This paper claims that there is a tradition of pessimistic thought, initiated by Rousseau, which shadows post-Enlightenment political philosophy both of the Continental and Anglo-American varieties. In attempting to reframe the history of political theory so that pessimism becomes one of its major strands, I will not be arguing for paying attention to a series of writers who have been, heretofore, wholly unknown. I shall be arguing, instead, that while many of the pessimists are well-known, the nature of their common project (indeed, the very idea that they have a common project) has been obscured. Since pessimism is understood more as a disposition rather than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting an continuous alternative. What they share then is something more than a sensibility, but less than a doctrine. It might be best to say that they share a problematic ? their thoughts all emerge from the question posed to them by the modern problem of time ? that issues in a certain approach to traditional questions of political theory. This tradition (which could be said to include, among others, Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Weber, Freud, Unamuno, Camus, Adorno, and Cioran) coalesces, I argue, around a series of propostions which are, in their bluntest form, as follows: that time is a burden; that the course of history is in some sense ironic; that freedom and happiness are incompatible; and that human existence is absurd. Finally, there is a divide between those pessimists, like Schopenhauer, who suggest that the only reasonable response to these propositions is a kind of resignation, and those, like Nietzsche, who reject resignation in favor of a more life-affirming ethic of individualism and spontaneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]