively. Finally, only regarding climate change did the government respond to electoral pressure by an increase in press releases, while communication about Corona was driven by voters' problem perception. These findings are corroborated by brief case studies of policy-making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special issue first describes the cumbersome process of forming the fourth and final Merkel government. Both coalition partners experienced severe electoral losses in 2017 and were not particularly close to one another programmatically. This made the formation of a new coalition difficult. Next, the to-do-list is discussed. It turns out that, as a response to the Fridays-for-Future protests, voters considered climate change to be the most important problem in 2019, while the Corona pandemic dominated the agenda from early 2020. Interestingly, none of the coalition parties 'owned' either of these issues and this could have made policy-making even more intricate. In the third part, we summarise the policy profile of the fourth Merkel government, based mostly on the contributions to this special issue. It turns out that the policies of the fourth Merkel government mirrored those of its predecessor. In the socio-economic dimension a gentle de-liberalisation continued, while the policies on the social dimension followed a moderately liberal path. In the final section, the plan of the special issue is outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of whether political parties make a systematic difference in terms of public policies is one of the classics of comparative public policy research. However, unstable class cleavages and changing party strategies challenge the assumptions of traditional partisan theory, namely that parties represent a stable group of voters and implement policies according to the preferences of this group. Against this backdrop, several recent studies have called for an "electoral turn" in partisan theory and suggest establishing a party–voter link on the microlevel, depending on the policy area at stake. In this article, we propose a different view on partisan effects. While we do not argue that public opinion is unimportant for parties, we maintain that the electoral turn literature has a tendency to black-box the political actors and their preferences, because they become mere agents of voter preferences. Our argument builds on a growing literature that shows that political actors both at the party member and the elite level do have preferences and that these may or may not be coherent with those of the voters. Hence, the effect of partisan ideology on public policies may also be situated on the level of the parties or policy-makers themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classic partisan theory posits that political parties translate their electorates' preferences into policies. Accordingly, the recent changes in left parties' voter base, from predominantly working-class to middle-class voters, should have resulted in changing policy positions and policy effects of left parties. We test this expectation for economic policies (i.e., subsidies, product market regulation, and privatization) in 16 European countries between 1980 and 2012. We find the expected relationships for subsidies but not for regulation and privatization. This can be explained by the fact that only with regard to subsidies, preferences substantially differ between the working- and the middle-class. Thus, economic policy preferences of voters of left parties diverge less than could be expected. Methodologically, the study suggests that empirically testing the complete causal mechanism of classic partisan theory, assessing voters' preferences and investigating more than one issue area, are promising ways to study partisan effects on public policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses German politics, the third coalition formed by the cabinet of Angela Merkel of the political parties Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU). It also discusses the macroeconomic situation, growing economy, and declination of unemployment and soaring employment.

While numerous indicators have been suggested in the scholarly literature on the determinants of privatization, they have mostly been treated as equivalents without much attention to how closely they are matched. This paper compares five prominent operationalizations of privatization. It finds that correlations between these indicators are worryingly low. Moreover, it shows that results of otherwise identical regressions differ immensely depending on which indicator of privatization is used. As a way forward, seeing the various indicators not as equivalents but as measuring different aspects of the phenomenon under study is suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negativity bias suggests that the attribution of blame to governments, for alleged or actual policy failures, is disproportionately pertinent for their popularity. However, when citizens attribute blame for adverse consequences of a policy, does it make a difference which policy was it, and who was the political agent that adopted the policy? We posit that the level of blame citizens attribute to political agents for policy failures depends on three policy-oriented considerations: (1) the distance between a citizen's ideal policy and the agent's established policy position; (2) the distance between a citizen's ideal policy and the agent's concrete policy choice; and (3) the distance between the agent's established policy position and her concrete policy choice. The inherent relationship between these three policy-oriented considerations renders their integration in one model a theoretical and methodological imperative. The model provides novel observable predictions regarding the conditions under which each of the three policy-oriented factors will produce either pronounced or subtle observable effects on blame attribution. We test the model's predictions in two survey experiments, in Israel and in Germany. The results of both experiments are highly consistent with the model's predictions. These finding offer an important contribution by specifying the ways in which individual-level preferences interact with politicians' policy reputations and policy choices to shape blame attribution. Our model entails unintuitive revisions to several strands of the literature, and in the "Discussion" section we provide tentative support for the applicability of this model to other political judgments beyond blame attribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have advanced democracies experienced a retreat of the interventionist state since 1980? This article provides evidence that in all relevant policy indicators (spending, subsidies, state-owned enterprises, regulation, capital taxation) government intervention has been scaled back across the OECD. An overview of the results of 130 quantitative studies analysing at least one of these indicators is provided. Focusing on five main explanatory variables – globalization, Europeanization, learning and emulation, socio-economic problems, and political parties – only limited agreement in the literature is found. The reasons for this disagreement are discussed. Ways forward are suggested for the theoretical models on which studies are based, how the dependent variable is chosen, the empirical approaches that may be applied, and how quantitative research and comparative case studies may be combined. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper discusses how institutions can be introduced into the Multiple Streams Framework. While the existing literature does not systematically integrate political institutions that structure the decision-making process into the Multiple Streams Framework, the article suggests distinguishing two coupling processes, one for agenda setting and one for decision making. During the latter coupling, the main issue is the adoption of proposals – and formal institutions play an important role here. Political entrepreneurs can ensure the adoption of their bills under conditions of institutional pluralism by conceding concessions, proposing package deals or manipulating the severity or salience of problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article applies a modified Multiple-Streams Approach (MSA) to the German Hartz IV labor market reform, probably the most far-reaching policy project since unification, which many theoretical approaches have substantial difficulties explaining. Empirically, the article provides the first encompassing explanation of the Hartz IV reform by putting together the empirical pieces of the overall puzzle. Theoretically, the article demonstrates that the extension of the MSA by Herweg, Huß, and Zohlnhöfer (HHZ) is fruitful regarding the adaptation of the MSA for decision making and regarding their hypotheses and operational definitions which allow a rigorous empirical analysis and provide the possibility to prove the MSA wrong. In contrast, HHZ's adaptation to parliamentary systems turn out to be less suitable for the case. Moreover, the point at which the political stream is considered to be ready for coupling needs reconsideration. It is argued that it suffices that some key political actors become interested in a proposal; in contrast, the necessary majorities for an adoption of the proposal need not be forthcoming already because these can still be organized during decision-coupling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the forum section on the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) developed by John W. Kingdon argues that the conditions under which policy making takes place today increasingly resemble the assumptions upon which Kingdon built his lens. At the same time, while the framework is extremely successful with regard to citations and has been applied in various contexts that often differ remarkably from those for which the framework was originally developed, a systematic theoretical debate about the Multiple Streams Framework is still lacking. It is the intention to spark such a debate with this forum section. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding party competition as a ‘political market’, we explore its characteristics during the second Merkel government, 2009–13. On the demand side, analysing opinion polls and the Länder election results, we find that the outcome of the next Bundestag election was uncertain. Thus, electoral competition was likely to be intense. On the supply side, opposition parties presented credible alternatives to government policies with regard to social as well as environmental policy. Regarding the Euro crisis, however, a consensus across the established parties existed. Studying three of the most salient policy issues, we identify party competition as a crucial determinant of decision-making. While the debate on minimum wages was substantially shaped by party competition, resulting in ‘anticipatory obedience’, nuclear energy only became affected by electoral considerations after the ‘Fukushima shock’ which resulted in a major policy shift. Regarding the response to the Euro crisis, however, party competition was essentially suspended. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This introduction connects some of the main themes covered in this special issue on Chancellor Merkel's second coalition cabinet, which was formed in October 2009 and ended with the electoral collapse of the FDP in the Bundestag election of September 2013. It starts by setting out an interesting ‘puzzle’: the parties forming the coalition of 2009–2013 (CDU, CSU and FDP) had expressed a strong preference for this coalition in the run-up to the election of 2009. Despite their seeming agreement in many policy areas, the coalition formed in 2009 faced tough negotiations and conflicts between the parties from the beginning. The economic crisis the preceding government faced between 2005 and 2009 and unforeseen events during the course of the CDU/CSU–FDP coalition 2009–2013 (e.g. the Euro crisis and the Fukushima environmental disaster) had altered the policy agenda in important ways and rendered the former ‘Christian–Liberal reform project’ obsolete. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The quantitative strand of social policy research suffers from a triple deficit: analyses of aggregate expenditure dominate, most of the few studies of replacement rates focus on unemployment or sickness benefits while pensions are excluded, and the interdependence between public and private pension plans is often ignored. This article addresses the said deficits, first, by discussing the pension sectors' theoretical peculiarities and by proposing two hypotheses: one on the role played by political parties in implementing public pension retrenchment, and the second on their role in extending private pension plans. Second, the article presents regression results of public pension replacement rate changes in 18 developed democracies. The findings show considerably smaller cuts to pensions than to unemployment or sickness benefits, and striking differences regarding partisan effects between the sectors. Lastly, the article assesses partisan effects on private pension plans, detecting some rather surprising effects. Most noteworthy is the fact that those parties which reduced public pension generosity during the 1990s (i.e. Social Democrats) cannot claim responsibility for compensating these cuts by eliciting higher private engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the debate on welfare politics replacement rates have been hailed as a measure far more appropriate to identify retrenchment than expenditure. However, this contribution demonstrates that there is a considerable dependent variable problem on the entitlement side as well. By means of a comparison between replacement rates for three major programmes from the two most prominent datasets, Scruggs's CWED and Korpi and Palme's SCIP, we show that not only diagnoses on the occurrence and intensity of welfare cutbacks vary considerably, but also the results on the determinants of welfare state change. After tracing some causes of the divergences, we conclude that future research needs to be more programme-specific, more data-conscious and more humble in its claims. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The German grand coalition's track record with regard to managing the financial crisis is mixed. The government has spent enormous amounts of money to prevent a breakdown of the banking system and to cushion the effects of the recession. It was at least partially successful as these programmes indeed prevented collapses of banks as well as bank runs, kept unemployment relatively low and somewhat mitigated the recession. Nonetheless, at least some of the crisis policies lacked coherence, particularly with regard to the bank rescue packages. The reason is that even in the face of a systemic banking crisis and a GDP decline of 5 per cent, programmatic differences between the coalition partners have not disappeared and became manifest in government policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2009 German federal election took place during the deepest recession in German post-war history. It brought to power a coalition of Christian democrats and liberals while the social democrats suffered by far their worst result at a general election since 1949. This paper discusses whether there is a causal relationship between the government's response to the crisis and the election result. While voters basically supported the government's management of the banking crisis they were much more sceptical with regard to the grand coalition's management of the recession. Interestingly, a majority of the voters disapproved of some of the interventionist policies the SPD had suggested and believed that the Christian democrats were the most competent crisis managers. Therefore, the economic crisis may well have helped the bourgeois parties win the election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By employing multiple regression analysis, the article identifies the social, economic and political determinants of overall private education expenditure and private spending on tertiary education in 26 OECD countries, testing hypotheses derived from theories of comparative public policy. We find that overall private education expenditure is higher in federal countries and under Conservative parties in government, while it is lower where voters prefer state-centred solutions, where Catholicism is strong and where a Church tax exists. Analysing private expenses for tertiary education only, these findings reappear with one exception: the size of the student population, which is without substantive effect on general private education expenditure, yields the largest single effect in the tertiary sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents a model of the decision-making process that can help to understand the politics of policy change and stability. The model takes as a starting point veto players. Since these actors are mostly political parties in Western democracies, their preferences can be modelled as policy seeking and vote maximization. Thus, governing parties try to adopt certain policies which differ according to their partisan orientation. The adoption of policies may, however, be impeded by electoral considerations unless the government is confronted with economic problems that put its re-election at risk. In addition, the existence of further veto players can make the adoption of reforms difficult. Policy change comes about if at least one element of the veto player constellation changes or if an external shock occurs. Both of these mechanisms are discussed in more detail, taking a change in the partisan complexion of government and globalization as examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1990s have witnessed unprecedented attempts at privatizing state-owned enterprises in virtually all OECD democracies. This contribution analyzes the extent to which the partisan control of the government can account for the differences in the privatization proceeds raised by EU and OECD countries between 1990 and 2000. It turns out that privatizations are part of a process of economic liberalization in previously highly regulated economies as well as a reaction to the fiscal policy challenges imposed by European integration and the globalization of financial markets. Partisan differences only emerge if economic problems are moderate, while intense economic, particularly fiscal, problems foreclose differing partisan strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to important parts of the literature, blame avoidance opportunities, i.e. the necessity and applicability of blame avoidance strategies, may differ between countries according to the respective institutional set-ups and between governing parties according to their programmatic orientation. In countries with many veto actors, a strategy of 'Institutional Cooperation' between these actors is expected to diffuse blame sufficiently to render other blame avoidance strategies obsolete. In contrast, governments in Westminster-style democracies should resort to the more unilateral strategies of presentation, policy design and timing. At the same time, left-wing parties are expected to have an easier time implementing spending cuts while right-wing parties are less vulnerable when proposing tax increases. Evidence from the politics of budget consolidation in Britain and Germany does not corroborate these hypotheses. Instead, it seems that party competition conditions the effects institutions and the partisan complexion of governments have on the politics of blame avoidance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the impact of the European Employment Strategy on German policies. The Luxembourg Process contains concrete, quantitative objectives as well as relatively heterogeneous proposals that allow rather antithetical national policies. Nevertheless, it marks a specific European path, emphasising state–led activation strategies. Applying clear and verifiable criteria, we analyse the impact of the guidelines, the quantified objectives and the recommendations on German employment policies and find that they selectively influenced German policies, normally catalysing existing policies (‘intensifier effects’), but sometimes also inducing a policy change (‘steering effects’). The impact varies depending on the concreteness of the guidelines and the party composition of the government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Was there a turnaround in economic policy after the change of government in Germany in 1998? And to what extent was it adopted or why did adoption fail? These are the questions this article addresses. Analysing fiscal policy and employment policy between 1998 and 2003, it is impossible to detect a stringent policy concept which the government tried to implement. What is more, there exist significant policy discontinuities over time. This is explained by intra-party conflicts within the Social Democratic Party and by the effects of party competition while the institutional obstacles turned out to be of minor importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intention of this special issue of Social Sciences is to study state fragility and its relationship with conflict and grievances in the post-Cold War Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This article will lay the foundation for such a study by offering a conceptual foundation, data and the identification of the correlative associations that are specific to the MENA region. This article suggests that the relationship between political legitimacy, factionalism of the state, and conflict needs special, MENA-specific emphasis, as this relationship seems more prominently different in the MENA region, compared to the rest of the world. While in the rest of the world, different aspects of state fragility all relate to grievances and conflict dynamics, in the MENA region political factionalism has a disproportionate role in the explanation of conflict grievances and violence. Moreover, the role of oil dependence, and the impact of external intervention requires attention of specialists of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dismantling the Welfare State? is a modern classic in the welfare state literature. Yet although the book is widely known, the 'Piersonian argument' as it is typically referred to today bears limited resemblance to the book's highly nuanced and thought-provoking ideas. This review revisits the book and explores some of the lessons it still holds for the research community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How did electoral competition during the second grand coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel affect policy-making? By examining opinion polls and the outcomes of Länder elections, the article shows that on the demand side party competition was (potentially) intense. On the supply side, it discusses the major opposition parties' policy positions and reviews whether the voters regarded them as credible and competent. Then it assesses the effects of this actor constellation for the two most salient policy areas, the euro crisis and the refugee crisis. It finds that the grand coalition partially revoked its initially liberal migration policy as the AfD gained strength and became a credible alternative for CDU/CSU (as well as SPD) voters. In contrast, euro rescue policy was largely unaffected by party competition because the issue was less salient and the CDU/CSU was regarded as the most credible party in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article suggests theoretical refinements to the multiple streams framework (MSF) that make it applicable to parliamentary systems and the decision-making stage of the policy process. Regarding the former, the important role of political parties in parliamentary democracies is highlighted. Party policy experts are expected to be members of the policy communities in the policy stream and to promote viable policy alternatives in their respective parties, while the party leadership is concerned with adopting policies in the political stream. With regard to the latter, the introduction of a second coupling process to analyse decision making more rigorously is suggested. Moreover, the article provides operational definitions of the framework's key concepts when applied to parliamentary systems and derives a systematic set of falsifiable hypotheses for agenda-setting and decision making in these systems, thus addressing one of the main critiques against the MSF -- namely that no hypotheses can be derived from it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have argued that partisan differences have disappeared since the 1980s because of the ever-increasing economic globalization and the deepening of European integration. Using a new primary data set on public ownership that contains detailed information on privatization in 20 countries between 1980 and 2007, we test these claims empirically in relation to state ownership. We pay special attention to the question of whether changes in the international political economy, notably globalization and different aspects of European integration, condition partisan politics. Our empirical findings suggest that political parties have continued to significantly shape national privatization trajectories in line with the classic partisan hypothesis. While partisan differences are somewhat reduced by the liberalizing and market-building efforts of the European Union, globalization does not condition partisan effects. Moreover, the run-up to the European Monetary Union even seems to have reinforced partisan differences. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]