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This review article explores two recent works on Paul Ricœur, A Companion to Ricoeur's The Symbolism of Evil, edited by Scott Davidson, and Ricœur at the Limits of Philosophy: God, Creation, and Evil by Barnabas Aspray. Both works focus on Ricœur's early works, before the 'hermeneutical turn'. In this review, I show how both works demonstrate Ricœur's applicability to contemporary theological thought, especially concerning the symbols of creation and evil. Ultimately, both works show the depth and complexity of Ricœur's early work and his continued importance for understanding how the symbols of creation, existence, finitude and God are deep and multifaceted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exposure to human evil, referring to malevolent deeds that deliberately inflict suffering or death, can be psychologically traumatic. This study examined self-perceived evil-related threats within the conception of hostile-world scenario (HWS) that signifies one's mental representation of major threats in life. The study explored whether evil-related threats, along with HWS, differentiated Holocaust survivors from comparisons, and how these concepts related to mental health. Participants were Israelis aged 58–93, including 220 Holocaust survivors and 205 non-Holocaust survivors. Participants completed measures of mental health (neuroticism, positive and negative affect, life satisfaction, depressive symptoms) and HWS. Evil-related threats were assessed by a 7-item Evil Scale separated from the HWS Questionnaire. Evil-related threats contained two factors, fear of human violence and interpersonal distrust, and correlated with lower mental health. With age and gender controlled, Holocaust survivors were higher than comparisons on evil-related threats and negative engagement with HWS. Beyond associations of HWS (in its negative and positive engagement modes) with mental health, evil-related threats related to higher depressive symptoms among survivors. Results suggest that early traumatic experiences related to perceived threats in later life. Evil-related threats complemented the HWS in associating with mental health. The findings bear implications in approaching victims of evil and trauma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to identify certain shortcomings in analytic philosophy as practised today. First, it identifies a disconnect between the darker aspects of the human condition and philosophers' inability to engage with them. Second, it locates this inability in a certain logic of detachment, explored by Peter Strawson. Third, it points out problems with Strawson's analysis, which it then tries to overcome, using Constantin Noica's account of the Platonising attitude philosophers are perennially tempted by – one of several ways in which humans try to overcome their fallen condition. This is contrasted with Thomas Nagel's valuable but still deficient discussion of the "cosmic question". This brings us, finally, to a reconsideration of an older tradition in philosophy, which focused more explicitly on human fallenness. Petrarch's Secretum meum is used as an example to show that while the failure of analytic philosophers has deep existential roots, it is not commendable. Philosophers must learn, again, to reflect on the darkness of the human soul – their own darkness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show that the traditional problem of evil can be logically dissolved by a more thorough analysis of what love (Agape, Eros, Philia) and evil actually are. When investigated this analysis reveals that they are manifestations and evaluations of power dynamical relations leading to a conclusion that it would be logically impossible for God to be all-loving and at the same time prevent evil as all-loving constitutes an unlimited, unjudgmental, empowerment and good and evil are simply evaluations or perspectives on that power use. To stop evil God would have to disempower in some way and that would not be Agape and thus logically impossible as Agape is part of the very nature of God. This paper reveals the "form" of good to be empowerment and the "form" of bad/evil to be disempowerment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The classic 'privation theory' of evil defines evil as an absence (or 'privation') of a good that ought to obtain. Despite its historical importance, privation theory is faced with a number of serious difficulties. I outline two of these difficulties and argue that they continue to pose a threat. I then present 'corruption theory', an alternative theory of evil reconstructed from some of Augustine's writings on the subject. I argue that this theory shares the strengths of privation theory, while evading its problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When we learn about a severe moral transgression that has been committed, we are often not only horrified but also puzzled. We are inclined to raise questions such as 'Why did they do this?' or exclaim: 'I cannot understand why anyone would do such a thing!'. This suggests that there is something difficult to understand about severe moral wrongs. In this paper, I offer an explanation of the phenomenon that severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand. I begin by arguing that the relevant sense in which we try but often fail to understand morally bad action is that we try but fail to empathize with the agent at the time of the action. Then, I introduce a distinction between two broad kinds of morally bad action. Finally, I show that each of these kinds of morally bad action gives rise to obstacles to empathizing with the agent at the time of the action. Based on this explanation, I consider whether we should try to overcome this limitation to our understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Spanish process of addressing Euskadi Ta Askatasuna's (ETA) violent past has not followed a single transitional justice model or established a truth commission akin to those in South Africa, Latin America or Eastern and Central Europe. Instead, the case of Spain is marked by diverse legal, political and civic endeavours, sparking distinct discussions and artistic depictions regarding the dialectic between justice, forgiveness and reconciliation when addressing past crimes. By drawing on Hannah Arendt's influential perspective on reconciliation and its critiques (in particular, by Jacques Derrida), this article combines philosophy and film studies to contribute to the interpretation of Icíar Bollaín's recent film, Maixabel (2021). The film explores real-life instances of reconciliatory transformation that were part of the short-lived 'reparatory encounters' between ETA criminals and their victims. Bollaín's realist directorial intent notwithstanding, the significance of the encounters and reparatory justice leading to personal healing and social reconciliation is not self-evident but a matter of debate and legitimately different standpoints and experiences. This article sheds light on the hidden cracks of the cinematic mirror of the reparatory encounters by analysing the directorial intent, Maixabel, and Maixabel Lasa's testimony, the key inspiration for the movie. Bollaín's understanding of her film and the reparatory encounters echoes the Arendtian vision in that it separates reconciliation from forgiveness. In contrast, the film, and the real-life Maixabel Lasa's self-understanding, construct alternative views of reparatory reconciliation that embrace both public and personal acts of forgiveness. This leads to a phenomenologically richer depiction of reconciliation, forgiveness and transitional justice, one that does not conform to the rigid constraints of philosophical prescriptivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the literature on religious fictionalism has emphasized that religious fictionalists employing a theistic fiction cannot just leave evil out of the fiction, and that on the contrary, they face worries that very closely parallel the worries raised by the problem of evil. This article argues that when religious fictionalism is construed most charitably, these worries do not arise. It explores three fictionalist approaches to evil (Excision, Completeness, and Inconsistency), shows that each can serve religious fictionalist ends, and recommends a pluralist stance towards them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious protest, such as the protest that Job expresses, reveals the manners in which believers experience the absurd while hanging on to God. The purpose of this article is to explore the "grammar" of this paradoxical faith stance by bringing Kierkegaard and Camus to bear upon it, and thereby to show the "family resemblance" between Job, Camus's "absurd man," and the Kierkegaardian believer. I begin with a discussion of experiences of the absurd that give rise to religious protest. I then turn to Kierkegaard to explore the manners in which "faith's thought" renders the "experience of the absurd" a religious one, while pushing the believer further into the absurd. I end with a discussion of Job as an absurd rebel in Camus's sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the role of mega size African Pentecostal/charismatic prophets and charismatic figures in the public response to Covid-19. There were responses to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in late 2019, and in Africa, a lot of these were religious. This article examines the intersection between religion and the Covid-19 pandemic, in the context contemporary African charismatic-prophetism. The data is sought mainly from oral and media sources of the various charismatic figures at the center of the discussion. The same religious interpretations that inform the understanding of events in society and human life in Africa were extended to the interpretation, diagnosis, and response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The charismatic power and influence of Pentecostal/charismatic church leaders, such as Emmanuel Makandiwa of Zimbabwe, was evident through the public role that the prophets played as these churches articulated their responses to the pandemic as a public health issue with spiritual implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article begins by noting a discrepancy between systematic-theological discourse of God, which speaks of ideal qualities, and biblical discourse of God, which does not refrain from associating God with evil, and analyzes this in more detail in a first section. The argument then turns to biblical texts and establishes that, especially where hopes rest on Yhwh as the only God, the authors of biblical texts seem to assume that God is also behind evil. Since most of the texts that see evil together with God are fictional narratives, the lessons drawn are pragmatic in the sense that they are warnings against abuse of power (Saul), aggression and attempts at destruction (Noah and Jonah) and insight into the background of evil (evil spirit, Satan, human culpability, omnipotence and uniqueness) rather than systematic considerations of the attributes of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the ways evil was conceptualized in the works of Cornelius Agrippa, the most important German representative of the Renaissance humanist current often labelled as Hermetic Neoplatonism. In a heterodox fashion of blending various Christian and non-Christian concepts developed by Marsilio Ficino, Agrippa attempted to further Christianize some aspects of Hermetic and Neoplatonic theology, cosmology and anthropology. This entailed a new interpretation of pagan deities and demons, which Renaissance Neoplatonists in general sought to disconnect from the exclusive domain of evil. A significant aspect of Agrippa's syncretistic attempt was his interpretation of the origin and locus of evil, which, as I argue, reveals a tense coexistence of the classical Thomist concept of privatio boni and anthropological dualism of possibly Gnostic provenance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the unprecedented events unfolding around the globe over the past four years, psychoanalytic communities near and far have sought to ask and ventured to answer the question: What does psychoanalysis have to offer individuals, and the collective, as a way of seeing and being with the reality of what is? Taking up these questions in such a time as this, feels, perhaps inevitably, unsafe. Sometimes it can feel as if there is a silent and unspoken mandate to ensure safety at all costs when we seek to find a spirit of the depth's response to the spirit of the times. I propose that the work of psychoanalysis is grounded in nothing but the journey through that which is unsafe. This article will take up Ann Ulanov's notion that one's own evil is the hinge door into collective and archetypal evil. To become unhinged means to risk well‐formulated understandings, theories, and modalities about being and becoming for the other and instead to allow the other to penetrate that which is unknown in ourselves, upending our well‐formed theories and pressing us to take up our own lives in new and unpredictable ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most Pentecostals, at least in the global South, believe that Satan and his demonic forces are responsible for much of the carnage and suffering that characterise life on earth. The broader context of the discourse is the challenge theodicy poses to Christian believers: if God is almighty and good, why do believers, just like unbelievers, suffer while living on earth? This paper aims to discuss Pentecostals' response: they blame evil as Satan's strategy to oppose God. They reason that his main goal is to handicap and double-cross creation because God threw him and his followers from heaven following his rebellion against the divine order. Thus, Satan is portrayed as the instigator of the first human couple, tempting them to sin, with all future generations implied by their choice and cursing human beings with a sinful nature at birth. Demonic forces employ human sinful nature to realise their ultimate goal, to separate humankind from the Creator by tempting them to sin while also threatening the rest of creation. This article investigates the Pentecostal theology of demonic forces in explaining the challenges posed by theodicy by comparing it to biblical data, using grammatical-historical exegesis and a comparative literature survey to evaluate their biblical grounding. It concludes that Pentecostals' belief in such forces are justified if the the New Testament narratives are accepted as divine revelation. However, some Pentecostal speculations about demons' origins, scope and reach are not biblically justified and complicates the response to theodicy, such as the origin of evil and its relation to human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accurate knowledge and correct analysis of the thoughts and opinions of Islamic sages are dependent on identifying the contexts and factors of the emergence of thoughts and their effectiveness from the wisdom of their predecessors. Anthropology is one of the wisdom heritages of ancient Iran, whose essence can be seen in the opinions of Muslim sages and their philosophy (Masha philosophy, Ishraq philosophy, and philosophy of Sadra). Therefore, the philosophical analysis of good and evil in the field of anthropology is based on the meaning of good and evil in the wisdom of ancient Iran, which was very important in order to confirm the truth of this statement. In the present study, the authors analyze and apply the philosophical foundations derived from good. There is evil in Iranian wisdom with Islamic wisdom. The result is proof of the existence of common philosophical points in the historical application of Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai ruling bases. Commonalities include the commonality of the concept of good and evil (light and darkness), the existence of human agency and his free will in finding good and evil, and the fact that angels are examples of good and demons are examples of evil. This is complete proof of the historical course of the thought of good and evil in terms of ontology and epistemology from Iranian wisdom to Sad [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jung's view of God as a unity of Christ and Antichrist was rejected by Western theological circles, but a convergence can be found in Chinese Buddhist thought. Both Jungian psychology and Tiantai Buddhism believe that evil is intrinsic to the nature of God/Buddha, which is actually a manifestation of human nature. Only a God/Buddha with a paradoxical and antinomial character could provide a logical explanation for the paradox of the existence of evil and a Supreme Being. And both suggest that for the well-being of the human psyche, people should recognize evil and integrate it into a pursuit of good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the notion of memory in the philosophy of religion. The area of this problematic is defined by Descartes, who, in a thought experiment, postulates an all-powerful, evil demon capable of falsifying human perception. The problem of solipsism raised here also implies doubt about claims based on memory. Descartes' assumptions are taken up constructively by Alvin Plantinga in his attempt to solve problems in the epistemology of religion by raising the following new question: is belief in God rational, and, if so, is it justified? Peter van Inwagen, for his part, uses memory analysis to construct arguments in support of theodicy. In considering these issues, other key topics within the philosophy of religion, such as the afterlife and the existence of the soul, which are closely related to the analysis of personal identity, inevitably arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a response to the problem of evil, the free will defense proposes that evil might exist as a consequence of God's endowing human beings with moral freedom which we have tragically misused. Standard versions of the free will defense assume that (1) our moral freedom began in this earthly existence and (2) what explains our suffering in this world must constitute an abuse rather than a right use of our moral freedom. However, there is another variation of the free will defense that does not share these assumptions. This version of the free will defense appeals to the pre-existence of the human soul. Here I consider a premortalist free will defense according to which each human soul might have rational concourse with God prior to the start of her earthly career and during which she might choose the sort of life she is to live on earth, complete with all of the trials and difficulties necessary to develop a certain kind of desirable character. Given the possibility that such a theory is true, the reach of the free will defense is significantly expanded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Open theism argues that traditional responses to the problem of evil fail to provide comfort amidst suffering because of their notion of metaphysical determinism and over-dependence on Greek philosophy. Open theists argue that the best solution to the problem of evil lies in our understanding of the nature of God’s power, which has been relinquished due to his love, the open nature of creation, and the creatures’ inherent powers. This study argues that the open-theistic notion of divine power is reductionistic because it does not consider coercive power as part of divine power. Further, the open theistic logic-of-love defence propagates a loveless God who respects his covenant with the beloved more than the beloved. Finally, the study argues that the open theists’ notions of divine omniscience and divine power are not viable; they raised many questions and objections and, therefore, created room for despair rather than comfort in adversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of God's silence is an problem that happens to many believers. Many believers think that they have lost their support and doubt their faith to such an extent that when they call upon God with all their being and do not feel any presence of God during their sufferings. It is as if you can no longer live with this God. No theodicy or defense can answer this problem because this issue is an emotional problem that harms the hearts of believers and not just their reason. Marilyn Adams has also taken a new approach to this issue by relying on existential theology. Adams believes that the answer to suffering is only possible depending on belief in God, because everyone leaves us, but God is always by our side, and we should feel God's comforting presence by our side with spiritual care. Adams explains the three stages of overcoming sufferings to solve this problem. These three stages are: 1. Creating a unifying relationship between the two aspects of fear of the terrible evil and intimacy with God. 2. Improving the capacities of meaning making for the person involved in suffering. 3. Rebuilding the relationship of the suffering person with the material world in such a way that he is no longer vulnerable to the sufferings of this world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to decipher distinctive conceptual characteristics attributed to the legendary founder of Ḥasidism, Israel Baʿal Shem Ṭov, as documented by his faithful disciple, Jacob Joseph of Polonnoye (1710–1784). I endeavor to demonstrate how a quantitative analysis of the earliest testimonies of Beshtian teachings can improve our understanding of the interplay between major concepts within these teachings. To achieve this objective, I apply a combination of statistical tools of distant reading with textual analysis of close reading. It will reveal singular characteristics of the reported teachings of the Beshṭ, while distinguishing them from the textual corpus into which they were integrated, Jacob Joseph's writings: Sefer Toldot Yaʿaqov Yosef (1780), Ben Porat Yosef (1781), and Ṣafnat Paʿneaḥ (1782). The results indicate a significant focus on negativity—moral, emotional, and conditional—as well as verbs that offer followers guidance regarding how to overcome these negative aspects of the human experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Book of Job treats of the Problem of Evil. It is divided into two documents: (1) the framework story, that is, the Prologue and the Epilogue (Job 1:1–2:13; 42:7–17); and (2) the speeches by Job, his friends, and God. In the framework story, Job is presented as a just man who serves God in good times and bad (Job 1:21; 2:10). In the speeches, God is accused by Job of 'destroying the hope of man' (Job 14:19). God replies with an ad hominem argument: 'Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?' (Job 38:4). If God argues that it is unfair for humans to judge God, Job argues that it is unfair for God to judge humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) represents a captivating domain within technological advancement, bearing the potential for profound societal transformations. While ANI holds the promise of enhancing various facets of human existence, it concurrently engenders inquiries into its “darker aspects.” This study delves into the challenges associated with ANI’s conceivable manifestation of harm and injustice, a phenomenon devoid of consciousness, intention, or responsibility akin to that of human entities. A pivotal dimension of ANI’s “dark side” pertains to its susceptibility to malevolent utilization. Despite its lack of awareness, ANI serves as a tool for malicious endeavors, encompassing the propagation of disinformation, compromise of security systems, and consequential decision-making. This prompts contemplation on strategies to mitigate these “precise manifestations of malevolence” arising from ANI’s technological progression. Additionally, ANI’s development introduces profound ethical quandaries. Ensuring ANI’s alignment with moral principles while averting scenarios in which it generates decisions conflicting with human morality becomes a pressing concern. This research underscores the imperative for rigorous regulatory frameworks and ethical directives to curtail potential hazards and unscrupulous utilization of ANI. The fundamental objective of this investigation is to advocate for the responsible deployment of ANI in society. A comprehensive understanding of potential risks, complemented by meticulous consideration of ethical dimensions, emerges as an indispensable prerequisite to harmonizing technological advancement with safeguarding societal and individual interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William R. Rowe argues for the low probability of the existence of God given our ignorance of the goods that come from apparently gratuitous evils. After exploring this argument, I present Stephen Wykstra's response, which is known as 'sceptical theism', focusing on the evocation of the so-called 'parent analogy'. According to the parent analogy, God's knowledge, compared to ours, is analogous to the comparison between a parent's knowledge and a one-month-old infant's. After pointing out some difficulties with this analogy, I develop an improved version of sceptical theism. My main point is that the most valuable disinterested love and awe for God can be best developed in a world with two evils: our ignorance about most of the justifying goods and the apparent divine absence to sufferers. Moreover, since disinterested love and awe for God bring numerous benefits to human beings, God has good reasons for creating a world with these two evils. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of theistic philosophers have recently denied that God is subject to moral and rational norms. At the same time, many theists employ epistemological and inductive arguments for the existence of God. I will argue that 'no-norms' theists cannot make use of such arguments: if God is not subject to norms – particularly rational norms – then we can say nothing substantive about what kind of worlds God would be likely to create, and as such, we cannot predict the likelihood of any particular evidence given theism. What is more, I argue that this lack of constraint on God's creative act raises a serious sceptical challenge for no-norms theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his article, 'What's Wrong with Tooley's Argument from Evil?', Calum Miller's goal was to show that the evidential argument from evil that I have advanced is unsound, and in support of that claim, Miller set out three main objections. First, he argued that I had failed to recognize that the actual occurrence of an event can by itself, at least in principle, constitute good evidence that it was not morally wrong for God to allow events of the kind in question. Miller's second objection was then that, in attempting to show that it is unlikely that God exists, I had failed to consider either positive arguments in support of the existence of God or possible theodicies, and thus that I was unjustified in drawing any conclusions concerning the probability that theism is true in the light of the total evidence available. Miller's third and final objection was that one of the approaches to logical probability that I employed – namely, that based upon a structure-description equiprobability principle, rather than a state-description equiprobability principle – was unsound since it has clearly unacceptable implications. In response, I argue that all three of Miller's objections are unsound. The third objection, however, is nevertheless important since it shows that my type of argument from evil cannot be based merely on the evils found in the world. One must also consider good states of affairs, and their relations to bad ones. I show, however, that that deficiency can be addressed in a completely satisfactory manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits one of the most difficult theological issues, namely God's infinite goodness and the presence of pain and suffering in the natural world. We deepen the understanding of this problem by referring to the philosophical notion of the intelligibility of the world. We argue that pain and suffering are present in biological evolution as a "structural necessity" for the development of more complex structures from simpler ones. The struggle for existence works as a necessary condition for the development of a sophisticated order of nature at the expense of an increase in pain and suffering. If this is so, arguments justifying the ways of a good, omniscient, and omnipotent God in a world where evil and suffering are widespread seem to be undercut. Therefore, we argue that the astonishing intelligibility of nature may help to open our understanding of whatever nature may reveal of itself. This notion—analyzed from ontic and epistemic perspectives—seems to be crucial in reflecting the evolving world, not only from the scientific point of view but also from the theological one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19 has increased awareness of the threat viruses can pose and drawn attention to the different areas of suffering one can be affected by. In this article, I use viruses as a case study to explore the current theological approaches to human suffering. I propose that there is a subjective and anthropocentric perspective on suffering that causes difficulties in the debate, but that awareness of this perspective can allow us to see the enigma within the theological discussion of suffering in a fresh way. This perspective will enrich academic as well as pastoral conversations on the topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Gamer’s Dilemma refers to the philosophical challenge of justifying the intuitive difference people seem to see between the moral permissibility of enacting virtual murder and the moral impermissibility of enacting virtual child molestation in video games (Luck Ethics and Information Technology, 1:31, 2009). Recently, Luck in Philosophia, 50:1287–1308, 2022 has argued that the Gamer’s Dilemma is actually an instance of a more general “paradox”, which he calls the “paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly”, and he proposes a graveness resolution to this paradox. In response, we argue for four key claims. First, we accept Luck’s expansion of the Gamer’s Dilemma to be applicable to a wider set of media, but give a novel recasting of this in terms of the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far. Second, we develop a novel criticism of Luck in Philosophia, 50:1287–1308, 2022 graveness resolution to this broader paradox. Third, we argue that the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far helps to expose an implicit moralism in the Gamer’s Dilemma literature when compared to relevant nearby literatures about other forms of media. Fourth, we consider a range of non-moral, cultural and media conventions that plausibly help to dissolve the intuitive moral gap between non-sexual and sexual violence that is central to this paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does not exist. In this paper, I offer a penal colony theodicy that will show how the world as we know it is entirely compatible with God's implementation of such evil prevention requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bethany Sollereder's recent work God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering attempts a novel treatment of the topic of evolutionary theodicy. While her contribution delivers several brilliant insights, its reliance upon the "Only Way" defense, open theism, and kenotic theology leaves it open for critique. After outlining these points, I propose two solutions to supplement her defense—namely Alvin Plantinga's theory of transworld depravity and a primordial fall of the "messengers". With these additions, I conclude that the narratival theodicy that emerges is logically tighter, Christocentric, and therapeutic to the sufferer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of evil is one that has earned much attention in recent decades and is frequently used as a justification for atheism, and increasingly so due to the rise in popularity of secularism and atheism. How is the issue of theodicy considered in Islamic philosophy, and especially in Shīʿa theology? Does this problem arise there at all? The following discussion addresses these questions, examining the basis of the so-called 'problem of evil' through the rationale and multiple perspectives offered by Islamic Shīʿa theology on the issue. First, some verses in the Qurʾān dealing with evil and suffering will be illuminated. After that, some mutakallimūn's views will be presented. Following that, the problem of evil will be investigated from the perspectives of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā. After briefly highlighting the mystical perspective, finally, a practical theological solution according to Shīʿa theology known as badāʾ will be introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German philosopher Franz Brentano develops his personal thinking by harmonising his favourite sources: Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz. However, he also goes beyond them, introducing a determinism foreign to Thomas Aquinas and eliminating divine punishments from the future life, thus departing from the Christian position also held by Leibniz. Aristotle is credited with Brentano’s Leibnizian ideas: his God is the author of the best of all possible worlds and, within a deterministic paradigm, leads all souls to immortal happiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This enquiry aims to reveal and find an answer to some problems concerning the definition of justice the young Leibniz grasps, and which is based on the concept of love. In his effort to handle a definition of justice that makes possible the development of his project of a universal jurisprudence, Leibniz considers the concept of love as the main element of justice. However, in front of this investigation of a purely speculative character, there is the experience, which reveals some undeniable injustices present in the world. Thus, taking for granted the existence of evil and injustices, it seems that all-powerful God does not love all men -as it supposed nevertheless to be the case in conformity with religion. If Leibniz does not state explicitly this consequence which follows from the contrast between his definition of justice and the experience, it is, however, the subheading from which he tries to resolve the problem in his first theodicy: the Confessio Philosophi. Before the problem of predestination, it is the heretical consequence that God does not love all men which pushes Leibniz's reflexion in the Confessio, and which manages his solution to this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In my study, I investigate some questions related to Plato’s discussion of the origins of Evil in the individual’s soul and of the possible solutions to the presence of Evil in it. The lack of the correct equilibrium between the parts of the soul exposes the individual to the moral degeneration; conversely, exclusively the correct equilibrium between the parts of the soul leads the individual to the correct composition between the parts of the soul. In particular, exclusively the development of the rational part of the soul, and its consequent leadership over the other parts, brings the individual to the right formation of the soul. The development of the rational part of the soul will not come about by itself: it needs an appropriate education, which can be reached only after a long and difficult process. The development of the rational part of the soul can be reached only through the disciplines preparing the philosophical education and through the philosophical education itself. The development of the rational part of the soul brings the individual nearer to the dimension of Being, thus opening for the individual a new dimension of experience, of knowledge and of life. At the same time, the philosophical education diminishes the attention of the individual’s soul for the dimension of Becoming. The cultivation and strengthening of the rational part bring about a progressive diminution of the force of the other parts of the soul, in particular, of the appetitive part of the soul. I concentrate my analysis on passages of Plato’s Republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Towards the end of the 20th century, the word "solidarity" became one of the most important and famous words, not only in the sphere of Euro–Atlantic civilization but the word was also readily used in political milieus. In the religious sphere, and especially in the Judeo–Christian tradition, the anthropological, ethical as well as biblical sense of this important concept was emphasized. This sense was recalled in the postulate: Bear one another's burdens. Never one against the other, but always one and the other, one together with the other. In this day and age, solidarity as a source of inter-human hope poses a real challenge and task for us because we are experiencing such great migrations of people who—for a variety of reasons, frequently very painful ones, and among them the devastating ravages of war—leave behind their places of residence and go into exile. In my study, I will try to show how, in the contemporary world of philosophy and socio-political changes, a modern sense of the concept of "solidarity" has been generated. In order to achieve this goal, I will refer to the anthropological and ethical thoughts of two Polish philosophers—Karol Wojtyła and Józef Tischner. It was these two thinkers who introduced us to the contemporary school of solidarity, reminding us that the fulfillment of solidarity still lies ahead of us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In search for understanding the ancient Egyptian beliefs about the afterlife, most modern Egyptologists tend to focus on either the search for heaven and its variety of bliss or the search for hell and its many types of torments, but they have not searched for purgatory. Hence, this paper deals with a hypothesis that sinners and evildoers were purified in the underworld by being punished in areas of torment for some time until they got rid of their sins and mistakes; afterwards, they went to eternal the bliss that was known in ancient Egypt, and which is echoed in the ideas that we find in the Old Testament, Catholic denominations, and Islamic beliefs. Did the ancient Egyptians really believe in purification of the souls of sinners before they departed from the areas of torment to the eternal life of bliss? Did textual sources specify a certain place for the purgatory? Were its concept, conditions for entry, types, and duration clearly defined in the sources? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing inspiration from Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and Thomas Aquinas, and in support of the definition of evil as the privation of being or goodness, this article proposes a complementary definition of evil. It argues that evil can be defined as the non-advancement of being, appetite, or natural inclination toward its proper perfection or completion. First, it explains what this definition entails, elaborates on its implications, and defends its plausibility. Second, it discusses typical objections to the privation account and shows how defining evil relative to appetite can help overcome them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass Kants berühmte Theorie vom „radikalen Bösen", gemäß der es eine natürliche Anlage zum Bösen und zum Guten in allen Menschen gibt, Vorläufer in der mittelalterlichen franziskanischen intellektuellen Tradition hat. Im frühen 13. Jahrhundert entwickelten Mitglieder dieser Tradition, inspiriert von ihrem Gründer Alexander von Hales, eine neue Vorstellung vom freien Willen, gemäß der der Wille in der Lage ist, zwischen gleichermaßen legitimen Optionen des Guten und des Bösen zu wählen. Damit wichen die frühen Franziskaner von der langjährigen Tradition des Augustinus ab, für den der freie Wille nur das Gute wählen kann, da das Böse lediglich eine Mangelerscheinung des Guten ist, die die menschliche Freiheit einschränkt. Gleichzeitig antizipierten sie die kantische Behauptung, dass Freiheit die Fähigkeit beinhaltet, zwischen guten und bösen Maximen zu wählen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I show that: (1) There is a transcendence strain in African Traditional Religion (ATR) and traditional African thought that agrees perfectly with traditional monotheism and legitimizes the question of the relation of God with evil in the world. (2) There is incontrovertible evidence of the conception of God as a limited deity that subverts the categories of omnipotence and omniscience. (3) African philosophers of religion must show how a transcendent or, conversely, a limited God is related to the evil that exists in the world, since the overwhelming stance of ATR is that God is the creator of the world and wields effective power. I substitute the categories of omnipotence and omniscience with the novel categories of power and glory and argue that while a powerful and glorious God is not the author of evil and cannot eliminate evil in the world, such a God can be conceived as working to reduce the evil in the world through the instrumentality of human moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important part of Nietzsche's philosophy is his criticism of morality and especially of the values of good and evil. According to Nietzsche, who sees the history of moral philosophy as the mere justification of these concepts, what really needs to be done is to examine the will behind the effort to justify them. In this sense, Nietzsche sees behind this will the purpose of condemning people to remorse of conscience, making them reasonable, stable, controllable, passive. In the history of moral philosophy, concepts such as the opposition of values, responsibility, thing-in-itself, substantiality, ego, free will, the opposition of instinct, the action-actor distinction and the metaphysics of language have been used for this purpose. In this context, according to Nietzsche, décadence values emerged. The inevitable end of these values is nihilism. In order to overcome nihilism, it is necessary to re-evaluate values and create new values from the perspective of the will to power and Übermensch. This study examines Nietzsche's path in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of evil seems to have been the patent of theism for a long time. However, some philosophers notice that this is not necessarily the case and raise arguments from evil against atheism. In this paper, I follow this insight and raise the evidential argument from evil against naturalism. I argue that some human behaviors that cause evil and suffering contradict the principles of evolution and should not exist in a naturalistic world. Nevertheless, they do exist, and they accordingly disconfirm naturalism. To attain this conclusion, I first establish that psychological mechanisms as evolutionary causes are the ultimate causes of human behaviors if naturalism is true. Then, I argue that cases of rape with murder and suicide have contravened their relevant psychological mechanisms' adaptive functions and should not exist. Therefore, cases of these behaviors make it reasonable to believe that naturalism is not true. Both naturalists and theists now have to raise plausible explanations for various evils in the world. It is possible for theism to outcompete naturalism with respect to evil as a result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reality of evil has always been a great enigma for humanity. Balthasar proposes a Trinitarian and soteriological theology that introduces novel elements into the understanding of evil. In particular, evil finds its condition of possibility in the distance of love within the Trinity. This position, which I have described as audacious, is evaluated in this study from three perspectives: the placement of evil within the Theo-drama, a certain phenomenology of evil/sin, and the examination of what could be a certain "responsibility" of God for the reality of evil. Is it possible to affirm something like this? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that within Kantianism, widespread indifference of the global rich to the suffering of the global poor should be understood as resulting at least partly from vice. Kant had much more to say about vice than is often recognized, and it forms a crucial part of his moral anthropology. Kantians should thus attend to the ways in which vice functions as a practical obstacle to fulfilling duties of beneficence. In vice-fueled indifference, inclinations associated with self-love and self-conceit work their way into our wills, interfering with our moral commitments by impeding our ability to recognize moral requirements and our motivation to act on them. Vice distorts our reasoning in ways that promote self-deception and rationalization about the extent to which we are fulfilling moral demands. Kantian vice also has social dimensions. I argue that widespread indifference exacerbates our individual vices through social norms and practices that legitimize ignoring the needs of others. I conclude by offering some potential remedies to indifference within the Kantian framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the creation of man, who was created as the vicegerent of the earth and at the service of whom all beings were put, is "to serve Allah". Allah Almighty guided man, whom He created with a sense of religion, to fulfill his duty of servitude by giving him reason, sending him prophets and giving books to prophets. As part of their mission, the prophets delivered the religion to the people, com-manded them to serve and obey Allah alone, enjoined what is good and forbade what is evil, and re-minded them that those who believed and obeyed would be rewarded and those who disbelieved and rebelled would face divine punishment. It is also the duty of the believers who are obliged to obey the Prophet and follow his example. It is understood from verse 104 of Surah Al-Imran that this duty is to be fulfilled both by a group of Muslims and by each individual Muslim. Interpretations explain this verse as meaning that the duty of inviting to good, enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong should be performed by a group of Muslims. This article discusses the duty of enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong in the context of this verse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The presented article outlines vectors of transformation of basic values of Good-Truth-Beauty in the network. The epistemological, moral-ethical, and aesthetic aspects are offered, which allows revealing the forms of representation of initial values in the Internet culture. In particular, the planes of the intersection of the axes "good/evil", "truth/lie", and "beautiful/ugly" in social media are presented. The authors are concerned about the assertion of equivalence and blurring of the boundaries between good and evil, which can lead to permissiveness that is covered by anonymity, symbolism, and nominalisation provided by social networks. The article explores the articulation of the problem of evil in the Internet through the use of the heuristic potential of aesthetic experience. An analysis of modern aesthetic forms of the representation of evil in network culture through the prism of such basic values as Goodness-Truth-Beauty is carried out. It is shown how these values are deformed and sometimes turn into their opposite with the help of aesthetic means. It is shown that modern propaganda, which is carried out in social networks, actively uses existential features of perception and experience of truth. In the course of the study, the opinion is substantiated that reflexive judgment allows to attract aesthetic means to the moral understanding of manifestations of evil in the absence of stable standards and moral guidelines in social networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The magical idiom of evil occupies an important position in numerous Christian societies. Cosmological capture refers to a historicized process through which Christian narratives and institutions attempt to integrate evil into dualist and oppositional cosmological schemas. This article begins by addressing the way that biblical stories of defeated magicians contribute to modern dynamics of cosmological capture. It then proceeds to address the role of evil in Cypriot society through narratives and descriptions of everyday rituals and events. As these narratives and rituals show, capture remains incomplete, and as evil extends beyond the limits of dualist categorization, the result is a situation of 'magical disorder': a cosmological arrangement in which evil manifests as an indifferent and inhuman force, which nevertheless conditions everyday experience and social relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]